

II 




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1 III 




III 











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GEANT 



SOLDIER AND STATESMAN: 



SUCCINCT HISTORY 



MILITARY AND CIVIL CAREER. 



BY EDWARD HOWLAND. 

: u 



" Our chief of men, who through a eload 

Not of war only, but detractions rude, 

Guided by faith and matchless fortitude, 

To peace and truth thy glorious way hast plough'd. 

Yet much remains , 

To conquer still ; Race hath her victories 
No less renown'd than War." 



HARTFORD: 

J. B. BURR & COMPANY. 

1868. 






Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 18G8, by 
J. B. BURR & COMPANY, 
In the Clerk's Office of the United States, for the District of Connecticut 



TO ^ 

IVE. H. 

"WHOSE DAILY LIFE AND 

CONVERSATION 

DEMONSTRATE THE TRUTHS OF THE 

PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM, 

I DEDICATE THIS 

BOOK. 



Truges et agris rettulit uberes, 
Et signa nostro restituit Jovi 
Dercpta Parthorum superbi8 
Postibus, et vacuum duellis 
Janum Quirini clausit, et ordinem 
Rectum evaganti fncna licentise 
Iujecit, amovitque culpas, 
F.i veteres revocavit artes 
Per quas Latinum nomen et Itala? 
Crevere vires. — Horace Car. iv: xv. 



PEEFAOE. 



It is the duty of every American to consider well the part his 
country is called upon to take in the great question of the develop- 
ment of the human race. 

The discovery of this continent at the end of the fifteenth century 
confirmed the new theories of the physical formation of the earth, and 
gave an impetus to the study of physical science, which since that 
day has characterized the tendency of the thought of the civilized 
world. Again, early in the seventeenth century, America by afford- 
ing an asylum for those desiring religious freedom, set an example 
to the world, the influence of which is still at work. Yet again, in 
the eighteenth century, this country, by realizing after an eight years' 
struggle the theory of a democratic form of government, held up 
before the world an example of the benefits of political freedom, 
which has had such an influence, that now in Europe even the most 
despotically inclined ruler claims only a constitutional right to his 
position. 

The divine right of kings has become as great an absurdity as 
the dogma that the earth is flat, or that religious persecution is the 
best means for spreading the reign of the Prince of Peace. 

Thus three times in the three centuries which have elapsed since 
the modern world obtained a knowledge of America, she has in- 
fluenced the thought of the world, and always in the direction of free- 
dom. Nor is her task wholly completed. It remains for her now, in 
the nineteenth century, to continue leading the van of the army of 



j T PREFACE. 

progress towards the realization of freedom in every interest of 
life. The struggle of the civil Avar through which we have just 
passed, has, by the abolition of slavery, secured the basis for the free- 
dom of labor. But the work is not yet wholly done. The contest 
has been transferred from the field of battle to the field of politics. 

As after the struggle of 1776, it was found that the constancy and 
caution of Washington which led us successfully through the war, 
were equally needed in organizing the results of victory, so now 
it will be found that the persistent self-reliance, the singleness of 
purpose, the fertility of resources, the application of common sense to 
action, which characterized General Grant, are the qualities now 
needed to organize in every interest of life the principles of freedom 
which the war vindicated, and which form the basis of our nationality. 

To show his fitness to direct the energies of this country towards 
the farther spread of the democratic idea, is the purpose for which 
this book is written. However imperfect and incomplete it may 
be, its faults may be excused in consideration of its purpose. If 
it can in any way, aid in calling our attention to the noble destiny of 
tin- nation, and to General Grant as an able leader of our exertions 
to attain it, then it will not have been written in vain. 

To those of my personal friends who aided me in its preparation, 
and to those whom I can not thus qualify, but who have also kindly 
assisted me, I would here take the opportunity of returning my 
vrarmesl thanks. 

New York, 18G8. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. page. 
Introductory — The situation, n 

CHAPTER II. 
Grant's early life — West Point, *? 

CHAPTER III. 
The Mexican war— Resigns from the Army— Civil life, 24 

CHAPTER IV. 

Enlists in the Army— Appointed Brigadier General of Volunteers— Takes 
the initiative — The affair at Belmont, 30 

CHAPTER V. 
Fort Henry and Fort Donelson — The commencement of unconditional sur 
render, 38 

CHAPTER VI. 
The capture of Fort Donelson, 50 

CHAPTER VII. 
The effect of these victories — Preparing for the next move, 69 

CHAPTER VIII. 
The battle of Shiloh or Pittsburgh Landing, *73 

CHAPTER IX. 
The siege of Corinth, 90 

CHAPTER X. 

New disposition of the forces— The civil duties of the military power, . 97 

CHAPTER XI. 

The battle of Iuka — The combination of strategy and action, ... . . 107 



Vlll CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XII. PAGE. 

The battle of Corinth, 113 

CHAPTER XIII. 
A broader field of action — Preparing for Vicksburg, 119 

CHAPTER XIV. 
The movement against Vicksburg begun, 12y 

CHAPTER XV. 

The first attempt to capture Vicksburg — How and why it failed, . . . 137 

CHAPTER XVI. 
Reorganization of the army — Getting into position before Vicksburg, . 144 

CHAPTER XVII. 

The final move — The first step in the right direction successful, . . . 152 

CHAPTER XVIII. 
Another attempt — A footing gained — Sherman's feint, 161 

CHAPTER XIX. 

The defences of Vicksburg — A repetition of strategy in action — Mississippi 

eloquence and its effect, *..... 167 

CHAPTER XX. 
The battle of Champion's Hill — Pemberton driven into Vicksburg, . . 178 

CHAPTER XXI. 
Vicksburg invested — The unsuccessful assaults — The regular siege begun, 187 

CHAPTER XXII. 
Vicksburg surrendered— A further display of the unconditional surrender 

policy, 204 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

The results of the surrender of Vicksburg— Preparing for further service — 
The final capture of Jackson, 216 

CHAPTER XXIV. 
capture of Mobile— Visits New Orleans— Meets with a severe 
i i.i -The position of Rosecrans at Chattanooga— Grants' depart- 
ment enlarged, 232 



CONTENTS. IX 

CHAPTER XXV. pagk. 

The condition at Chattanoga — The means taken to improve it — The result 

of a week's work, , 240 

CHAPTER XXVI. 
Burnside's position — Sherman's arrival — The army preparing for actively 

offensive measures — The battle of Chattanooga, 254 

CHAPTER XXVII. 
The relief of Burnside — Longstreet's attack on Knoxville — He is allowed 

to fall back unpursued, 271 

CHAPTER XXVIII. 

Plans for the next campaign — Shermau's expedition — Grant visits St. 

Louis — His speeches there, 278 

CHAPTER XXIX. 

The extra military duties of the department and the means taken to per- 
forin them, 286 

CHAPTER XXX. 
The grade of Lieutenant General revived — Grant selected to fill it — Cor- 
respondence between Grant and Sherman — Visits Washington and re- 
ceives his commission, 293 

CHAPTER XXXI. 
A review of the situation — Headquarters in the field — The new cam- 
paign — The Army of the Potomac crosses the Rapidan, 303 

CHAPTER XXXII. 

The campaign commenced — The battje of the Wilderness, 311 

CHAPTER XXXIII. 

The first of the series of flank movements— The battle of Spotsylvania 

Courthouse, 316 

CHAPTER XXXIV. 

The co-operative movements in the Shenandoah valley, and south of the 

James, 319 

CHAPTER XXXV. 
Another flank movement — The position on the North Anna, 325 

CHAPTER XXXVI. 

The battle of Cold Harbor— The movement to the south side of the James, 330 



X CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XXXVII. page. 

The position before Petersburg — The attempts to capture this city, . . 341 

CHAPTER XXXVIII. 
The mine, aud why it failed, 346 

CHAPTER XXXIX. 
Operations in the Shenandoah valley — Early's advance against Washington, 354 

CHAPTER XL. 

The siege of Petersburg — The active operations of the Army of the 

Potomac during the summer and winter months, 363 

CHAPTER XLI. 
Operations elsewhere in the field — Sherman on his march to the Sea — 

Thomas at Nashville — The attack on Fort Fisher — Sheridan on a raid, 372 

CHAPTER XLII. 
The opening of the last campaign — Petersburg and Richmond evacuated, 384 

CHAPTER XLIII. 
The pursuit — The surrender of Lee — End of the ten day's campaign, . 398 

CHAPTER XLIV. 
The surrender of Johnston — The disbanding of all armed organized op- 

position to the government, 415 

CHAPTER XLV. 

Grant in a new field — nis course as commander of the armies in the mat- 
ter of reconstruction 423 

CHAPTER XL VI. 

t of what has been done during the war— The army returning 
to the pursuits of peace, 427 

CHAPTER XLVII. 
The first year of reconstruction, and Grant's course as head of the military 
ithority— His answer to General Lee's petition for pardon— The tes- 
timonials given him by the people 433 

CHAPTER XLVHI. 
1 I year of reconstruction— The block in the administration of 

Grant's position and action, 445 



CONTENTS. XI 

CHAPTER XLIX. 
The divergence between the President and Congress — Grant's position in 

this contest, 448 

CHAPTER L. 
Personal appearance and characteristics, 461 



APPENDIX. 



PAGE. 

I. The Capture of Fort Donelson — General Grant's Report, . ... 467 

Rebel Reports, 469 

II. Letter from General Sherman concerning the battle of Shiloh or 
Pittsburg Landing, 477 

III. Extracts from the remarks of Hon. E. B. Washburne, of Illinois, 
made in the House of Representatives, May 2d, 1862, 481 

IV. An estimate of the number of men in Pemberton's command during 

and before the siege of Vicksburg, 487 

V. Report of Lieutenant General Grant, 1864-5, 488 

VI. Grant's Report as Secretary of War ad interim and General United 
States Army for 1867, 564 

VH. Correspondence between General Grant and the President concern- 
ing Mr. Stanton's Reinstatement as Secretary of War. 604 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 



1. Portrait of Grant, Frontispiece 

2. The House in wnicn Guant was born — 

From a Drawing by Granville Perkins, . . . To face page 17 

3. The Surrender of Fort Donelson — 

From a Drawing by George G. White, ...."" " 64 

4. Grant and Sherman at TnE battle of Shiloh — 

From a Drawing by Albert Berghaus, ...."" " 78 

5. Grant and his Staff entering Jackson, Mississippi — 

From a Drawing by Albert Berghaus, ...."" " 175 

0. The Surrender of Vicksburg — 

From a Drawing by G. G.White, " " " 206 

7. < ! RANT RECEIVING HIS COMMISSION AS LlEUT. GENERAL 

Prom a Drawing by Albert Berghaus, . ...""" 301 

8. Sheridan's Ride at Winchester — 

li "in a Drawing by Albert Berghaus, . . . . " " " 361 

9. The Surrender of Lee, 409 



• 



GRANT 

AS A SOLDIER AND A STATESMAN. 



CHAPTER I. 

INTRODUCTORY. — THE SITUATION. 

The history of a nation's great men is a history of 
the nation itself, since great men are possible only as 
they are the expression of a nation's great thoughts. 
They are the mouthpieces of their age, and give 
utterance, either in word or deed, to the collective 
spirit of their times. The history, therefore, of the 
growth of humanity is found in the history of the suc- 
cession of great men, who have in turn been the result 
of this growth, and have aided in its development. 
The calmness and moderation of Washington, while 
serving to guide and direct the enthusiasm of the 
youthful nation who accepted him as their head, was an 
indication and a result of these qualities in the people. 
It was a new thing in the history of the world, that a 
nation should rebel in order to maintain a philosophic 
principle. Up to this time revolutions had been 
caused by abuses which had assumed such monstrous 

proportions as to become unbearable ; the people had 

(ii) 



12 Grant as a Soldier 

risen in the desperation of despair ; but the American 
colonies, accustomed through generations to their own 
self-government, rebelled against the assumption of a 
right upon the part of the mother country to impose 
upon them taxation without representation. It was 
not a question of pounds to be paid, but of principles 
to be maintained. It was not a question of money to 
be saved, but of the majesty of self-government. 

It is so also with the great man whose life forms the 
theme of these pages. His comprehensiveness of con- 
ception, his versatility of resource, his promptness of 
execution, are the fitting expression of a nation, which 
in less than a century has developed the railroad, the 
steamboat, and the telegraph as they are to be found 
nowhere else in the world ; whose cities, situated 
where, within the compass of a single life, the wild 
beast roamed the trackless forest unharmed, now 
count their inhabitants by the hundreds of thousands ; 
whose commerce scatters its white sails over every 
navigable sea of the earth's surface ; whose energies 
and conquests have always been devoted to the in- 
crease and spread of industry and peace, of the dignity 
and majesty of productive labor, instead of the hollow 
glory of some ruling monarch ; of a nation whose mis- 
sion is to vindicate the freedom of republicanism, and 
not the constraint of despotism; whose wealth lies not 
in its few royal residences, but in its millions of homes; 
whose glory lies not in the tinsel splendor of a court,, 
but in t^ic well-being of its citizens; whose rule of 
conduct is not based upon the whims and fancies of a 
few, but results from the free development of the 
many. 



and a Statesman. 13 

In honoring the man who in his life and deeds 
makes these qualities manifest, we are therefore hon- 
oring ourselves, and proclaiming to the world the best 
convictions of our national life. 

It will be well, perhaps, before entering immediately 
upon the facts in General Grant's career, to take a 
hasty glance at the condition of affairs which led to the 
crisis that furnished the fit field for the display of his 
great qualities as a military leader and a statesman. 

The founders of our government had intended to 
establish a Republic, and hoped that they had suc- 
ceeded in doing so. Unfortunately, however, they had 
left slavery undisturbed ; and in the course of time, the 
culture of cotton having made this system of labor 
appear profitable, it had grown with the growth of the 
country, and finally threatened to rule it entirely in its 
own interests. It was intrenched behind the conven- 
tions of habit, of prejudice, of the rights of property, 
of the constitution, of respect for law, and the theory 
of state rights. Never in our history did it show so 
bold, and apparently so strong, a front. The press of 
the country, almost without exception, advocated its 
right to exist where it was. The journals which de- 
nied this right were so few in number, and so power- 
less in influence, that they counted for nothing in 
moulding public opinion. The clergy of the country 
were, in the enormous majority, engaged in advocating 
its right to maintain its position, on Bible grounds, as 
well as those of expediency. So strong was public 
opinion in this direction, that even the Republican 
party designed only to stop its extension : they were 
content with this. 



14 Grant as a Soldier 

But a nation grows as surely as the individuals that 
compose it grow. Its sentiments, its feelings, its opin- 
ions are matured by events, as those of the youth be- 
come manly by his increase in years. As men, we 
must morally either advance or retrograde. To remain 
stationary is to stagnate, and stagnation implies putre- 
faction and decay. As the particles composing our 
physical being are in a constant state of change, the 
old and worn-out portions being rejected and replaced 
by new, so is it with our mental condition : the habits 
of thought which once were new, become, in their turn, 
effete and worn out, and must be replaced by new. A 
man might as well hope to be physically well and 
in robust health without an active circulation of the 
blood, as hope to be mentally robust without a cor- 
respondingly active circulation in his thoughts. The 
vivifying streams which the pulsations of the great 
heart of mankind keep constantly in circulation, must 
be allowed to flow freely, and perform their destined 
office of change and renewal, or sickness, decay, and 
death are the result. There is a moral aneurism of 
nations, as there is a physical aneurism for the in- 
dividual. 

Slavery was like a- bandage tied tight about the 
body politic, preventing the free circulation of ideas, 
of thought, of labor. The doctors all stood by, saying 
that the patient must rest quiet ; that it was impossi- 
ble he could be in a better condition ; and had almost 
persuaded him that they were right. The real history 
of the secession conspiracy cannot be yet written. 
The leaders have not yet confessed; and until they 
do, it will always remain a mystery how the South was 



and a Statesman. 15 

precipitated into so foolish, so reckless, and so criminal 
a revolution. But they took the step, and with the 
cannon shots against Fort Sumter, the whole loyal 
population of the North and West rose like a giant 
roused from a drugged sleep. At first we seemed 
almost helpless. Treachery had been actively at work. 
Those whom we had trusted, to whom we had dele- 
gated our affairs, had proved meanly derelict. We 
found our army scattered and in the control of traitors. 
Our navy was dispersed all over fehe world. Our 
finances were disorganized. The public positions of 
trust had been used by their occupants for private 
speculation. The nation and the Executive knew not 
whom to trust. The time had come for the new birth 
of the nation; and the American people seemed as 
helpless as a new-born babe. The strength and en- 
durance of republicanism was put to the extremest 
test, and most nobly and completely has the principle 
of self-government vindicated itself. No greater crisis 
could ever arise in any nation's history, and no nation 
could ever meet it more promptly and fully than we 
have done. 

Of the disasters which at first attended our military 
operations it is needless to say more than a word. 
Bull Run was a providential defeat. If we had been 
victorious then, slavery would have been left undis- 
turbed. It required disaster to awake us thoroughly 
from the apathy with which we had so long regarded 
this system of organized injustice. The attention of 
.the North was for a long time concentrated principally 
upon the operations of the army of the Potomac. It 
was the nearest scene of operations, and we had been 
2 



16 Grant as a Soldier 

too long accustomed to take party and sectional views 
of our interests. The idea of the national unity, of the 
oneness of this nation, of the identity of its interests, 
had hardly yet been practically demonstrated with 
such force as to become a universally received truth. 
The conduct of the war and its results have made this 
truth more impressive and more generally accepted. 
Our first success began at the West, under the direc- 
tion of the hero of these memoirs, who was finally, 
after organizing success with our armies from the Ohio 
to the Gulf, to complete the work with the army of 
the Potomac, and by leading them to the crowning 
victory, redeem the continued course of disaster which 
for years had appeared to be the inevitable lot of 
this noble, courageous, indomitable, persistent body of 
soldiers. 

Let us examine the causes which influenced the 
development of this soldier and statesman, whose in- 
fluence, in turn, upon the future of this country, time 
alone will enable us to fully comprehend. 



and a Statesman. 17 



CHAPTER II. 

GRANT'S EARLY LIFE.— WEST POINT. 

In a small, one-story cottage, still standing in Cler- 
mont Comity, Ohio, on the banks of the river, and 
commanding a view of the stream and the opposite 
shore of the State of Kentucky, on the 27th day of 
April, 1822, a child was born, who is now known to 
the world as Ulysses Simpson Grant. He was at first 
christened Hiram Ulysses ; but on going to West Point, 
his cadet warrant was made out, by accident, in the 
name of Ulysses Sidney, which name he took, and re- 
tained during his education, chansring; it, on his g-rad- 
uation, to Ulysses Simpson, in honor of his mother, 
whose maiden name he thus assumed. 

His father's name is Jesse R Grant, a descendant of 
a Scottish family, two brothers of which emigrated to 
this country in the early part of the eighteenth cen- 
tury, while we were . still colonies of Great Britain. 
One of these brothers settled in New Jersey, and the 
other in Canada. 

Jesse R Grant was a descendant of the settler in 
New Jersey, and was born in Westmoreland County, 
Pennsylvania, in 1794. When eleven years old, his 
father having died, he was apprenticed to a tanner. 
Subsequently, with his mother and the rest of the fam- 



18 Grant as a Soldier 

ily, he removed from Pennsylvania to Kentucky, and 
then to Ohio. This portion of the country was then 
still partially in the possession of the Indians, and in 
an unsettled state, so that, after several changes, he 
finally settled at Point Pleasant, in Clermont County, 
where, in June, 1821, he married Hannah Simpson. 

Hannah Simpson was the daughter of John Simpson, 
and was born in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, 
but removed with her family, in 1818, to Clermont 
County, Ohio. 

Grant's parents were married in June, 1821, and ten 
months after, he was born as their first child. His 
father was an upright, hard-working, energetic, and 
honest man, while his mother was a kind-hearted and 
devoted woman. 

As a boy, Grant was robust, strong, and cool, as he 
has since shown himself; but though many stories 
are now told of his boyhood, which display his sturdi- 
ness, and quickness of resource under difficulties, they 
are hardly of enough importance to be repeated here. 
There is a constant tendency to discover -in a great 
injurs youth the germ of the qualities which in after 
life have made him distinguished ; but almost all such 
discoveries are accessories after the fact. To be child- 
ish in childhood is the best prognostic that the boy* 
will be manly when he reaches man's estate; but in 
Grant's case, the only distinctive quality he appears to 
have manifested as a boy,and which appears distinctive 
in his after career, is a want of ambition. Whatever 
be had to do, he did thoroughly and well, but with- 
out any apparent ulterior design. Fortunately for his 



and a Statesman. 19 

country, this habit appears to have grown with his 
growth and strengthened with his strength. 

His education, like that of most boys whose lot 
places them in such an unsettled condition of society, 
was quite limited. There was too much hard and 
practical work to do, in conquering the soil and wrest- 
ing from it the means of living by labor, to give him 
leisure for the luxuries of learning. He had to help 
his 'father, and so could attend the village school only 
during the winter months. Of these limited advan- 
tages he made, however, the best and fullest use, learn- 
ing thoroughly whatever he did learn, and acquiring — 
what is of the greatest advantage — a habit of applica- 
tion and a desire for further knowledge. 

When a young man he desired to go to West Point. 
It was known that at this national school education 
w r as not only gratuitous, but that the student, during 
his course, was supported well, and also paid regularly 
more than enough for his dress, &c, and that, when he 
graduated and had served his term of enlistment, the 
field was open for him either to remain in the army, 
or else, with the prestige which the graduation gave 
him, to interest himself in the industrial and engineer- 
ing pursuits, which made the demand for competent 
men inexhaustible. The whole country was to be sur- 
veyed and improved ; its roads and bridges were to be 
built ; while the schools, which could prepare men for 
superintending and directing these works, were rarer 
even than now. 

Such an opportunity was too good to be lost with- 
out a trial ; and so application was made successfully 
to the Hon. Thomas L. Hamer, who represented the 



20 Grant as a Soldier 

congressional district in which Grant resided, and who 
gave him the appointment The preliminary exami- 
nation at West Point is quite simple : reading, writing, 
spelling, arithmetic through decimal fractions, are all 
that is required ; and Grant, having passed safely 
through this ordeal, was admitted a cadet on the 1st 
of July, 1839, being then seventeen years old. 

At West Point he was no more distinguished than 
during his boyhood. He went through the whole 
course respectably. From September to June the 
cadets live in barracks, studying, riding, and fencing in 
the riding-school, and drilling in the open air when 
the afternoons are fine. From June to September 
they live in camp, being regularly drilled, and studying 
pyroteclmy and civil engineering. 

In his studies Grant suffered in competition with the 
members of his class, from his want of early prepara- 
tion. The class numbered over one hundred in 1839, 
when appointed, and of these only thirty-nine gradu- 
ated in 1843. In this list Grant stood the twenty-first. 
Among his classmates were William B. Franklin, who 
stood at the head of the class ; Eoswell S. Ripley, who 
fired with increased rapidity upon Fort Sumter, while 
it was on fire and the garrison were attempting to 
extinguish the flames; Rufus Ingalls, subsequently 
the Quartermaster-General of the army of the Poto- 
mac ; Franklin Gardner, the rebel general who sur- 
rendered Port Hudson to Banks, and others. 

Henry Coppee, Esq., who was with Grant at West 
Point for mo years, gives the following account of him 
while there : — 



and a Statesman. 21 

" I remember him as a plain, common-sense, straightforward 
youth ; quiet, rather of the old-head-on-young-shoulders order ; 
shunning notoriety ; quite contented, while others were grumbling ; 
taking to his military duties in a very business-like manner ; not a 
prominent man in the corps, but respected by all, and very popular 
with his friends. His sobriquet of Uncle /Sam was given to him 
there, where every good fellow has a nickname, from these very 
qualities; indeed, he was a very uncle-like sort of a youth. He 
was then and always an excellent horseman, and his picture rises 
before me as I write, in the old, torn coat, obsolescent leather gig- 
top, loose riding pantaloons, with spurs buckled over them, going 
with his clanking sabre to the drill hall. He exhibited but little 
enthusiasm in anything : his best standing was in the mathematical 
branches, and their application to tactics and military engineering. 

" If we again dwell upon the fact that no one, even of his most 
intimate friends, dreamed of a great future for him, it is to add 
that, looking back now, we must confess that the possession of 
many excellent qualities, and the entire absence of all low and 
mean ones, establish a logical sequence from first to last, and illus- 
trate, in a novel manner, the poet's fancy about 

' The baby figures of the giant mass 
Of things to come at large.' " 

On leaving West Point, Grant entered the army as 
brevet Second Lieutenant in the Fourth Infantry, and 
commenced his army life, which we will describe in 
the next chapter, after noticing the fact that the edu- 
cation of West Point, though it was strictly a national 
one, did not, as we see, inculcate such ideas of loyalty 
as prevented those who were indebted to the nation 
for its benefits from turning traitorously upon it in 
its hour of need. 

Nor can this charge be brought against West Point 
alone. It applies with equal force to all the institu- 
tions of learning in the country; and the reason is very 
evident. In none of them has proper attention been 



22 Grant as a Soldier 

paid to the study of our own history, our own institu- 
tions, our own national spirit. The nationality of 
America has had a growth as definite, if not as ex 
tended, as that of any nation of antiquity or of modern 
times. Even its literature — for we have a literature, 
though most of our educated men are unaware of the 
fact — has had a regular growth. 

The democratic idea, which was the culmination of 
the great eighteenth century, and which is destined to 
change all our social relations, as here in this country, 
of all the world, it has substituted a representative 
government for the monarchical system which Europe 
inherited from the barbarism of the feudal ages, — the 
democratic idea leads to the unity of mankind. In 
political economy its culmination is the harmony of 
interests; in industry it leads to the abolition of all 
monopolies, the freedom of labor, the cultivation of the 
productive arts, and their union with science. In gov- 
ernment it leads to peace instead of war; and in modern 
Europe, despite the obstacles in its path, spread by the 
various dynastic interests, we see its effects in a united 
Italy, a united Germany, and in the growing impatience 
of public opinion with the narrowness of national 
prejudices; in social life it leads to the freedom of 
the individual guaranteed by the law, which is the 
expression of the public interest as best understood by 
the community, and as we see, in our own times, has 
changed (lie whole tone of criminal legislation, has 
emancipated class after class from their legal disabilities, 
and proved that the strength, the wealth, the happi- 
■ and the intelligence of a nation are in direct 
proportion to the freedom enjoyed by its population. 



and a Statesman. 23 

Here, in our own country, which in its theory of 
government realizes more fully than any other country 
this democratic idea, we find that the attention of our 
educated youth is turned, during the period they pass 
under the guidance of our "institutions of learning," to 
the study of every other subject but this, which is the 
all-important one. No wonder, then, that when the 
crisis came, many of those who had been educated for 
the nation, at the public expense, turned against it. 
They could quote glibly examples from Greece and 
Rome in their justification, but were wholly unaware 
of the new spirit and tendency of thought which sepa- 
rates the new from the old world, by a gulf wider 
than the ocean, or the ages which roll between us 
and them. 

Had the tone of thought been turned in this direc- 
tion, which is truly national and American, by our 
thinkers and teachers, slavery would have faded from 
the South, despite the adventitious aid it derived from 
the culture of cotton, as it did from the North, by a 
process similar to that which has modified the barba- 
rous brutality of our penal codes; and the war would 
have become impossible for want of a moving cause. 

Let us hope, however, that the lesson it has taught 
us of the power of ideas may not be lost ; and that 
our education may become national and American in 
fact as well as in word, that our youth who enjoy its 
training may become impressed with the majesty and 
solemnity of the position America has to assume in the 
world's history, and be able to lead rightly those who 
look naturally to them for guidance, instead of being 
themselves only fit food for demagogues. 



24' Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER III. 

THE MEXICAN WAR, — RESIGNS EROM THE ARMY. - CIVIL 

LIFE. 

The graduates from West Point are attached to 
regiments, in the order of their merit, as supernu- 
merary officers, to wait in turn for vacancies. Grant, 
according to this custom, was made a brevet Second 
Lieutenant in the Fourth Infantry, and began his ser- 
vice on the 1st of July, 1843. His regiment was then at 
Jefferson Barracks, near St. Louis, Missouri. The next 
summer it was moved to Natchitoches, Louisiana, and 
the next year, 1845, was sent to Corpus Christi, to 
w atch the Mexican army then gathering on the frontier. 
In September of this year he was made a full Second 
Lieutenant in the Seventh Regiment, but made an 
application to the War Department to remain with the 
Fourth, which was granted. 

On the 6th and 7th of May, 1846, he was present 
at the I -allies of Palo Alto and Eesaca, and also took 
pari in the bloody battle of Monterey, September 
10. 

When General Scott commenced his march from 
Writ Cruz to the city of Mexico, a distance of almost 
three hundred miles through the enemy's country, 
Grant's regiment was withdrawn from General Taylor's 
command, to make part of the invading army. He 



and a Statesman. 25 

was at the siege of Vera Cruz in March, and on the 1st 
of April, 1847, was made regimental Quartermaster, 
and held this position during the rest of the war. This 
position is one requiring system, business ability, and 
patience, and in his administration of its duties Grant 
displayed these qualities with the same success that he 
has since shown in his more extended sphere of action. 
Though it is customary for the Quartermaster, since 
he has charge of the regiment's trains of supplies, to 
remain with them during an engagement, it is recorded, 
to Grant's honor, that he always rejoined his regiment 
on such occasions, and shared their fighting. 

At Molino del Key, September 8, 1847, he distin- 
guished himself, and was brevetted First Lieutenant, 
but declined, since he became, owing to the casualties 
of the battle, a full First Lieutenant. At Chapultepec, 
September 13, with a few of his men, he joined a de- 
tachment of the Second Artillery in an attack on the 
enemy's breastworks, and was mentioned in the official 
report as having " acquitted himself most nobly." 

Captain Horace Brooks, of the Second Artillery, in 
his report of the battle of Chapultepec, says, " I suc- 
ceeded, in reaching the fort with a few men. Here 
Lieutenant U. S. Grant and a few more men of the 
Fourth Infantry found me, and by a joint movement, 
after an obstinate resistance, a strong field-work was 
carried, and the enemy's right was completely turned." 

The report of Major Francis Lee, commanding the 
Fourth Infantry, of the battle of Chapultepec, says, 
" At the first barrier the enemy was in strong force, 
which rendered it necessary to advance with caution. 
This was done, and when the head of the battalion was 



2G Grant as a Soldier 

within short musket range of the barrier, Lieutenant 
Grant, Fourth Infantry, and Captain Brooks, Second 
Artillery, with a few men of their respective regiments, 
by a handsome movement to the left, turned the right 
flank of the enemy, and the barrier was carried. . . . 
Second Lieutenant Grant behaved with distinguished 
gallantry on the 13th and 14th." 

The report of Lieutenant Colonel John Garland, com- 
manding the First Brigade, of the battle of Chapulte- 
pec, says, " The rear of the enemy had made a stand 
behind a breastwork, from which they were driven by 
detachments of the Second Artillery, under Captain 
Brooks, and the Fourth Infantry, under Lieutenant 
Grant, supported by other regiments of the division, 
after a short but sharp conflict. ... I recognized 
the command as it came up, mounted a howitzer on 
the top of a convent, which, under the direction of 
Lieutenant Grant, Quartermaster of the Fourth In- 
fantry, and Lieutenant Lendrum, Third Artillery, an- 
noyed the enemy considerably. ... I must not omit 
to call attention to Lieutenant Grant, Fourth Infantry, 
who acquitted himself most nobly upon several occa- 
sion.-, under my own observation." 

In this particular mention of officers for gallantry 
ami good conduct, besides the officers of his own staff, 
Lieutenant Colonel Garland names but one other officer, 
besides Lieutenant Grant, out of his whole brigade. 

General Worth's report, September 16, also speaks 
highly of Lieutenant Grant. 

For I his he received the brevet of Captain, for "gal- 
lanl and meritorious conduct," which was awarded in 
1849, but not confirmed until 1850. 



and a Statesman. 27 

Upon the close of the Mexican war, in 1848, the 
Fourth Infantry was sent first to New York, then to 
the frontier, and Grant served in the command of 
his company first at Detroit, and then at Sackett's 
Harbor. This year he married Miss Dent, the sister 
of one of his classmates at West Point. 

In the autumn of 1851, the discovery of gold in 
California having made the presence of more troops 
necessary on our western frontier, in order to protect 
the crowds of emigrants from the Indians, the Fourth 
Infantry was ordered to Oregon, and one battalion, in 
which brevet Captain Grant was serving, was ordered 
to Fort Dallas, where he saw some service against 
the Indians. 

In 1853, after a two years' absence from his family, 
Grant, having been promoted to a full captaincy, but 
seeing only a slight chance for further promotion during 
the continuance of peace, resigned his commission, and 
in July, 1854, commenced life as a private citizen. 

During the next few years, until the commencement 
of the rebellion, he tried his hand at many various kinds 
of business, but with very indifferent success. He was 
by turns a farmer near St. Louis, a dealer in wool, an 
agent for collecting money, an auctioneer, a house 
agent, and finally, in 1859, entered into partnership 
with his father in a new leather and saddlery business 
in Galena, Illinois. 

Here his probity, industry, and economy achieved a 
certain success; but it is more than probable that he 
would never have distinguished himself in trade. His 
mind is of a kind to grasp the large combinations of 
military science, to put in practice the great economies 



28 Grant as a Soldier 

of a nation's finances, to seize and direct a nation's 
sympathies and feelings, rather than to master all the 
chicaneries of trade, to be interested in the petty details 
of business, and to foresee and take advantage of the 
rise and fall of markets. 

Business, as conducted in the present system of iso- 
lated competition, offers no scope for the exercise of a 
generous and comprehensive mind, and, as a general 
rule, such natures cannot succeed in it. When the 
rare exceptions occur, they have to seek relief in 
philanthropy from the contracting tendency of trade. 
But even this is insufficient, since it is justice, and not 
almsgiving, which should regulate our relations with 
our fellow-men. 

The present era of competitive commerce is repre- 
sented in government by diplomacy, which is the trick- 
ery of trade transported to a higher sphere of action. 
Both of them find their congenial home in Europe, 
where the interests of the people are made subservient 
to those of the rulers. But here, where the government 
is the people, where the democratic idea has become a 
reality in the government, diplomacy is useless, and, as 
far as its votaries are represented by our politicians, 
injurious; and what we want is statesmanship, that is, 
the practice of common sense applied to all our political 
relations. 

The time must come when commerce shall represent 
the same idea; and until then it is no wonder if a 
nut me like Grant's finds itself singularly out of place 
in the petty competitions of trade. It is, therefore, 
to his credit that he made no brilliant success in his 
attempts to dwarf himself; and though nothing can 



and a Statesman. 29 

compensate for the waste of blood and treasure caused 
by the civil war, yet we should rejoice that we finally 
found in our midst a man capable of grasping and 
directing the military energies of the nation, and also, 
as we shall see, capable of treating with a states- 
man's comprehension the political issues which arose 
from the new situation. 



30 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER IV. 

ENLISTS IN THE ARMY. — APPOINTED BRIGADIER GENERAL 
OF VOLUNTEERS. — TAKES THE INITIATIVE. — THE AFEAIR 
AT BELMONT. 

Prompt in his response to the first call of President 
Lincoln for seventy-five thousand men, Grant in April 
aided in raising a company in his own immediate 
neighborhood, and in May went to Springfield, Illinois, 
and tendered his services to Governor Yates, to whom 
he had. been recommended by a member of Congress 
from his state. Use was soon made of his experience 
in organizing the state troops, and he was appointed 
a mustering officer, and by his energy succeeded in 
raising the three months men, and received a com- 
mission as Colonel of the Twenty-first Illinois Volun- 
teers. 

This regiment was at first enlisted for three months, 
but subsequently, from their confidence in him, en- 
listed, one thousand strong, for three years. His first 
care was to drill and discipline his command, which 
soon became known for its order. He took command 
of them at Springfield, Illinois, and soon after marched 
them to Quincy, on the Mississippi, which was supposed 
to be in danger. Thence he was moved to St. Joseph, 
to defend the line of the Hannibal and Hudson Rail- 
way. Here meeting with other regiments, though the 



and a Statesman. 31 

youngest Colonel, he was appointed commander of the 
combined forces ; and thus acting as Brigadier General, 
his headquarters, on the 31st of July, 1861, were at 
Mexico, Missouri. 

In August he received his commission as Brigadier 
General of Volunteers, to date from May 17, being 
the seventeenth in the list of the thirty-four original 
appointments of that date. He was now ordered to 
Cairo, and with two brigades took command of " the 
District of South-east Missouri." This district included 
both banks of the Mississippi, from Cape Girardeau 
to New Madrid, and the whole of Western Kentucky 
on the Ohio River. 

The importance of Cairo as a strategic point is 
evident at a glance. Lying at the confluence of the 
Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, it is the natural base for 
a military movement upon the south, and is of equal 
importance in the line of defence for the extensive 
and rich country lying between the Ohio and Missis- 
sippi Rivers. It is also of great importance for river 
expeditions, for the gathering and transportation of 
supplies, and for the equipment and organization of 
gunboat fleets. The Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, 
flowing parallel northward into the Ohio, include also 
a most important part of Western Kentucky, which 
Grant saw immediately was to become the scene of 
active hostilities. 

The State of Kentucky, as will be remembered, at- 
tempted, in the commencement of the war, to hold the 
ridiculously incomprehensible condition which was called 
* neutral." As, however, the line separating Tennessee, 
which had seceded, from Kentucky, which had not, was 
3 



32 Grant as a Soldier 

simply an imaginary one, the practical results of neu- 
trality were, giving free access to the rebel forces, and 
throwing all possible obstacles in the way of the Union 
armies. Of these advantages the rebels were not slow 
to make a decided use. Seizing first Hickman, then 
Columbus and Bowling Green, fortifying the Tennessee 
at Fort Henry, and the Cumberland at Fort Donelson, 
they established a strong line from the Mississippi to 
the State of Virginia, running through the " neutral " 
State of Kentucky. 

Seeing this, Grant urged frequently upon Fremont, 
his superior in command at St. Louis, the importance 
of taking actively offensive measures, but could never 
get the permission necessary. 

On the 5th of September he informed Fremont by 
telegram that the rebels had invaded Kentucky, and 
that he was "nearly ready for Paducah, should not a 
telegram arrive preventing the movement." Receiving 
no word from Fremont, he left Cairo on the night of 
tin- 5th, and occupied Paducah on the morning of the 
Gth. without meeting any resistance. 

Paducah is a village lying at the mouth of the Ten- 
se River, and forms a valuable military post. Within 
nineteen days he had also taken possession of Smithland, 
situated similarly at the mouth of the Cumberland, and 
by these movements had effectually blockaded both 
tin- 1' rivers, running up into the rebel states, and thus 
prevented any supplies from being forwarded to them 
in this direction; and had also secured two fine bases 
lor further operations, and cleared out the guerrillas', 
who appear upon all occasions to have risen spontane- 
ously throughout the rebel country, and who were now 



and a Statesman. 33 

attempting to blockade the Ohio River below these 
points. 

Placing a garrison sufficiently strong in each of 
these places to hold them, he still retained his head- 
quarters at Cairo. 

At the moment when Grant took possession of Pa- 
ducah, he found secession flags flying in various parts 
of the city, in expectation of the speedy arrival of the 
rebel forces, which were reported as being not many 
miles distant, in a force numbering some thousands. 
Taking immediate possession of the telegraph, the rail- 
road, and the public buildings, Grant issued the fol- 
lowing proclamation to the inhabitants : — 

Paducah, Ky., September 6, 1861. 
To the Citizens of Paducah. — I am come among you, not 
as an enemy, but as your fellow-citizen ; not to maltreat you 
nor annoy you, but to respect and enforce the rights of all loyal 
citizens. An enemy, in rebellion against our common govern- 
ment, has taken possession of, and planted its guns on the soil 
of, Kentucky, and fired upon you. Columbus and Hickman are 
in his hands. He is moving upon your city. I am here to de- 
fend you against this enemy, to assist the authority and sover- 
eignty of your government. 1 have nothing to do with opinions, 
and shall deal only with armed rebellion and its aiders and 
abettors. You can pursue your usual avocations without fear. 
The strong arm of the government is here to protect its friends 
and punish its enemies. Whenever it is manifest that you are 
able to defend yourselves, and maintain the authority of the gov- 
ernment, and protect the rights of loyal citizens, I shall withdraw 
the forces under my command. 

U. S. Grant, Brigadier General commanding. 

This proclamation is of importance as being the first 
of the series of public documents in which Grant has 
shown that in statesmanship he is as reliable as in war. 



34 Grant as a Soldier 

It is the first of the series in which, seizing the salient 
facts of the situation, he applies good common sense to 
them, and arrives at just conclusions. 

On the 14th of October, Major General Polk, of the 
Confederate army, addressed a note, from Columbus, 
Kentucky, to General Grant, proposing an exchange 
of prisoners; to which Grant returned the following 
terse reply : — 

District of South-east Missouri, ) 
Headquarters, Cairo, October 14, 1861. ) 

General: Tours of this date is just received. In regard to 
an exchange of prisoners, as proposed, I can of my own accord- 
ance make none. I recognize no " Southern Confederacy " my- 
self, but will communicate with higher authorities for their views. 
Should I not be sustained, I will find means of communicating 
with you. 

Respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Brigadier General commanding. 
To Major General Polk, Columbus, Ky. 

The time was now approaching when General Grant 
should show his powers in active operations. Having 
found by an expedition, which had returned success- 
ful, that the Confederates were concentrating at Bel- 
mont, Missouri, while on the opposite Kentucky side 
they had fortified their position at Columbus, so as to 
protect the camp at Belmont, and also blockade the 
Mississippi River, General Grant, at the head of two 
brigades, commanded respectively by himself and Gen- 
eral McClerriand, left Cairo on the 6th of November, 
1861, for this point. 

On the morning of the 7th the brigades landed, 
formed in Hue of battle, and immediately attacked the 
rebel works, where the enemy was in force under the 



and a Statesman. 35 

command of General Cheatham. Having driven them 
out, the camp was destroyed, and then our forces fell 
back before the superior number of the enemy, who 
had been reenforced from Columbus. 

The following description of this action, from a pri- 
vate letter from General Grant to his father, written 
on the night of the 8th, will give the best idea of the 
object and result of the expedition : — 

" Day before yesterday I left Cairo with about three thousand 
men in five steamers, convoyed by two gunboats, and proceeded 
down the river to within about twelve miles of Columbus. The 
next morning the boats were dropped down just out of range of 
the enemy's batteries, and the troops debarked. During this op- 
eration our gunboats exercised the rebels by throwing shells into 
their camps and batteries. When all ready, we proceeded about 
one mile towards Belmont, opposite Columbus, when I formed the 
troops into line, and ordered two companies from each regiment to 
deploy as skirmishers, and push on through the woods, and dis- 
cover the position of the enemy. They had gone but a little 
way when they were fired upon, and the ball may be said to have 
fairly opened. 

"The whole command, with the exception of a small reserve, 
was then deployed in like manner and ordered forward. The 
order was obeyed with great alacrity, the men all showing great 
courage. I can say, with great gratification, that every Colonel, 
without a single exception, set an example to their commands 
that inspired a confidence that will always insure victory when 
there is the slightest possibility of gaining one. I feel truly proud 
to command such men. 

" From here we fought our way from tree to tree through the 
woods to Belmont, about two and a half miles, the enemy contest- 
ing every foot of ground. Here the enemy had strengthened their 
position by felling the trees for two or three hundred yards and 
sharpening their limbs, making a sort of abatis. Our men charged 
through, making the victory complete, giving us possession of their 
camp and garrison equipage, artillery, and everything else. 



36 Grant as a Soldier 

" We got a great many prisoners. The majority, however, suc- 
ceeded in getting aboard their steamers and pushing across the 
river. We burned everything possible, and started back, having 
accomplished all that we went for, and even more. Belmont is 
entirely covered by the batteries from Columbus, and is worth 
nothing as a military position — cannot be held without Columbus. 

" The object of the expedition was to prevent the enemy from 
sending a force into Missouri to cut off troops I had sent there 
for a special purpose, and to prevent reenforcing Price. 

"Besides being well foi'tified at Columbus, their number far 
exceeded ours, and it would have been folly to have attacked 
them. We found the Confederates well armed and brave. On 
our return, stragglers, that had been left in our rear (now front), 
fired into us, and more recrossed the river and gave us battle 
for a full mile, and afterwards at the boats when we were em- 
barking. 

" There was no hasty retreating or running away. Taking into 
account the object of the expedition, the victory was complete. 
It has given us confidence in the officers and men of this com- 
mand, that will enable us to lead them in any future engage- 
ment without fear of the result. General McClernand (who, by 
the way, acted with great coolness and courage throughout, and 
proved that he is a soldier as well as a statesman) and myself, 
each had our horses shot under us. Most of the field-officers 
met with the same loss, besides nearly one third of them being 
themselves killed or wounded. As near as I can ascertain, our 
loss was about two hundred and fifty killed, wounded, and 
missing." 

In his official report, General Grant gives great 
credit, by name, to the officers who were with him on 
this occasion, and shows — as he has shown through 
liis whole military career — that he has none of the 
small fear and jealousy of his fellow-officers which so 
often characterize military men, in common with their 
fellows in every other pursuit in life. Conscious of his 
own merit, he has no need to prop up his own reputa- 



and a Statesman. 37 

tion by the detraction or neglect of the services and 
merits of others. This quality will become more bril- 
liantly apparent as his sphere of action enlarges. 

Although, in comparison with the subsequent mili- 
tary operations in which Grant took the lead, this 
affair at Belmont is insignificant, yet it was, in its 
place, of considerable importance, and deserves espe- 
cial notice from the following considerations : It was, 
first, the commencement of Grant's active career. 
While the Fabian policy of waiting was that pursued 
by most of our generals in the field, this was an of- 
fensive move. The enemy was outwitted, his camp 
burned, and a successful retreat was made, when re- 
enforcements enabled the enemy to outnumber us, 
and the whole affair was conducted in a soldier-like 
manner. 

It was also a trial for our new western troops, and 
their behavior was such that, while it established their 
own confidence in themselves, it gave an earnest to 
their commanders of what could be expected from 
them in the future, and thus established a sympathy 
between the officers and the men. 

Again, the objects of the expedition were fully ac- 
complished, and even more, as Grant himself says. 

It also was the commencement of the train of causes 
which led to the subjugation of Forts Henry and Don- 
elson, an account of which will form the subject of the 
next chapter. 



38 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER V. 

FORT HENRY AND FORT DONELSON. — THE COMMENCEMENT 
OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. 

The proportions the war was destined to assume 
now began to be more apparent, and the importance 
of the " District of Cairo " to be more evident. On the 
12th of November, 1861, General Henry W. Halleck, 
of the regular army, was sent to take command of the 
"Department of Missouri." This department included 
the States of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illi- 
nois, Arkansas, and that portion of Kentucky west 
of the Cumberland River. General Halleck at once 
divided this large territory into districts, and of these 
the " District of Cairo " was the most important. On 
the 20th of December, 1861, the bounds of this district 
were; extended, so that it included all the southern part 
of Illinois, all that part of Kentucky west of the Cum- 
berland, and the southern counties of Missouri south of 
Cape Girardeau; and General Grant was appointed to 
command it, and assumed the position on the 21st of 
December, 1861, in an order dated from Cairo as his 
headquarters, and ascribing the positions of the forces 
under his command. 

Having organized his forces so as to have them well 
in hand, ready lor mutual support, and at the same time 



and a Statesman. 39 

60 disposed as to deceive the enemy concerning his 
strength, on the 10th of January Grant sent General 
McClernand, with a force of five thousand Illinois Vol- 
unteers, to penetrate into the interior of Kentucky in 
the vicinity of Columbus, and towards Mayfield and 
Camp Beauregard. On the 14th two entire divisions, 
under Generals Payne and C. F. Smith, were sent to 
act in concert with him. 

General Payne moved from Bird's Point, with a col- 
umn from Cairo, and General Smith with a column 
from Smithland, at the mouth of the Cumberland 
Grant himself accompanied the column from Cairo. 
The three columns combined made a force of nineteen 
regiments of infantry, four regiments of volunteer 
cavalry, two companies of regular cavalry, and seven 
batteries of artillery. 

McClernand penetrated to within a mile of the de- 
fences of Columbus, and on the 20th was recalled, the 
objects of the expedition having been accomplished in 
gaining an accurate knowledge of the roads, and the 
topography of the country, which could serve in oper- 
ating directly against Columbus. 

This city is situated on the Mississippi, in the west 
of Kentucky, about twenty miles below the mouth of 
the Ohio, on bluffs two hundred feet high, which were 
strongly fortified with heavy batteries, sweeping the 
Mississippi above and below. The land defences of the 
city were being daily strengthened, and the design was, 
evidently, as the southern press stated, to make this 
position the Gibraltar of America, which should com- 
mand the Mississippi until all nations should acknowl- 
edge the independence of the Confederacy. 



40 Grant as a Soldier 

From this point east, covering Nashville, the Confed- 
eral <\s had, in August, 1861, strongly fortified Bowling 
Green, a small place on the Big Barren River, but with 
natural advantages of defence, and of great strategical 
importance, since it was on the line of the Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad. The Big Barren River is at 
times navigable for small vessels from Louisville, by 
the Ohio and Green Rivers. The river winds sharply 
through steep hills in the vicinity of Bowling Green, 
and all these points were covered with fortifications, 

In this line of defences the Tennessee and Cumber- 
land Rivers, flowing north into the Ohio, and almost 
parallel, were very important. The Tennessee is nav- 
igable for steamboats, at high water, up to Florence, 
at the port of Muscle Shoals; and the Cumberland, on 
the right bank of which Nashville is situated, is nav- 
igable, at high water, up to this city, nearly two hun- 
dred miles from its mouth, for large steamboats, and 
nearly three hundred miles farther for small steam- 
boats. 

It was, of course, a prime necessity for the Con- 
federacy to close these streams against the passage of 
the Union gunboats. If they were left open, the Union 
army would have easy access to almost the heart of the 
Confederacy. For this purpose, therefore, they had 
erected two strong works, which they boastfully pro- 
claimed were quite sufficient to secure their ends. 
The one on the eastern bank of the Tennessee was 
called Fort Henry. It mounted seventeen guns, and 
had accommodations for fifteen thousand men. The 
other, on the west bank of the Cumberland, was called 
Fori Donelson, and mounted about forty guns. The 



and a Statesman. 41 

distance between these two forts was twelve miles, and 
they were connected by a good road and a telegraph. 
These forts served also to guard the railroad from 
Memphis to Nashville and Bowling Green, and were 
thought to be one of the strongest points in the line of 
defence running from the Mississippi at Belmont and 
Columbus, through Southern Kentucky and Northern 
Tennessee, to Cumberland Gap, and thence, by East 
Tennessee and South-western Virginia, to the positions 
around and beyond Richmond. Of such importance 
did the Confederacy rightly consider these points in 
this line, that all the troops which could be spared had 
been forwarded for their defence. 

The problem before the government was, how to 
break through this line, and take the measures neces- 
sary for meeting and overcoming greater difficulties, 
such as the clearing of the Mississippi, the advance 
from Chattanooga, and the final suppression of the re- 
bellion by sweeping from the face of the country all 
armed resistance in its favor. 

Whether there was any one man in the country, at 
this time, who could look clearly so far in the future, 
and who had formed his plans for meeting and over- 
coming all these difficulties, is more than questionable. 
It is too much to expect that any one could do this. It 
is only as difficulties arise that they can be met, and 
among those in the country who displayed a versatility 
of resource, a comprehensiveness of view, which led 
always to attempting the most important thing first, 
and a far-reaching foresight of what the result of action 
would be, General Grant, as we shall see from his 
action here, and during the rest of his career, must 



42 Grant as a Soldier 

be esteemed as holding one of the foremost, if not the 
foremost place. 

It is impossible to follow his history without being 
struck with this, and without being also impressed 
with the manner in which he himself was educated by 
the deeds in which he acted so important a part ; with 
each success in overcoming the difficulties then be- 
fore him, the circle of his vision seems to have en- 
larged, his comprehension of the difficulties in his 
way, and of his means for overcoming them, to become 
clearer, and he goes on from one action to another, 
making each an aid in successfully terminating the 
next, until the final and absolute overthrow of the 
rebellion is attained. War thus conducted displays 
genius, and the genius for foresight and combination 
which makes statesmen as well as warriors. 

During the autumn and early winter a fleet of gun- 
boats had been prepared at Cairo, St. Louis, and other 
river towns, under the superintendence of Commodore 
A. H. Foote ; and many of these were now ready to 
cooperate with the army in its operations. In order 
to obtain sailors to man these gunboats, General Grant 
issued the following important order : — 

Headquarters District of Cairo, ? 
Cairo, January 20, 1862. £ 

ClRCULA 

Commanders of regiments will report to these headquarters, 
without delay, the number of river and seafaring men of their 
respective commands who are willing to be transferred from the 
military to the gunboat service. Seeing the importance of fitting 
out our gunboats :is speedily as possible, it is hoped there will be 
no delay or objections raised by company or regimental com- 
manders in responding to this call. Men thus volunteering will 



and a Statesman. 43 

be discharged at the end of one year, or at the end of the war, 
should it terminate sooner. 
By order. 

IT. S. Gkant, Brigadier General commanding. 

This call was promptly responded to. and the success 
which attended the operations of this branch of the 
service rendered it, for a time, very popular. 

In accordance with orders from General Grant, 
General Smith, who was in command of one of the 
reconnoitring columns whose operations we have 
detailed, had, on his return, struck the Tennessee 
River about twenty miles below Fort Henry, and there 
having met Commander Phelps, who was patrolling 
that river in a gunboat, resolved, after a conference 
with this energetic officer, to run up in the gunboat, 
and survey Fort Henry himself. Having steamed up 
sufficiently near to draw the enemy's fire, and form 
an accurate idea of the strength of the place, General 
Smith, on his return to headquarters, reported to Gen- 
eral Grant that he was convinced Fort Henry might 
be easily taken by three or four of the iron-clads, act- 
ing in conjunction with a land attacking force, if the 
attempt was made within a short time. 

This report having been forwarded to General Hal- 
leck about the 15th of January, and no response having 
been received, on the 28th General Grant and Com- 
modore Foote sent despatches, asking permission to 
attack Fort Henry. The next day Grant wrote an 
urgent letter to Halleck, requesting him to grant per- 
mission for the attack, and setting forth the feasibility 
of the plan, and the importance of putting it promptly 
in execution. On the afternoon of the 30th, despatches 



44 Grant as a Soldier 

came to hand from Ilalleck, directing Grant to prepare 
immediately for taking and holding Fort Henry, and 
promising full instructions by messenger. Whether 
this plan of action was designed originally by Halleck 
or not, it certainly was conceived by Grant independ- 
ently, and suggested to his superior officer, in entire 
ignorance as to what were the plans he had formed. 

The preparations having been all made, on Monday, 
February 2, the expedition sailed from Cairo, its route 
being up the Ohio to Paducah, and thence up the Ten- 
nessee. The armament of Fort Henry consisted of 
one sixty-two pounder, one ten-inch columbiad, twelve 
thirty-two pounders, two forty-two pounders, and one 
twelve pounder. Twelve of these guns bore upon the 
river. Above and below the fort were creeks, defended 
by rifle-pits and abatis of timber, and around it was a 
swamp, with a sheet of water in the rear. The land 
approach was difficult, while on the other side of the 
river was an unfinished work, which was intended to 
assist the fort in stopping the navigation of the river. 
The defence of Fort Henry had been intrusted to Lloyd 
Tilghman, a Brigadier General in the Confederate ser- 
vice, of a Maryland family, which had been distinguished 
in the Revolution of 1776. He was a graduate of 
West Point, had served in the Mexican war, and was 
ii nally killed at Baker's Creek, near Vicksburg. The 
force under his command was over three thousand 
men, and the importance of the position intrusted to 
him had been impressed upon him in the orders 
appointing him to the command. 

The fleet under Commodore Foote consisted of the 
iron-clads Cincinnati, Essex, Carondelet, and St, Louis, 



and a Statesman. 45 

and the wooden boats Lexington, Tyler, and Cones- 
toga. The Cincinnati was the flag-ship. At daylight 
on Tuesday. February 3, the fleet were three or four 
miles below Fort Henry. It was necessary they should 
proceed slowly, since information received from per- 
sons on the banks led them to drag for submerged 
torpedoes, several of which were secured, but so im- 
perfectly constructed as to be harmless. At half past 
twelve, the Cincinnati, as she passed the head of 
Panther Island, within a mile of the fort, fired the 
first gun. 

In the mean time the cooperating land army had 
been delayed by the bad condition of the roads, and 
the combined attack had been arranged for the 6th, at 
which time the army would have been in a position to 
cooperate. The following disposition had been made 
by Grant of his forces. He had moved to the com- 
bined attack with the divisions of McClernand and C. 
F. Smith thus disposed: McClernand, with the First 
Division, landing at Marbury's, three miles below, was 
to move in rear of the fort, to occupy the road leading 
to Dover and Fort Donelson, — thus to cut off the re- 
treat of the garrison and prevent reinforcements from 
coming in, and also to be " in readiness to charge and 
take Fort Henry by storm promptly on receipt of 
orders." 

Two brigades of Smith's (Second) Division, landing 
on the west bank, were to reconnoitre and occupy the 
unfinished work, Fort Heiman, and the surrounding 
eminences, and bring their artillery to bear on Fort 
Henry. The Third Brigade of Smith was to march up 
the east bank in the track of McClernand, and either 



46 Grant as a Soldier 

to support him or form a special column of attack on 
the fort, as circumstances might prompt. 

Had the fort made anything like the resistance which 
had been anticipated, there would have been an oppor- 
tunity for the army to cooperate with the fleet, and 
the victory would have dated from the 6th of February, 
instead of from the 3d. The gunboats came into action 
in the following order, from right to left, after passing 
Panther Island by the western channel, and extending 
their line diagonally across the river : First, the iron- 
clads Essex, Caronclelet, Cincinnati, and St. Louis ; then, 
in a second line, just above Panther Island, the wooden 
boats Lexington, Conestoga, and Tyler. The firing 
from the boats was at once responded to by the fort, 
and a terrific cannonade commenced. The practice on 
both sides was excellent. The rifled gun in the fort 
soon exploded, killing three men, and wounding many 
others; the flagstaff was shot away; seven of the guns 
arc soon dismantled and rendered useless; the garrison 
becomes discouraged ; the three thousand men en- 
camped outside become panic-stricken, demoralized, 
and ilee, hardly waiting Tilghman's orders to save them- 
selves. Some of them, fearing the approach of McCler- 
nand's column, fled by the upper Dover road, while 
others, taking forcible possession of a small steamer 
lying at the mouth of the creek above the fort, steamed 
up the river to a place of safety. Tilghman, the com- 
mander, is thus left, with about eighty or ninety artil- 
lerists, to surrender the fort, which he saw was his only 
course, since, having now but four guns bearing on the 
river fit for service, and " only fifty privates, and twenty 
sick," having done a private's duty himself, ' ; covered 



and a Statesman. 47 

with smoke, and personally pointing the guns," a fur- 
ther resistance was evidently as impossible as useless. 
He therefore struck the flag, hung out a white ensign, 
and surrendered at five minutes before two, the action 
having lasted one hour and a quarter. 

The flag-ship, Cincinnati, had received thirty-one 
shots; the Essex, sixteen; the St. Louis, seven; the 
Carondelet, six. The iron sides of those vessels in the 
front rank had shed most of the shots; but one had 
penetrated the boiler of the Essex, and caused the 
wounding and scalding of twenty-nine officers and men, 
among whom was the commander, W. D. Porter. 

Within an hour after the surrender, the supporting 
army came upon the scene, delighted at the speedy 
success of the attack, but disappointed, since it had 
deprived them of sharing in it. Commodore Foote 
turned over to General Grant the captured fort, with 
its munitions and prisoners ; and the next step was 
in order. 

Grant's brief report to Halleck's staff-officer, written 
the same day from Fort Henry, is as follows : — 

Captain: Enclosed I send you my order for the attack upon 
Fort Henry. Owing to despatches received from Major-General 
Halleck, and corroborating information here, to the effect that the 
enemy were rapidly reenforcing, I thought it imperatively necessary 
that the fort should be carried to-day. My forces were not up at 
ten o'clock last night, when my order was written ; therefore I did 
not deem it practicable to set an earlier hour than eleven o'clock 
to-day to commence the investment. The gunboats started up at 
the same hour to commence the attack, and engaged the enemy 
at not over six hundred yards. In little over one hour all the 
batteries were silenced, and the fort surrendered at discretion to 
Flag-officer Foote, giving us all their guns, camp and garrison 
4 



48 Grant as a Soldier 

equipage, &c. The prisoners taken are General Tilghrnan and staff, 
Captain Taylor and company, and the sick. The garrison, I think, 
must have commenced their retreat last night, or at an early hour 
this morning. 

Had I not felt it an imperative necessity to attack Fort Henry 
to-day, I should have made the investment complete, and delayed 
until to-morrow, so as to secure the garrison. I do not now be- 
lieve, however, the residt would have been any more satisfactory. 

The gunboats have proven themselves well able to resist a 
severe cannonading. All the iron-clad boats received more or less 
shots, — the flag-ship some twenty-eight, — without any serious 
damage to any, except the Essex. This vessel received one shot 
in her boiler that disabled her, killing and wounding some thirty- 
two men, Captain Porter among the wounded. 
I remain your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Brigadier General. 

This brilliant victory carried dismay to the heart of 
the Confederate government ; and though they then, 
when it was too late, found that the site of the fort was 
badly chosen, — that it was low, easily surrounded, and 
commanded by the ground on the other side of the 
river, — the effect of the victory was none the less deci- 
sive ; and such discoveries only increased the folly of 
attempting to make a stand in a naturally weak posi- 
tion, by the military incompetence shown in selecting 
an improper place for defence. All that they thus 
urged to lessen the mortification of the defeat, only 
enhanced the credit due to Grant and Foote for having 
been sagacious enough to discover the weakness of 
what the Confederates had boasted was so strong a 
position. 

The first result of this victory at Fort Henry was 
seen in the promptness with which Buckner evacuated 
Bowling Green. As early as September, 1861, by 



and a Statesman. 49 

command of Albert Sidney Johnson, Buckner, with ten 
thousand men, had occupied this position, and boasted 
of its impregnable strength. But with the fall of Fort 
Henry he saw himself in danger, and fell back upon 
Fort Donelson, the rear-guard leaving Bowling Green 
on the 15th of February, while this position, upon 
which the Confederates had wasted all their powers of 
defence, which they had strengthened by a system of 
the most complex fortifications, was entered by General 
Mitchell, of Buell's column, so soon after its evacuation 
that he captured great stores of supplies in it. Fort 
Donelson was now in danger, and the safety of Nash- 
ville was threatened. 

Immediately after the capture of Fort Henry, Com- 
modore Foote sent Lieutenant Phelps up the Tennessee 
with three of the gunboats. He destroyed the railway 
bridge, twenty-five miles above Fort Henry, and, pro- 
ceeding up to Florence, at the head of navigation, 
captured a large quantity of stores, and destroyed sev- 
eral steamers and other river craft, besides developing 
and giving an opportunity for expression to the loyal 
sentiments of many of the people of Northern Alabama, 
who had always looked with distrust upon the secession 
conspiracy. 

The next step in order was, evidently, the reduction 
of Fort Donelson, of the strength of which the Con- 
federates were more certain than they had been of 
either Fort Henry or Bowling Green; and to the 
performance of this task General Grant immediately 
devoted himself. 



50 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 

Fort Donelson was designed and constructed by the 
Confederates for the purpose of blockading the Cum- 
berland, as Fort Henry was intended to serve the same 
purpose for the Tennessee. No sooner had the victory 
over Fort Henry been gained, than Grant commenced 
active preparations for an attack upon Fort Donelson. 
He was fully aware of the great importance of follow- 
ing up the first blow instantly, without giving the 
enemy time to recover from their dismay. He re- 
organized his forces, and sent for all available rein- 
forcements to Cairo. For this new service his army 
was formed into two divisions. The first, under Gen- 
eral McClernand, was composed of three brigades, un- 
der Colonels Oglesby, W. H. L. Wallace, and Morrison ; 
the second, under Brigadier General Charles F. Smith, 
of three brigades, under Colonels Cook, Lauman, and 
McArthur. A third division also took part in the af- 
fair, under Brigadier General Lewis Wallace, composed 
of a part of Smith's division, and the reinforcements 
sent forward by General Ilalleck. When the advance 
was first made, General Lewis Wallace was left in com- 
mand of Forts Henry and Heiman, with garrisons taken 
from Smith's division. 

The order of advance was thus arranged in Grant's 



f 

and a Statesman. 51 

general field-order for February 11, 1862. One brigade 
of McClernand's division was to move by the telegraph 
road from Fort Henry directly upon Fort Donelson, 
and to halt when within two miles of it ; three other 
brigades were to march by the Dover road to within 
the same distance of the fort, and then to unite with 
the first in forming the right wing in the investment of 
the fort. Two brigades of Smith's division were to 
follow by the Dover road, and were to be followed by 
the reserves as soon as these could be sent forward. 
The details of the attack could not be arranged until 
the forces were on the ground ; but Smith was directed 
to occupy Dover, if practicable, and cut off all retreat 
by the river. 

In accordance with these directions, McClernand and 
Smith marched across the country on the morning of 
the 12th, to attack the works on the land side, while 
six regiments were sent in transports, accompanied 
by the gunboats, up the Cumberland to join in the 
attack on the water front, or to be used as might 
be thought best under the circumstances. The move- 
ment was made very hastily. Hardly time enough to 
repair the gunboats had been taken; but Grant was 
fully aware of the great importance of every moment 
just at this juncture, and pushed forward as rapidly 
as possible. 

The fort itself was most favorably placed, and con- 
structed according to the best rules of engineering 
art. It was situated upon a high hill, on the left bank 
of the river, where it makes an abrupt turn from north 
to west, flowing in this last direction about a quarter of 
a mile, and then turning again towards the north. This 



1 

52 Grant as a Soldier 



peculiarity of its location enabled a large number of 
guns to be trained directly down the stream. At the 
foot of the hill, on the river side, were two strong 
water batteries. The armament of the lower, or main 
battery consisted of eight thirty-two pounders, and one 
ten-inch columbiad ; the other battery contained one 
heavy rifled gun, carrying a bolt weighing one hundred 
and twenty-eight pounds, and two thirty-two pounders. 
Both of these batteries were sunken, or excavated in 
the hill-side. The fort itself was of irregular form, 
following the inequalities of the surface, and enclosing 
about one hundred acres. It was covered on one side 
by a creek, which is generally not fordable ; and just 
above it a small creek separates it from the town of 
Dover, which is a mile above it on the river bank. 

On the land side the defences were equally strong. 
The Confederates had taken advantage of the natural 
inequalities of the ground, which consist of a series 
of hills, knolls, valleys, and ravines ; had cleared away 
all the timber which might serve to protect and conceal 
the enemy's advance, and erected field-works, from the 
extreme western angle of the fort, running along the 
southern direction of a ridge, and thus forming an 
outer line of defence. In front, also, of this outer line, 
encircling the fort and the town of Dover, was a line 
of rifle trenches, made of logs, forming a kind of par- 
apet, with an abatis of timber in front. The land side 
appeared as strong as the water front, and the garrison 
seemed proportionally strong. 

This garrison consisted of thirteen regiments from 
Tennessee, two from Kentucky, six from Mississippi, 
one from Texas, two from Alabama, four from Virginia, 



and a Statesman. 53 

two independent battalions of Tennessee infantry, and 
Forrest's brigade of cavalry; and besides the armament 
of the fort and water batteries, six batteries of light 
artillery and seventeen heavy guns. The whole num- 
ber of the defensive force amounted to at least twenty- 
three thousand men. The command of the position 
was placed in the hands of General Floyd, who had 
gained a somewhat unenviable reputation as Secretary 
of War under Buchanan, and who here was to cap the 
climax of his achievements by adding to his talent for 
dishonesty the proof of a genius for cowardice. He 
had been appointed to the command of Fort Donelson, 
by General A. S. Johnston, on the loth, the day Grant 
commenced his operations, and had assumed the post 
without delay. His ignorance of military matters, of 
the fort, its topography, its garrison, &c., was as great 
as his insolence in peculation and in treason. Floyd 
assigned the next position in command below his own 
rank to General Gideon J. Pillow, giving him control 
of the left wing of the Confederate army in and around 
Dover. General Pillow had also arrived at the fort 
only on the 10th, and was, perhaps, as ignorant and 
valueless as Floyd, though the accurate settlement 
of their respective claims in this direction is difficult. 
The other commanders of the Confederate army were 
Buckner, who had command of the fort and the ground 
in its immediate vicinity, and B. R. Johnson, both of 
whom were graduates of West Point, and capable men. 
Buckner had been appointed first to the command 
of the fort, but had been superseded by Pillow, who 
in turn was superseded by Floyd, and each of them 
had remained to serve under his superior. 



54 Grant as a Soldier 

The attacking army under Grant consisted of about 
fifteen thousand men, while in his artillery he was pro- 
portionally still more inferior to the enemy. The 
boldness and audacity of the attack must count, how- 
ever, for something : by this he deceived the enemy, 
as he intended doins;. The inarch began from Fort 
Henry on the morning of the 12th, and the columns 
under McClernand and Smith advanced, preceded by 
cavalry to clear the way, to within sight of the fort, 
in the early afternoon, without having met the en- 
emy, who remained huddled in the fort, waiting 
to be attacked, instead of coming boldly out and 
disputing the passage of the attacking force. The 
night of the 12th was passed by our forces in their 
assigned positions, and the next morning the fight 
began by the Confederate batteries opening upon our 
troops, whose positions had been discovered by the 
advance of our sharp-shooters upon the enemy's line 
of pickets. 

Here Grant rapidly posted his divisions. General 
C. F. Smith was placed on the left, opposite the north- 
west face of the fort, McClernand on the right, while 
the light artillery, with proper supports, was placed 
upon the various roads, and the heavy guns were di- 
rected against the armament of the fort. Grant's head- 
quarters were located at a farm-house on the Dover 
road. The struggle soon commenced with a furious 
cannonade upon both sides, in which the practice was 
equally excellent. The design was to assault the works 
with infantry, and our artillery was to prepare the way. 
General McClernand lorinod a storming column under 
the command of Colonel Ilayne, of the Forty-eighth 



and a Statesman. 55 

Illinois, and the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth Illi- 
nois, with McAllister's battery to cover the assault, 
the object being to make a lodgment upon the in- 
trenchment. The attack was not, however, successful, 
though reenforced by the Forty-fifth Illinois: the fire 
of the enemy was so fierce, and the abatis so formidable 
an obstacle, that the assailants were forced to retire. 
The action was opened, however, and Grant's persistence 
was not to be lessened by a single repulse. 

Meanwhile the gunboats were anxiously expected ; 
they were to bring reinforcements and supplies. The 
weather now changed, and, from its previous mildness, 
became bitterly cold. A ram-storm also set in, and 
changed first to hail and then to sleet. The thermom- 
eter fell rapidly to only ten above zero, and our troops 
were without any shelter whatsoever, were in want of 
rations, and the majority of them, with the recklessness 
characteristic of new troops, had left or thrown away 
their overcoats, beguiled by the previous spring-like 
mildness of the weather. 

The sufferings our army endured that night can be 
realized only by those who have passed through similar 
experiences ; many of the wounded froze to death, and 
it was with great difficulty that the well could keep 
themselves from the same fate. The next morning 
dawned upon these hungry, shivering men, and the 
gunboats had not yet arrived with the desired rein- 
forcements and supplies. Grant, keenly alive to the 
hazard of his position, despatched a messenger to Gen- 
eral Lewis Wallace, at Fort Henry, with orders to bring 
up the garrison which had been left at that post. The 
messenger had, however, hardly set out, when a scout 



56 Grant as a Soldier 

brought the enlivening news that a gunboat was in 
sio-ht ; and a distant cloud of smoke announced that the 
balance of the fleet was not far behind. The Caronde- 
let was the gunboat in sight, and as soon as she came 
within range she opened upon the water batteries, which 
responded fiercely, and the contest began anew. 

The reinforcements and supplies were landed about 
three miles below the fort; a road was rapidly cut 
through the woods, and having made their connection 
with the forces previously on the ground, rations were 
quickly distributed, ammunition was served out, and 
arrangements made for the comfort of the wounded. 

The re enforcements which had just come up, to- 
gether with the garrison from Fort Henry, constituted 
the Third Division, composed of eleven regiments, which 
were placed under the command of Wallace, and posted 
in the centre, so that the line was completed. 

The attack of the gunboats now commenced. As at 
Fort Henry, Commodore Foote steamed up with his 
vessels in two lines; the iron-clads, the Pittsburg, St. 
Louis, Louisville, and Carondelet in the first line, and 
the wooden ships, the Conestoga, Tyler, and Lexington 
in the second. His purpose was to silence the water 
batteries, and take up such a position in the bend of 
the river as would enable him to enfilade the faces 
of the fort with his broadsides. To do this, however, 
he was exposed to the concentrated fire of both the 
batteries and the fort, which was at once both raking 
and plunging, and was probably as severe a test as 
any fleet has ever experienced. Still the fleet pressed 
on, approaching nearer and nearer the desired end. 
The practice of the guns on the boats was most ex- 



and a Statesman. 57 

cellent ; they were within perhaps less than four hun- 
dred yards of the batteries, and for two hours remained 
giving and receiving this terrible cannonade. The 
upper water battery had been silenced ; and though 
the boats had not been thoroughly repaired, after the 
damage they had suffered at Fort Henry, and had suf- 
fered still more from the present contest, it seemed as 
though a short time longer would suffice for success, 
when suddenly they were forced to fall back. The cross 
and plunging fire had done its work. A shot had cut the 
rudder chains of the Louisville, and sent her drifting, 
helpless and unmanageable, down the stream. The 
flag-ship, the St. Louis, had her steering-wheel shot 
away, the ball at the same time killing her pilot, who 
was standing at Commodore Foote's side, while he him- 
self was injured in the foot by a splinter. On examina- 
tion, her additional steering apparatus was also found 
to be disabled, and she herself rendered helpless and 
unmanageable. Fifty-nine shots had struck the St. 
Louis during the conflict, some of them raking her from 
stem to stern. The Louisville had been struck thirty- 
five times, the Carondelet twenty-six times, and her 
rifled gun had burst during the action. The Pittsburg 
had been struck twenty-one times. The fire of at least 
twenty guns had been concentrated upon these boats, 
while they could bring only twelve to bear upon the 
batteries in reply. 

Thus two of the iron-clads being rendered unmanage- 
able, and the other two being greatly damaged, Com- 
modore Foote found himself, on the verge of victory, 
obliged to withdraw, having lost fifty-four killed and 
wounded. 



58 Grant as a Soldier 

On consulting with Grant, it was decided that the * 
best course to be pursued was to send the gunboats 
back to Cairo to repair, while the army should hold 
the fort in a state of siege, until they could return 
with sufficient reinforcements to make the army com- 
petent to reduce the fort. Though the fleet had not 
been entirely successful, yet their services had been 
of great importance. They had relieved General Grant 
from the danger of attack while unprepared, and had 
enabled him to post his reinforcements and mature 
his plans. To hold the place invested until both the 
army and navy, reenforced, should be strong enough 
to insure victory, now seemed the plan most proper for 
action. Had the Confederates remained intrenched 
in their works, repairing their damages, and strength- 
ening their fortifications, this plan would have been 
pursued. 

On Friday night, however, a council of war was held 
at Floyd's headquarters at Dover, and the plan of 
action there adopted led to a change in Grant's action, 
and hastened the surrender of the fort. This council 
was composed of the Confederate division and brigade 
commanders, and they agreed unanimously to the plan 
of action proposed by Floyd. This plan was, to make 
an overwhelming attack upon our forces. The princi- 
pal portion of the attacking force, about one half the 
entire Confederate army, with all of Forrest's cavalry 
under Pillow and Johnson, was to attack our right wing 
under McClcinand, and drive them from the heights 
they occupied commanding the Cumberland River, and 
whose batteries, it was evident, would soon close the 
river above the fort. This being accomplished, this 



and a Statesman. 59 

force was then to fall back upon that portion of our 
line occupied by Wallace with his division, while Buck- 
ner, with the remainder of the army which could be 
spared after leaving the necessary garrison in the fort, 
should sally out against our centre, and attack Wallace 
in front If these attacks should prove successful, the 
whole of our right wing and centre would be thrown 
back upon Smith's division, and would thus be routed 
and destroyed. In case the plan was only partially 
successful, Floyd hoped at least that a way would be 
opened for the evacuation of the fort, and his own 
successful escape, which seemed to him the most im- 
portant and pressing piece of business now on hand. 
The decision was, that the plan should be put in op- 
eration on the next morning, Saturday the 15th. 

Accordingly, at five in the morning of the 15th, the 
attacking column, numbering about ten thousand men, 
with thirty guns, under Pillow and Johnson, marched 
out from Dover, with the purpose of crushing our right 
wing under McClernand, and cutting a pathway through 
them. Our lines at this point followed the contour of 
the rebel intrenchments, and with each brigade was a 
field battery. The attack was a surprise. Reveille was 
just sounding; the troops were hardly under arms, 
when it became evident that the right wine? was se- 
riously threatened. Promptly, however, our line was 
formed, and guided by the flashes of the enemy's guns, 
a partial change of front was executed in order to meet 
their advance. There was no time to be lost, for Pillow 
had sent his cavalry round to try and attack our rear, 
while he was attacking our right flank. 

Our line stood firm for a time, but, pressed too 



60 Grant as a Soldier 

strongly by the constantly arriving fresh troops, w& 
forced to fall back ; and but for the coolness of th( 
officers and their inspiring courage, a panic might have 
ensued. But though thus partially successful, the en- 
emy did not advance with impunity. Our light bat- 
teries poured a withering fire into their advancing 
columns, and forced them frequently to falter and re- 
coil, until pushed onward by the advancing masses 
behind them. 

Our new line was formed, and the enemy held in 
check, when Buckner's force came out to attack our 
left flank. As soon as they were discovered, the threat- 
ened flank was strengthened, and two guns being rap- 
idly brought to bear upon them, they were easily 
repulsed, but not without having had the effect of 
somewhat disheartening our men. We seemed to be 
attacked on all sides. The ammunition had given 
out, and signs of a panic began to appear. Many 
officers were wounded, and the crisis of the battle had 
arrived. General Wallace, however, formed a new line ; 
the regiments which had borne the brunt of the attack 
were formed again in our rear, and given fresh sup- 
plies of ammunition. 

Pillow had now sent an aid to telegraph to Nash- 
ville that, " on the honor of a soldier," the day was 
theirs. Having delayed some little time in plunder- 
ing McClernand's camp, the enemy came forward again, 
Hushed with success. They expected to finish the con- 
test with an easy victory. But our line stood firm, and 
by their deliberate fire, and the excellent handling 
of the artillery, the Confederates were repulsed. 

During the seeming success of the unexpected at- 



and a Statesman. 61 

tack upon our lines, Grant had been on the flag-ship 
consulting with Commodore Foote, who was wounded. 
He saw, on his return, from the desperate character of 
the attack, that when it culminated, the enemy would 
give way, if he showed a bold front, and pressed them 
vigorously in return. Examining the haversacks of 
some of the prisoners captured, they were found filled 
with three days' rations ; and at the sight of this evi- 
dence Grant exclaimed, " They meant to cut their way 
out; they have no idea of staying here to fight us. 
Whichever party now attacks first will whip, and the 
rebels will have to be very quick if they beat me." 
The evident truth of this shrewd common-sense conclu- 
sion inspired our troops with new courage. Riding to 
the front, Grant then ordered Wallace, who had first 
checked the enemy, to advance and recover the ground 
lost in the morning, while Smith should storm the works 
on the enemy's right. The result showed the accuracy 
of his foresight and the correctness of his reasoning. 
Wallace advanced, and drove the enemy back before 
him, and at five in the afternoon, just at dark, our line 
halted within one hundred and fifty yards of the en- 
emy's intrenchments. During the whole of the follow- 
ing intensely cold night, our troops remained in the 
position thus gained, ministering to the wants of the 
wounded, and wishing eagerly for the morning. At 
daylight reinforcements were brought up, and prepa- 
rations made for storming the intrenchments, when the 
display of white flags from various parts of the fort 
showed that the battle was won. 

Let us now look at the manner in which affairs were 
conducted in another part of the field. When, in the 



62 Grant as a Soldier 

afternoon of the 15th, Wallace was ordered to advance, 
Smith's division was also set the arduous and danger- 
ous task of storming the enemy's works upon the right 
While he is organizing his column of attack, a feint was 
made by Cook's brigade posted on his left, and the batter- 
ies of heavy artillery open fire upon the intrenchments 
and the fort The attacking column was composed of five 
regiments — the Second Iowa, the Fifty-second Indiana, 
the Twenty-fifth Indiana, the Seventh Iowa, and the 
Fourteenth Iowa. It was nearly sunset, when Smith, 
hearing Wallace's guns, far away to the right, awaking 
the echoes with their angry roar, put himself at the 
head of his column, and with a few such inspiriting 
words as the ardor of battle suggests, told them of the 
work before them to be done, and offered to lead them 
himself. Riding at their head, his gray hair floating in 
the wind as he waved his hat upon the point of his 
sword, he led them to the attack. The murderous fire 
from the enemy's guns decimates his ranks, but nothing 
can make them waver with such a leader, and, at the 
point of the bayonet, they rush through and over the 
intrenchments. Planting their standards upon the cap- 
tured works, they pour volley after volley upon the de- 
feated Confederates, who flee precipitately in dismay. 
Four hundred of the gallant body of men who make 
this decisive charge have fallen, but the victory is won. 
Grant's audacity of conception and Smith's fearless 
valor, backed by the irresistible enthusiasm of his troops, 
has plucked victory from seeming defeat 

Wallace, holding his advanced ground, is informed of 
Smith's success, and night settles upon the scene. Our 
soldiers remain upon the ground, ready for action with 



and a Statesman. 63 

the approach of daylight. Grant had shown that he 
was a general ; that he had a genius for comprehend- 
ing the entire situation. He had foreseen that the 
impetuous surge of the enemy's attack promised, by 
its very might, that it would recede ; and he had 
also shown that he possessed — the rarest quality in 
a military commander — the skill of intuition which 
recognizes and selects the fit moment for prompt 
action. 

During the whole of the following night, despite the 
cold, though without fires, and though mostly wanting 
food, our men remained upon the ground they had 
gained, awaiting the morning with impatience. The 
enthusiasm of success both cheered and warmed them, 
while the contemplation of complete victory in the 
morning kept them in spirits, and their valor would 
have been irresistible the next day. But while the 
Union army was in this condition, the Confederates were 
in the most thoroughly disheartened state of mind. 
The officers were more so than the men, while the lead- 
ers were more so than the officers. Floyd and Pillow 
were the worst frightened of all. To the first it seemed 
as though the whole action was undertaken simply for 
the purpose of capturing him. The consciousness of 
his treason, of the shameful manner in which he had 
abused the trusts confided to him, made him fear the 
just vengeance of an indignant people, and the only 
question with him was how to escape. He declared 
he would sooner die than surrender, but he preferred 
escape to either. At the council of war, held that even- 
ing at his headquarters, he proposed cutting his way 
out with his own brigade of Virginia troops; but such an 
5 



64 Grant as a Soldier 

apt illustration of the principle of state rights was not 
relished by his companions. 

Pillow, the second in command, seemed actuated only 
by a similar fear of capture, and an equally strong de- 
sire for escape. Both of these worthies absolutely re- 
fused to retain the command ; so Floyd transferred it to 
Pillow, who immediately passed it over to Buckner, who 
was the only one of the three who appears to have had 
any of the dignity of honor which is traditionally sup- 
posed to be the first requisite of a soldierly character. 
Having thus shifted the immediate responsibilities of 
their position, these two " valiant Pistols " escaped that 
night upon two small steamers from Dover, and suc- 
ceeded in reaching Nashville. Their official reports, 
together with that of General Grant, will be found in 
the Appendix. 

The command having thus devolved upon Buckner, 
and no other course remaining open to him than sur- 
render, his army being in such confusion that further 
resistance would have been impossible, he sent an offi- 
cer, at early daylight, as the bearer of the following 
letter to General Grant : — 



Headquarters Fort Donelson, * 
February 16, 1862. J 
Sm: In consideration of all the circumstances governing the 
. present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the com- 
manding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of commis- 
sioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and foil, 
under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until 
twelve o'clock to-day. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

S. B. Bucknek, Brigadier General C. /S. A. 



and a Statesman. 65 

This communication reached Grant in due time, and 
he returned the following answer, which has become 
historical, and from which dates his soubriquet among 
the armies of " Unconditional Surrender Grant : " — 

Headquarters Army in the Field, > 
Camp near Donelson, February 16, 1862. ) 
To General S. B. Buckner, Confederate Army. 

Yours of this date, proposing an armistice and appointment 
of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. 
No terms other than an unconditional and immediate surrender 
can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your 
works. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, 
Brigadier General U. S. A., commanding. 

The reply was far from a pleasing one to the rebel 
commander; but, on looking around his position, he 
found he could not stand another assault, and his fol- 
lowers were anxious for a cessation of the strife. He 
therefore sent the following acceptance of General 
Grant's terms of surrender : — 

Headquarters Dover Tennessee, > 
February 16, 1862. j 

To Brigadier General U. S. Grant, XT. S. A. 

Sir : The distribution of the forces under my command, in- 
cident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the over- 
whelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding 
the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept 
the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose. 
I am, sir, your very obedient servant, 

S. B. Buckner, Brigadier General 0. S. A. 

This reply is most amusing, and suggests the singu- 



GG Grant as a Soldier 

lar mixture of folly and enthusiasm which seemed at 
this time to be the principal ingredients of the seces- 
sion spirit. What is ungenerous or unchivalrous in un- 
conditional surrender, when a man has staked all on 
the wager of battle, and lost ? While what has any 
preceding success, however brilliant, to do with the 
present question? But the southern leaders having 
been so long accustomed to domineer with a high 
hand, both at home and in Washington, it required 
time for them to learn that they were subject to 
defeat, and that a Union victory was not intended 
especially and only as a personal indignity towards 
themselves. The foolish halo of chivalry in which they 
moved was as far apart from the stern practical com- 
mon sense of the present world as their system of sla- 
very was behind the present condition of labor. Yet 
as, in spite of the world's progress, they defended and 
fought for this last as at once the highest, most moral, 
and most economic system, it is not so very surprising 
that they felt aggrieved when the illusions of the other 
were suddenly destroyed by the realities of war. 

Grant's terms were, however, accepted, and the sur- 
render was immediate and unconditional. With the 
fort were captured (according to the figures given by 
Pollard, the southern historian) thirteen thousand five 
hundred men as prisoners of war, three thousand horses, 
forty-eight field-pieces, seventeen heavy guns, twenty 
thousand stands of arms, and immense quantities of 
supplies. The clay after the capitulation two regiments 
of Tennessee troops, numbering fourteen hundred and 
seventy-five men, came to reenforce the garrison, and 
marched in with their colors Hying, wholly unconscious 



and a Statesman. 67 

of the surrender which had taken place, and, to their 
surprise and chagrin, were all taken prisoners. The 
Confederate loss in killed and wounded was twelve 
hundred and thirty-eight; the Union loss was four 
hundred and forty-six killed, seventeen hundred and 
fifty-three wounded, and one hundred and fifty prison- 
ers. The disparity of numbers arose from the fact that 
the Union forces had to fight in an open field, while 
the enemy was protected by the works: 

The results of this compaign were most important : 
first, it broke the outer line of the defence of the Coiv 
federacy, which extended from Columbus to Bowling 
Green, both of which places had been strongly fortified, 
and forced the Confederates to abondon them both, so 
that a few days after the victory of Fort Donelson, the 
Union troops entered both these places without any 
resistance. It filled also the whole loyal population of 
the country with rejoicing. In the midst of the un- 
certainty, the anxiety, the approaching despair which 
had followed the course of our arms in the east, this 
victory was most welcome ; it gave assurance to those 
who, drawing deductions too rapidly, and from too 
limited a- field of observation, began to think that our 
leaders were incompetent, that we had at least one 
man who could execute as well as plan, to whom the 
science of war was not only strategy, but who also 
understood the value of action ; and it proved that our 
soldiers might be relied upon for endurance as well 
as valor. Following the universal expression of the 
people's wish, the government made General Grant a 
Major General of Volunteers, his commission to date 
from the day of the surrender of Fort Donelson. The 



68 Grant as a. Soldier 

following order, issued by General Grant to the troops 
under his command, gives a succinct account of the 
events we have been trying to describe : — 

General Orders, No. 2. 

Headquarters, District of West Tet™essee, \ 
Fort Donelson, February 17, 1862. $ 

The General commanding takes great pleasure in congratulating 
the troops of this command for the triumph over rebellion, gained 
by their valor, on the 13th, 14th, and 15th instants. 

For four successive nights, without shelter, during the most 
inclement weather known in this latitude, they faced an enemy in 
large force, in a position chosen by himself. Though strongly for- 
tified by nature, all the additional safeguards suggested by science 
were added. Without a murmur this was borne, prepared at all 
times to receive an attack, and, with continuous skirmishing by 
day, resulting ultimately in forcing the enemy to surrender with- 
out conditions. 

The victory achieved is not only great in the effect it will have 
in breaking down rebellion, but has secured the greatest number 
of prisoners of war ever taken in any battle on this continent. 

Fort Donelson will hereafter be marked in capitals on the map 
of our united country, and the men who fought the battle will live 
in the memory of a grateful people. 
By order. 

U. S. Grant, Brigadier General commanding. 



and a Statesman. 69 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE EFFECTS OF THESE VICTORIES. — PREPARING FOR THE 
NEXT MOVE. 

The grand plan for the suppression of the rebellion 
was now more apparent than ever. While the army 
of the Potomac was checked in its advance upon Rich- 
mond, in Virginia, it became evident that, to crush all 
armed resistance against the government, it was neces- 
sary that the Mississippi should be open for navigation 
from its mouth to its source, and that, the Confederate 
power being thus broken, access to the interior would 
be had from the south-west, and thus finally the Con- 
federacy be split to pieces by the driving in of these 
two wedges. In carrying out the principal operations of 
this vast plan, Grant took a singularly prominent part. 
Having been the chief agent in breaking the first line 
of defence made by the Confederacy in protecting their 
territory to the east of the Mississippi and south of the 
Ohio, he was now called upon to continue the work 
thus nobly begun. His sphere of action after the vic- 
tory at Fort Donelson was enlarged, and it will be seen 
that his grasp of the situation and its necessities kept 
pace with the extension of his field for action. 

On the 14th of February, 1862, by an order from 



70 Grant as a Soldier 

General Halleck, he was assigned to the new district 
of West Tennessee, embracing the territory from Cairo, 
between the Mississippi and Cumberland Rivers, to the 
Mississippi border. His headquarters were in the field, 
and he kept them there. 

The department of the Ohio was at this time in 
command of Brigadier General Don Carlos Buell. It 
comprised the States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, that 
portion of Kentucky east of the Cumberland, and the 
State of Tennessee. In the new move his army was to 
operate with Grant's, and we shall find them together 
at the battle of Pittsburg Landing, or Shiloh. Clarks- 
ville, on the east bank of the Cumberland, was evacu- 
ated by the Confederates, and taken possession of by 
us on the 20th of February. The gunboats then 
hastened on to Nashville. This city was abandoned by 
Johnston as soon as he heard of the fall of Fort Donel- 
son, and was occupied on Sunday evening, February 
23, by our forces. On the 3d of March Columbus 
was also evacuated, and the Confederates were forced 
to seek a new line. The capture of Nashville and 
Columbus, which was the result of Grant's victories, 
was quite as terrible a loss to the Confederacy as the 
taking of Forts Henry and Donelson. Pollard compares 
the first to the shock of an earthquake, and the second 
was hardly less staggering. 

Soon after taking command of the district of West 
Tennessee, Grant proclaimed martial law in the follow- 
ing order : — 



and a Statesman. 71 

General Orders, No. 7. 

Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, ) 
Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 22, 18C2. $ 

[extract.] 

Tennessee, by her rebellion, having ignored all laws of the 
United States, no courts will be allowed to act under state au- 
thority ; but all cases coming within the reach of the military 
arm will be adjudicated by the authorities the government has 
established within the state. 

Martial law is, therefore, declared to extend over West Ten- 
nessee. Whenever a sufficient number of citizens return to their 
allegiance to maintain law and order over the territory, the mili- 
tary restriction here indicated will be removed. 

By order of Major General U. S. Grant. 

J. A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 

He also issued an order from General Halleck, 
exhorting bis troops to " let no excesses on their part 
tarnish the glory of their army." All supplies which 
had to be impressed were to be paid for, and such mag- 
nanimous justice as a great nation, confident, perhaps 
too confident, in its honor and material strength, could 
afford and would prefer to exercise, were to character- 
ize the conduct of our troops. The " relation of master 
and slave " was not to be interfered with. Such ques- 
tions were to be settled by the "civil courts." We 
were then in the early part of 1862. But it is im- 
possible to make an army of free citizens a mere 
unthinking machine. It may be possible in Europe, 
where the people are distinct from the government, 
opposed in interest, antagonistic in feeling, and where 
the army is the tool of the government. But here the 
people are the government, and the army is a part of 



72 Grant as a Soldier 

themselves. It is not a band of mercenaries, hired to 
do a despot's bidding, but a collection of freemen, who 
have volunteered to do a public work, in which each 
man of them has a personal interest. We shall see 
further results arising from this fundamental difference 
in the constitution of our nationality and of our army 
as a part and parcel of this, and that of European gov- 
ernments and European armies, before we get through 
our record. 

About this time there was a misunderstanding be- 
tween Grant and the Department at Washington. He 
had gone to Nashville, February 26, to consult with 
Buell, and this fact being reported to Halleck and at 
Washington, it was made a cause of complaint against 
him. Fault was also found with him for beins; re- 
miss in reporting the condition of his army promptly ; 
though it is evident that the constant active duty they 
had been engaged in made this impossible. To his 
astonishment, on the 4th of March he was ordered to 
turn over his command to General C. F. Smith, and 
remain at Fort Henry. A correspondence took place 
between himself and General Halleck, in which he asked 
to be relieved entirely from duty. But the whole mat- 
ter was explained, and he was restored to command, 
resuming the position on the 14th of March. The real 
cause of the difficulty was, probably, some petty jeal- 
ousy of his success, which, as it did not result in depriv- 
ing us of his services, we need not now trouble our- 
selves with investigating. 



and a Statesman. 73 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH, OE PITTSBURG LANDING. 

The next line of defence necessary for the Confed- 
eracy was one which should protect the line of the 
Memphis and Charleston Railway, one of their great 
arteries of interior communication. Memphis was 
strongly fortified, and Corinth, a little town at the 
junction of the Memphis and Charleston Railway with 
the Mobile and Ohio Railway, was evidently a most 
important point to be guarded by one party and to be 
taken by the other. The Tennessee River, now that it 
was opened, gave an opportunity for our forces to pen- 
etrate far into the interior of the Confederacy, and 
our troops were concentrated rapidly at Savannah and 
Pittsburg Landing, two points upon the banks of this 
river, quite near to Corinth, being only about twenty 
miles distant. The approach of the Union army upon 
Corinth, down the Mississippi, was guarded by the for- 
tifications at Memphis and those at Island No. 10, and 
other points above that city, while the strength of New 
Orleans, Vicksburg, and other points, was supposed by 
the Confederates to make the approach from the mouth 
of the stream equally impossible. 

When, on the 3d of March, 1862, General Polk, the 
Confederate bishop, — who may perhaps be taken as a 



74 Grant as a Soldier 

fair sample of the church militant, — evacuated and dis- 
mantled the works at Columbus, falling back upon the 
strong defences which had been constructed at Island 
No. 10, and which were intended to guard the passage of 
the Mississippi, in place of those abandoned at Columbus, 
which had become worthless at the fall of Forts Henry 
and Donelson. This island is situated in the stream, 
about forty-five miles below Columbus, and is the tenth 
island in the river, counting from Cairo ; hence its 
name. The river here makes a series of bends, in the 
form of an co . The island lies in the mid-channel, and 
is about a mile long, and a half mile wide in its widest 
part. The armament placed here consisted of four 
heavy batteries on the island, and seven on the Ken- 
tucky and Tennessee shores. At the upper and lower 
ends of the co are New Madrid and Point Pleasant. 
Beside the works, a floating dock was brought up from 
New Orleans, armored, anchored, and converted into a 
floating battery. Forts were also erected at New Mad- 
rid, and the place was considered exceedingly strong. 
A detailed account of the operations of the cooperating 
army under General John Pope, and the fleet under 
Commodore Foote, by which this strong position was 
taken, with one hundred and twenty-four guns, and 
some three thousand prisoners, as they do not enter 
strictly in an account of Grant's campaigns, need not 
be given here. Suffice it to say, that Polk evacuated 
Columbus on the 3d of March ; Mackall, who was ap- 
pointed to Island No. 10, took command there on the 
5th, and the place was formally surrendered to us on 
the 8th. This was the completion of the next step in 
the opening of the Mississippi River. 



and a Statesman. 75 

Pittsburg Landing, at which and in the vicinity our 
troops were concentrated, is on the west bank of the 
Tennessee. The landing is flanked on the left by a 
short but precipitous ravine, along which runs the road 
to Corinth. On the right and left of the position are 
Snake and Lick Creeks, which would compel an attack 
to be made in front. The distance between the mouths 
of these creeks is almost two and a half miles, The 
landing was protected by the gunboats Tyler and Lex- 
ington. The army of the Ohio, under Buell, was coming 
up to effect a junction with Grant. On the 17th of 
March Grant arrived at Savannah, where he was most 
conveniently placed for overseeing the whole force at 
his disposal, which consisted of about thirty-eight thou- 
sand men. 

The credit of the rebel plan is given to Beauregard, 
who conceived the whole movement in his headquarters 
at Corinth, and who, though Johnston was his superior, 
was looked on as the leader during the day, while 
Johnston was on the field, and after his fall on the after- 
noon of the first day of the battle, became nominally 
commander. Beauregard had collected his troops from 
every available point. Bragg's corps had been brought 
up from Mobile and Pensacola ; Polk had brought the 
greater part of his from the evacuation of Columbus ; 
Johnston had brought his, which had retreated from 
Nashville to Murfreesboro\ These forces, amounting 
to about forty-five thousand men, had been disposed 
along the Mobile and Ohio Railway from Bethel to 
Corinth, and on the Memphis and Charleston Railway 
from Corinth to Iuk'a. Unquestionably Beauregard 
hoped to crash Grant entirely, though in his report, 



76 Grant as a Soldier 

made of course in the light of subsequent events, he 
claims to have done all he desired, which was only to 
stun our army, take their stores, and then return to his 
base at Corinth. 

On the 2d of April there was slight skirmishing at 
Cramp's Landing. On the 3d General A. S. Johnston 
issued a proclamation to his army, and their advance 
began ; and on the 4th a grand reconnoissance of our 
position was made, from which, however, they rapidly 
retired. Johnston's proclamation was couched in the 
following terms : — 

Soldiers op the Army op the Mississippi : I have put you 
in motion to offer battle to the invaders of your country, with the 
resolution, and discipine, and valor becoming men, fighting, as you 
are, for all worth living or dying for. You can but march to a 
decisive victory over agrarian mercenaries, sent to subjugate and 
despoil you of your liberties, property, and honor. 

Remember the precious stake involved; remember the depen- 
dence of your mothers, your wives, your sisters, and your children, 
on the result. Remember the fair, broad, abounding lands, the 
happy homes, that will be desolated by your defeat. The eyes 
and hopes of eight millions of people rest upon you. You are 
expected to show yourselves worthy of your valor and courage, 
worthy of the women of the South, whose noble devotion in this 
war has never been exceeded in any time. "With such incentives 
to brave deeds, and with trust that God is with us, your General 
will lead you confidently to the combat, assured of success. 

By order of 

General A. S. Johnstok commanding. 

On the evening of Saturday, the 5th of April, the Con- 
federates arrived in position in front of our lines, having 
been delayed by the bad condition of the roads. The 
portions of the Confederate army nearest to our lines 



and a Statesman. 77 

were allowed no fires that night, nor were the noises 
usual in a camp permitted. Nothing was done which 
should make us aware of either their position or their 
strength. Orders were issued for the disposition of the 
forces the next day, and the Confederate leaders held 
an informal council that night at Beauregard's head- 
quarters, who, though weak from a recent illness, was 
full of exaggerated confidence, and announced that his 
men should "water their horses the next day in the 
Tennessee or in hell." From his spies and the residents 
of the country he had an accurate knowledge of the 
position and composition of Grant's army ; and hoping 
that Buell would not arrive in time, he expected to 
attack us unawares, and with his generals was in high 
spirits over their expected success of the morrow. 

The morning of the 6 th was bright and clear. By 
three in the morning the Confederates had breakfasted, 
and stripped for battle. It was Sunday. The contest 
raged all that day, and until the afternoon the Con- 
federates were successful. Our forces were driven back 
at all points, and concentrated round the Landing in so 
compact a hody, that the lines extended only about a 
mile in length, running in a curve round the Landing. 
Though such concentration was forced upon us, yet 
it had the effect of consolidating our resistance. The 
last attempt of the Confederates, just before nightfall, 
to cross the ravine, seize the road, and cut us off from 
the Landing, though made with desperate and deter- 
mined valor, was unsuccessful. Our artillery fire, aided 
by the guns from the boats, was too severe for them to 
pass, and they were forced to fall back. Beauregard, 



78 Grant as a Soldier 

professing himself satisfied with the clay's work, re- 
solved to leave the final and utter overthrow of 
Grant's army until the next day, and his army slept 
upon their arms. 

General Grant had been upon the field all day, and 
about five in the evening had visited Sherman, and, 
being yet ignorant of Buell's arrival, had ordered Sher- 
man, with the aid of Lewis Wallace, who had been ex- 
pected upon the field at an early hour of the morning, 
but by some accident, taking the wrong road, did not 
arrive until the evening, to assume the offensive in the 
morning. Here, as at Fort Donelson, he had seen that 
when the fury of the Confederate attack had sjDent 
itself, the plan was to assume the offensive. During 
the night Buell's forces were posted, and the steamers 
kept plying between the Landing and Savannah, bring- 
ing up reinforcements, so that we should be ready 
the first thing in the morning for an overwhelming 
advance. 

Next morning, early, both parties commenced the of- 
fensive. Beauregard persisted in attempting to capture 
the Landing. His assault was of the most determined 
and vigorous kind, but was met with more than equal 
valor and persistence. By four in the afternoon the 
Confederates saw the hopelessness of further fighting, 
and at half past five were in full retreat, having burned 
their camp, and, protected by a strong rear-guard, has- 
tened back to Corinth, and commenced to intrench. 
Yet Beauregard's genius for vaunting did not desert 
him, despite the failure of his attack, and the next day 
he sent the following despatch to Richmond : — 



and a Statesman. 70 

Corinth, Tuesday, April 8, 18C2. 
To the Secretary of War, Richmond. 

"We have gained a great and glorious victory. Eight to ten 
thousand prisoners, and thirty-six pieces of cannon. Bucll reen- 
forced Grant, and ine retired to our intrenchments at Corinth, 
which we can hold. Loss heavy on both sides. 

Beauregard. 

His boast of holding his position at Corinth, we shall 
find, is as empty as his vaunted victory. The following 
correspondence will also serve to throw some additional 
lustre upon the magnificent disregard for facts which 
prompted Beauregard's telegraphic despatch : — 



Headquarters Department of Mississippi, 
Monterey, April 8, 1862 



pi, > 



Sir: At the close of the conflict yesterday, my forces being 
exhausted by the extraordinary length of the time during which 
th'ey were engaged with yours on that and the preceding day, and 
it being apparent that you had received, and were still receiving, 
reinforcements, I felt it my duty to withdraw my troops from the 
immediate scene of the conflict. Under these circumstances, in 
accordance with the usages of war, I shall transmit this under a 
flag of truce, to ask permission to send a mounted party to the 
battle-field of Shiloh, for the purpose of giving decent interment 
to my dead. Certain gentlemen wishing to avail themselves of 
this opportunity to remove the remains of their sons and friends, 
I must request for them the privilege of accompanying the burial 
party ; and in this connection, I deem it proper to say, I am asking 
what I have extended to your own countrymen under similar 
circumstances. 

Respectfully, General, your obedient servant, 

P. G. T. Beauregard, General commanding. 

To Major General U. S. Grant, Major General 

commanding United States Forces, Pittsburg Landing. 



6 



80 Grant as a Soldier 

Headquarters Army in Field, 
Pittsburg, April 9, 1862. 

General P. G. T. Beauregard, commanding Confederate 
Army on Mississippi, Monterey, Tenn. 
Your despatch of yesterday is just received. Owing to the 
warmth of the weather, I deemed it advisable to have all the dead 
of both parties buried immediately. Heavy details were made for 
this purpose, and it is now accomplished. There cannot, therefore, 
be any necessity of admitting within our lines the parties you 
desired to send on the ground asked. I shall always be glad to 
extend any courtesy consistent with duty, and especially so when 
dictated by humanity. 

I am, General, respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Major General commanding. 

In the mean time, while Beauregard was withdraw- 
ing his discomfited army to Corinth, Grant's army 
being " too much fatigued from two days' hard fighting 
and exposure to the open air, in a drenching rain, 
during the intervening night, to pursue immediately," 
they remained on the field; but the next day, the 8th, 
Sherman, with two brigades and some cavalry, recon- 
noitred the route of the retreating army ; and in his 
abandoned and disordered camp, in the wounded left 
under the protection of hospital flags, and in the sup- 
plies scattered along the road, he found every evidence 
of a hasty and disorderly retreat. 

Our loss in this two days' fighting numbered, all 
told, some fifteen thousand men. That of the Con- 
federates was still greater. Beauregard confesses to 
seventeen hundred and twenty-eight killed, eight thou- 
sand and twelve wounded, nine hundred and fifty-five 
missing — total, ten thousand six hundred and ninety- 
nine ; and as his army went into action forty-five thou- 



and a Statesman. 81 

sand strong, and lie could not on Monday, by his 
own account, bring twenty thousand into action, there 
must have been from fifteen to eighteen thousand 
stragglers. 

During the engagement General Grant frequently 
exposed himself to the thickest of the fire, and during 
the second day headed a charge himself, and was slight- 
ly wounded in the ankle, but not enough to prevent his 
remaining personally in the field. The Confederate Gen- 
eral Johnston, in the afternoon of the first clay, received 
a wound in the leg from a minie ball, which subse- 
quently proved fatal. The following report forwarded 
to the Department by General Grant, gives a succinct 
resume of the two days' operations, and accords the 
credit due to his officers with that magnanimous gen- 
erosity which has endeared him to the hearts of all 
those who have ever served actively under him : — 

Headquarters District of Western Tennessee, ) 
Pittsburg, April 9, 18G2. £ 
Captain N. H. McLean, Assistant Adjutant General, 
Department of Mississippi, St. Louis. 

Captain : It becomes my duty again to report another battle, 
fought by two great armies, one contending for the maintenance of 
the best government ever devised, and the other for its destruction. 
It is pleasant to record the success of the army contending for the 
former principle. 

On Sunday morning our pickets were attacked and driven in by 
the enemy. Immediately the five divisions stationed at this place 
were drawn up in line of battle to meet them. 

The battle soon waxed warm on the left and centre, varying at 
times to all parts of the line. There was the most continuous firing 
of musketry and artillery ever heard on this continent kept up 
until nightfall. 

The enemy having forced the entire line to fall back nearly half 



82 Grant as a Soldier 

way from their camps to the landing, at a late hour in the after- 
noon a desperate effort was made by the enemy to turn our left 
and get possession of the landing, transports, &c. 

This point was guarded by the gunboats Tyler and Lexington, 
Captains Gwin and Shirk commanding, with four twenty-four 
pounder Parrott guns and a battery of rifled guns. 

As there is a deep and impassable ravine for artillery or cavalry, 
and very difficult for infantry, at this point, no troops were sta- 
tioned here, except the necessary artillerists, and a small infantry 
force for their support. Just at this moment the advance of Major 
General Buell's column and a part of the division of General Nelson 
arrived. The two Generals named both being present, an advance 
was immediately made upon the point of attack, and the enemy 
was soon driven back. 

In this repulse much is due to the presence of the gunboats 
Tyler and Lexington, and their able commanders, Captains Gwin 
and Shirk. 

During the night the divisions under Generals Crittenden and 
McCook arrived. 

General Lewis Wallace, at Camp Landing, six miles below, was 
ordered, at an early hour in the morning, to hold his division in 
readiness to move in any direction it might be ordered. At eleven 
o'clock the order was delivered to move it up to Pittsburg ; but, 
owing to its being led by a circuitous route, it did not arrive in 
time to take part in Sunday's action. 

During the night all was quiet; and, feeling that great moral 
advantage would be gained by becoming the attacking party, an 
advance was ordered as soon as day dawned. The result was the 
gradual repulse of the enemy at all points of the line, from nine 
until probably five o'clock in the afternoon, when it became evi- 
dent the enemy was retreating. 

Before the close of the action, the advance of General T. J. 
Wood's division arrived in time to take part in the action. 

My force was too much fatigued from two days' hard fighting, 
and exposure in the open air to a drenching rain during the inter- 
vening night, to pursue immediately. 

Night closed in cloudy, with a heavy rain, making the roads 
impracticable for artillery by the next morning. 



and a Statesman. 83 

General Sherman, however, followed the enemy, finding that the 
main part of their army had retreated in good order. 

Hospitals, with the enemy's wounded, were found all along the 
road as far as pursuit was made. Dead bodies of the enemy, and 
many graves were also found. I enclose herewith a report of 
General Sherman, which will explain more fully the result of the 
pursuit and of the part taken by each separate command. 

I cannot take special notice in this report, but will do so more 
fully when the reports of the division commanders are handed in. 

General Buell, commanding in the field, with a distinct army 
long under his command, and which did such efficient service com- 
manded by himself in person on the field, will be much better able 
to notice those officers' commands, who particularly distinguished 
themselves, than I possibly can. 

I feel it a duty, however, to a gallant and able officer, Brigadier 
General W. T. Sherman, to make a special mention. He not only 
was with his command during the entire t^fo days of the action, 
but displayed great judgment and skill in the management of his 
men. Although severely wounded in the hand on the first day, 
his place was never vacant. He was again wounded, and had three 
horses killed under him. In making this mention of a gallant 
officer, no disparagement is intended to other division commanders, 
or Major Generals John A. McClernand and Lewis Wallace, and 
Brigadier Generals S. A. Hurlbut, P. M. Prentiss, and W. H. L. 
Wallace, all of whom maintained their places with credit to them- 
selves and the cause. 

General Prentiss was taken prisoner on the first day's action, and 
General W. H. L. Wallace was severely and probably mortally 
wounded. His Assistant Adjutant General, Captain William 
MeMichael, is missing, and was probably taken prisoner. 

My personal staff are all deserving of particular mention, they 
having been engaged during the entire two days in carrying orders 
to every part of the field. It consists of Colonel J. D. Webster, 
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel J. B. McPherson, Chief of En- 
gineers, assisted by Lieutenants W. L. B. Jenney and William 
Kossac ; Captain J. A. Rawlins, Assistant Adjutant General W. S. 
Hilger, W. R. Rawley, and C. B. Lagow, Aids de Camp ; Colonel G. 
Pride, Volunteer Aid, and Captain J. P. Hawkins, Chief Com- 
missary, who accompanied me upon the field. 



84 Grant as a Soldier 

The Medical Department, under direction of Surgeon Hewitt, 
Medical Director, showed great energy in providing for the wound- 
ed, and in getting thern from the field, regardless of danger. 

Colonel Webster was placed in special charge of all the artillery, 
and was constantly upon the field. He displayed, as always here- 
tofore, both skill and bravery. At least in one instance, he was 
the means of placing an entire regiment in position of doing most 
valuable service, and where it would not have been but for his 
exertions. 

Lieutenant Colonel McPherson, attached to my staff as Chief of 
Engineers, deserves more than a passing notice for his activity and 
courage. All the grounds beyond our camps, for miles, have been 
reconnoitred by him, and the plans, carefully prepared under his 
supervision, give the most accurate information of the nature of the 
approaches to our lines. During the two days' battle he was con- 
stantly in the saddle, leading the troops, as they arrived, to points 
where their services were required. During the engagement he 
had one horse shot under him. 

The country will have to mourn the loss of many brave men who 
fell at the battle of Pittsburg, or Shiloh, more properly. 

The exact loss in killed and wounded will be known in a day or 
two. At present I can only give it, approximately, at fifteen hun- 
dred killed and thirty-five hundred wounded. 

The loss of artillery was great, many pieces being disabled by 
the enemy's shots, and some losing all their horses and many men. 
There were probably not less than two hundred horses killed. 

The loss of the enemy, in killed and left upon the field, was 
greater than ours. In the wounded an estimate cannot be made, 
as many of them must have been sent to Corinth and other points. 

The enemy suffered terribly from demoralization and desertion. 

A flag of truce was sent in to-day from General Beauregard. I 
enclose herewith a copy of the correspondence. 

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Major General commanding. 

The news of the victory flashed all over the country, 
and the loyal heart of the people throbbed with joy. 
General Ilalleck, in an order, thanked Generals Grant 



and a Statesman. 85 

and Buell, " and the officers and men of their respective 
commands, for the bravery and endurance with which 
they sustained the general attack of the enemy on the 
6th, and for the heroic manner in which, on the 7th, 
they defeated and routed the entire rebel army." 

There was, however, a great deal of dissatisfaction 
and technical criticism applied to Grant's action and 
conduct of the battle. The people had hardly yet real- 
ized that war is necessary slaughter ; there had been so 
much talk of the bloodless victories to be gained by 
strategy, and this system of warfare was in such brilliant 
development in the management of the army of the 
Potomac, that most specious u.se was made, by the 
envious detractors of General Grant, of the terrible 
mortality attending his victories. The charge of drunk- 
enness while on duty was also brought against him, and 
although the charge was untrue, yet as it has been 
brought against every public man in the country since 
the time of Washington, and was frequently urged 
against him, it would seem too much to expect that 
Grant could be an exception to this universal penalty 
of greatness. It was objected to him also that he h'ad 
not intrenched his position, though Halleck in general 
terms had ordered it to be fortified ; that he was on the 
wrong side of the river, since in case of defeat he would 
have been overwhelmed ; that he was surprised ; that 
the victory had been gained by Buell's fortunate arrival, 
which Grant could not have counted on ; and so on 
through the entire gamut of petty criticism. There 
are critics who exult in finding flaws in Milton's rheto- 
ric, and Shakespeare's faults in grammar are all that 
many persons can find in his plays. Military genius 
must be liable to similar attacks. 



86 Grant a$ a Soldier 

To those who still think that he risked too much by 
placing his army on the west bank, and thus came very 
near total defeat, we can only quote the words of Gen- 
eral Sherman's letter, which will be found entire in the 
Appendix. " If there were any error in putting that 
army on the west side of the Tennessee, exposed to the 
superior force of the enemy, also assembling at Corinth, 
the mistake was not General Grant's ; but there was no 
mistake. It was necessary that a combat, fierce and 
bitter, to test the manhood of two armies, should come 
off; and that was as good a place as any. It was not, 
then, a question of military skill and strategy, but of 
courage and pluck; and I am convinced that every 
life lost that day to us was necessary ; for otherwise, 
at Corinth, at Memphis, at Vicksburg, we would have 
found harder resistance had we not shown our enemies 
that, rude and untutored as we then were, we could 
fight as well as they." 

The following extract from a speech by General 
Sherman, delivered at St. Louis, on the 19th of July, 
18G5, may also be quoted here in reference to this 
affair. Having reviewed the incidents of the com- 
mencement of the war, the General continued: "Then 
came the landing of forces at Pittsburg Landing. 
Whether it was a mistake in landing them on the west 
instead of the east bank, it is not necessary now to 
discuss. I think it was no mistake. 

"There was gathered the first great army of the West. 
Commencing with only twelve thousand, then twenty, 
then thirty thousand, and we had about thirty-eight 
thousand in that battle; and all I claim for it is, that 
it. was a contest for manhood ; there was no strategy. 



and a Statesman. 87 

Grant was there, and others of us, all young at that 
time, and unknown men, but our enemy was old, and 
Sidney Johnston, whom all the officers remembered as 
a power among the old officers, high above Grant, 
myself, or anybody else, led the enemy on that battle- 
field, and I almost wonder how we conquered. But, as 
I remarked, it was a contest for manhood — man to 
man, soldier to soldier. We fought, and held our 
ground, and therefore counted ourselves victorious. 
From that time forward we had with us the prestige. 
That battle was worth millions and millions to us, by 
reason of the fact of the courage displayed by the 
brave soldiers on that occasion ; and from that time to 
this, I never heard of the first want of courage on the 
part of our northern soldiers. 

" It then became a game of grand war ; armies were 
accounted equal, and skill and generalship came into 
play." 

The present advocates of bloodless victories are prob- 
ably incorrigible; while General Smith and all the 
division commanders, together with Grant, were opposed 
to intrenching the position, on the ground that it would 
tend to injure the morale of the army, who should be 
made to trust in themselves, and not in their intrench- 
ments. Nor can the charge that we were surprised be 
maintained in the face of the present evidence upon 
this point. The enemy came up in force, and we were 
obliged to fall back. There is a military logic in au- 
dacity which rises above the conclusions of the schools. 
This is Grant's justification for selecting his position 
with the river in his rear. He did so as Cortes burned 
his ships when he landed with his handful of men in 



88 Grant as a Soldier 

Mexico. It is reported that Grant once answered the 
question, What he would have done had he been forced 
to cross the stream ? " We would have used the gun- 
boats." " But," continued his questioner, " the gunboats 
could have carried over only ten thousand men at 
most." "Well," said Grant, "there would not have been 
more than ten thousand men to carry over." 

It was this persistence which led him to order Sher- 
man, on the evening of the 6th, before he knew of 
Buell's arrival, to take the offensive the next morning. 
What possibilities an if may conceal, no one can know. 
But it was enough for the loyal men of the country to 
know that Grant gained victories, to feel confidence in 
him, and take him to their hearts. It is said that Lin- 
coln, having been told that Grant drank too much, said 
he wished he knew the brand of the whiskey he used, 
for he would send a barrel of it to every one of his 
generals. Many of these charges having been more 
than insinuated in Congress, Mr. Washburne, one of the 
representatives from Illinois, refuted them in a speech, 
extracts of which will be found in our Appendix. 

One of the great benefits of this action at Pittsburg 
Landing was, that it served to give Grant a greater 
confidence in himself; and as we are, all of us, during 
our whole lives, either educated by circumstances or 
made their sport, he could not escape the effects of this 
universal law. The difference between the ordinary 
and the extraordinary man, between the large majority 
and the exceptional geniuses, lies in the ability of the 
last to derive the materials for education and develop- 
ment from the circumstances which surround them. 
Some men never seem to acquire the power for this, but 



and a Statesman. 89 

drift all their days, to all appearance, as helplessly down 
the stream of life as logs and brushwood down the cur- 
rent of a river; while others, on the contrary, appear 
to obtain such mastery over the circumstances in which 
they are placed, that, in comparison with the others, 
they can be likened only to the steamboats which 
advance in their desired course, despite the opposing 
influence of the current or the wind. In this respect 
the analogies between individuals and societies are 
identical. 

Another great benefit derived from this campaign 
was, that it offered the opportunities for Grant to be- 
come acquainted with the great abilities of Sherman. 
He had been pleased before with the promptness Sher- 
man had shown in forwarding his reinforcements from 
Paducah during the campaign against Fort Donelson ; 
and here he had an opportunity of seeing his value in 
the field. From this campaign, then, we can date the 
commencement of the warm friendship and the mutual 
recognition which exist between these two men, and 
which have already been so fruitful in admirable results 
for the benefit of their countrymen. 



90 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER IX. 



THE SIEGE OF CORINTH. 



After the battle of Pittsburg Landing, General Hal- 
leck took command of the combined army in person, 
issuing at the time an order confirming Generals Grant 
and Buell in their respective positions; and prepara- 
tions were made for an advance against Corinth, to 
protect which Beauregard had sought and lost the 
recent engagement. This village, as we have said, de- 
rived its importance from the fact that it was situated 
at the junction of the Memphis and Charleston and 
the Mobile and Ohio Railways, and was therefore of 
great strategical importance upon the second line 
of interior defence taken up by the Confederacy, to 
prevent the Union forces from penetrating to the heart 
of their territory. Corinth itself is situated upon a low 
and clayey plain, but has natural defences in the ridges 
lying about it. In the country beyond, up to the Ten- 
nessee River, the surface is broken by ridges, streams, 
and marshes. Farmington on the east, and College 
Hill on the north, are the highest points in the vicinity 
of Corinth, and were occupied as the signal-posts of the 
vast intrenchments surrounding the position. 

On the 8th of April, as we have seen, Sherman had 
reconnoitred the road used by the enemy in his retreat 



and a Statesman. 91 

fiom Pittsburg Landing, and had found the roads very 
bad, but strewed with evident signs of his precipitate 
retreat. On the evening of the same clay he returned 
to Pittsburg Landing, and reported the results of his 
observations. On the next day, the 9th, Halleck left 
St. Louis for the scene of action. Before his arrival 
Grant had not been idle; an expedition sent forward 
by his orders, under the command of Sherman, had 
proceeded up the Tennessee, accompanied by gunboats, 
as far as Eastport, and destroyed the railroad bridge 
over Big Bear Creek, east of Iuka. By this, Corinth was 
cut off in its connections, by this route, with Richmond. 
On the 22d of April, General John Pope arrived with 
his army, consisting of twenty-five thousand men, from 
New Madrid. On the 30th, an expedition under General 
Wallace succeeded in destroying the railroad bridge 
on the Mobile and Ohio Railway, four miles beyond 
Purely; thus cutting off from the Confederates at Cor- 
inth all supplies and reinforcements from Jackson, 
Tennessee. 

On his arrival General Halleck took command of 
the combined armies concentrated at Pittsburg Land- 
ing, and naming them collectively " the grand army 
of the Tennessee," divided them as follows : the army 
of the Ohio, under General Buell, holding the centre ; 
the army of the Mississippi, under General Pope, hold- 
ing the left; the army of the Tennessee, under Gen- 
eral Grant, holding the right. The entire force was 
divided into sixteen divisions, eight of which formed the 
army of the Tennessee, four the army of the Mississippi, 
and four the army of the Ohio. Grant's force was 
divided into the right wing under General Thomas, and 



92 Grant as a Soldier 

the reserve under General McClernand. The combined 
Union forces numbered about ninety thousand men. 

At Corinth;, Beauregard, after his failure at Pittsburg 
Landing, had concentrated all the troops he could 
gather. His force contained the remains of the army 
he had led against Grant at Pittsburg Landing ; the 
combined armies of Van Dorn and Price, from Arkansas 
and Missouri; the forces which Lovell had withdrawn 
from New Orleans, when it was taken by the Union army 
on the 28th of April ; and others sent from Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Louisiana. These, combined, numbered 
about sixty-five thousand men, comprising some of the 
best troops in the Confederacy ; and under Beauregard 
they were expected to accomplish great things. 

New Orleans, we must remember, had been captured 
on the 28th of April, and the Mississippi had thus been 
opened at its mouth. Island No. 10 had also fallen, and 
the Confederacy thus kept its hold of the great river 
only in those portions between these two points. The 
beginning of the end commenced to appear. 

On the 1st of May, the grand army of the Tennessee 
was ready to move, and on that day it occupied Monte- 
rey, a small town about half way between Pittsburg 
Landing and Corinth. On the 8th, Beauregard, who 
appears to have been as presumptuous and as unfor- 
tunate with his pen as with his sword, issued the fol- 
lowing grandiloquent order to the forces under his 
command : — 

Headquarters of the Forces at ") 
Corinth, Miss., May 8, JSG2. j" 

Soldikus of Shiloii and Elkhorn : We are about to meet 
once more, in the shock of battle, the invaders of our soil, the 
despoilers of our homes, the disturbers of our family ties, face to 



and a Statesman. 93 

face, hand to Land. We are to decide whether we arc to be free- 
men, or vile slaves of those who are only free in name, and who but 
yesterday were vanquished, although in largely superior numbers, 
in their own encampments, on the ever-memorable field of Sliiloh. 
Let the impending battle decide our fate, and add a more illustri- 
ous page to the history of our revolution — one to which our chil- 
dren will point with noble pride, saying, "Our fathers were at the 
battle of Corinth." I congratulate you on your timely junction. 
With our mingled banners, for the first time during the war, we 
shall meet our foe in strength that should give us victory. Soldiers, 
can the result be doubtful? Shall we not drive back in Tennessee 
the presumptuous mercenaries collected for our subjugation? One 
more manly effort, and trusting in God and the justness of our 
cause, we shall recover more than we lately lost. Let the sound 
of our victorious guns be reechoed by those of the army of Vir- 
ginia on the historic battle-field of Yorktown. 

P. G. T. Beauregaed, General commanding. 

It is one of the singular pieces of poetic justice, of 
which the history of the rebellion is so full, that this 
appeal to the " soldiers of Shiloh and Elkhorn," in both 
of which fields they had been unsuccessful, was in- 
tended to stimulate their valor by an allusion to York- 
town, which was evacuated on the 8th, the date of the 
order, by the Confederate forces in Virginia. The pen 
is mightier than the sword, and is a more dangerous 
double-edged implement when wielded by those whose 
insolent ignorance is their only claim to its use. 

On the 3d of May our advance had reached a point 
eight miles from Corinth; and the same day a portion of 
the army occupied Farmington, the garrison of which, 
numbering four thousand five hundred men, under Gen- 
eral Marmaduke, retired to Corinth, after a very plight 
resistance. At the same time an expedition proceeded 
on the Memphis and Charleston Railway as far as Glen- 
dale, destroying the track and the bridges. 



94 Grant as a Soldier 

In this advance of the grand army of the Tennessee, 
Grant was the second in command; and the difference 
in its operations is sufficiently explained by this. fact. 
The order of the day was intrenchment, and no advance 
was made in which the spade did not play a very im- 
portant part as a subsidiary implement of war. On 
the 11th a consultation was held at General Halleck's 
headquarters, and a general advance decided on. On 
the 17th General Sherman came into actual conflict 
with a portion of the Confederate army, posted at Rus- 
sell's house, on the road to Corinth, and drove them 
from this position. It was now decided that Corinth 
should be reduced by regular approaches, and Beaure- 
gard, as an engineer, knew that the result could only 
be a postponement of his surrender. Besides, *too, as 
his position depended upon the Confederacy holding the 
Mississippi, and as it was questionable whether Mem- 
phis and Vicksburg would remain in their hands, now 
that New Orleans and Island No. 10 had fallen, it was 
his evident plan of action to evacuate the position. 
His apparent defence was, therefore, nothing but a 
blind, in order to gain time, and his bold front nothing 
but a trick, to enable him to retreat unmolested. This 
he did on the 28th and 29th of May, just one month 
after the siege commenced. On the 30th of May our 
troops occupied the town, and the second line of the in- 
terior defence, selected by the Confederates themselves, 
was taken by the Union army, and they were forced to 
fall back upon their third, the strategic points of which 
were Vicksburg, Jackson, Meriden, and Selma. 

The pursuit was immediately begun, and continued 
until the 10th, when Beauregard, having taken up a 



and a Statesman. 95 

strong position at Tupelo, where the railway is crossed 
by Oldtown Creek, one of the feeders of the Tombigbee, 
Halleck, anxious concerning his communications, and 
being desirous of strengthening his base, stopped the 
pursuit, and the army returned to Corinth. 

At Tupelo, on the 13th of June, Beauregard wrote 
his report, in which he says that he had " accomplished 
his purposes and ends ;" that he had twice offered battle 
to the Union army, which they declined ; and the im- 
pression he would give is, that the occupation of Corinth 
was simply a temporary expedient, to be abandoned 
when other and more important matters were prepared 
and made ready for action. The best commentary on 
this report is the following list of elates. On the 28th 
of April New Orleans had become ours. Yorktown was 
evacuated on the 3d and 4th of May. Fort Pillow, on 
the Mississippi, was evacuated on the 4th of June; and 
Memphis, on the 6th, was captured by the fleet, after 
a most brilliant action, in which three of the largest 
Confederate vessels were sunk, one burned, and three 
captured, while in the Union fleet only one vessel was 
temporarily injured ; no one was killed, and Colonel 
Ellet, the daring commander of the Monarch, the only 
man wounded. The time for even the South to place 
any confidence in the boasting promises of their leaders 
was past. But the unscrupulous rulers had seized the 
reins of power, and showed no intention to surrender 
their hold of them. They established a military des- 
potism as severe and uncompromising as has ever been 
seen. A sweeping conscription act was passed by the 
Congress, giving the President power to impress all 
white men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, 
7 



96 Grant as a Soldier 

for three years or for the war. Soon after camps of in- 
struction were established in every state, and the levies 
were distributed proportionally among the states. In 
this way every nerve was strained to recover their lost 
ground and repair their broken fortunes. The result 
was a partial success in the East, marked by the suc- 
cesses in the Peninsula, the victories of the second Bull 
Run, and the advance into Maryland. 

In the West the same efforts were made, and the 
manner in which they were met by Grant will form 
the subject for some future chapters. On the 15th of 
June, having been for some time in bad health, Beaure- 
gard left the army at Tupelo, relieving himself from 
duty, on the certificate of two surgeons, in order to 
recuperate by rest. He retired to Bladen Springs, 
turning over the command to Bragg during his ab- 
sence, with instructions looking to the preparation of 
the army for the field at once on his return, which he 
anticipated would be in three weeks. No sooner, how- 
ever, did Jefferson Davis hear of this step, than he 
telegraphed to Bragg to assume permanent command ; 
declaring, passionately, that Beauregard, thus laid upon 
the shelf, should not be reinstated by him, though the 
whole world should urge him to it. Thus Beauregard 
passed out of prominence upon the scene, and was not 
to be heard from again during the war, except in an 
unimportant command at Charleston and the last cam- 
paign before Richmond, where he gave evidence that 
his genius for braggadocio and his talent for failure 
still flourished in unimpaired vigor. 



and a Statesman. 97 



CHAPTER X. 

NEW DISPOSITION OF THE FORCES. — THE CIVIL DUTIES 
OF THE MILITARY POWER. 

On the 11th of July, General Halleck, by general 
orders from the War Department, was called to 
Washington, and assigned the command, as General- 
in-chief, of the whole land forces of the United States. 
This caused a new arrangement in the disposition of 
the armies in the West. New departments were cre- 
ated out of the original department of the Mississippi. 
General Buell was given the department of the Ohio, 
embracing the country north and east of the Ten- 
nessee River. Missouri was also made a separate de- 
partment ; while all the country from the Mississippi 
| River to the western shore of the Tennessee, Cairo, Forts 
Henry and Donelson, the western shore of the Missis- 
sippi River, and the northern part of the State of Mis- 
sissippi, were grouped into the department of West 
Tennessee, and of this Grant was given the command, 
with his headquarters at Corinth. 

Memphis was surrendered on the 6th of June, 1862, 
soon after the evacuation of Corinth, and was imme- 
diately occupied by the Union troops, and became a 
very important post in Grant's department, both as a 
base for operations and for supplies. In the mean 



98 Grant as a Soldier 

time, as there was but little fighting in his depart- 
ment from June till September, 1862, his attention 
was chiefly occupied with the reorganization of his 
forces, and his preparations for a campaign against 
Vicksburg, which was evidently the next point to be 
taken. It will be well here to consider, for a moment, 
the qualities of a statesman which he developed in his 
management of the turbulent and unconquered Con- 
federate material which he found in his department, 
and particularly in Memphis. A selection of some of 
his orders, bearing upon the aid given by sympathiz- 
ers with the rebellion to its armies; upon the sup- 
pression of illicit and contraband trade ; upon the 
unmixed evils resulting from the guerrilla system, 
which flourished with great vigor about Memphis ; and 
upon other similar subjects, — will be found interesting 
and instructive. There was one idea running through 
the whole of them — that loyalty to the government 
must be unconditional ; and we also find in them early 
indications of the spirit of economy which has always 
characterized Grant's financial administration. 



Special Orders, No. 4. 

IEE, \ 

I I 



Headquarters District of West Tennessee, 
Office Provost Marshal General, 
Memphis, June 28, 1862- 



Passes issued for persons to pass out of the city will be un- 
derstood to mean the person alone, and will not include goods, 
letters, or packages. 

Where letters are found on persons passing out, without being 
marked PASSED by the Provost Marshal, Post Commander, or 
General commanding, they will be seized and delivered to the 
Provost Marshal, and the offender arrested. 

Powder, lead, percussion caps, and fire-arms of all descriptions, 



and a Statesman. 99 

are positively prohibited from being carried out of the city by cit- 
izens. Citizens are also prohibited from carrying them within the 
city limits on pain of forfeiture of such weapons, and ten days' 
confinement for the first offence, and expulsion south of our lines, 
to be treated as spies if ever caught within them thereafter, for the 
second. 

By command of Major General U. S. Grant. 

Wm. S. Hillyer, Provost Marshal General. 

Finding that the above appeared to have had 
no effect in stopping the illicit traffic, General Grant 
issued the following, which was of great service in re- 
storing the city of Memphis to order and loyalty : — 



Special Orders, JVo. 13. 

District of West Tennessee, 
Office of the Provost Marshal General 
Memphis, Tenn., July 9, 1862 



BE, J 

: 1 



All passes heretofore issued to citizens, either by the command- 
ing General, the Provost Marshal General, the Provost Marshal of 
Memphis, or any other officer, which may have been issued without 
the party being required to take the oath of allegiance, or give 
the prescribed parole of honor, are hereby revoked. 

No pass will be granted in any case hereafter, except upon the 
taking of the oath or parole. 

The parole will be substituted for the oath only in special cases 
(at the discretion of the officer authorized to grant passes), where 
the party lives beyond the protection of our army. 

By command of Major General Grant. 

Wm. S. Hillyer, Provost Marshal General. 

Special Orders, No. 14. 

District of West Tennessee, \ 

Office Provost Marshal General, \ 

Memphis, July 10, 1862. j 

The constant communication between the so-called Confederate 
army and their friends and sympathizers in the city of Memphis, 



100 Grant as a Soldier 

despite the orders heretofore issued, and the efforts to enforce them, 
induced the issuing of the following order : — 

The families now residing in the city of Memphis, of the follow- 
ing persons, are required to move south, beyond the lines, within 
five days from the date hereof. 

First. All persons holding commissions in the so-called Con- 
federate army, or who have voluntarily enlisted in said army, or 
who accompany and are connected with the same. 

Second. All persons holding office under or in the employ of 
the so-called Confederate government. 

Third. All persons holding state, county, or municipal offices, 
who claim allegiance to said so-called Confederate government, 
and who have abandoned their families and gone south. 

Safe conduct will be given to the parties hereby required to 
leave, upon application to the Provost Marshal of Memphis. 

By command of Major General Gkant. 



Special Orders, No. 15. 

District of West Tennessee 
Office of the Provost Marshal General, 
Memphis, Tenn., July 11, 1862 



EE, \ 

: I 



In order that innocent, peaceable, and well-disposed persons 
may not suffer for the bad conduct of the guilty parties coming 
within the purview of Special Order No. 14, dated July 10, 1862, 
they can be relieved from the operation of said Order No. 14 by 
siguing the following parole, and producing to the Provost Marshal 
General, or the Provost Marshal of Memphis, satisfactory guaran- 
tees that they will keep the pledge therein made : — 

PAROLE. 

First. I have not, since the occupation of the city of Mem- 
phis by the Federal army, given any aid to the so-called Confed- 
erate army, nor given or sent any information of the movements, 
strength, or position of the Federal army to any one connected 
with said Confederate army. 

Second. I will not, during the occupancy of Memphis by the 
Federal army and my residing therein, oppose or conspire against 
the civil or military authority of the United States, and I will 



4ND a Statesman. 101 

not give aid, comfort, information, or encouragement to the so- 
called Confederate army, nor to any person cooperating therewith. 

All of which I state and pledge upon my sacred honor. 

By command of Major General Grant. 

Wm. S. Hillyer, Provost Marshal General. 

As a warning to the guerrillas who were operating 
about Memphis, destroying cotton and plundering from 
friend and foe, the following order was also issued : — 

General Order, No. 60. 

Headquarters District of West Tennessee, i 
Memphis, Tenn., July 3, 18G2. ) 

The system of guerrilla warfare now being prosecuted by some 
troops organized under authority of the so-called Southern Confed- 
eracy, and others without such authority, being so pernicious to 
the welfare of the community where it is carried on, and it being 
within the power of the community to suppress this system, it is 
ordered that, wherever loss is sustained by the government, collec- 
tions shall be made, by seizure of a sufficient amount of personal 
property, from persons in the immediate neighborhood sympathiz- 
ing with the rebellion, to remunerate the government for all loss 
and expense of the same. 

Persons acting as guerrillas without organization, and without 
uniform to distinguish them from private citizens, are not entitled 
to the treatment of prisoners of war when caught, and will not 
receive such treatment. 

By order of Major General TJ. S. Grant. 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 

Though it is always undesirable to interfere with the 
freedom of the press, yet this term does not include 
license ; and war being itself a condition to be greatly 
deprecated, it is manifestly impossible for an army in 
possession of a disaffected country to allow the unre- 
stricted publication of impassioned appeals to the 
people. The press is, no doubt, a most powerful agent 



102 Grant as a Soldier 

in the diffusion of intelligence, and the development 
of civilization among the people ; but when it prosti- 
tutes itself, as the southern press . did, to becoming 
merely a bitter partisan organ, misleading the people, 
concealing the truth, and diffusing error, it must be 
dealt with strictly and firmly. The following order 
shows Grant's action in such a case : — 



iEE, \ 

I I 



Headquarters District of West Tennessee, 
Office Provost Marshal General, 
Memphis, Tenn., July 1, 1862. 
Messrs. Wills, Bingham & Co., 

Proprietors of the Memphis Avalanche. 
You will suspend the further publication of your paper. The 
spirit with which it is conducted is regarded as both incendiary 
and treasonable, and its issue cannot longer be tolerated. 

This order will be strictly observed from the time of its re- 
ception. 

By command of Major General U. S. Grant. 

Wm. S. Hillyer, Provost Marshal General. 

Memphis, July 1, 1862. 
The Avalanche can continue by the withdrawal of the author 
of the obnoxious article under the caption of "Mischief Makers," 
and the editorial allusion to the same. 

U. S. Grant, Major General. 

To our Patrons. — For reasons apparent from the foregoing 
order, I withdraw from the editorial management of The Ava- 
lanche. Self-respect and the spirit of true journalism forbid any 
longer attempt to edit a paper. I approved and indorsed the 
articles in question. Prudence forbids my saying more, and duty 
less, to the public. 

Jeptha Fowlkes. 

The ruinous system of guerrilla warfare continuing, 
and it being found almost impossible to stop the contra- 
band trade, which was being carried on through Mem- 



and a Statesman. 103 

phis, in aid of the rebellion, General Grant appointed 
General Sherman to the command of that city, with the 
full knowledge that his decision would soon check both 
these nuisances. On the 21st of July, 1862, General 
Sherman assumed the command, and from the following 
order we may judge of the vigorous means taken for 
the suppression of these illegal operations : — 

U. S. Military Telegraph, Corinth, July 26, 1862. 
To Brigadier General J. T. Qltmbt, Columbus, Ky. 

General: Examine the baggage of all speculators coming 
South, and when they have specie turn them back ; if medicine 
and other contraband articles, arrest them and confiscate the con- 
traband articles. Jews should receive special attention. 

(Signed) U. S. Grant, Major General. 

The most stringent measures were also adopted 
against all guerrillas and their agents, and the fol- 
lowing despatch is an evidence of the manner in 
which the orders were carried out : — 

Trenton, Tenn., July 29, 1862. 
General: The man who guided the rebels to the bridge that 
was burned was hung to-day. He had taken the oath. The houses 
of four others who aided have been burned to the ground. 

(Signed) G. M. Dodge, Brigadier General. 

On July 28, General Grant ordered General Sher- 
man to take possession of all unoccupied dwellings, 
manufactories, and stores, within the city of Memphis, 
to hire them out, and to collect the rents for the United 
States government, in all cases where the owners were 
absent, engaged in arms against the United States. 
This plan was adopted to prevent the property being 
destroyed or abused, as well as to bring in a revenue 



104 Grant as a Soldier 

from rebel sources to help pay the expenses of the 
war. 

The large number of negroes who had found refuge 
within the Union lines being a serious tax upon the 
resources of the army, it was decided that they should 
be put at some useful employment. General Grant, 
therefore, to remedy the evil in his own special depart- 
ment, issued the following order, which contains certain 
regulations in relation to both the negro refugees and 
the carrying out of the confiscation law, as passed by 
the Houses of Congress, and signed by the President : — 

General Orders, No. 72. 

Headquarters Department of West Tennessee, 1 
Corinth, Miss., August 11, 1862. ] 

The recent Act of Congress prohibits the army from returning 
fugitives from labor to their claimants, and authorizes the employ- 
ment of such persons in the service of the government. The fol- 
lowing orders are therefore published for the guidance of the army 
in this matter. 

1. All fugitives thus employed must be registered ; the names 
of the fugitives and claimant given, and must be borne upon the 
morning report of the command in which they are kept, showing 
how they are employed. 

2. Fugitives may be employed as laborers in the quartermaster's, 
subsistence, and engineer's department; and whenever by such 
employment a soldier may be saved to its ranks, they may be em- 
ployed as teamsters and as company cooks, not exceeding four to 
a company, or as hospital attendants and nurses. Officers may 
employ them as private servants, in which latter case the fugitives 
will not be paid or rationed by the government. Negroes thus 
employed must be secured as authorized persons, and will be ex- 
cluded from the camps. 

3. Officers and soldiers are positively prohibited from enticing 
slaves to leave their masters. When it becomes necessary to em- 
ploy this kind of labor, the commanding officer of the post or 



and a Statesman. 105 

troops must send details, all under the charge of a suitable com- 
missioned officer, to press into service the slaves of persons to 
the number required. 

4. Citizens within reach of any military station, known to be 
disloyal and dangerous, may be ordered away or arrested, and their 
crops and stock taken for the benefit of the government or the use 
of the army. 

5. All property taken from rebel owners must be duly reported 
and used for the benefit of the government, and be issued to the 
troops through the proper department ; and, when practicable, the 
act of taking should be accompanied by the written certificate of 
the officer so taking to the owner or agent of such property. 

It is enjoined on all commanders to see that this order is exe- 
cuted strictly under their own direction. The demoralization of 
troops consequent upon being left to execute laws in their own way 
without a proper head must be avoided. 

By command of Major General Grant. 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 

Advantage had been taken of the advance of onr 
armies, by many of the lawless population of the South, 
to come within our lines, and thus escape the effect of 
the strict conscription acts of the Confederate govern- 
ment. These men were generally of a disreputable 
character, and made their living by following the army, 
robbing the soldiers, or trading with the rebels. To 
meet their cases, the following order was issued by 
General Grant from his departmental headquarters : — 

General Orders, iVb. 74. 
Headquarters Department of West Tennessee, 1 
Corinth, Miss., August 16, 1SG2. j 
1. All non-residents of this department, found within the same, 
who, if at home, would be subject to draft, will at once be enrolled 
under the supervision of the local commanders where they may be 
found, and, in case of a draft being made by their respective states, 
an equal proportion will be drawn from persons thus enrolled. 



106 Grant as a Soldier 

Persons so drawn will at once be assigned to troops from the 
states to which they owe military service, and the executive thereof 
notified of such draft. 

2. All violation of trade by army followers may be punished by 
confiscation of stock in trade, and the assignment of offenders to do 
military duty as private soldiers. 

By command of Major General TJ. S. Grant. 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 

It must be remembered that this was in 1862, and 
that neither the government nor the people had yet 
reached the point of using the negroes as soldiers. 
While Grant as a soldier has the invaluable qualities of 
fully accepting the responsibilities of his position, when 
they devolve upon him naturally, he has also the not 
less important quality of a soldier, of following orders 
without comment. 

We thus find that sound judgment, clear, good com- 
mon sense, and an eminently practical mode of action 
characterize Grant's behavior in all the political emer- 
gencies which the anomalous position of our armies in 
the field forced frequently upon our generals ; and also 
that he handles the pen as decisively as he does his 
sword. 



and a Statesman. 107 



CHAPTER XI. 

THE BATTLE OF ITJEA. — THE COMBINATION OF STEATEGY 
AND ACTION. 

During the summer montns of 1862, the active 
operations in the field, in Grant's department, were 
confined generally to skirmishes ; but by his constant 
cavalry reconnoissances he kept himself well informed 
of the whereabouts of the enemy. Under General 
Bragg, the Confederates had collected a force at Chat- 
tanooga, Tennessee, which was designed to make a flank 
movement through East Tennessee and Kentucky to 
the Ohio. Meanwhile General Pope, who had com- 
manded the army of the Mississippi in the advance 
upon Corinth, had been called to take command of 
the army of the Potomac, and his place was given to 
General Rosecrans, who had gained so excellent a rep- 
utation in West Virginia. During the whole summer, 
also, the Confederates had been straining every nerve 
to make Vicksburg strong enough to withstand any at- 
tack which mio-ht be brought against it. It was their 
last stand on the Mississippi River, and one of their 
plans for its defence appears to have been to operate 
against Grant, and prevent his giving his whole atten- 
tion to its capture. At the same time it was impor- 
tant that Grant, before advancing against Vicksburg, 



108 Grant as a Soldier 

should protect himself from any attacks in his rear, 
by destroying the armies which could thus operate 
to annoy him. The details of the operations to secure 
these ends will occupy our attention before entering 
immediately upon the operations before Vicksburg. 

Early in September, General Sterling Price, who had 
gained an unenviable reputation early in the war, in 
Missouri, advanced from the south to cross the Charles- 
ton and Memphis Railway at some point between Cor- 
inth and Tuscumbia, probably at Iuka. On the 10th 
of September he reached Jacinto, the small Union gar- 
rison of which fell back upon Corinth. Tuscumbia 
was also vacated by the Union garrison which held 
it, they falling back upon Iuka ; while the garrison at 
Iuka was also withdrawn to Corinth. Price therefore 
occupied this latter place, and Grant's object was to 
discover what the enemy's plan was. The reports con- 
cerning Price's intentions were numerous and conflict- 
ing. By patient and shrewd observation Grant became 
convinced that Price's design was to make a feint of 
crossing the Tennessee as though to attack Buell, who 
was then falling back upon Nashville, in order to in- 
duce Grant to march against him, and, by withdraw- 
ing his army from Corinth, make that strong point an 
easy prey to Van Dorn, who was advancing against it 
with all possible haste. 

Having fathomed this design, the next thing was 
to counteract it, and render it injurious, instead of ben- 
eficial, to its formers. It did not take long to conclude 
what should be the proper course of action. By his 
scouts ({rant knew that it would take Van Dorn four 
days to reach Corinth, and within this time he deter- 



and a Statesman. 109 

mined to attack Price, to defeat, and if possible destroy, 
his army, and then return to his position at Corinth, in 
time to receive Van Dorn on his arrival. There were 
only four days for this, so that not an hour was to be 
lost. 

He therefore directed General Ord, with a force of 
three thousand men, to move upon the left of the 
railway, through Burnsville to Iuka, while General Ross 
was telegraphed to advance at full speed from Boli- 
var, on the same route, and join Ord with three thou- 
sand five hundred more men. This combined force 
was to attack Price on the north wherever an oppor- 
tunity should offer for so doing. At the same time 
Rosecrans was ordered to advance with his men, by 
way of Jacinto, to strike the enemy's flank, while Ham- 
ilton, moving round by the Fulton road, should cut off 
his southward retreat, or turn it to a rout. The force 
commanded by Rosecrans was about nine thousand 
men. This combined movement began on the morn- 
ing of September 18. That night, after marching 
through a drenching rain, Rosecrans and his army ar- 
rived at Jacinto. 

The next morning, advancing early, they pushed on 
to Iuka, and finding the enemy upon an exterior ridge, 
engaged him ; and the fighting continued until night. 
The ground was very much broken, so that it was diffi- 
cult to bring the troops into action in large masses ; yet 
the fighting was very severe, and the loss very large. 
The guns of the Eleventh Ohio were lost and retaken 
three or four times during the day, and at nightfall re- 
mained in the hands of the enemy. This battery was 
one belonging to Hamilton's -division, and, despite this 



110 Grant as a Soldier 

result, was so admirably handled by that officer, that he 
received the special encomiums of both Grant and 
Kosecrans. 

On the morning of the 18th, Grant had started with 
Orel's column, and expected on reaching the ground to 
be in constant communication with Rosecrans, so that 
the two divisions should be able to act together and 
simultaneously. 

On arriving upon the ground, however, the tangled 
nature of the country rendered it necessary, it was 
found, to send despatches so long a way round, that they 
constantly arrived too late, caused frequent misunder- 
standings, and prevented the timely cooperation of the 
forces. The next morning Rosecrans was ready to re- 
commence the action, but found that the enemy had 
retreated. Price hastened to Bay Springs, a place about 
twenty-seven miles south of Iuka, on the Fulton road. 
He had lost upwards of a thousand prisoners, and left 
his dead and wounded on the field. On their retreat 
Price's men committed all kinds of outrages, as we learn 
from Confederate accounts, upon the people of the 
country through which they passed. The men were 
completely demoralized, and their officers could not 
restrain them if they wished. Sending the following 
report of the engagement by telegraph from Iuka, on 
the 20th, Grant on the 22d withdrew his forces to Cor- 
inth, to prepare for the reception of Van Dorn's ap- 
proaching attack. 

Iuka, Miss., September 20, 1862. 
To Major General H. W. Halleck, General-in- Chief. 

General Rosecrans, with Stanley's and Hamilton's divisions 
and Misener's cavalry, attacked Price south of this village about 



and a Statesman. Ill 

two hours before dark yesterday, and had a sharp fight until 
night dosed in. General Ord was to the north with an armed 
force of about five thousand men, and had some skirmishing with 
the rebel pickets. This morning the fight was renewed by Gen- 
eral Rosecrans, who was nearest to the "town; but it was found 
that the enemy had been evacuating during the night, going 
south. Generals Hamilton and Stanley, with cavalry, are in full 
pursuit 

This will, no doubt, break up the enemy, and possibly force them 
to abandon much of their artillery. The loss on either side, in 
killed and wounded, is from four to five hundred. The enemy's 
loss in arms, tents, &c, will be large. We have about two hun- 
dred and fifty prisoners. 

I have reliable intelligence that it was Price's intention to 
move over east of the Tennessee. In this he has been thwarted. 
Among the enemy's loss are General Little, killed, and General 
Whitefield, wounded. 

I cannot speak too highly of the energy and skill displayed by 
General Rosecrans in the attack, and of the endurance of the 
troops. General Ord's command showed untiring zeal ; but the 
direction taken by the enemy prevented them from taking the 
active part they desired. Price's force was about eighteen thou- 
sand. 

U. S. Grant, Major General. 

The examination of the field, after the first excite- 
ment of the battle was over, showed a still more favor- 
able result for the Union forces, as may be judged by 
the following despatch : — 

Headquarters Corinth, September 22, 18G2. 
Major General Halleck, General-in- Chief. 

In my despatch of the 20th our loss was over-estimated, and the 
rebel loss under-estimated. We found two hundred and sixty-one 
of them dead upon the field, while our loss in killed will be less 
than one hundred. 

U. S. Grast, Major General. 
8 



112 Grant as a Soldier 

General Grant, on the same day that he sent the 
above despatch, issued the following order, compliment- 
ing his officers and men upon their bravery, not forget- 
ting those who fell on that occasion : — 

General Field Orders, No. 1. 

Headquarters Department op West Tennessee, ~> 
Corinth, September 22, 1862. | 

The General commanding takes great pleasure in congratu- 
lating the two wings of the army, commanded respectively by 
Major General Ord and Major General Rosecrans, upon the en- 
ergy, alacrity, and bravery displayed by them on the 19th and 
20th inst., in their movement against the enemy at Iuka. Al- 
though the enemy was in numbers reputed far greater than their 
own, nothing was evinced by the troops but a burning desire to 
meet him, whatever his numbers, and however strong his position. 

With such a disposition as was manifested by the troops on this 
occasion, their commanders need never fear defeat against any- 
thing but overwhelming numbers. 

While it was the fortune of the command of General Rosecrans, 
on the evening of the 19th inst., to engage the enemy in a most 
spirited fight for more than two hours, driving him with great loss 
from his position, and winning for themselves fresh laurels, the 
command of General Ord is entitled to equal credit for their ef- 
forts in trying to reach the enemy, and in diverting his attention. 

And while congratulating the noble living, it is meet to 
offer our condolence to the friends of the heroic dead, who offered 
their lives a sacrifice in defence of constitutional libertg, and in 
their fall rendered memorable the field of Iuka. 

By command of Major General U. S. Grant. 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 



and a Statesman. 113 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE BATTLE OF COKINTH. 

When Corinth had been in the possession of the Con- 
federates under Beauregard, the line of defences con- 
structed for its protection were so extended, reaching 
about fifteen miles, and requiring such numbers to man 
them, that Halleck, on taking possession of the place 
had had an interior line built, which could be manned 
by a much smaller number. Grant was not, however, 
satisfied with these, and said to General Halleck, that 
they would be admirable if we had an army of one 
hundred thousand men to defend them. When Gen- 
eral Halleck, therefore, went to Washington, Major F. 
E. Prime, under Grant's direction, made a plan for a 
still further interior and more compact line of defences, 
the work upon which was pushed forward with vigor, 
so that on the 25th of September they were about 
completed. Upon this day, General Rosecrans, under 
Grant's orders, took command at Corinth, while Ord 
was stationed at Bolivar, which might be the point of 
Van Dorn's attack, and where, in any event, he would 
be within easy distance, while Grant removed his head- 
quarters to Jackson. General Hurlbut was stationed 
with his division at Pocahontas. 

The Confederates combined their forces for this at- 
tack. Price, after leaving Iuka, joined Van Dorn, by 



114 Grant as a Soldier 

a circuitous route, at Dumas, and their united force 
moved northward to Pocahontas, where they met the 
troops under Mansfield Lovell, and the entire army 
then advanced by the railroad to Corinth. Eosecrans, 
having called in his outposts, awaited the attack, which 
came with impetuous force on the 3d of October. 
The Confederates were in large force, and pressed vig- 
orously upon the works. During the day of the 3d, 
they gained ground ; our troops being drawn in to 
concentrate in the works immediately surrounding the 
position. Deceived by the apparent ease of his first 
day's success, Van Dorn sent a telegraph to Richmond, 
announcing a great victory. 

The next day, the 4th of October, the assault was 
repeated with even increased determination. The 
impetuousness of the assault was equalled only by the 
stubbornness of the resistance. At one time the head 
of the column penetrated into the town, but they 
were driven back by our artillery, supported by in- 
fantry. The battle raged with inconceivable fury the 
whole morning. Time after time the advancing wave 
of living men is broken by the murderous fire of our 
guns, and falls away only to re-form and surge again 
tumultuously against our defences, only to meet again 
with a similar reception. But the Confederate valor 
was of no avail. At noon the battle was ended. 
Having waited a short time, after the last repulse, for 
the enemy's reappearance, our skirmishers advance to 
find that they have retired. Rosecrans gallops along 
the whole length of our line, to give the information, 
to cheer our exhausted men, to give them rest and 
rations, and to inspirit them for the pursuit early the 



and a Statesman. 115 

next morning. The enemy's loss was one thousand 
four hundred and twenty-three killed, and upwards of 
five thousand wounded. Two thousand two hundred 
and forty-eight prisoners were taken, with fourteen 
colors and ten guns. 

Our infantry followed the retreating enemy forty 
miles, and the cavalry sixty miles ; while on the morn- 
ing of the 5th, near Pocahontas, they were met by 
Hurlbut, who drove them back towards Corinth. Dur- 
ing the day, Orel, coming up, assumed the command, 
but fell, severely wounded, and Hurlbut took his place. 
The fighting here was again severe, and the retreating 
army was driven to make a circuit, and cross the 
Hatchie six miles above where they had intended. 
The following despatches from General Grant tell the 
story with military brevity and conciseness : — 



Headquarters Jackson, Tenn., 
October 5, 8 A. M. 



} 

To Major Gei^eral H. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chief United States Army. 

Yesterday the rebels under Price, Van Dorn, and Lovell were 
repulsed from their attack on Corinth with great slaughter. 

The enemy are in full retreat, leaving their dead and wounded 
on the field. 

Rosecrans telegraphs that the loss is serious on our side, par- 
ticularly in officers, but bears no comparison with that of the 
enemy. 

General Hackleman fell while gallantly leading his brigade. 

General Oglesby is dangerously wounded. 

General McPherson, with his command, reached Corinth yes- 
terday. 

General Rosecrans pursued the retreating enemy this morning, 
and, should they attempt to move towards Bolivar, will follow to 
that place. 



116 Grant as a Soldier 

General Hurlbut is at the Hatchie River with five or six thou- 
sand men, and is, no doubt, with the pursuing column. 

From seven hundred to a thousand prisoners, besides the 
wounded, are left in our hands. 

U. S. Grant, Major General commanding. 

Headquarters, Jackson, Tenn., ) 
October 5, 1862. J 
To Major General H. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chief United States Army. 
General Ord, who followed General Hurlbut, met the enemy 
to-day on the south side of the Hatchie, as I understand from a 
despatch, and drove them across the stream, and got possession of 
the heights with our troops. 

General Ord took two batteries and about two hundred pris- 
oners. 
A large portion of General Rosecrans's forces were at Chevalla 
At this distance everything looks most favorable, and I cannot 
see how the enemy are to escape without losing everything but 
their small arms. 

I have strained everything to take into the fight an adequate 
force, and to get them to the right place. 

U. S. Grant, Major General commanding. 

The General issued also the following congratulatory 
order to the army. 

General Orders, No. 88. 

Headquarters Department of West Tennessee, i 
Jackson, Tenn., October 7, 1862. \ 

It is with heartfelt gratitude the General commanding con- 
gratulates the armies of the West for another great victory won 
by them on the 3d, 4th, and 5th instant, over the combined armies 
of Van Dora, Price, and Lovell. 

The enemy chose his own time and place of attack, and know- 
ing the troops of the West as he does, and with great facilities for 
knowing their numbers, never would have made the attempt, 
except with a superior force numerically. But for the undaunted 



and a Statesman. 117 

bravery of officers and soldiers who have yet to learn defeat, the 
efforts of the enemy must have proved successful. 

Whilst one division of the army, under Major General Rose- 
crans, was resisting and repelling the onslaught of the rebel hosts 
at Corinth, another, from Bolivar, under Major General Ilurlbut, 
was marching upon the enemy's rear, driving in their pickets and 
cavalry, and attracting the Attention of a large force of infantry 
and artillery. On the following day, under Major General Ord, 
these forces advanced with unsurpassed gallantry, driving the 
enemy back across the Hatchie, over ground where it is almost 
incredible that a superior force should be driven by an inferior, 
capturing two of the batteries (eight guns), many hundred small 
arms, and several hundred prisoners. 

To those two divisions of the army all praise is due, and will be 
awarded by a grateful country. 

Between them there should be, and I trust are, the warmest 
bonds of brotherhood. Each was risking life in the same cause, 
and, on this occasion, risking it also to save and assist the other. 
No troops could do more than these separate armies. Each did 
all possible for it to do in the places assigned it. 

As in all great battles, so in this, it becomes our fate to mourn 
the loss of many brave and faithful officers and soldiers, who have 
given up their lives as a sacrifice for a great principle. The 
nation mourns for them. 

By command of Major General U. S. Grant. 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 

President Lincoln, on receiving General Grant's de- 
spatch giving the news of the victory, returned the fol- 
lowing characteristic reply : — 

Washington, D. C, October 8, 1862. 
Major General Grant. 

I congratulate you and all concerned in your recent battles and 
victories. How does it all sum up ? I especially regret the death 
of General Hackleman, and am very anxious to know the condi- 
tion of General Oglesby, who is an intimate personal friend. 

A. Lincoln. 



118 Grant as a Soldier 

The answer to the President's shrewd inquiry will 
show the results of the whole movement. The brief cam- 
paign had displayed Grant's military judgment, and the 
admirable clearness of his perceptions. He had divined 
the intentions of the enemy, had shown himself able to 
plan and execute a combined movement, and that he 
was a master of military strategy in the best sense of 
this much misused word. He had enticed Price to 
Iuka, and had defeated him there, and had thus ob- 
tained information which made his surmise a certainty 
that Price and Van Dorn were acting in concert. He 
had made the way clear for his campaign against 
Vicksburg, and had prepared himself and his soldiers 
for that brilliant military drama ; and, further, these 
active operations in the field afforded him the means 
of becoming acquainted with the qualities of his offi- 
cers, and enabled him to make that rare selection of 
his immediate aids which organized the final overthrow 
of the rebellion. The sum, it will be found, is capable 
of proof. 



and a Statesman. 119 



CHAPTER XIII. 

A BROADER FIELD OF ACTION. — PREPARING FOR VICKS- 

BURG. 

By general orders from the War Department, dated 
October 16, General Grant was assigned to the depart- 
ment of the Tennessee. Since the departure of Gen- 
eral Halleck for Washington^ he had virtually held 
this position, but now assumed it officially, in the fol- 
lowing order: — 

General Orders, No. 1. 

Headquarters Department op the Tennessee, ) 
Jackson, Tenn., October 25, 1862. $ 

I. In compliance with General Orders, No. 159, A. G. O., War 
Department, of date October 16, 1862, the undersigned hereby 
assumes command of the department of the Tennessee, which in- 
cludes Cairo, Fort Henry, and Fort Donelson, Northern Mississippi, 
and the portions of Kentucky and Tennessee west of the Ten- 
nessee River. 

II. Headquarters of the department of the Tennessee will 
remain, until farther orders, at Jackson, Tennessee. 

III. All orders of the district of West Tennessee will continue 
in force in the department. 

U. S. Grant, JIajor General commanding. 

General Orders, No. 2. 

Headquarters Department of the Tennessee, ) 
Jackson, Tenn., October 2G, 1SG2. \ 

I. The geographical divisions designated in General Orders, No. 
83, from Headquarters District of West Tennessee, dated Septem- 



120 Grant as a Soldier 

ber 24, 18G2, will hereafter be known as districts. The First 
Division will constitute the "District of Memphis," Major General 
W. T. Sherman commanding; the Second Division, the "District 
of Jackson," commanded by Major General S. A. Hurlbut; the 
Third Division, the " District of Corinth," Brigadier General C. S. 
Hamilton commanding; the Fourth Division, the "District of Co- 
lumbus," commanded by Brigadier General T. A. Davies. 

II. The army heretofore known as the " Army of the Missis- 
sippi," being now divided and in different . departments, will be 
continued as a separate army. 

III. Until army corps are formed, there will be no distinction 
known, except those of departments, districts, divisions, posts, 
brigades, regiments, and companies. 

By command of Major General U. S. Gkant. 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 

Buell having been defeated by Bragg, at Perryville, 
on the 8th of October, he was superseded in command 
by Rosecrans on the 30th. 

Before entering upon the details of the active cam- 
paign against Vicksburg, it will be well to glance for a 
moment at what Grant was doing while preparing for 
this campaign, and also to get an accurate idea of the 
difficulties in his way, and what had been done by 
others to remove them. 

One of his first cares was to republish and carry out 
Halleck's order, limiting the baggage of the army, and 
cutting down to the smallest possible quantity the 
amount carried by the officers and men. To insure the 
carrying out of his orders, he himself set the example, 
and adhered so rigorously to it, that, during the en- 
suing campaign, his personal baggage was said to 
consist only of a tooth-brush, and nothing more. To 
prevent the demoralization of his troops, by giving way 
to the tendency to plunder, which is almost always the 



and a Statesman. 121 

necessary and inevitable concomitant of warfare, the 
following order was issued: — 

Special Field Orders, No. 2. 

Headquarters Department of the Tennessee, ) 
Lagrange, Tenn., November 9, 18G2. $ 

Hereinafter stoppage will be made on muster and pay rolls 
against divisions for the full amount of depredations committed 
by any member or members of the division, unless the act can be 
traced either to the individuals committing them, or to the company, 
regiment, or brigade to which the offenders belong. 

In all cases the punishment will be assessed to the smallest 
organization containing the guilty parties. 

Confiscation acts were never intended to be executed by soldiers ; 
and if they were, the general government should have full benefit 
of all property of which individuals are deprived. A stoppage of 
pay against offenders will effect this end, and it is to be hoped will 
correct this growing evil. 

It is not only the duty of commissioned officers to correct this 
evil, but of all good men in the ranks to report every violation ; 
and it is determined now that they shall have a pecuniary interest 
in doing so. 

Assessments will also be made against commissioned officers, in 
the proportion of their pay proper. 

Where offences of the nature contemplated in this order are 
traced to individuals, they will be summarily punished to the full 
extent formerly given to garrison court martials, or be arrested 
and tried by a general court martial, according to the enormity 
of the offence, and the severest penalties provided imposed and 
executed. 

This order will be read on parade, before each regiment and 
detachment, for three successive evenings. 

By order of Major General U. S. Grant. 

This excellent idea, by which the soldiers were made 
pecuniarily responsible for acts of this kind, was so 
sternly carried out into practice, that it not only stopped 
all tendency towards this disorganizing habit, but had 



122 Grant as a Soldier 

also the admirable effect of making his army one of the 
best disciplined in the country, and cultivating among 
the men a high sense of personal honor and dignity 
— qualities which come only from a feeling of personal 
responsibility. 

All cotton which came into the hands of the quarter- 
masters south of Jackson, Tennessee, was, in another 
order, directed to be sent to that point, while that cap- 
tured north of this place was to be sent to Columbus, and 
directed to be kept until orders were received to sell 
the same at public auction. Record was also to be kept 
of the names of the parties from whom it was seized. 
In this way the money thus gained was to aid in meet- 
ing the expenses of the government. 

To look after the interests of the negroes, who gath- 
ered in great numbers in our camps, who were not 
yet declared free, and who, it was supposed, in some 
cases acted the part of spies for their former masters, 
and who, at any rate, were quite a burden upon his 
army for their subsistence, the following order was 
issued, by which a special camp was organized for their 
accommodation and protection, and their labor, as far 
as possible, made available for their support : — 

Special Field Orders, No. 4. 



Headquarters Thirteenth Army Corps, 
Department of the Tennessee, 
Lagrange, Tenn., November 



3RPS, ~\ 



1. Chaplain J. Eaton, Jr., of the twenty-seventh Regiment Ohio 
Infantry Volunteers, is hereby appointed to take charge of all fugi- 
tive slaves that are now, or may from time to time come, within the 
military lines of the advancing army in this vicinity, not employed 
and registered in accordance with General Orders, No. 72, from 
Headquarters District of West Tennessee, and will open a camp 



and a Statesman. 123 

for them nt Grand Junction, where they will be suitably cured for 
and organized into companies, and set to work, picking, ginning, 
and baling all cotton now outstanding in fields. 

2. Commanding officers of troops will send all fugitives that 
come within the lines, together with such teams, cooking utensils, 
and other baggage as they may bring with them, to Chaplain J. 
Eaton, Jr., at Grand Junction. 

3. One regiment of infantry from Brigadier General McArthur's 
division will be temporarily detailed as guard in charge of such 
contrabands, and the surgeons of said regiment will be charged 
with the care of the sick. 

4. Commissaries of subsistence will issue on the requisitions of 
Chaplain J. Eaton, Jr., omitting the coffee rations, and substituting 
rye. By order of Major General U. S. Grant. 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 

The subject of trade in the insurrectionary states, 
after they had been brought within the lines of the 
Union army, had become a matter of great importance. 
The Treasury Department had laid down rules for its 
management, but they were in many cases deficient; 
while it also required very stringent military super- 
vision, in order to prevent such traffic being made a 
means of affording aid and comfort to the enemy. 
Grant's first desire was to suppress all trade, and he was 
especially severe upon the Jews, particularly the Ger- 
man Jews, who followed our camp, and having no na- 
tionality, felt themselves in no way bound by oaths or 
obligations of any kind, but pursued their own private 
interests regardless of every other consideration. For 
some time he rigidly excluded them entirely from his 
department; and it is a singular fact that they fell under 
the equal displeasure of the Confederates. Grant's 
opinion was, that a certain amount of trade might be 
made even useful to the Union cause, provided it was 



124 Grant as a Soldier 

carried on by honest persons, who were above all sus- 
picion ; but being pressed to name such persons, he 
refused, on the intelligent grounds that should he do 
so, it would not be a week before it would be made to 
appear that he w T as the partner and in collusion with 
every one of the persons so appointed. This was the 
just conclusion of common sense, and the result has 
been, that no one has dared to even insinuate that 
he made money by the war, while such a charge has 
been repeatedly brought against other of our Generals. 
In order to define the trade which should be carried on 
within the lines of the department of the Tennessee, 
the following orders were issued : — 

General Orders, No. 8. 

Headquarters Thirteenth Army Corps, I 

Department of the Tennessee, > 

Lagrange, Tenn., November 19, 1862. * 

I. In addition to permits from the Treasury Department, all 
persons are required to have a permit from the local Provost 
Marshal at the post before purchasing cotton or other southern 
products in this department, and shipping the same north. 

II. It icill be regarded as evidence of disloyalty for persons to 
go beyond the lines of the army to purchase cotton or other prod- 
ucts ; and all contracts made for such articles in advance of the 
army, or for cotton in the field, are null and void, and all persons 
so offending will be expelled from the department. 

III. Freight agents on military railroads will report daily to the 
post Provost Marshal all cotton or other private property shipped 
by them; and when shipments are made by persons who have not 
the proper permits, notice will be given, by telegraph, to the Pro- 
vost Marshal at Columbus, Ky., who will seize the goods for the 
benefit of the government. 

IV. The Federal army being now in the occupancy of West 
Tennessee to the Mississippi line, and it being no part of the policy 
of the government to oppress, or cause unnecessary suffering to 



and a Statesman. 125 

those ic/io are not in active rebellion, hereafter, until otherwise 
direct ei], licenses will be granted by district commanders to loyal 
persons, at all military stations within the department, to keep for 
sale, subject to the Treasury regulations, such articles as are of 
prime necessity for families, and sell the same to all citizens who 
have taken, or may voluntarily take, the oath of allegiance, and 
who have permits from the Provost Marshal, obtained under oath, 
that all goods to be purchased are for their own and for their fam- 
ilies' use, and that no part thereof is for sale or for the use of any 
person other than those named in the permit. Permits so given 
will be good until countermanded ; and all violations of trading 
permits will be punished by the forfeiture of the permit, fine, and 
imprisonment, at the discretion of a military commission. 

V. Particular attention is called to existing orders prohibiting 
the employment or use of government teams for hauling private 
property. All cotton brought to stations or places for shipment 
in this department by government teams will be seized by the 
Quartermaster's department for the benefit of the government, 
and persons claiming such property expelled from the department. 
It is made the duty of all officers, and especially of local Provost 
Marshals, to see that this order is rigidly enforced. 

By command of Major General U. S. Gkant. 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 

The following order, expelling the Jews, was also 
issued, but afterwards so modified that they were 
allowed to trade under certain regulations: — 

General Orders, JVb. 11. 

Headquarters Department of the Tennessee, 
Oxford, Miss., December 17, 18G2. 

The Jews, as a class, violating every regulation of trade estab- 
lished by the Treasury Department, also department orders, are 
hereby expelled from the department within twenty-four hours 
from the receipt of this order by post commanders. They will see 
that all this class of people are furnished with passes and required 
to leave; and any one returning after such notification will be 
arrested and held in confinement until an opportunity occurs of 



126 Grant as a Soldier 

sending them out as prisoners, unless furnished with permits from 
these headquarters. No passes will be given these people to visit 
headquarters for the purpose of making personal application for 
trade permits. 

By order of Major General Grant. 

Let us now look at the condition of Vicksburg. As 
early as the 12th of January, 1861, the Governor of 
Mississippi had sent artillery to be used in fortifying 
this place, which was supposed to be the strongest 
defensive point upon the Mississippi River, since it com- 
manded, from an elevated position, the channel for 
miles, both above and below. As soon as Island No. 
10 was taken, the works at Vicksburg were pushed 
vigorously towards completion, under the direction of 
the most skilful engineers in the Confederacy, until at 
last they were considered to be as strong as it was pos- 
sible to make them, and capable of resisting any attack 
either by land or water. The Confederates had boasted 
the possession of several " Gibraltars," but heretofore 
they had, in turn, been found wanting when weighed in 
the balance. Here, however, they felt convinced that 
they possessed the real Gibraltar of America, and the 
city had, in fact, become a series of forts. 

The importance of this point is evident from the 
testimony of both parties. Sherman, in a speech at St. 
Louis, said that the possession of the Mississippi River 
was the possession of America; while Jefferson Davis, 
in a speech to the legislature of Mississippi, on the 
26th of December, declared that the fall of Vicksburg 
would "cut off their communication with the trans- 
Mississippi department, and sever the western portion 
of the Confederacy from the eastern." 



and a Statesman. 127 

In consequence of this evident fact, the Confederates 
had, on the 25th of November, fortified Port Hudson, a 
naturally strong point on the left bank of the river, 
twenty-five miles above Baton Rouge, and the terminus 
of the Clinton Railway. This kept quite a stretch 
of the river free from our gunboats, and kept open 
their communications with Texas and the south-west, 
upon which they depended in great measure for their 
supplies. 

On the 20th of June, Brigadier General Thomas Wil- 
liams had left Baton Rouge, and on the 25th was off 
Vicksburg, and unmolested had commenced to cut a 
canal across a narrow point enclosed in a sharp turn of 
the river at this part, by which the channel should be 
turned, and Vicksburg made an inland town, situated 
about six miles from the stream. This canal was to 
run from De Soto to Richmond, Louisiana, and, if suc- 
cessful, would have transferred a piece of territory from 
this state to Mississippi. It was apparently a slight 
work, and was soon finished by the labor of about 
twelve hundred negroes, taken from the neighboring 
plantations; but on the 22d of July, when it was com- 
pleted, it was found that the current would not run 
through it, from some cause which has not yet been 
thoroughly explained. The channel of the Mississippi 
had often before this been changed by simply drawing 
a furrow with a plough from one point to another, and 
thus making a commencement for the current to take 
a new path ; but the low condition of the river at this 
time may have been one of the principal causes of the 
failure. It having become evident from this failure 
that the position at Vicksburg was not to be turned in 



128 Grant as a Soldier 

this way, Williams went back to Baton Rouge, and the 
canal was immediately filled up by the Confederates. 

On the 7th of June — the day after the capture of 
Memphis — Farragut had steamed up to Vicksburg, and 
on the 8th had silenced the Grand Gulf batteries. On 
the 28th of the same month he had sent seven vessels 
past, silencing the lower batteries, and had joined, on 
the 1st of July, a fleet of four gunboats and six mortar- 
boats, sent down from the upper fleet, while Porter, 
with the remainder of Farragut's fleet, had engaged 
a^ain the water batteries below ; but after an ineffectual 
bombardment, the rapidly falling condition of the water 
forced the fleet to return to New Orleans, for fear lest 
they should run aground. 

About twelve miles north of Vicksburg the Yazoo 
River empties into the Mississippi. Here the Con- 
federates had constructed a formidable ram, the Arkan- 
sas, which came down to Vicksburg on the 15th of 
July, and was sent down to Baton Rouge, to aid in 
Breckinridge's attack upon that place on the 5th of 
August, where she was sunk by the Union ram Essex, 
under the command of Colonel Ellet. 



and a Statesman. 129 



CHAPTER XIV. 

THE MOVEMENT AGAINST VICKSBURG BEGUN. 

On the 4th of November Grant was ready to move. 
He had concentrated his troops from Corinth, Jackson, 
and Bolivar. As early as June 16, the Confederate 
government had intrusted the command in and about 
Vicksburg to General John C. Pemberton, whose un- 
popularity more than counterbalanced his military 
superiority to Generals Van Dorn and Lovell, over 
whose heads he was appointed to this position. Pem- 
berton's army lay upon the line of the Mississippi 
Central Railway, principally at Abbeville, behind the 
Tallahatchie River, and in the vicinity of Holly Spring 
Miss. Its advance was near Grand Junction and La 
Grange. On the 4th of November Grant moved to 
La Grange, three miles east of Grand Junction, on the 
Memphis and Charleston Railway, pushing the advance 
of the Confederate army back towards Holly Springs. 
Meanwhile Grant's cavalry reconnoissances had shown 
that the Confederates intended to hold the line of the 
Tallahatchie River, and were chiefly in force at Holly 
Springs and Coldwater, Van Dorn having fortified the 
river line. 

While the main army was moving down from Grand 
Junction upon Abbeville, on the Tallahatchie, where 



130 Grant as a Soldier 

the Confederates were strongly posted, Sherman was 
moving down in the same direction from Memphis, and 
a third cooperating force, amounting to about seven 
thousand men, under Generals Hovey and Washburn, 
were moving from Helena, for the purpose of flanking 
the enemy, clearing the country for Grant's advance, 
and gaining for him possession of Northern Mississippi, 
with its rich resources. 

This plan and its results were thus stated by Sher- 
man in a speech at St. Louis : " Grant moved direct on 
Pemberton, while I moved from Memphis, and a smaller 
force, under General Washburne, struck directly for 
Grenada; and the first thing Pemberton knew, the 
depot of his supplies was almost in the grasp of a small 
cavalry force, and he fell back in confusion, and gave 
us the Tallahatchie without a battle." The credit of 
this plan, which was as brilliantly conceived as exe- 
cuted, belongs to Grant. The movement was rapid: 
on the 29th of November Grant's advance was at Holly 
Springs, on the 30th at Waterford, and on the 1st of 
December a junction was made with Sherman. Start- 
ing on the 27th of November from Helena, on the 
28th General Hovey was at Delta. From here to Cold- 
water, capturing a rebel camp ; then southward, rap- 
idly, along the Cold-water and Tallahatchie Rivers, to 
Garner's Station, just north of Grenada, destroying the 
railroad and bridges; then by other points to Grand 
Junction. The success was perfect. The railroad from 
Memphis to Grenada was destroyed. While the Con- 
federates were pressed in front by Grant, their rear was 
seriously threatened, and nothing was left for them 
but to fall back, which they did, to Grenada. Still ad- 



and a Statesman. 131 

vancing, Grant's headquarters on the 3d of December 
were at Oxford, and his cavalry were driving Van Dorn 
out of Water Valley and Coffeeville, while our gunboats 
were in the Yazoo, threatening the enemy's rear, and 
perhaps to cut off their retreat. 

Grant, having been thus far successful, proposed to 
General Halleck to hold the enemy south of the Yala- 
busha, and move a force upon Vicksburg from Mem- 
phis and Helena; and receiving the required permission, 
Sherman was selected for the command of the expedi- 
tion, and notified in the following order : — 

Headquarters Thirteenth Army Corps, \ 

Department of the Tennessee, -> 

Oxford, Miss., December 8, 18G2. ) 

Major General W. T. Sherman, commanding Might Wing. 

General : You will j>roceed with as little delay as possible to 
Memphis, Tenn., taking with you one division of your present 
command. On your arrival at Memphis, you will assume com- 
mand of all the troops there, and that portion of General Curtis's 
force at present east of the Mississippi River, and organize them 
into brigades and divisions in your own way. As soon as possible 
move with them down the riv#r, to the vicinity of Vicksburg; and, 
with the cooperation of the gunboat fleet under command of Flag- 
officer Porter, proceed to the reduction of that place, in such 
manner as circumstances and your own judgment may dictate. 

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, &c, necessary 
to take, will be left entirely with yourself. The Quartermaster at 
St. Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for thirty 
thousand men. Should you still find yourself deficient, your Quar- 
termaster will be authorized to make up the deficiency from such 
transports as may come into the port of Memphis. 

On arriving at Memphis, put yourself in communication with 
Admiral Porter, and arrange with him for his cooperation. 

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you 
will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold 



132 Grant as a Soldier 

the forces here in readiness to cooperate with you in such manner 
as the movements of the enemy may make necessary. 

Leave the district of Memphis in the command of an efficient 
officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege- 
guns, and whatever cavalry may be there. 

TJ. S. Grant, Major General. 

The following letter of General Sherman to Admiral 
Porter gives his views of the movement : — 



Headquarters Right Wing Army of the Tennessee, 
Oxford, Miss., December 8, 1862 



ee, ) 



Rear Admiral D. D. Porter, 

Commanding U. S. Naval Forces, Cairo, III. 

The movement thus far has been eminently successful. General 
Grant, moving down directly upon the enemy's strong lines behind 
the Tallahatchie, while the Helena force appeared unexpectedly 
on their flank, utterly confounded them ; and they are now in full 
retreat, and we are at a loss where they will bring up. We hope 
they will halt and re-form behind the Yalabusha, with Grenada as 
their centre. If so, General Grant can press their front, whilst I 
am ordered to take all the spare troops from Memphis and Helena, 
and proceed with all despatch to Vicksburg. 

Time now is the great object. We must not give time for new 
combinations. I know you will promptly cooperate. It will not 
be necessary to engage their Vicksburg batteries until I have 
broken all their inland communication ; then Vicksburg must be 
attacked by land and water. In this I will defer much to you. 

My purpose will be to cut the road to Munroe, La., to Jackson, 
Miss., and then appear up the Yazoo, threatening the Mississippi 
Central road where it crosses the Big Black. 

These movements will disconcert the enemy, and throw them on 
to Meridian, especially as General Grant presses them in front. 
All this should be done before the winter rains make General 
Grant's road impassable. I will leave for Memphis to-morrow, 
Tuesday night, and will reach Memphis with one of my old divis- 
ions Friday night. We ought to leave Memphis before the 20th, 
and I do earnestly desire you should meet me there. At all events, 



and a Statesman. 133 

even if the larger gunboats cannot proceed at once, send those of 
light draught down, with Captains Phelps, Gwinn, Shirk, or some 
officer to assist me in the preliminary work. Of course Vickshurg 
cannot be reduced till you arrive with the large gunboats. 

General Grant's purpose is to take full advantage of the effects 
of this TallaTiatchie success. 

I am, with great respect, 

"VV. T. Siieeman, Major General commanding. 

As we have seen, it was expected that Sherman would 
be able, with the cooperation of the navy, to surprise 
and capture Vicksburg. If, however, he could not do 
this, it was supposed to be certain that he could take 
and hold Haine's Bluff, and thus operating against the 
enemy's lines, open up the Yazoo as a line of supplies to 
Grant, while he should press Pemberton in front, and 
hold him in the Yalabusha until the result of Sherman's 
attack should be known. 

On the 14th of December General Grant telegraphed 
to Sherman, in cipher, as follows : — 

I have not had one word from Grierson since he left, and am 
getting uneasy about him. I hope General Gorman will give you 
no difficulty about returning the troops that were on this side of 
the river, and Steele to command them. The twenty-one thou- 
sand men you have, with twelve thousand from Helena, will make 
a good force. The enemy are as yet in the Yalabusha. I am 
pushing down on them slowly, but so as to keep up the impression 
of a continuous move. I feel particularly anxious to have the 
Helena cavalry on this side of the river; if not now, at least after 
you start. If Gorman will send them, instruct them where to go, 
and how to communicate with me. My headquarters will proba- 
bly be in Coffeeville one week hence. In the mean time I will be 
at Springdale. It would be well if you could have two or three 
small boats, suitable for navigating the Yazoo. It may become 
necessary for me to look to that base for supplies before we get 
through. 



134 Giiant as a Soldier 

Still pushing the enemy, Grant kept sending cavalry 
expeditions, threatening hoth his flanks, and, as he 
advanced, leaving adequate garrisons at all the posts 
in his rear. Among the points thus protected were 
Columbus, Humboldt, Bolivar, Corinth, Holly Springs, 
Cold-water, and others. His headquarters were at 
Oxford, Mississippi. 

Sherman set about immediately organizing his ex- 
pedition. The forces were to embark at Memphis, and 
rendezvous at Friar's Point, eighteen miles below 
Helena. The fleet consisted of one hundred and 
twenty-seven steamboats, in addition to gunboats. 
The infantry force was composed of western troops 
entirely, men who were hardy, daring, and used to a 
rough and adventurous life. The following order, 
issued by him on the 18th, will show what care was 
used in organizing the expedition: — 

General Orders, No. 8. 

Headquarters Eight Wing Thirteenth Army Corps, ) 
Memphis, Tenn., December 18, 1862. J 

1. The expedition now fitting out is purely of a military char- 
acter, and the interests involved are of too important a nature to 
be mixed up with personal and private business. No citizen, 
male or female, will be allowed to accompany it, unless employed as 
part of a crew or as servants to the transports. Female chamber- 
maids to the boats and nurses to the sick alone will be allowed, 
unless the wives of captains and pilots actually belonging to 
the boats. No laundress, officer's or soldier's wife, must/ pass 
below Helena. 

2. No person whatever, citizen, officer, or sutler, will, on any 
consideration, buy or deal in cotton or other produce of the 
country. Should any cotton be brought on board of any trans- 



and a Statesman. 135 

port, going or returning, the brigade Quartermaster, of which the 
boat forms a part, will take possession of it, and invoice it to 
Captain A. R. Eddy, Chief Quartermaster at Memphis. 

3. Should any cotton, or other produce, be brought back to 
Memphis by any chartered boat, Captain Eddy will take posses- 
sion of the same, and sell it for the benefit of the United States. 
If accompanied by its actual producer, the planter or factor, the 
Quartermaster will furnish him with a receipt for the same, to be 
settled for, on proof of his loyalty, at the close of the war. 

4. Boats ascending the river may take cotton from the shore 
for bulkheads to protect their engines or crew, but on arrival at 
Memphis it will be turned over to the Quartermaster, with a state- 
ment of the time, place, and name of its owner. The trade in 
cotton must await a more peaceful state of affairs. 

5. Should any citizen accompany the expedition below Helena 
in violation of these orders, any Colonel of a regiment or Captain 
of a battery will conscript him into the service of the United 
States for the unexpired term of his command. If he show a 
refractory spirit unfitting him for a soldier, the commanding 
officer pi-esent will turn him over to the captain of the boat as 
a deck hand, and compel him to work in that capacity without 
wages until the boat returns to Memphis. 

6. Any persons whatever, wmether in the service of the United 
States or transports, found making reports for publication, which 
might reach the enemy, giving them information, aid, and com- 
fort, will be arrested and treated as spies. 

By order of Major General Sherman. 

J. H. Hammond, Major and A. A. G. 

The call was entirely successful, and Sherman, locat- 
ing his headquarters in the Forest Queen, arrived 
with his staff at Friar's Point on the 21st of December. 
From thence the expedition proceeding, a small force, 
under General Morgan L. Smith, was landed at Milliken's 
Bend, who proceeded to Delhi and Dallas, on the Vicks- 
burg and Texas Railway, destroying these stations and 



136 Grant as a Soldier 

the track, so as to cut off the retreat of the Confederates 
from Vicksburg. The main body of the expedition, 
having safely disembarked, on the 27th of December, 
1862, at Johnston's Landing, near the mouth of the 
Yazoo River, prepared for an assault upon the northern 
works defending Vicksburg. 



and a Statesman. 137 



CHAPTER XV. 

THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE VICKSBURG, HOW AND 
WHY IT FAILED. 

Let us now return to Grant, whom we left advancing 
against the enemy, and examine the causes which pre- 
vented his supporting Sherman's expedition. 

The cause was very simple. As Grant advanced, we 
have told how he left the important posts in his rear 
garrisoned with what he considered an adequate force. 
As soon as Van Dorn was aware of the return of 
Hovey's expedition, he formed the idea of attacking 
some of the garrisons left in Grant's rear, and thus, by 
threatening his base, force him to postpone his advance. 
On the 12th a skirmish took place at Corinth, and 
other points were similarly threatened ; but in them 
all the enemy were boldly repulsed. The weak point, 
however, was found. Holly Springs had been left in 
the command of Colonel R C. Murphy, who on the 20th 
surrendered his post to an attack of cavalry, without 
attempting to make the slightest resistance. Grant 
was at this time at Oxford, thirty miles away. This 
base surrender, opening as it did his communications, 
forced him to fall back upon Holly Springs, and post- 
pone advancing upon Vicksburg, and supporting Sher- 
man's expedition. It also freed the troops in Grant's 
front, who had been kept in check by his advance, and 



138 Grant as a Soldier 

enabled them to hasten back to Vicksburg to assist in 
repelling Sherman. 

This failure of so well combined a plan, caused as it 
was by the imbecility of one man, in whom circum- 
stances had necessitated the placing of confidence, was 
the more unfortunate just at this juncture, since the 
season had been one of disaster in the East. Pope had 
been defeated at Centre ville on the 28th of August. 
The battle of Antietam was not a complete victory. 
Buell at Perryville had gained anything but a victory 
over Bragg, while, on the 19th of December, the terrible 
slaughters had taken place at Fredericksburg. But 
though every one else might despair, Grant remained 
firm. His tenacity of purpose was perhaps never more 
severely tried, and never came stronger from the trial. 
He lost no time in regrets, but made preparations for 
putting a new plan in execution. Having returned 
to Holly Springs, and made his headquarters there, he 
investigated the conditions of the surrender, and issued 
the following order on the 24th of December : — 

Special Field Orders, No. 23. 

Headquarters Thirteenth Army Corps, \ 

Department of the Tennessee, \ 

Holly Springs, Miss., December 24, 1862. j 

[extract.] 
It is with pain and mortification that the General commanding 
reflects upon the disgraceful surrender of the place, with all the 
valuable stores it contained, on the 20th instant, and that without 
any resistance except by a few men, who form an honorable ex- 
ception ; and this, too, after warning had been given of the enemy 
northward the evening previous. With all the cotton, public 
stores, and substantial buildings about the depot, it would have 
been perfectly practicable to have made, in a few hours, a defence 
sufficient to resist, with a small garrison, all the cavalry force 



and a Statesman. 139 

brought against them, until the reinforcements which the com- 
manding officer was notified were marching to his relief could 
have readied him. 

The conduct of officers and men in accepting paroles, under the 
circumstances, is highly reprehensible, and, to say the least, 
thoughtless. By the terms of the Dix Hill cartel each party is 
bound to take care of their prisoners, and to send them to Vicks- 
burg, or a point on the James River, for exchange or parole, 
unless some other point is mutually agreed upon by the Generals 
commanding the opposing armies. 

By a refusal to be paroled, the enemy, from his inability to take 
care of the prisoners, would have been compelled either to have 
refused them unconditionally, or to have abandoned further ag- 
gressive movements for the time being, which would have made 
their recapture, and the discomfiture of the enemy almost certain. 

The prisoners paroled at this place will be collected in camp at 
once by the post commander, and held under close guard until 
their case can be reported to Washington for further instructions. 

Commanders throughout the department are directed to arrest 
and hold, as above, all men of their commands and all stragglers 
who may have accepted their paroles upon like terms. 

The General commanding is satisfied that the majority of the 
troops who accepted a parole did so thoughtlessly and from want 
of knowledge of the cartel referred to, and that in future they will 
not be caught in the same way. 

By order of Major General U. S. Grant. 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 

The following order of the 8th of January, 1863, 
shows that, after a careful investigation of all the cir- 
cumstances, the blame was made to rest where it be- 
longed, and fit punishment meted out to the offender. 

General Orders, No. 4. 
Headquarters Department of the Tennessee, 1 
Holly Springs, Miss., January 8, 18G3. | 

1. The Major General commanding the department takes just 
pride and satisfaction in congratulating the small garrisons of the 



140 Grant as a Soldier 

posts of Coldwater, Davis's Mills, and Middleburg, for the heroic 
defence of their positions on the 20th, 21st, and 24th ultimo, and 
their successful repulse of an enemy many times their number. 

The Ninetieth Illinois, at Coldwater (its first engagement), the 
detachment of the veteran Twenty-fifth Indiana and two com- 
panies of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry at Davis's Mills, and the detach- 
ment of the gallant Twelfth Michigan at Middleburg, are deserving 
of the thanks of the army, which was in a measure dependent 
iipon the road they so nobly defended for supplies, and they will 
receive the meed of praise ever awarded by a grateful public to 
those who bravely and successfully do their duty. 

These regiments are entitled to inscribe upon their banners, 
respectively, Coldwater, Davis's Mills, and Middleburg, with 
the names of other battle-fields made victorious by their valor 
and discipline. 

It is gratifying to know that at every point where our troops 
made a stand during the late raid of the enemy's cavalry, success 
followed, and the enemy was made to suffer a loss in killed and 
wounded greater than the entire garrisons of the places attacked. 
Especially was this the case of Davis's Mills and Middleburg. The 
only success gained by Van Dorn was at Holly Springs, where 
the whole garrison was left by their commander in ignorance of 
the approach of danger. 

2. Colonel R. C. Murphy, of the Eighth Regiment Wisconsin 
Infantry Volunteers, having, while in command of the post of Holly 
Springs, Mississippi, neglected and failed to exercise the usual and 
ordinary precautions to guard and protect the same ; having, after 
repeated and timely warning of the approach of the enemy, failed 
to make any preparations for resistance or defence, or shown any 
disposition to do so ; and having, with a force amply sufficient to 
have repulsed the enemy and protect the public stores intrusted 
to his care, disgracefully permitted him to capture the post and. 
destroy the stores, — and the movement of troops in face of an 
enemy rendering it impracticable to convene a court martial for 
his trial, — is, therefore, dismissed the service of the United States 
— to take effect from the 2,0th day of December •, 18G2, the date of 
his cowardly and disgraceful conduct. 

By order of Major General U. S. Grant. 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 



and a Statesman. 141 

Let us now follow the movements of Sherman's ex- 
pedition, and the subsequent events, which for a time 
delayed all active operations against Vicksburg. 

The approach to Vicksburg by land, from Johnston's 
Landing, the place where the embarkation was success- 
fully accomplished by the troops, after the armed vessels 
had silenced a battery planted by the Confederates to 
resist the landing, is peculiarly difficult. The town is 
on a hill, with a line of hills surrounding it at a distance 
of several miles, extending from Haine's Bluff, on the 
Yazoo Eiver, to Warrenton, ten miles below, on the 
Mississippi Eiver. The low ground in the vicinity is 
swampy, and filled with sloughs, lagoons, and bayous. 
The approach over such a country would, even in times 
of peace, be very difficult for a large force, and in war, 
with an enemy in front, it was almost an impossibility. 

On the morning of the 27th of December, the army 
was drawn up in line, prepared to make the assault 
Sherman was of course unaware of the disaster at 
Holly Springs on the 20th. The general advance com- 
menced, and the enemy was driven back about one 
fourth of a mile from his original position. The next 
day the men pressed forward with great bravery ; but 
the want of cooperation of Grant's command disar- 
ranged the plan of action, left Sherman's force too weak, 
and enabled the Confederates to be largely reenforced 
by the men who were freed by Grant's falling back, 
and could be used for this purpose. 

During the next day, also, the 29th, the fighting was 
continued; but the attempt was futile, and General 
Sherman gave orders for the troops to reembark. 

By the arrival upon the ground of General McCler- 



142 Grant as a Soldier 

nand, who ranked General Sherman by over a month 
in the date of his commission, the command was trans- 
ferred, and by the orders of the new commander, the 
vessels were withdrawn from the Yazoo to the Mis- 
sissippi. The title of the army was also changed, and 
these facts were announced by General Sherman to 
the troops in the following order : — 

General Orders, N~o. 5. 

HEADQUARTERS RlGHT WlNG ARMY OP TENNESSEE, 1 

Steamer Forest Queen, Milliken's Bend, January 4, 1863. ) 

Pursuant to the terms of General Orders, No. 1, made this day 
by General McClemand, the title of our army ceases to exist, and 
constitutes in the future the Army of the Mississippi, composed 
of two " army corps," one to be commanded by General G. W. 
Morgan, and the other by myself. In relinquishing the command 
of the army of the Tennessee, and restricting my authority to my 
own corps, I desire to express to all commanders, to soldiers and 
officers, recently operating before Vicksburg, my hearty thanks for 
the zeal, alacrity, and courage manifested by them on all occa- 
sions. We failed in accomplishing one purpose of our movement — 
the capture of Vicksburg ; but we were part of a whole. Ours was 
but part of a combined movement, in which others were to assist. 
We were on time ; unforeseen contingencies must have delayed 
the others. We have destroyed the Shreveport road ; we have 
attacked the defences of Vicksburg, and pushed the attack as far 
as prudence would justify; and having found it too strong for our 
single column, we have drawn off in good order and good spirits, 
ready for any new move. A new commander is now here to lead 
you. He is chosen by the President of the United States, who is 
charged by the Constitution to maintain and defend it, and he has 
the undoubted right to select his own agents. I know that all 
good officers and soldiers will give him the same hearty support 
and cheerful obedience they have hitherto given me. There are 
honors enough in reserve for all, and work enough too. Let each 
do his appropriate part, and our nation must in the end emerge 
from this dire conflict purified and ennobled by the fires which 



and a Statesman. 143 

now test its strength and purity. All officers of the general staff 
now attached to my person will hereafter report in person and by 
letter to Major General McClernand, commanding the army of 
the Mississippi, on board the steamer Tigress, at our rendezvous at 
Gaines's Landing and at Montgomery Point. 

By order of Major General W. T. Sherman. 

J. H. Hammond, A. A. G. 

Before McClernand had assumed the command, Gen- 
eral Sherman had conceived the plan of attacking Ar- 
kansas Post, and had consulted with Admiral Porter 
concerning the advantage and feasibility of so doing. 
McClernand concurring in this design, the army went 
up White River from the Mississippi, and then by a 
canal to the Arkansas. Moving up to Fort Hindman, 
this place was attacked on the 11th, and after about 
four hours' fighting surrendered. The following report 
details the operations : — 

Headquarters Army of the Mississippi, | 
Post op Arkansas, January 11, 1863. ) 

Major General U. S. Grant, 

Commanding Department of the Tennessee. 

I have the honor to report that the forces under my command 
attacked the Post of Arkansas to-day, at one o'clock, having 
stormed the enemy's work. We took a large number of prisoners, 
variously estimated at from seven thousand to ten thousand, to- 
gether with all his stores, animals, and munitions of war. 

Rear Admiral David D. Porter, commanding the Mississippi 
squadron, effectively and brilliantly cooperated, accomplishing this 
complete success. 

John A. McClernand, Major General commanding* 

10 



144 Grani as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XVI. 

reorganization of the army. — getting into position 
before vicksburg. 

Grant had been from the commencement of his 
career gaining the confidence of the government, and 
the great importance of his plans of operation on the 
Mississippi becoming more and more apparent, he was 
finally furnished new troops in such numbers as re- 
quired a new organization. He therefore issued the fol- 
lowing order, organizing his army into army corps — a 
system which is French in its origin, but the advantages 
of which are so manifest, particularly in handling large 
bodies of men, that experience soon led to its adoption. 
One of its chief advantages is, that it gives to com- 
petent corps commanders a sufficient field for the dis- 
play of their abilities, and relieves the chief from a 
great deal of official drudgery ; the reports, &c, being 
settled at the corps headquarters, and only digests 
being handed in to the chief. On the field also orders 
are issued to corps commanders, and they are held 
responsible for their execution. In fact each corps is 
an independent army, regularly organized, and ready 
to act independently as well as in cooperation. 



and a Statesman. 145 



General Orders, No. 14. 

Headquarters Department of the Tennessee, | 
Holly Springs, Miss., December 22, 1862. ) 

By directions of the General-in-Chief of the army, the troops in 
this department, including those of the department of the Missouri, 
operating on the Mississippi River, are hereby divided into four 
army corps, as follows : — 

1. The troops composing the Ninth Division, Brigadier General 
G. W. Morgan commanding ; the Tenth Division, Brigadier Gen- 
eral A. J. Smith commanding ; and all other troops operating on 
the Mississippi River below Memphis, not included in the Fifteenth 
Army Corps, will constitute the Thirteenth Army Corps, under the 
command of Major General John A. McClernand. 

2. The Fifth Division, Brigadier General Morgan L. Smith com- 
manding; the division from Helena, Arkausas, commanded by 
Brigadier General F. Steele ; and the forces in the " District of 
Memphis," will constitute the Fifteenth Army Corps, and be com- 
manded by Major General W. T. Sherman. 

3. The Sixth Division, Brigadier General J. McArthur command- 
ing ; the Seventh Division, Brigadier General I. F. Quimby com- 
manding ; the Eighth Division, Brigadier General L. F. Ross com- 
manding; the Second Brigade of cavalry, Colonel A. L. Lee 
commanding; and the troops in the "District of Columbus," 
commanded by Brigadier General Davies, and those in the " Dis- 
trict of Jackson," commanded by Brigadier General Sullivan, will 
constitute the Sixteenth Army Corps, and be commanded by 
Major General S. A. Hurlbut. 

4. The First Division, Brigadier General J. W. Denver com- 
manding ; the Third Division, Brigadier General John A. Logan 
commanding ; the Fourth Division, Brigadier General J. G. Lau- 
man commanding ; the First Brigade of cavalry, Colonel B. H. 
Grierson commanding ; and the forces in the " District of Corinth," 
commanded by Brigadier General G. M. Dodge, will constitute the 
Seventeenth Army Corps, and be commanded by Major General 
J. B. McPherson. 

District commanders will send consolidated returns of their 
forces to these headquarters, as well as to army corps head- 



146 Grant as a Soldier 

quarters, and will, for the present, receive orders from depart- 
ment headquarters. 

By order of Major General U. S. Grant. 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 

"We have now come to the 1st of January, 1863, the 
day upon which the proclamation issued by President 
Lincoln on the 22d of September, 1862, was ratified by 
a formal proclamation, enumerating the states and 
portions of states in which slavery was declared dead, 
and the slaves to be free. The justice and the benefit 
of this policy will probably be disputed now by no 
one ; but at the time many even of our generals in the 
field opposed it, though probably there could not be a 
better school than active military service in a slave 
state for learning the folly and absurdity of slavery, 
considered only in an economic point of view, and dis- 
regarding any other higher and nobler considerations. 
Here, however, as everywhere else, Grant showed him- 
self fully up to the situation, as the following extract 
from an order issued early in January will show : — 

General Orders, No. 25. 

Milliken's Bend, La. 
1. Corps, division, and post commanders will afford all facilities 
for the completion of the negro regiments now organizing in this 
department. Commissaries will issue supplies, and quartermasters 
will furnish stores, on the same requisitions and returns as are 
required from other troops. 

It is expected that all commanders will especially exert them' 
selves in carrying out the policy of the administration, not only in 
organizing colored regiments, and rendering them efficient, but 
also in removing prejudice against them. . . . 

By order of Major General U. S. Grant. 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 



and a Statesman. 147 

On the 29th of January, 1863, Grant obtained full 
and personal control of the operations against Vicksburg 
and on this clay sent a portion of his troops to Young's 
Point, Louisiana, and another to Milliken's Bend, and, 
following soon after, established his headquarters at the 
former place. On a thorough inspection of the works, 
he became convinced that it was impossible to take 
Vicksburg from the water front, and his plan was to 
take it from the land side. To do so, the first thing 
necessary was to obtain a base for his operations. The 
principal routes proposed for arriving at this end were 
the following : First, Williams Canal ; second, the route 
from Milliken's Bend ; third, Lake Providence ; fourth, 
the Yazoo Pass ; fifth, Steele's Bayou. All of these were 
attempted ; and though to give a minute account of all 
the details connected with these operations would more 
than occupy all our space, yet we will glance briefly at 
them all. It is, however, the great results we desire to 
call special attention to, for it is in them that we find 
the material for estimating the amount of praise and 
gratitude due by the country to the man whose com- 
prehensive mind first clearly estimated the difficulties 
in the successful prosecution of the war, whose genius 
formed the plans for overcoming them, and whose per- 
sistent energy carried us finally through to victory. 

We have already spoken of the failure of the Wil- 
liams Canal, and of the results which would have fol- 
lowed from its success. After his corps had captured 
Arkansas Post, or Fort Hindman, McClernand had 
been ordered to Young's Point ; and this was made the 
destination of the whole of the army of the Tennessee, 
less the garrisons left for the protection of important 



148 Grant as a Soldier 

points in the rear and Logan's division. At the same 
time a large naval force, under Admiral Porter, had 
rendezvoused there. On the 2d of February Grant 
came down to superintend in person trie work on the 
canal, which was pushed forward with great vigor. The 
river was rising rapidly, and in fact so fast that it 
threatened to break down the embankment erected 
to keep the water out until the canal was finished and 
ready to be opened. On the 8th of March this occurred. 
While the men were actively at work, the immense 
pressure of the rising waters of the Mississippi broke 
through the temporary barrier raised against their ap- 
proach, and, sweeping through, carried away the dikes 
and implements, flooding the camp, to the great dis- 
comfort and danger of the troops. Hastily seizing their 
tents and equipments, the men rushed to the levee, the 
Confederates laughed at our discomfiture, and the plan 
of a canal at this point had to be abandoned. All that 
part of the peninsula south of the railway was under 
water. Grant was not, however, disconcerted at this 
failure. It was only one of his plans, and he had oth- 
ers in reserve. The work was to be done, and he in- 
tended to do it. His army was large, in good spirits 
and good condition, and he felt the certainty of success 
which distinguishes genius from foolhardiness. 

Another channel had been reported as practicable by 
his engineers. This was a route through the bayous 
which run from near Milliken's Bend on the north and 
New Carthage on the south, through Roundabout Bayou 
to the Tensas River. Dredge boats were sent through 
to clear this channel, and a small steamer, with a few 
barges, was passing through to test it practically, when 



and a Statesman. 149 

the sudden falling of the water caused this scheme to 
be abandoned. 

While work was being executed upon the Williams 
Canal, Grant's attention was directed to the route 
through Lake Providence, and he had placed a large 
force at work upon it. This lake is situated about sev- 
enty-five miles from Vicksburg, and just south of the 
state line of Arkansas, and is only one mile west of the 
Mississippi, so that a canal was cut connecting them. 
The lake is six miles long, and is connected by Bayou 
Baxter with Bayou Macon, a channel which opens into 
the Tensas, and by the Washita and Red Rivers into the 
Mississippi. This route was a long and difficult one, 
and was principally of use as opening a means of com- 
munication with Banks at Port Hudson. The project 
was soon abandoned, but served for a time to keep our 
soldiers occupied and engaged. 

The most promising of all these plans was that of the 
Yazoo Pass, and the most vigor was applied to its devel- 
opment. Yazoo Pass lies eight miles below Helena, and 
is a narrow, tortuously winding passage, running east- 
ward from the Mississippi into Moon Lake, whence it 
issues in a winding eastward course until it empties into 
the Coldwater River, which finally empties into the 
Tallahatchie. It was known that the Confederates were 
building gunboats on both the Coldwater and the Tal- 
lahatchie. At high water the Tallahatchie is navigable 
as far above the mouth of the Coldwater as Wyatt. 

Grant's plan was to get into the Coldwater with boats 
of light draught, to destroy the vessels the Confederates 
were building ; and he hoped also that his boats would 
be able to penetrate to the Yazoo, and thus cooperate 



150 Grant as a Soldier 

with a land force, in a new assault upon Haine's Bluff. 
The want of a sufficient number of vessels prevented 
a large enough number of troops from being sent 
upon this expedition, so that only one division was 
despatched upon this duty. On the 24th of Febru- 
ary, 1863, after tearing away that portion of the levee 
of the Mississippi which closed the entrance, the fleet 
entered the pass, and on the 28th. after very slow prog- 
ress on account of the obstacles in the way, the wind- 
ing course of the channel, the thickness of the forest, 
which overarches and at times almost bars the passage, 
they arrived at the Coldvvater. The difficulties in the 
way may be imagined from the rate of advance made 
by the boats, which averaged about one mile in three 
and a half hours. When even the current ran strong:, 
it was impossible to drift with it, since the overhanging 
trunks would sweep the decks clean. 

The Confederates also, having gained information 
of the expedition, had closed the lower end of the 
Tallahatchie River, into which the Coldwater empties, 
by building a fort just above Greenwood, where the 
Tallahatchie and the Yalabusha combine to form the 
Yazoo. This fort was called Fort Pemberton, and was 
well posted for defence. An attempt to silence its 
guns by the gunboats was unsuccessful, and the whole 
expedition withdrew, arriving at Milliken's Bend on the 
23d of March. 

The attempt by Steele's Bayou was also unsuccessful. 
The difficulties in the way of this tortuous route were 
as great as those in the other. The boats were to pro- 
ceed up the Yazoo, seven miles, to Cypress Bayou, a 
short opening into Steele's Bayou, which after thirty 



and a Statesman. 151 

miles connects by a short canal with Deer Creek. 
After following this stream eighteen miles, there is a 
connection by the Rolling Fork with the Sunflower 
River, ten miles distant. This last stream, after a flow 
of over forty miles, empties into the Yazoo, not far from 
Haine's Bluff, and about sixty miles from its mouth. 
This route was recommended by Admiral Porter, after 
a reconnoissance. One . of its advantages was, that it 
would flank Greenwood, threaten the rear of those who 
held our boats checked there, and turn the flank of the 
defences at Haine's Bluff. General Grant accompanied 
this expedition to Black Bayou, and was a witness of 
the difficulties in its way. He then returned to Young's 
Point in order to send up a pioneer troop which should 
clear the way for the expedition. Here he received a 
message from Admiral Porter, asking for the coopera- 
tion of a military force : in answer Grant forwarded a 
division of the Fifteenth Army Corps, with Sherman in 
command. The number of steam transports being too 
small for the accommodation of the entire force, the 
larger part of them were sent up the Mississippi to 
Eagle Bend, a point where the river runs within a 
mile of Steele's Bayou. The Confederates having, how- 
ever, obtained a. knowledge of this operation, made 
ready to receive us, and it was thought best to aban- 
don the plan when we were within a few hundred 
yards of the point which, had we reached it, would have 
assured our success. 



152 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XVII. 

THE PINAL MOVE. — THE PLRST STEP IN THE EIGHT 
DIRECTION SUCCESSFUL. 

All of these plans having been tried with unvarying 
fortune, Grant resolved to occupy New Carthage, the 
plan now being to move his forces below Vicksburg on 
the Louisiana shore, so as to attack the Confederate 
works in the rear. The movement began on the 29th 
of March, 1863, the Thirteenth Corps taking the lead, 
followed by the Seventeenth and Fifteenth, while the 
Sixteenth was left in charge of the communications 
and supplies. 

Before giving an account of this new move, it will 
be well to glance for a moment at the sanitary condition 
of Grant's army at this time, since attention to this point 
is one of the most important qualities of a good general, 
and since about this time the unfounded public rumors 
to the contrary, having culminated into official inquiry, 
were officially answered. 

During the time passed in the movements described 
above, public attention was very strongly directed to 
Grant's army, and every rumor relating to #it excited 
public interest. As also during the time these various 
expeditions were preparing, it was of absolute necessity 
that the strictest secrecy concerning them should be 



and a Statesman. 153 

preserved, all private correspondence of the army with 
friends left at home had been prohibited, for fear that 
such letters might fall into the hands of the enemy 
through the agency of the prowling bands of guerrillas 
which swarmed all round the outside of the lines. This 
absence of regular communication had the effect of 
redoubling the anxiety of those at home, who had 
friends in the army, and rendering them doubly sensi- 
tive to all rumors of every kind. Where, of course, 
such a desire for news exists, the supply to satisfy it 
will not be wanting, since the unscrupulous speculators 
in sensational news increase equally with, if they do not 
surpass, the growth of the legitimate cliffusers of infor- 
mation — the public press. Inquiry into the facts of 
the sanitary condition of the army was made by the 
Surgeon General, and Grant, under date of March 6, 
responded informally as follows: — 

No army ever went into the field better provided with medical 
stores and attendance than is furnished to the army before Vicks- 
burg. There was a deficiency in volunteer surgeons, but that is 
now supplied. The hospital boats are supplied with their own 
Burgeons, nurses, and everything for the comfort of the sick. The 
purveyor's department not only has everything furnished the sick, 
but more than it ever dreamed of was furnished to the army, and 
more than the great majority of men could have at home. Then, 
too, there is not that amount of sickness that persons would be led 
to believe from the statements in the public prints. I question 
whether the health of the St. Louis force is better than that of this 
command. On my arrival here, the men having to put up with 
straw for so long a time, and then with camping* on low ground 
and in the most terrible weather ever experienced, there was for a 
time, of necessity, a great number of sick. 

U. S. Gkastt, Major General. 

The foregoing letter was informal ; but on the 12th 



lo± Grant as a Soldier 

General Grant sent, in answer to the official inquiry, 
the following document for registry in the departmental 
offices at Washington : — 

Headquarters Department op the Tennessee, > 
Before Vicksburg, March 12, 18C3. £ 

Brigadier General "W. A. Hammond, 

Sufgeon General United States Army. 

Sir : Surgeon J. R Smith's letter of the 20th of February is just 
received, inquiring into the sanitary condition of this command, 
and asking for suggestions for its improvement. I know a great 
deal has been said to impress the public generally, and officials 
particularly, with the idea that this army was in a suffering con- 
dition, and mostly from neglect. This is most erroneous. The 
health of this command will, I venture to say, compare favorably 
with that of any army in the field, and every preparation is made 
for the sick that could be desired. 

I will refer Surgeon Smith's letter to my medical director for a 
fuller report of the condition of the medical department here. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Major' General. 

On the 27th of the same month the following; order 
was issued for the purpose of giving every facility to 
the Sanitary Commission in their self-imposed task : — 

Special Orders, No. 86. 

Headquarters Department of the Tennessee, ~) 
Young's Point, La., March 27, 18G3. j 

1. The Quartermaster's department will provide and furnish a 
suitable steamboat, to be called the " United States Sanitary Store 
Boat," and put the same in charge of the U. S. Sanitary Commis- 
sion, to be used by it exclusively for the conveyance of goods cal- 
culated to prevent disease — and supplement the government sup- 
ply of stores for the relief of the sick and wounded. 

2. No person will be permitted to travel on said boat, except 
sick officers of the army and navy (and they only on permits from 



and a Statesman. 155 

their proper commanding officers), discharged soldiers, and em- 
ployees of said Sanitary Commission ; and no goods whatever for 
trading or commercial purposes will be carried on said boat, and 
no goods will be taken for individuals, or with any conditions 
which will prevent their being delivered to those most needing 
them in the army or navy. 

3. The contents of all packages to be shipped on said U. S. 
Sanitary Store Boat will be inspected before shipment, by an 
agent of said Sanitary Commission, at the point of shipment, un- 
less an invoice of their contents has been received, the correctness 
of which is assured by the signature of some person of known 
loyalty and integrity. A statement, showing what goods have 
been placed on board at each trip, will be sent to the Medical 
Director of the department at these headquarters. 

4. A weekly statement will also be made by said Sanitary Com- 
mission to the department Medical Director, showing what san- 
itary supplies have been issued by said Commission, and to whom 
issued. 

5. All orders authorizing the free transportation of sanitary 
stores from Cairo south, on boats other than the one herein pro- 
vided for, are hereby rescinded. 

By order of Major General TJ. S. Grant. 

John A. Rawlins, A. A. G. 

Shortly before the movement of the forces below the 
works of Vicksburg, Admiral Farragut had run by the 
batteries at Port Hudson, with his flag-ship, the Hart- 
ford, and her tender the Albatross, and on March 17 
was lying off Natchez. On March 21 the Hartford 
arrived off Vicksburg, and anchoring below the bat- 
teries, her commander communicated with General 
Grant and Admiral Porter. On the 25th of March, two 
rams, which had been made by altering river steam- 
boats, the Lancaster and the Switzerland, attempted to 
run by the batteries of Vicksburg, but were found not 
strong enough to stand their heavy fire ; the Lancaster 



156 Grant as a Soldier 

was sunk, and the Switzerland temporarily disabled. 
Admiral Farragut descended the stream with his two 
vessels, engaging the batteries at Warrenton and 
Grand Gulf, and on the 2d of April arrived at the 
mouth of the Red River. 

In the mean time the army kept on the move, and 
on the 30th of March reached Richmond, a village in 
Madison County, Louisiana, a few miles inland from the 
Mississippi River, and in a line with Vicksburg. Here 
a portion of the Thirteenth Corps, after two hours' sharp 
fighting, drove out the Confederate cavalry, and took 
possessionof the place. From here to New Carthage 
the roads were in a frightfully bad condition, so much 
so that in places it was necessary to drag the wagons by 
hand ; but the corps kept on, and, when within two miles 
of New Carthage, it was found that, by a breakage in 
the levee, the current had flowed in and made New 
Carthage an island. It would seem as though Fortune 
was heaping up all kinds of unforeseen difficulties in 
Grant's way; but his indomitable perseverance never 
wavered. Boats and barges were collected from the 
neighborhood, and built ; but, this operation taking too 
much time, the troops were marched round by a detour, 
which made the distance from Milliken's Bend thirty- 
five miles. The roads were horrible, but Grant ex- 
emplified the old proverb, that " where there's a will 
there's a way." 

The army was now upon the west side of the Mis- 
sissippi, below Vicksburg; and to operate against that 
place it was necessary that they should cross the 
stream, and to do this the transports and barges, to- 
gether with the gunboats to protect the landing, had 



and a Statesman. 157 

to be run past the batteries. The successful perform- 
ance of this difficult and dangerous task was one of the 
most brilliant operations of the war. On the 16 th of 
April Admiral Porter was ready to make the first at- 
tempt. In this three transports were used, the Forest 
Queen, Henry Clay, and Silver Wave, which were 
loaded with supplies, and their machinery protected by 
bales of cotton and hay. Together with these, eight 
gunboats, all iron-clad except one, and all further 
protected with cotton and hay bales, formed the little 
fleet, to make the first trial, which took place at night. 
The plan of action was as follows : — 

The gunboats were to proceed in single file, engaging 
the enemy's batteries if discovered an&» fired upon, 
while the transports were to try and slip down the 
stream under the cover of the smoke, between the gun- 
boats and the opposite bank. It was between ten and 
eleven at night when they came round the bend of the 
river, and for a short time they supposed they were 
going to slip by unnoticed ; but all of a sudden two 
sharp and brilliant lines of fire gave the signal, and in 
an instant the whole length of the bluff was ablaze 
with the lurid flames of cannon. The gunboats re- 
turned the fire bravely, and in an hour and a quarter 
the batteries were passed. The damage done was as 
follows : The Forest Queen had received a shot through 
her steam drum, but was towed safely past, and soon 
repaired. The Henry Clay was the worst sufferer. 
Her protection of cotton bales was set on fire, and she 
was abandoned, a blazing wreck, to float at the mercy 
of the stream. The fire of the gunboats so intimidated 



o' 



the batteries at "Warrenton,that they scarcely responded. 



158 Grant as a Soldier 

Inspired by this success, six more transports were 
got ready, towing twelve barges loaded with forage ; 
and these were run by on the night of the 22d of April. 
One of these transports was sunk, and five damaged, 
but only so that they were easily repaired, while one 
half of the forage was safely landed. 

The dangerous task of manning the transports on 
these expeditions was done by volunteers, who re- 
sponded enthusiastically to the call ; and Grant re- 
marks in his report, that as far as his observation goes, 
there is nothing which the volunteer army of the 
United States is called upon to do, u mechanical or pro- 
fessional, that accomplished adepts cannot be found for 
the duty required, in almost every regiment." No 
higher compliment could be paid to the character of 
our army, or to the character of the loyal population 
of the country, of whom the army was a fit representa- 
tive. Its occupation and its interests are thus shown 
to be in productive labor, and a nation so employed 
cannot but be manly, honest, and fittest to lead in the 
civilization of the nineteenth century. 

The number of the transports for the army being 
still inadequate, Grant determined to move his force, 
by a circuitous route, to Hard Times, on the Louisiana 
shore, just above Grand Gulf, making thus the distance 
traversed by the army, since leaving Milliken's Bend, 
about seventy miles. The next step was crossing the 
river, and then after the navy had silenced the batteries 
at Grand Gulf, the position was to be stormed by the 
Thirteenth Corps, under McClernand, which was the 
only portion of the army that had reached this 
point. 



and a Statesman. 159 

On the morning of the 29th of April, at eight o'clock, 
the fleet moved to the attack, while a portion of the corps 
was held in readiness to land. Grand Gulf was an 
exceedingly strong post, on a high bluff, just south of 
the Big Black River. Its batteries were arranged in 
tiers, and the range of hills was lined with rifle-pits. 
On a tug in the stream, General Grant watched the 
action of the navy, and was greatly struck with the 
bravery they displayed. Bringing their vessels within 
pistol shot of the batteries, for five hours and a half 
they delivered and received a perfect hail of shot and 
shell. The lower batteries were silenced, but the up- 
per tiers were so high as to be out of range of the guns 
on the boats, and it being shown that they were too 
strong to be taken by assault, this plan was abandoned. 

Before leaving the north side of Vicksburg, and 
taking command in person, General Grant, being de- 
sirous of cutting the enemy's communications with that 
city, and to secure his own forces from attacks in the 
rear, should he find it necessary to invest the place, 
determined to send a cavalry expedition which should 
pass round their lines, destroying the railroads. The 
command of this expedition was intrusted to Colonel 
H. B. Grierson, of the First Cavalry Brigade. 

On the 17th of April, 1863, this force left La Grange. 
Tennessee, about two in the morning, and after a series 
of most brilliantly daring adventures, the details of 
which would require almost a volume to do them justice, 
entered Baton Rouge about noon on Friday, the 1st 
of May. The value of this expedition can hardly be 
appreciated, but the following data may give some idea 

11 



160 Grant as a Soldier 

of it. In fifteen days this force had marched over six 
hundred miles, through the very heart of the enemy's 
country, had destroyed over four million dollars' worth 
of property, broken all the railroad communications, 
captured over five hundred prisoners and twelve hun- 
dred horses, and menaced the enemy at points where 
they thought themselves most secure — while its total 
loss from all causes was only twenty-four. 

The announcement of the successful issue of the ex- 
pedition was given to the country by General Grant in 
the following despatch : — 

Grand Gulf, Miss., May 6. 
Major General Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

I learn that Colonel Grierson, with his cavalry, has been heard 
of, first about ten clays ago, in Northern Mississippi. 

He moved thence and struck the railroad thirty miles east of 
Jackson, at a point called Newton's Station. 

He then moved southward towards Enterprise, demanded the 
surrender of the place, and gave one hour's grace, during which 
General Lormniey arrived. 

He left at once, and moved towards Hazelhurst, on the New 
Orleans and Jackson Railroad. At this point he tore up the track. 
Thence he pushed to Bahala, ten miles farther south, on the same 
road, and thence eastward, on the Natchez road, where he had a 
fight with Wirt Adams's cavalry. 

From this point he moved back to the New Orleans and Jackson 
Railroad, to Brookhaven, ten miles south of Bahala; and when last 
heard from, he was three miles from Summit, ten miles south of 
Brookhaven, and was supposed to be making his way to Baton 
Rouge. 

He had spread excitement throughout the state, destroying rail- 
roads, trestle-works, and bridges, burning locomotives and railway 
stock, taking prisoners, and destroying stores of all kinds. 

U. S. Grant, Major General. 



and a Statesman. 1G1 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

ANOTHER ATTEMPT. —A FOOTING GAINED. — SHERMAN'S 

FEINT. 

Finding that Grand Gulf could not be taken by as- 
sault, the troops were again landed at Hard Times, and 
then marched across the upper end of Coffee's Point 
and De Shroon's plantation, to the Louisiana shore of 
the Mississippi, below Grand Gulf, and opposite Bruins- 
burg, while the navy and transports ran the batteries 
and joined them. A reconnoitring party having been 
sent to examine the best point for crossing the river, 
General McClernand reported on the 17th of June, that 
Bruinsburg was such a • point ; so that on the 30th of 
June, his corps was carried across the stream, and 
started, with three days' rations, to reach, as soon as 
possible, the high land, and succeeded in forming a line 
without meeting any resistance. 

The advance was now upon the Vicksburg side of 
the river, and everything depended upon promptness, 
since success could be guaranteed only in this way. 
This plan of action was so daring, that its feasibility 
was doubted by the authorities at Washington, and it 
did not meet the views of many of Grant's own officers. 
Sherman went even so far as to present a written 
protest against it, though expressed in the friendliest 



1G2 Grant as a Soldier 

terms. This fact appears from Sherman's own mag- 
nanimous declaration, after the capture of Vicksburg, 
and when the credit of this successful plan was attrib- 
uted to himself. It is certain, however, that the concep- 
tion of this plan belongs entirely to Grant, and his per- 
sistence and self-confidence, based upon a consciousness 
of genius, the highest quality of a military commander, 
and the touchstone of which is success, is shown in his 
determination to carry it out, even against the opinion 
of all those about him. This determination is equalled 
only by Grant's modesty and want of ambition, since, 
but for Sherman's declaration, the credit of the plan 
could not have been with certainty given to him ; for, if 
on no other grounds, his kind consideration for Sher- 
man, his dearest friend, would have prevented him 
from ever claiming his own. The tender and exalted 
friendship, the mutual respect, recognition, and admira- 
tion, which exist between these two great men, are as 
fine an evidence of the nobility human nature is capa- 
ble of, as can be culled from the pages of Plutarch, or 
any other record of the world's history. But if this 
plan of action was against the judgment of Grant's 
subordinates, most nobly and heartily did they aid him 
in its execution : there was no small jealousy among 
this body of men ; their hearts and souls were in 
the work, and each did all he could to help the com- 
mon cause. Herein also Grant has shown that he 
possesses the rare quality of judiciously selecting those 
upon whose aid he must rely, and then, by the gener- 
ous magnanimity with which he treats them, infusing 
his own spirit into them. As the tyrant always pro- 
duces a brood of sycophants and hypocrites, as slavery 



and a Statesman. 1G3 

fosters only all the petty vices in the slave, so only 
freedom produces the manly virtues of freemen, and a 
nobly great man, whose life is justice, fosters only the 
best qualities in those he has about him. 

The Seventeenth Corps followed as soon as possible, 
and Grant himself arrived also the same day. The 
enemy were first met eight miles from Bruinsburg, on 
the night of the 30th, and were driven back a consider- 
able distance. The next morning they were met in 
force, about four miles from Port Gibson, and thirteen 
from Bruinsburg, strongly posted, under Major General 
Bowen, where two roads met, both leading, by detours 
to the right and left, to Port Gibson. The position was 
one where a small force could resist the advance of 
a large one. The roads were upon ridges, and the 
country upon each side was broken with ravines. The 
battle was immediately joined, and lasted about all 
day, but at evening our forces were successful. The 
Confederates fled, thoroughly defeated, across Bayou 
Pierre, towards Grand Gulf, destroying, in their flight, 
the bridges over this stream. On the next day, how- 
ever, a new floating bridge was built by McPherson, 
and the army passed over in pursuit, to the banks of 
the Big Black River. The Confederates, in crossing 
this stream, attempted to destroy the pontoon bridge 
over which they had passed, but were prevented from 
so doing by our sharp-shooters. 

This part of the army was now seven miles beyond 
Grand Gulf, and within eighteen miles of Vicksburg. 
From an examination of some prisoners captured, it 
was learned that Grand Gulf had been evacuated, and 
the magazine blown up. Proceeding with a few men 



164 Grant as a Soldier 

to Grand Gulf, Grant found this to be the case, and 
made the necessary arrangements for changing his 
base of supplies from Bruinsburg to this place. The 
following modest report of the results thus gained was 
sent by General Grant to the department at Wash- 
ington : — 

Grand Gulf, Miss., May 3, 18C3. 
Major General Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

"We landed at Bruinsburg April 30, moved immediately on 
Port Gibson, met the enemy, eleven thousand strong, four miles 
south of Port Gibson, at two o'clock, A. M., on the 1st instant, and 
engaged him all day, entirely routing him, with the loss of many 
killed, and about five hundred prisoners, besides the wounded. 
Our loss is about one hundred killed and five hundred wounded. 

The enemy retreated towards Vicksburg, destroying the bridges 
over the two forks of the Bayou Pierre. These were rebuilt, and 
the pursuit has continued until the present time. 

Besides the heavy artillery at the place, four field-pieces were 
captured, and some stores, and the enemy were driven to destroy 
many more. 

The country is the most broken and difficult to Operate in I ever 
saw. 

Our victory has been most complete, and the enemy is thoroughly 
demoralized. 

Very respectfully, 

U. S. Grant, Major General commanding. 

On the 4th of May Governor Yates, of Illinois, who 
was with the army, and who, it will be remembered, 
was the first to perceive and employ Grant's military 
ability, wrote from Grand Gulf as follows : " Our arms 
are gloriously triumphant. We have succeeded in 
winning a victory which, in its results, must be the 
most important of the war. On my way to Grand 
Gulf I saw guns scattered all along the road, which the 



and a Statesman. 1G5 

enemy had left in their retreat. I consider Vicksburg 
as ours in a short time, and the Mississippi River as 
destined to be open from its source to its mouth." 

The same night that Grand Gulf was occupied, sev- 
eral barges were sent past the batteries of Vicksburg ; 
but the fire upon them was so heavy that they were 
yet on fire by shells bursting in the midst of the cot- 
ton and hay, and those on board were compelled to 
surrender. 

In order to divert the enemy's attention, and occupy 
a portion of his force elsewhere, General Grant ordered 
Sherman to make a feint upon Haine's Bluff, at the 
same time that he made his landing at Bruinsburg. 
Sherman's orders were received on the 28th of April, 
and proceeding up the Yazoo, he was at the mouth of the 
Chickasaw on the evening of- the 29th; and the next 
day, the fleet, proceeding to within an easy range of 
the works, kept up an active fire for four hours. That 
evening Sherman disembarked his troops, in full view 
of the enemy, and made preparations as though to 
assault the works. Keeping up this show, the object 
of which was successfully gained, as was evident from 
the activity the Confederates displayed in moving their 
guns, bringing up their forces, and in various ways 
preparing for a desperate resistance, the troops were 
reembarked that night, and the next clay was spent 
in making similar movements on both sides of the 
Yazoo. Then, quietly dropping back to Young's Point, 
the whole corps, with the exception of a garrison left 
at this place, marched to Hard Times, on the Louisiana 
shore, four miles above Grand Gulf, arriving there on 
the morning of the 6th of May, having marched sixty- 



1G6 Grant as a Soldier 

three miles. During that night and the next day they 
were carried across the stream, and on the 8th com- 
menced their march into the interior. 

Both Sherman and Grant were aware that the army 
could discriminate between a feint and a genuine at- 
tack, and that their spirit would not be depressed by a 
seeming repulse ; and the result showed that they had 
exactly understood the character of the men under 
their command. 

In his report Grant shows that he felt the importance 
of prompt action, by the following allusion to a proposi- 
tion he received from General Banks, who proposed to 
join him with twelve thousand men. Time was, however, 
of more importance than any prospective reinforce- 
ment. The iron was to be struck when hot. 

"About this time (May 4) I received a letter from 
General Banks, giving his position west of the Missis- 
sippi River, and stating that he could return to Baton 
Rouge by the 10th of May ; that by the reduction of 
Port Hudson he could join me with twelve thousand 
men. 

" I learned, about the same time, that troops were 
expected at Jackson from the southern cities, with Gen- 
eral Beauregard in command. To delay until the 10th 
of May, and for the reduction of Port Hudson after that, 
the accession of twelve thousand men would not leave 
me relatively so strong as to move promptly with what 
I had. Information, received from day to day, of the 
movements of the enemy, also impelled me to the course 
I pursued." 



and a Statesman 16' 



CHAPTER XIX. 

THE DEFENCES OF VICKSBURG. — A REPETITION OF STRAT- 
EGY IN ACTION.— MISSISSIPPI ELOQUENCE, AND ITS RE- 
SULTS. 

Having now succeeded in establishing a foothold, 
before we attempt to follow Grant in his movements, 
it will be well to glance at the obstacles in the way of 
his approach. The town of Vicksburg is situated on 
a sharp bend, or bow, in the river, on a high line of 
bluffs, extending from Haine's Bluff, touching the Yazoo, 
on the north, to a point below Warrenton on the south, 
a distance of about fifteen miles. The river front was 
impregnable, and was, as we have seen, considered so 
by General Grant. Perhaps immediately after the fall 
of New Orleans it might have been carried, but the 
Confederates had been too busily engaged since then in 
strengthening its defences. 

On the land side, at the time of Grant's approach, it 
was hardly less formidable. Pierre Bayou, with its steep 
banks, formed an outer line of defence ; then came the 
Big Black River, with its tributaries, the Big Sandy, 
Five-mile, Fourteen-mile, and Baker's Creeks: besides 
this, the city itself was surrounded with defensive works, 
constructed with great skill, and taking every advan- 
tage of the natural strength of the position. It seemed, 
and was afterwards proved, that nothing but an attack 



168 Grant as a Soldier 

by overwhelming numbers, secure from any interference 
by a succoring army, and able by a regular investment 
and siege to starve the defending army into surrender, 
could hope to obtain possession of the place. Yet this 
was the work Grant had proposed to himself and his 
army. 

The defence of Vicksburg was intrusted to Lieu- 
tenant General John C. Pemberton, with about sixty 
thousand men. Having secured his position, General 
Grant went personally to Grand Gulf, to superintend 
the landing of supplies, and found that the Confederates 
had retreated in such haste as to leave behind them 
thirteen heavy guns. A careful study of the opera- 
tions of the war which were carried on in Grant's 
department, affords more and more conclusive proof 
of how much the efficiency of the armies under his 
command depended upon his unwearied activity and 
his minute supervision. He was indefatigable, and in- 
spired this, quality in all of his subordinates. Com- 
puting the amount of work he did, the despatches he 
wrote, the orders he gave, the hours he must have 
spent in making himself personally almost ubiquitous, 
it seems nearly impossible that he could have found 
time to do so much in the short twenty-four hours of 
the day. 

On the 8th of May, Sherman having reached him, 
the main army was at once marched forward to the 
Big Sandy. An army was gathering, under Johnston, 
to aid Pemberton, by operating upon Grant's rear, and 
he conceived the plan of cutting away from his base, 
and by deceiving Pemberton, hold him in check, then 
quickly advance upon Jackson, the capital of the state, 



and a Statesman. . 1G9 

at which place Johnston was posted, and be back in 
time to meet Pemberton outside of Vicksburg. It 
was a repetition of the bold tactics at Corinth. The 
plan, however, when proposed, met with nothing but 
opposition from his subordinates. Grant, however, had 
learned from his experience at Holly Springs, that it 
was possible to support his army, without a base of 
supplies, from the enemy's country. 

Meanwhile the Confederates were making every effort 
to raise all the troops possible, since they had become 
thoroughly alarmed at the situation. The governor of 
Mississippi, John J. Pettus, issued from Jackson, the cap- 
ital of the state, a proclamation containing the following 
extracts : — 

"Recent events, familiar to you all, impel me, as 
your chief magistrate, to appeal to your patriotism 
for united effort in expelling our enemies from the soil of 
Mississippi. It can and must he done. Let no man ca- 
pable of bearing arms withhold from his state his ser- 
vices in repelling the invasion. Duty, interest, our 
common safety, demand every sacrifice necessary for 
the protection of our homes, our honor, liberty itself. 

" The exalted position won in her name upon every 
battle-field where Mississippi's sons have unfurled her 
proud banner, and hurled defiance in the face of over- 
whelming numbers, forbids that her honor, the chivalry 
of her people, the glory of her daring deeds on foreign 
fields, should be tarnished, and her streaming battle- 
flag dragged to the clust, by barbarian hordes on her 
own soil. 

" Awake, then ; arouse, Mississippians, young and old, 



170 • Grant as a Soldier 

from your fertile plains, your beautiful towns and cities, 
your once quiet and happy, but now desecrated homes; 
come and join your brothers in arms, your sons and 
neighbors, who are now baring their bosoms to the storm 
of battle at your very doors, and in defence of all you 
hold dear. 

"Meet in every county with your arms; organize com- 
panies of not less than twenty (under the late act of 
Congress), forward your muster-rolls to this office, and 
you will be received into the service with all the pro- 
tection and rights belonging to other soldiers in the 
field. Fathers, brothers, Mississippians ! while your 
sons and kindred are bravely fighting your battles on 
other fields, and shedding new lustre on your name, the 
burning disgrace of successful invasion of their homes, 
of insult and injury to their wives, mothers, and sisters, 
of rapine and ruin, with God's help, and by your assist- 
ance, shall never be written while a Mississippian lives 
to feel in his proud heart the scorching degradation. 
Let no man forego the proud distinction of being one 
of his country's defenders, or hereafter wear the dis- 
graceful badge of the dastardly traitor who refused to 
defend his home and his country." 

Before Grant's army started on their expedition, the 
following congratulatory order was read at the head of 
every regiment, which the curiously accurate reader 
may compare with the one from which we have just 
given extracts, and by the comparison obtain some 
assistance in arriving at the spirit and motives which 
actuated the two armies: — 



and a Statesman. 171 

Headquarters Army of tiie Tennessee. ") 
In the Field, Hankinson's Ferry, May 7. j 

Soldiers of tiie Army of Tennessee: Once more I thank 
you for adding another victory to the long list of those pre- 
viously won by your valor and endurance. The triumph gained 
over the enemy near Port Gibson, on the 1st, was one of the 
most important of the war. The capture of five cannon and 
more than one thousand prisoners, the possession of Grand Gulf, 
and a firm foothold on the highlands between the Big Black 
and Bayou Pierre, from whence we threaten the whole line of 
the enemy, are among the fruits of this brilliant achievement. 

The march from Mill /'ken's Bend to the point opposite Grand 
Gulf was made in stormy weather, over the worst of roads. 
Bridges and ferries had to be constricted. Moving bg night 
as well as by dag, with labor incessant, and extraordinarg pri- 
vations endured bg men and officers, such as have been rarely 
paralleled in any campaign, not a murmur of complaint has 
been uttered. A few days' continuance of the same zeal and con- 
stancy will secure to this army crowning victories over the 
rebellion. 

More difficulties and privations are before us; let us endure 
them manfully. Other battles are to be fought; let us fight 
them bravely. A grateful country tcill rejoice at our success, 
and history will record it with immortal honor. 

U. S. Grant, Major General commanding. 

On his arrival at Rocky Springs, after leaving Han- 
kinson's Ferry, Grant learned that the Confederates were 
concentrating at Edwards's Station, about twenty-five 
miles distant on the Vicksburg and Jackson Railway, 
and therefore resolved to keep as close to the Black 
River as possible, with McClernand's and Sherman's 
corps, and strike the railway somewhere between Ed- 
wards's Station and Bolton. McPherson, meanwhile, 
was to move by way of Utica to Raymond, thence to 
Jackson, destroying the railway, telegraph, &c, and 
then to join the main force by pushing west. By this 



172 Grant as a Soldier 

means he would avoid fighting with Pemberton on the 
ground of his own selection, would keep his troops 
within distance for mutual protection, and at the same 
time divide the enemy by striking between Pemberton 
and the force at Jackson. 

To deceive the enemy as to his intentions, was one 
of Grant's great objects, and, as we shall see, he succeed- 
ed thoroughly. On the 10th of May Grant heard again 
from Banks, earnestly asking reinforcements for his 
operations on the Red River, and replied, " It was my 
intention, on gaining a foothold at Grand Gulf, to have 
sent a sufficient force to Port Hudson to have assured 
the foil of that place, with your cooperation, or rather 
to have cooperated with you to that end. Meeting the 
enemy as I did below Port Gibson, however, I followed 
him to the Big Black, and could not afford to retrace 
my steps. Many days cannot elapse before the battle 
will begin which is to decide the fate of Vicksburg, but 
it is impossible to predict how long it may last. I would 
urgently request, therefore, that you join me, or send 
all the force you can spare, to cooperate in the great 
struggle for opening the Mississippi." 

On the 11th of May Grant wrote to Halleck from 
Cayuga, " My forces will be this evening as far advanced 
towards Jackson as Fourteen-mile Creek, the left near 
Black River, and extending as nearly east and west as 
they can get without bringing on a battle. As I shall 
communicate with Grand Gulf no more, except it be- 
comes necessary to send a train with heavy escort, you 
may not hear from me again for several days." Curi- 
ously enough, this was the date of a despatch from Hal- 
leck to Grant, to return and cooperate with Banks. 



and a Statesman. 173 

Fortunately the despatch did not come in time to pre* 
vent the move. 

On the same day McPherson, who was now beyond 
Utica, was ordered, " Move your command to-night to 
the next cross roads, if there is water, and to-morrow 
with all activity into Raymond. We must fight the 
enemy before our rations fail, and we are equally bound 
to make our rations last as long as possible. Upon one 
occasion you made two days' rations last seven. We 
may have to do the same thing again." 

On the 12th, at about 11 A. M., McPherson came upon 
the enemy, about five thousand strong, within two miles 
of Raymond. The lines were formed, and at two in the 
afternoon the advance was ordered ; and before the 
reserves under Crocker, who was ordered up when the 
enemy were. first discovered, reached the field, the Con- 
federates were defeated and flying in disorder, and at 
five the army entered Raymond. Pemberton had been 
completely deceived. Supposing that Grant was ad- 
vancing upon Edwards's Station, he waited there to 
receive him, and on the 12th telegraphed to Jefferson- 
Davis, " That will be the battle-place." Instead, how- 
ever, of assaulting the main Confederate army concen- 
trating to meet him on his left, Grant pushed out his 
right, destroyed the opposition at Raymond, avoided a 
battle where he w^as expected, fought the enemy where 
they did not expect him, and opened the road for Jack- 
son. The Confederates retreated direct to Jackson, 
where Johnston next day took command, having just 
arrived upon the ground. This flight confirmed Grant 
in his opinion, that a strong force of the enemy was at 
Jackson, on his right, and he immediately resolved to 



174 Grant as a Soldier 

deflect his entire force in that direction. This place 
uas also a railroad centre, and its destruction as such 
would be of great value in preventing any future con- 
centration to interfere with his future plans. 

On the night of the 13th Johnston arrived at Jack- 
son, and found his available force about eleven thousand 
men. In addition to these, twelve or thirteen thousand 
more were on their way to join him from the east, for 
he had urged the Confederate government to make 
every exertion to aid him in preserving Vicksburg 
and the Mississippi. He also ordered Pemberton to 
come up from Edwards's Station, and attack Grant in 
the rear. "If practicable," he writes on the 13th, 
" come up in his rear at once. To beat such a de- 
tachment would be of immense value. All the troops 
you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is 
all-important." 

Sherman arrived at Raymond before McPherson left 
it, and was ordered to take immediately the southern 
road to Jackson. During this day McClernand also 
withdrew from his position near Edwards's Station, 
where his pickets had been within two miles of Pem- 
berton's army. A portion of his force was drawn up 
in line of battle, and behind them the remainder retired, 
so that the movement was not discovered until too late 
to interfere. This force was then marched near to 
Raymond, where they were in position to cooperate 
with the others. That night Grant remained at Ray- 
mond, and on the morning of the 14th sent by a cou- 
rier to Grand Gulf the first report he had made to 
Halleck since leaving that post, in which he ends by 
saying, " I will attack the state capital to-day." 



and a Statesman. 175 

At nine in the morning the pickets of McPherson's 
corps engaged the enemy about five miles out of Jack- 
son. While dispositions were making for the attack, a 
heavy rain storm set in, which came down in such tor- 
rents that the battle was deferred an hour and a half, 
for fear of spoiling the ammunition if the cartridge- 
boxes were opened. During this time, however, the 
positions for the forces were selected. About eleven, 
the rain having ceased, McPherson's line advanced, and 
the Confederates broke and fled, followed by our men, 
to within the range of the artillery in the defences of 
the city. Sherman meanwhile had advanced until 
checked by a line of intrenchments. Grant, who had 
been with Sherman all the morning, ordered a detach- 
ment sent to the right of this line to reconnoitre it; 
but as they did not return speedily, he rode to the right 
himself, accompanied only by his staff, and found the 
road open into the city. The enemy had abandoned 
the place, and Grant, with his officers, rode into the 
works. His son, a boy of thirteen, who was with his 
father through this campaign, spurred on his horse as 
the party reached the limits of the town, and was the 
first to enter the capital of the State of Mississippi, from 
which, a few days before, the grandiloquent proclama- 
tion for its defence had been dated by its now fleeing 
governor. The " scorching degradation " and " burn- 
ing disgrace" of successful invasion were "written," 
while many of the Mississippians still lived. 

By three the army was in possession of Jackson, and 
that night Grant slept in the house occupied by John- 
ston the night before. That afternoon Grant gave his 
further orders to his commanders from the State House. 
12 



176 Grant as a Soldier 

Sherman was ordered to destroy the railroads, which 
he did most effectually, north, south, east, and west, for 
a distance of twenty miles. All the bridges, manu- 
factories, arsenals, and everything which could be of use 
to the Confederates, were destroyed, and the importance 
of Jackson as a railroad centre for the concentration of 
troops and supplies was annihilated. There was slight 
pillaging by our soldiers, who had found some bad 
liquor; a hotel was burned, called the Confederate 
Hotel ; but there was good excuse for this, since it was 
done by a party who had been led as prisoners through 
Jackson, but were soon after exchanged, and now re- 
turned as victors. On their previous visit they had been 
halted before this hotel, and on asking for water, had 
been refused with abuse and jeers. Here some of our 
soldiers, taking peaceful possession of the deserted State 
House, enacted a farcical burlesque of the Mississippi 
legislature, showing in so doing an adaptability for wit 
and humor which equalled their valor and endurance. 

After leaving Jackson, Johnston retreated about six 
miles on the Canton road, and then encamped. From 
here he sent despatches to the approaching reinforce- 
ments to assemble at a point forty or fifty miles from 
Jackson, and also to Pemberton, giving information of 
the capture of Jackson, and saying, " As soon as the 
reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the 
rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled 
that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the ene- 
my." In the same despatch he asks whether Grant 
" could supply himself from the Mississippi. Can you 
not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be 
compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him?" 



and a Statesman. 177 

Grant had, however, cut himself off from the Mississippi, 
and for a week had obtained his supplies from the coun- 
try, since with the exception of a train of two hundred 
wagons, which had set out from Grand Gulf on the 
12th, and guarded by a division of Sherman's corps, 
under Blair, had arrived just before the battle, and the 
rations he had started with, he had nothing else to 
depend on. 



178 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XX. 

TIIE BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL. — PEMBERTON DRIVEN 
INTO VICKSBURG. 

On the 16th Grant had his divisions on the march 
to concentrate at Edwards's Depot, whence Pemberton, 
having disregarded Johnston's order to attack Grant, 
had finally set out for Dillon's, to cut Grant's commu- 
nications, but on the 16th, having received positive 
orders from Johnston to unite with him by marching 
directly to Clinton, was now returning in order to 
obey. The persons from whom Grant received the in- 
telligence that Pemberton's army was here, had passed 
through it the night before, and estimated the force 
at twenty-five thousand men. Up to this time it had 
been intended to leave one division of Sherman's corps 
still another day at Jackson, in order to complete the 
destruction of the railways and stores ; but he was now 
ordered to move promptly to the support of the main 
army. " It is important," Grant writes, " that the great- 
est celerity should be shown in carrying out this move- 
ment, as I have evidence that the entire force of the 
enemy was at Edwards's Depot at seven P. M. last 
night, and still advancing. The fight may therefore 
be brought on at any moment. We should have every 
man in the field." In an hour from the reception of 
this order Sherman had his division in motion. 



and a Statesman. 170 

There are three roads leading from Ra} r mond to 
Edwards's Station, known as the Southern, Middle, and 
Northern roads. McClernand was ordered to move the 
troops under Blair and A. J. Smith by the Southern 
road, to place Carr and Osterhaus on the Middle road, 
and Hovey on the Northern, which is the direct road 
from Bolton to Edwards's Station. This done, he was 
to feel the enemy with a line of skirmishers, but not to 
bring; on a o;eneral engraorement unless he felt certain 
of success. A messenger was sent to McClernand, to 
explain the situation to him, and urge him to come up 
promptly. At about seven, Smith's division was met 
by the rebel skirmishers on the Southern road, about 
a mile and a half from Edwards's Station. Hearing the 
guns, Osterhaus pressed forward on the Middle road, 
drove in a line of skirmishers, and uncovered the enemy 
in force. At about half past six, McPherson, having 
heard from Hovey that he had met the enemy in force, 
sent to Grant a despatch : " I think it advisable for 
you to come forward to the front as soon as you can." 
Seeing that a battle was imminent, and that McClernand 
was the ranking officer in front, McPherson preferred, 
as he afterwards explained, that Grant should be there 
in person. 

The enemy was strongly posted, with his left upon 
Champion's Hill, over which the road to Edwards's 
Station runs. This hill is a ridge, rising sixty or sev- 
enty feet above the surrounding country, and its top, 
which was bare, made a commanding point for their 
artillery ; the thick woods and deep ravines, however, 
covered the rest of the ridge, and made it a difficult 
matter to manoeuvre troops. The Confederate line 



180 Grant as a Soldier 

was about four miles long, running southward upon 
this ridge, its centre covering the Middle road, while 
its right was on the Southern road. Champion's Hill, 
on their left, was evidently the key of their position. 
The Confederate force, by Pemberton's report, was 
seventeen thousand five hundred men ; but Grant 
estimated it at at least twenty-five; and this is evidently 
nearer the truth, as was seen afterwards by the num- 
bers which were surrendered at Vicksburg. By eleven 
the firing between the skirmishers grew into a battle, 
and Hovey with his division gained the crest of the 
hill. The enemy, however, receiving reinforcements 
rapidly, recaptured the position ; but fresh troops be- 
ing sent to Hovey, he again carried the crest. This 
operation was again repeated, and with the aid of 
Logan's division, who turned the enemy's left, and 
threatened to cut off his line of retreat, between three 
and four in the afternoon the rout was complete. 

While the battle was fighting, McClernand, despite 
Grant's repeated despatches to move promptly, was 
delaying through excess of caution, and consequently 
did not arrive on the ground until the battle was over. 
It is said that even during the pursuit, "when the 
beaten enemy came headlong across his front, McCler- 
nand, supposing this an assault, developed his troops, 
and prepared to receive a flank attack from the pell- 
mell fugitives." 

In Ilovey's and McPherson's commands, who did the 
whole of the fighting, Grant had about fifteen thou- 
sand men, all of whom took part in the battle, and were 
under fire. Our loss was severe — about twenty-five 
hundred killed, wounded, and missing. The enemy's 



and a Statesman. 181 

was, however, greater ; besides which, one of the divis- 
ions of the Confederate force, under Loring, which held 
the right of their line, and, being in McClernand's front, 
had not been seriously engaged, became separated from 
the rest of the army by the rapidity of Grant's advance 
after the battle, and, abandoning all their artillery, set 
out in the night to join Johnston, and, making a wide 
detour, succeeded in doing so after several days, having 
lost largely by desertion during the march. This entire 
division was thus taken from Pemberton's command. 
It appears that Pemberton had found, during the en- 
gagement, the same trouble with Loring that Grant 
found with McClernand — though he repeatedly sent him 
orders to come to the assistance of the left, he could 
not get him to stir, and the result was as we have 
stated above. 

The rout of the Confederates was complete : two 
batteries of six guns each were left in their flight, 
and the ground was strewed with evidences of the 
precipitancy of their retreat. The Seventeenth Corps 
continued the pursuit until dark, while Hovey remained 
on the field. " The heroes slept on the field they had 
so dearly w T on. Men, horses, cannon, and all the wrecks 
of the battle were scattered around in wild confusion ; 
rebels and Union men heaped upon each other, dead 
and dying; their struggles ended, their hot rage all 
chilled. The soldiers called the spot the 'Hill of 
Death.'" 

Grant and his staff pushed on at the head of the col- 
umn in pursuit until long after dark, and halted for the 
night at a house, when soon finding their position was 
unsafe, they returned, and passed the night in the vi« 



182 Grant as a Soldier 

cinity of the column which was just going into bivouac 
on the road, under the porch of a house used as a Con- 
federate field hospital. This night Grant received the 
despatch from Halleck, ordering him to return and co- 
operate with Banks. But the campaign was won. 

At the time of the battle, Pemberton was on his way 
to join Johnston, and in a despatch to this last describ- 
ing the route he was taking, he says, " I am thus par- 
ticular, that you may be able to make a junction with 
this army j " adding in a postscript, "Heavy skirmish- 
ing now going on in my front." His next despatch 
to Johnston announced that he had been " compelled 
to fall back with heavy loss." The celerity of Grant's 
movements had enabled him to defeat both armies be- 
fore they could combine. 

Sherman left Jackson on the 16 th, and was in Bol- 
ton the same day. That night he was informed of the 
victory at Champion's Hill, and ordered to march to 
Bridgeport without delay. Blair's corps was ordered 
to move to the same point by way of Edwards's Sta- 
tion, carrying the pontoon train with it; and by this 
arrangement Sherman's force was brought together at 
the best point for crossing the Big Black, and turn- 
ing the enemy's flank, or striking Haine's Bluff, which 
was now a point of great importance, since the estab- 
lishment of a base of supplies was a matter of urgent 
necessity. Though forage and beef had been found in 
great abundance in the country, other supplies were 
getting short. The main column pushed on the direct 
route for Vicksburg, and would thus be able to attack 
the flank of any force attempting to confront Sherman, 
or to defend Haine's Bluftj while, if the Confederates 



and a Statesman. 183 

should oppose Grant in front, Sherman could cut off 
their retreat to Vicksburg, by interposing in their rear. 

To Sherman Grant wrote, "I will endeavor to hold 
the enemy where he is, to give you time to cross the 
river, if it can be effected. The moment the enemy 
gives way, I will endeavor to follow him so closely that 
he will not be able to destroy the bridge." 

At half past three on the morning of the 17th, the 
pursuit was resumed, and the enemy was found in force, 
strongly posted at the bridge over the Big Black. The 
stream at this point flows in a horse-shoe bend, the 
opening towards the east, while on the western shore 
high bluffs rise from the water's edge. The opening 
of the curve on the eastern side is about a mile wide, 
making a low, level bottom, surrounded by a stagnant 
bayou nearly twenty feet wide and two or three deep. 
Inside of this bayou, making a natural ditch, the Con- 
federates had made a line of intrenchments, defended 
by twenty guns and a garrison of four thoilsand men — 
as many as could be .used to advantage in the space. 
The intrenchments were commanded by the bluffs on 
the opposite side of the river, though the open space 
between them and the stream had no cover. The main 
body of the Confederate army had crossed. The pur- 
suit having come up, the position was invested, and 
the flank being; turned, the line of defence was carried 
by storm. Our men vied with each other in valor, 
being inspired by success, and friendlily emulous of 
each other's glory. The supports charged as soon as 
they saw the assaulting column start, and the Confed- 
erates, disheartened by the defeat of the day before, 
were completely demoralized, and broke and fled in 



184 Grant as a Soldier 

confusion. Peniberton himself says, " Our troops on 
their front did not wait to receive them, but broke 
and fled precipitately. One portion of the line being 
broken, it very soon became a question of sauve qui 
pent" The troops on the other side of the river shared 
the panic, and set fire to their end of the bridge before 
those on the eastern side had crossed. A wild struggle 
to save themselves commenced, in which all distinctions 
of rank were lost, and only the blind instinct of life 
ruled. One entire brigade remained in the trenches, 
and surrendered. Seventeen hundred and fifty-one 
prisoners, eighteen cannon, and five stands of colors 
fell into our hands here. 

Pemberton began to fear for Vicksburg. The rapid- 
ity of Grant's movements completely bewildered him. 
His report said, "The enemy, by a flank movement 
on my left at Bridgeport, and on my right by Bald- 
win's or other ferries, might reach Vicksburg almost 
simultaneously with myself, or perhaps interpose a 
heavy force between me and that city. I myself pro- 
ceeded at once to Vicksburg to prepare for its defence." 

The destruction of the bridge gave the Confederates 
twelve hours' start, for the Big Black is here wide and 
deep. During the day Grant sent the following to Sher- 
man : " Secure a commanding position on the west bank 
of Black River, as soon as you can. If the information 
you gain after crossing warrants you in believing you 
can go immediately into the city, do so. If there is any 
doubt in this matter, throw out troops to the left, after 
advancing on a line with the railroad bridge, to open 
your communications with the troops here. We will 
then move in three columns, if roads can be found 



and a Statesman. 185 

to move on, and either have Vicksburg or Ilaine's 
Bluff to-morrow night. The enemy have been so ter- 
ribly beaten yesterday and to-day, that I cannot believe 
that a stand will be made, unless the troops are relying 
on Johnston's arriving with large reinforcements ; nor 
that Johnston would attempt to reenforce with anything 
at his command, if he was at all aware of the present 
condition of things." 

The labor on the bridges was continued all night, and 
on the morning of the 18th, at eight, the Thirteenth 
and Seventeenth Corps were again on the march for 
Vicksburg. On the 17th, at noon, Sherman reached 
Bridgeport, and found Blair with the pontoon train 
there. There was a body of Confederates intrenched 
on the other side of the stream ; but on the appearance 
of the national forces, they displayed a white flag and 
retired. The pontoon bridge was laid, the troops passed 
over, and at daylight next morning, the 18th, Sherman 
pushed rapidly forward, and at half past nine the head 
of his column struck the Benton road, three and a half 
miles from Vicksburg, thus interposing a superior force 
between that place and the forts on the Yazoo. 

When this column struck the hills, Grant was riding 
with Sherman, and together they mounted the farthest 
height, from Which they looked down upon the Yazoo, 
and from which Sherman had been repulsed six months 
before. The two friends gazed in silence upon the goal 
they had so long desired, the high, dry ground to the 
north of Vicksburg, and the base for their supplies, 
when suddenly Sherman, turning to Grant, said, " Until 
this moment I never thought your expedition a suc- 
cess. I never could see the end clearly until now. But 



186 Grant as a Soldier 

this is a campaign ; this is a success, if we never take 
the town." To this the other made no response save 
his usual one of smoking his cigar in quiet. During 
the campaign, Sherman, with his corps, had not been 
much engaged in the active fighting, though they had 
had more than their share of the marching ; and there- 
fore he had not been stirred with the enthusiasm of 
success which victory gives. Now, however, he saw the 
results, and recognized the brilliancy and accuracy of 
conception on the part of his chief, with an enthusiasm 
as great as the imperturbable self-confidence of the 
leader. 



and a Statesman. 187 



CHAPTER XXI. 

VICKSBURG INVESTED. — THE UNSUCCESSFUL ASSAULTS.— 
THE REGULAR SIEGE BEGUN. 

Grant now directed Sherman to push on and occupy 
the right, while McPherson held the centre and McCler- 
nand the left. Sherman pushed forward his column, 
and by dark had reached the bluffs of the Mississippi. 
Possession was taken early next morning of the enemy's 
outer works, and many prisoners were made of those 
left behind in the hasty evacuation of his camps. At 
eight in the morning of the 19th of May, the north 
side of Vicksburg was encompassed, our right resting 
on the banks of the Mississippi, in full view of the fleet 
at the mouth of the Yazoo, and only about four hun- 
dred yards separating our lines from the line of Con- 
federate intrenchments. The other portions of the 
troops were as successfully disposed, and on the 19th 
the siege of Vicksburg began. 

Haine's Bluff was also immediately occupied, for the 
enemy had of course abandoned this stronghold as 
soon as Grant had pushed himself between it and Vicks- 
burg. Chickasaw Landing was made a base of supplies, 
and roads built for bringing them up. 

It was just twenty days since the campaign had 
be^un. In that time Grant had marched more than 



188 Grant as a Soldier 

two hundred miles, beaten two armies in five several 
battles, captured twenty-seven heavy cannon, sixty-one 
pieces of field artillery, taken six thousand five hun- 
dred prisoners, and put at least six thousand more 
Confederates hors de comlat. He had forced the evac- 
uation of Grand Gulf, captured Jackson, the capital of 
Mississippi, destroyed the railways for more than thirty 
miles, and invested the chief stronghold of the Con- 
federacy on the Mississippi. Starting without teams, and 
with only ten days' rations, he had found his wagons and 
supplies in the country. Only five days' rations had 
been issued in the whole twenty days, yet there was 
no want or complaining in his army ; and his entire 
loss had been four thousand three hundred and thirty- 
five. In this campaign Grant first displayed his origi- 
nal system of warfare in a conspicuous way. War in 
the western country was as different an affair from war 
in Europe, as the condition of the country and the 
character and life of the people differ from those in 
Europe. The country there is all known, and the 
Generals can study the movements of their own and 
the opposing armies as easily as they can study out a 
problem in chess. Here, however, much of the country 
is a wilderness, and the first surveys of it were made 
by the armies in the field j here, too, the country is not 
covered with a network of roads. The railroad runs 
through forests in order to connect villages, and is 
frequently the only means of communication for large 
tracts of country. Grant in this campaign showed his 
full appreciation of the strategical importance of the 
railroad. Here, too, he first put into practice the idea 
of living upon the country, and made the suggestion 



and a Statesman. 189 

of Sherman's final campaign possible. In his ability 
also to plan a military combination, to appreciate the 
value of promptness and celerity in his movements, he 
showed himself a master mind. In fathoming also his 
adversaries' plans, judging what their course of action 
would be, in certain circumstances, from the character of 
the men themselves, he again showed himself a master ; 
while in his power of infusing his spirit into his subor- 
dinates, gaining the enthusiastic confidence of his men, 
and influencing inversely his opponents, he showed 
himself unquestionably the most capable General the 
war had as yet produced. 

The siege of Vicksburg was now commenced. The 
line of the rebel defences of the city was seven or 
eight miles long, exclusive of those on the water front. 
It consisted of a series of detached works, on prominent 
points, connected by a continuous line of trenches or 
rifle-pits. This line was, from the nature of the ground, 
irregular, and the works were placed at distances of 
from seventy-five to five hundred yards from each 
other. In fact, Vicksburg was rather an intrenched 
camp than a regularly fortified town, while the broken 
nature of the ground, making all attempts at rapidity 
and unity of movement impossible, made it a place of 
unusual strength. This evident strength of its de- 
fences, both natural and artificial, was well calculated 
to inspire new courage in an army, even though it had 
retired to the place after a series of defeats in the open 
field. This was found to be the case with Pemberton's 
men. Here they met some eight thousand troops, who 
had been left as the garrison, who had not therefore 
been demoralized by the recent defeats; and so no 



190 Grant as a Soldier 

wonder that Pemberton felt, with his thirty thousand 
men, his two hundred cannon, well able to stand a siege, 
at least until Johnston should have time enough to col- 
lect another army and come to his relief. 

On the 18th of May, however, while Grant was still 
advancing on the Jackson road, Pemberton received a 
despatch from Johnston, who had learned that he had 
been driven back into Vicksburg, as follows : " If 
Haine's Bluff be untenable, Vicksburg is of no value, 
and cannot be held. If, therefore, you are invested at 
Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under 
such circumstances, instead of losing both troops and 
place, you must, if possible, save the troops. If it is 
not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, 
and march to the north east." 

Pemberton, on the receipt of this order, called a 
council of war, composed of all his general officers, to 
deliberate on the propriety of obeying. The unanimous 
opinion of this council was that " to withdraw from 
Vicksburg with such morale and materiel as to be of 
further use to the Confederacy, would be impossible." 
Pemberton therefore decided to remain, and did so. 

Grant had at this time about thirty thousand men. 
His troops were flushed with success, and eager to 
carry the place by assault. He therefore, on the 19th, 
the first day of the investment, ordered his corps com- 
manders to " push forward carefully, and gain positions 
as close as possible to the enemy's works, until two 
o'clock, P. M. ; at that hour they will lire three volleys 
of artillery from all the pieces in position. This will 
be the signal for a general charge along the whole 
line." This assault was unsuccessful ; the troops pen- 



and a Statesman. 191 

etrated as far as possible, but were unable to make a 
permanent lodgment, and were forced to fall back. 
The result, however, of the attempt was of great value. 
It served to show the nature of the ground, and the 
obstacles to be overcome, and it showed that to take 
the place by assault was impossible. 

The 20th and 21st of May were devoted to looking 
after the comfort of the army — bringing up supplies, 
a change of clothes, and bread, of which the army 
had felt the want : communications were opened, new 
roads laid, and all the needed arrangements for a be- 
sieging camp made. McClernand was ordered to open 
his communications with Warrenton, and for a time 
drew his supplies from there. On the 20th the mortar 
fleet was brought into position, and on that and the 
next day bombarded the city, but met with little 
response from the artillery in the defences ; for Pember- 
ton was desirous of saving his ammunition, and had 
forbidden both picket firing and artillery duels. The 
fire from the boats was so heavy that the citizens 
commenced digging caves in the sides of the hills for 
shelter. They had been desired to leave the town by 
the military commander, but refused to abandon their 
homes. The horses and mules were also driven out of 
the lines, since it was found too great a tax upon the 
resources of the garrison to feed them. 

On the 21st Grant resolved upon another assault. 
He was led to this course by the following considera- 
tions. The distance to be passed over by the assault- 
ing columns in no case exceeded four hundred yards, 
and in most cases partial shelter could be obtained to 
within one hundred yards of the enemy's line : he also 
13 



192 Grant as a Soldier 

felt that a resolute assault from the advanced position 
he had gained would succeed, if made with vigor and co- 
operation : then besides he knew that Johnston was gath- 
ering an army at Canton ; that it was in daily receipt of 
accessions ; and that if, instead of waiting to be attacked 
in his rear, he could take Vicksburg, and, sallying out 
from there, attack and defeat Johnston, he could 
destroy all the railroads, make the state secure, and save 
the government from the necessity of sending him re- 
enforcements, which were so much needed elsewhere 
at this juncture. The troops also were desirous of 
obtaining possession of the place ; the weather was get- 
ting hot, and water among the hills was becoming scarce, 
and would probably fail during the summer ; the army 
also would not work with as hearty a will in the dif- 
ficult and laborious duties of the trenches, until they 
were convinced that all other means had been tried 
and failed. Grant has the ability of a great leader — to 
feel the spirit of his men, and to be influenced by it, as 
in turn he influences it. This spirit demanded an as- 
sault. On the 21st, therefore, orders were given for a 
general assault along the line the next day, at ten in 
the morning. The artillery was to prepare the way 
by a vigorous fire. The columns were to move at 
quick time, with fixed bayonets, carrying only canteens, 
ammunition, and one day's rations, and not to fire a 
gun until the outer works were stormed. "If pros- 
ecuted with vigor, it was confidently believed that this 
course would carry Vicksburg in a short space of time, 
and with very much less loss of life than would result 
from a protracted siege." Admiral Porter was informed 
of the intended assault, and requested to send up the 



and a Statesman. 193 

gunboats and shell the city until half past ten, and also 
to mount and use the mortars from the opposite shore, 
the night before. This was done, and Porter kept six 
mortars playing rapidly all night upon the city and 
works, while at three next morning the cannonade from 
the land side began. Vicksburg was encircled with fire, 
and the thundering roar of the artillery continued until 
.eleven. The bombardment was the most terrible one 
of the siege, and the sharp-shooters kept up so ac- 
curate a fire that the enemy was able to make only a 
partial response, and the attacking columns could form 
without molestation. 

Grant held a position near McPherson's front, in the 
centre. All the corps commanders had set their time by 
his, and promptly at the appointed hour the three corps 
moved to the assault. No men could be seen above 
the works, except occasionally a sharp-shooter, who 
would quickly rise, fire, and disappear. A line of sharp- 
shooters was placed to keep them down. The assault 
was, however, like the first, a failure, and at two o'clock, 
it being evident the works could not be thus carried, 
the troops were all withdrawn. Prodigies of valor 
were performed, in every corps the colors were planted 
on the works, and some of them remained there all 
day, the sharp-shooters preventing any approach to 
them from either side ; but it was impossible. Each 
corps had advanced, and had been driven back by the 
withering fire of the enemy. The position was too 
strong to be taken. At every point of the assault, the 
enemy had all the force necessary to repel it, while 
the nature of the ground outside rendered an attack 
by a column impossible. In many cases the riflemen, 



194 Grant as a Soldier 

who had got too near to retreat with safety, stood still, 
exposed from head to foot, with their pieces ready to 
fire at any head that showed itself, and the fire from 
the works was always kept down where the Union 
troops had nerve enough for this desperate course. 

The- brunt of the first assault was over in an hour, 
and the result was seen to be ineffectual ; but about 
twelve o'clock, Grant received a despatch from McCler- . 
nand, saying he was hard pressed. Telling him to 
call on his reserves, Grant went round to Sherman's 
position, and there received another despatch from 
McClernand, saying he had carried two forts, and ad- 
vising a bold push along the line, and soon a third, 
repeating this assertion, and asking for reinforcements. 
Although doubting the truth of these despatches, — four 
of which were sent, the last at half past three, — another 
trial was ordered ; but it was as unsuccessful as the first. 
By these despatches the battle was prolonged, many 
lives lost, and no advantage gained. McClernand's 
corps had been as brave as the others, but they had 
gained no success which justified the despatches he 
had sent. About three thousand men were killed or 
wounded in this day's fight, but the spirit of the army 
was in no way shaken. 

During the night the troops were withdrawn from 
the most advanced positions they had reached during 
the assault. Most of the wounded were carried off 
the field, but there was not time enough to bring 
back the dead, who lay for two days exposed between 
the two armies, since the enemy's guns commanded 
the ground where they lay. Pemberton then,»being 
afraid that a pestilence would be caused in his garrison, 



and a Statesman. 195 

proposed an armistice of two and a half hours, to enable 
Grant to remove them. The offer was promptly ac- 
cepted, and the enemy took advantage of it to remove 
the dead horses and mules which lay before their 
works, and which had become very offensive by decom- 
position. During the armistice a good deal of inter- 
course took place between the soldiers on both sides ; 
but there was no evidence of animosity between them, 
and an utter absence of insulting language. They had 
tested each other's manliness too well not to respect 
each other. 

On the 22d Grant reported to Halleck the progress 
of the campaign since his arrival before Vicksburg. In 
speaking of the second assault, he said, " General 
McClernand's despatches misled me as to the facts, and 
caused much of this loss. He is entirely unfit for the 
position of corps commander, both on the march and 
on the battle-field. Looking after his corps gives me 
more labor and infinitely more uneasiness than all the 
remainder of my department." 

The assaults having failed, preparations were im- 
mediately made for the siege. The troops retained the 
positions they had assumed when the place was in- 
vested, Sherman holding the right, McPherson the 
centre, and McClernand the left. Grant had now about 
forty thousand troops in line. Reinforcements had 
been received since his investment of Vicksburg, but 
he still felt the need of more men, in order to prosecute 
the siege vigorously, and at the same time protect 
himself against the efforts of Johnston to relieve Pem- 
berton, to do which effectually, he should guard the 
line of the Big Black, and the Yazoo to HaWs Bluff. 



196 Grant as a Soldier 

Halleck clearly saw this need, and without waiting for 
an application from Grant, telegraphed that he would 
do all he could to help him. The army was, however, 
in want of almost all the appliances of a siege, and 
contained only four regular engineer officers; but with 
the materials at hand, the best was done that could 
be done. 

The enemy was evidently short of ammunition, and 
his fire was consequently not very heavy, while our 
sharp-shooters were so effective that at the end of the 
first fortnight nearly all the artillery of the enemy was 
either dismounted or withdrawn. The first ground in 
the regular approaches was broken on the 23d of May. 
The history of this siege is another proof, if further 
proof were necessary, of the adaptability to circum- 
stances, and fertility of resources, shown by our volun- 
teers during the war. They could, after a few trials, 
perform all the various duties required of them ; 
they were able to learn, which is more than half of the 
task of learning. The scarcity of engineer officers 
obliged Grant to give a great deal more personal super- 
intendence to the works than he would otherwise have 
done. His military education fitted him for this, and 
every day he rode through the lines, directing, advising, 
overseeing the works, and infusing his spirit into his men. 
The aggregate length of the trenches was twelve miles; 
eighty-nine batteries were constructed during the siege. 
On the 30th of June there were in position two hun- 
dred and twenty guns, mostly light field-pieces ; one 
battery of heavy guns, on the right, was manned and 
officered by the navy. The enemy slackened their 
fire, as the batteries were built, until towards the end 



and a Statesman. 197 

they hardly responded at all : they also made sorties 
occasionally, and sometimes resorted to mines, to delay 
the approaches; but their general policy appears to 
have been to wait for another assault, and their indif- 
ference to the approach of the works was, at some 
points, amusing. The night working parties were pro- 
tected by a line of pickets, and at one point the 
pickets of the two sides made an agreement not to 
fire upon each other at night. On one occasion our 
pickets, in order to allow the opening of another paral- 
lel, encroached upon the position of the enemy's line, 
so that the pickets became mixed, and after some dis- 
cussion their relative position was arranged by a com- 
promise, and they were stationed in places not more 
than ten yards apart, and in full view of each other. 

While the investment of Vicksburg was thus pro- 
ceeding, Grant's attention was directed to Johnston's 
menacing attitude in his rear, and on the 25th of May 
he wrote to Banks, " I feel that my force is abundantly 
strong to hold the enemy where he is, or to whip him 
should he come out. The place is so strongly fortified, 
however, that it cannot be taken without either a great 
sacrifice of life or by a regular siege. I have de- 
termined to adopt the latter course, and save my 
men. . . . The great danger now to be apprehended 
is, that the enemy may collect a force outside, and 
attempt to rescue the garrison. I deem it advisable 
that as large a force be collected here as possible. 
Having all my available force that can be spared from 
West Tennessee and Helena here, to get any more 
I must look outside of my own department. You 
being engaged in the same enterprise, I am compelled 



198 Grant as a Soldier 

to ask you to give me such assistance as may be in 
your power. I would be pleased, General, to have you 
come, with such force as you may be able to spare." 

On the 2Gth a force of twelve thousand men, under 
Blair, was sent against a body of the enemy, supposed 
to be gathering between the Big Black and Yazoo 
Rivers. Blair was absent nearly a week, and accom- 
plished the objects of the expedition most thoroughly. 

On the 31st of May Grant received a letter from 
Banks, asking for ten thousand men ; to Avhich Grant 
replied, "Vicksburg is the vital point. Our situation 
is, for the first time during the entire western cam- 
paign, what it should be. We have, after great labor 
and extraordinary risk, secured a position wmich should 
not be jeopardized by any detachments whatever. On 
the contrary, I am now, and shall continue to exert 
myself to the utmost to concentrate. I have ample 
means to defend my present position, and effect the 
reduction of Vicksburg within twenty days, if the re- 
lation of affairs which now obtains remains unchanged. 
But detach ten thousand men from my command, and 
I cannot answer for the result. 1 need not describe 
the severity of the labor to which my command must 
necessarily be subjected, in an operation of such mag- 
nitude as that in which I am now engaged. Weakened 
by the detachment of ten thousand men, or even half 
that number, with the circumstances entirely changed, 
1 should be crippled beyond redemption. My arrange- 
ments lor supplies are ample, and can be expanded to 
meet any exigency. All I want now is men." 

On the 7th of June a body of the enemy attacked 
Milliken's Bend, but were driven back by the garrison 



and a Statesman. 199 

of white and black troops occupying that place, under 
the command of Brigadier General Dennis. Grant 
also sent him reinforcements, with orders to drive the 
enemy beyond the Tensas. " Every vestige of an ene- 
my's camp ought to be shoved back of that point." 

On the 8th of June, a division of troops having arrived 
from Memphis, they were ordered to Haine's Bluff, 
which till then had been temporarily held by a garrison 
of the Marine Brigade, furnished by Admiral Porter. 
Haine's Bluff was now placed under the command of 
Washburne, with orders to so fortify it that it could be 
held by ten thousand men against a sudden move- 
ment, and could be capable of protecting at least forty 
thousand. 

Reinforcements continued to arrive, until, on the 
14th of June, Grant's force amounted to seventy-five 
thousand men, about half of whom remained in the 
trenches till the place surrendered, while the other half 
formed an army of observation, and watched closely 
all the movements of the forces gathering to relieve 
the town. On the 22d of June positive information 
was received that Johnston was crossing the Big Black, 
and Grant immediately gave the command in the rear 
to Sherman, with the orders, " Use all the forces indi- 
cated as you deem most advantageous, and should 
more be required, call on me, and they will be furnished 
to the last man here and at Young's Point." 

To McPherson Grant w T rote, " Sherman goes out to 
meet Johnston. If he comes, the greatest vigilance will 
be required on the line, as the Vieksburg garrison may 
take the same occasion for an attack also. Batteries 
should have a good supply of grape and canister." A 



200 Grant as a Soldier 

line of works, quite as strong as those defending Vicks- 
burg, were now constructed from the Yazoo River to 
the Big Black, so that if Johnston should attempt to 
attack the rear of the besieging army, he would find it 
as difficult as they found the attack upon Vicksburg. 

On the 17th of June Grant received from Sherman 
and McPherson a formal protest against a congratula- 
tory order, issued on the 30th of May, by McClernand 
to his troops, and which, besides being in direct viola- 
tion of the army regulations and the orders of the 
department, which required all such papers to be for- 
warded to the superior officer, since it had not been 
seen by Grant, was also full of insinuations against the 
other officers and corps of the army, while it magnified 
the glory of its author. Enclosing the copy of the 
order, Grant wrote to McClernand,asking,ifitwasatrue 
copy ; and on receiving an answer in the affirmative, 
he immediately relieved McClernand of his command, 
appointing General Ord in his place, subject to the 
approval of the President. This was the end of the 
military career of a political general, whose incompe- 
tence and self-sufficiency had troubled Grant greatly 
during his entire connection with the army. Grant 
had frequently complained of him to the department 
at Washington, and finally, on the 14th of May, had 
received "authority to relieve any person who, from 
ignorance in action, or from any cause, interfered with 
or delayed his operations." He was also told that the 
government expected him to exert his authority, and 
woidd hold him responsible. This congratulatory order 
offered the opportunity so long desired, and immediate 
advantage was taken of it. 



and a Statesman. 201 

On the 14th of June Johnston had written to Pem- 
berton, "By fighting the enemy simultaneously at 
the same points of his line, you may be extricated ; 
our joint forces cannot raise the siege of Vicksburg." 

The garrison began now to suffer both for rations 
and supplies. There was particularly a great dearth 
of percussion caps. On the 15th Pemberton sends to 
Johnston, " We are living on greatly reduced rations, 
but I think sufficient for twenty days yet. Our men, 
having no relief, are becoming much fatigued, but are 
still in pretty good spirits." On the 19th, "My men 
have been thirty-four days and nights in the trenches 
without relief, and the enemy within conversation dis- 
tance. We are living on very reduced rations, and, as 
you know, are entirely isolated. What aid am I to 
expect from you ? " The prices of food in the town 
had risen enormously. Flour was a thousand dollars a 
barrel, rebel money ; beef, — very often the oxen killed 
by the shot from the Union army, and picked up by the 
butchers, — two dollars and a half a pound. The rich 
had eaten all the food they had, while the poor were 
nearly starved. There was scarce a building which had 
not been hit; women and children had been killed by 
the shells, and all who did not retire to the caves were 
in danger. Meanwhile • the pickets met every night, 
and were always good-natured to each other. The 
conversation often turned on the merits of the war, 
and the question would be discussed vehemently, until, 
arguments being exhausted, they would separate, as 
one of them said, " for fear of getting into a fight upon 
the subject." 

On the 25th of June Grant fired a mine which had 



202 Grant as a Soldier 

been prepared on the Jackson road. It extended 
thirty-five feet from the starting-point; fifteen hun- 
dred pounds of powder were placed in three branches, 
and seven hundred in the central lead : fuses were 
arranged to fire them all at once, and at half past 
three the explosion took place, and the earth was 
shaken as though with an earthquake, and huge 
masses were thrown into the air. The crater made 
was large enough to hold two regiments, and the para- 
pet was partially destroyed. As soon as the result was 
discovered, a column of infantry, which '- had been held 
in readiness, rushed in and gained the crater, while the 
enemy retired to the interior line, only a few feet back, 
and no practical result was gained. Another mine was 
sprung on the 1st of July, but the effect was not more 
decisive. 

Thus matters went on, and, as accurately summed up 
by Mr. Badeau, this was the condition: "A continuous 
siege, and a mighty battle imminent. A citadel surround- 
ed by land and water. The bombardment almost inces- 
sant. The beleaguered garrison reduced to quarter ra- 
tions ; living on mule meat, and thinking it good fare. 
The population of the town hiding in caves to escape 
the storm of mortar shells exploding in their streets. 
A squadron thundering at the gates by night as well 
as by day. Mines trembling beneath their feet. What 
rare news came from Johnston, far from cheering ; all 
hope, indeed, of succor quite cut off. Ammunition al- 
most expended. The lines of the besieger contracting 
daily ; his approaches getting closer, his sharp-shooters 
more accurate ; his sap rollers steadily rising over the 
hills that Vicksburg had proudly declared impassable. 



and a Statesman. 203 

Every day some new battery opening from an unex- 
pected quarter ; every day the position detected from 
which to-morrow still another battery would surely be- 
ffin its fire. To crown all, after a few more contractions 
of the coil, another mighty assault would bring the en- 
emy beneath the walls, when, covered by their works, 
and more numerous than the besieged, the assailants, in 
every human probability,, would storm the town, and 
all the unutterable horrors to which fallen cities are 
exposed might come upon the devoted fortress." 



204 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XXII. 

VICKSBURG SURRENDERED. —A FURTHER DISPLAY OF THE 
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER POLICY. 

On the 27th of May, a courier, who had been in- 
trusted by Pemberton with a despatch for Johnston, 
came into Grant's lines, and gave the document to him. 
This despatch read as follows : "I have fifteen thousand 
men in Vicksburg, and rations for thirty days — one meal 
a clay. Come to my aid with an army of thirty thou- 
sand men. If you cannot do this within ten days, you 
had better retreat. Ammunition is almost exhausted, 
especially percussion caps." On the 28th of June the 
Union lines were thirteen hundred yards nearer the 
city than the original works, and the advance contin- 
ued, and it was said among the troops that on the 4th 
of July an assault was to be made. On the morning, 
however, of the 3d of July, 1863, a flag of truce was 
displayed, at eight A. M., upon the works in front of that 
portion of the forces under General A. J. Smith; and 
soon after General Bowen and Colonel Montgomery 
left the fortifications, and being met at the Union lines, 
announced that they bore a sealed communication from 
Pemberton to Grant. The bearers being taken to the 
nearest, headquarters, a messenger was despatched with 
all possible haste to acquaint Grant with the fact. The 
communication was as follows: — 



and a Statesman. 205 

Headquarters Vicksburg, July 3, 1803 
Major General Grant, 

Commanding United States Forces. 
General : I have the honor to propose to you an armistice for 
■ — hours, with a view to arranging terms for the capitulation of 
Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three 
commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at 
such place and hour as you may find convenient. I make this 
proposition to save the farther effnsion of blood, which must other- 
wise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to 
maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This com- 
munication will be handed you, under a flag of truce, by Major 
General James Bowen. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

J. C. Pemberton. 

To this General Grant replied as follows : — 

Headquarters Department of Tennessee, ) 
In the Field, near Vicksburg, July 3, 1863. \ 

Lieutenant General J. C. Pemberton, 

Commanding Confederate Forces, &c. 
General : Tour note of this date, just received, proposes an 
armistice of several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of 
capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, &c. The 
effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended 
at any time you may choose, by an unconditional surrender of the 
city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and 
courage as those now in Vicksburg will always challenge the 
respect of an adversary, and, I can assure you, will be treated with 
all the respect due them as prisoners of war. I do not favor the 
proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange terms of 
capitulation, because I have no other terms than those indicated 
above. 

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Jfajor General. 

• General Bowen expressed a wish to converse with 



206 Grant as a Soldier 

the General further on this important matter ; but the 
latter at once declined. General Bowen then requested 
that General Grant would meet General Pemberton on 
neutral ground, as more could be arranged in one 
personal interview than could be by the interchange 
of numerous despatches. General Grant expressed his 
willingness to do this, and offered to meet Pemberton 
that afternoon at three, and then the interview closed. 
After the return of the messengers, hostilities continued 
until noon, when a cessation was ordered. 

At three in the afternoon a signal gun from the 
Union side was answered by one from the works, and 
announced the approach of the Confederate com- 
mander. Pemberton was accompanied by the bearers 
of his despatch in the morning. Grant was supported 
by Generals A. J. Smith and McPherson. The inter- 
view took place in front of McPherson's line, on a spot 
which had not yet been trodden by either army, and 
under the branches of a gigantic oak. After shaking 
hands and introducing the officers to each other, Pem- 
berton opened the conference by saying, — 

" General Grant, I meet you in order to arrange 
terms for the capitulation. What terms do you de- 
mand ? " 

" Unconditional surrender," replied Grant. 

"Unconditional surrender?" said Pemberton. "Never, 
so long as I have a man left me. I will fight rather." 

« Very well," said Grant, coolly. 

The appearance and manner of the two men showed 
their difference of character. Pemberton was greatly 
agitated, and his hot and impulsive nature could hardly 
be restrained by the dignity of his position. Grant, on 



and a Statesman. 207 

the other hand, was as collected and imperturbable as 
ever, and smoked his cigar with his accustomed cool- 
ness. Though the desired object of all his hopes and 
labors for months was now in his grasp, he did not 
appear elated in any way. 

After this short conversation, as though by mutual 
but tacit consent, the two chiefs wandered off a short 
distance by themselves, and, seating themselves upon 
the grass in a clump of bushes, remained for a con- 
siderable time in conversation. The four companions 
of the Generals followed their example, while in a 
larger group their respective staffs remained in the 
rear. The interview ended with the understanding 
that Pemberton would submit the matter to a council 
of war, and would send his answer in the morning. 

The oak tree under which this memorable scene took 
place has long since disappeared, its trunk being 
manufactured into relics of the occasion, and on the 
spot where it stood now stands a monument com- 
memorating the surrender. 

The monument is a pyramid twenty feet high, sur- 
mounted with a globe fifteen inches in diameter. On 
the principal side is a large American eagle, with wide- 
spread wings, which cover implements of defence ; in 
one claw he holds the laurel, in the other an American 
shield, and in its beak a pennant, inscribed, " E Pluribus 
Unum." The eagle sustains on its wings the Goddess 
of Liberty. On one side of the monument is inscribed, 
" To the Memory of the Surrender of Vicksburg by 
Lieutenant General J. C. Pemberton to Major General 
U. S. Grant, U. S. A., on the 3d of July, 1863." 



14 



208 Grant as a Soldier 

After the conference, Grunt, on his return to his 
headquarters, conferred with his corps and division 
commanders, and sent that same evening the following 
letter to Pemberton : — 

Headquarters Department of Tennessee, | 
Near Vicksbcrg, July 3, 1863. ) 

Lieutenant General J. C. Pemberton, 

Commanding Confederate Forces, Vicksburg, 3fiss. 

General : In conformity with the agreement of this afternoon, 
I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the 
city of Vicksburg, public stores, &c. On your accepting the terms 
proposed, I will march in one division, as a guard, and take pos- 
session at eight o'clock to-morrow morning. As soon as paroles 
can be made out and signed by the officers and men, you will be 
allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them 
their regimental clothing, and staff, field, and cavalry officers one 
horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, 
but no other property. 

If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may 
deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and 
also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them ; thirty 
wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one. You 
will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried 
along. The. same conditions will be allowed to all sick and 
wounded officers and privates, as fast as they become able to 
travel. The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, 
whilst officers are present, authorized to sign the roll of pris- 
oners. 

I am, General, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Major General. 

The officers who received this letter stated that it 
would be impossible to return an answer before night ; 
but very early next morning the following letter was 
sent to the Union lines : — 



and a Statesman* 209 

Headquarters Vicksburg, July 3, 18G3. 
Major General Grant, 

Commanding United States Forces. 

General : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of this date proposing terms for the surrender of 
this garrison and post. In the main your terms are accepted ; but 
in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops, manifested in 
the defence of Vicksburg, I have the honor to submit the follow- 
ing amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the 
agreement between us. At ten o'clock to-morrow I propose to 
evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender 
the city and garrison under my command by marching out with 
my colors and arms and stacking them in front of my present 
limits, after which you will take possession ; officers to retain their 
side arms and personal property, and the rights and property of 
citizens to be respected. 

I am, General, yours, very respectfully, 

J. C. Pemberton, Lieutenant General. 

In his reply Grant showed his magnanimity: the 
proposition amounted to surrendering with the honors 
of war; and if so doing was any gratification to the 
wounded vanity of the vanquished, he had no objection 
to their enjoying it, particularly since it in no way af- 
fected the results of the victory he had gained. His 
reply to Pemberton's last letter was therefore as fol- 
lows : — 

Headquarters Department of Tennessee, i 
Before Vicksburg, July 4, 1SG3. ) 

Lieutenant General Pemberton, 

Commanding Forces in Vicksburg. 
General : I have the honor to acknowledge your communica- 
tion of the 3d of July. The amendments proposed by you cannot 
be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every officer 
and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the com- 
pletion of the rolls of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. 
Again, I can make no stipulation with regard to the treatment of 



210 Grant as a Soldier 

citizens and their private property. While I do not propose to 
cause any of them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent 
to leave myself under restraint by stipulations. The property 
which officers can be allowed to take with them will be as stated 
in the proposition of last evening — that is, that officers will be 
allowed their private baggage and side arms, and mounted officers 
one horse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade 
to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack 
their arms at ten o'clock A. M., and then return to the inside and 
remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objec- 
tion to it. Should no modifications be made of your acceptance 
of my terms by nine o'clock A. M., I shall regard them as having 
been rejected, and act accordingly. Should these terms be ac- 
cepted, white flags will be displayed along your lines to prevent 
such of my troops as may not have been notified from firing on 
your men. 

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

TJ. S. Grant, Major General U. 8. A. 

After a very short consultation with his general of- 
ficers, the commandant of Vicksburg sent the following 
reply : — 

Headquarters Vicksburg, July 4, 1863. 

Major General U. S. Grant, 

Commanding United States Forces, &c. 
General : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of this date, and, in reply, to say that the terms 
proposed by you are accepted. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

J. C. Pemberton, Lieutenant General. 

This final reply was received by Grant on Sunday 
morning, July 4, 1863, and he immediately sent instruc- 
tions to McPherson's headquarters, ordering the Seven- 
teenth Corps under arms as soon as possible, to be 
ready to move into the city instantly upon receipt of 
orders. Shortly after ten the rebel works displayed a 



and a Statesman. 211 

number of white flags along the entire lines, extending 
from right to left. This was the signal for surrender. 
The enemy soon after marched out by regiments, on 
McPherson's front, stacked their arms, and returned to 
the works, where they were paroled in a body prior to 
being paroled individually. This ceremony of stacking 
their arms took three hours. No one had been del- 
egated by General Grant to superintend this process; 
with the high courtesy of a natural gentleman, he 
trusted the matter to themselves ; we shall see how 
this nobility of breeding was returned by the Con- 
federate officers. The probability is, that they could 
not understand it. It shot clear above their com- 
prehension. 

Pemberton, in his report, says, " If it should be asked 
why the 4th of July was selected as the day for sur- 
render, the answer is obvious. I believed that upon 
that day I should obtain better terms. Well aware 
of the vanity of our foes, I knew that they would attach 
vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of July 
into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to 
gratify their national vanity, they would yield then 
what could not be extorted from them at any other 
time." 

On the afternoon of the 4th of July, General Grant 
rode into Vicksburg, and proceeded to the rebel head- 
quarters. Pemberton and his Generals were seated 
upon the porch. Grant dismounted, and saluted them. 
None of them rose, and Grant remained standing, 
until, for very shame, one of the officers rose and 
offered him a seat. The day was hot, and his ride had 
been dusty, and Grant asked for a drink of water. 



212 Grant as i. Soldier 

He was referred to the house, and, rising, went in, where 
finally he found a negro who gave him what he wanted. 
On his return to the porch his seat had been taken, 
and during the rest of the interview he remained 
standing. This is the man whose vanity Pemberton 
flattered himself he could play upon. Modest, unas- 
suming, patient, like all great natures, Grant disregards, 
because most probably he does not see, the petty con- 
ventions which bound the circle of most men's lives. 
Persistent, too, like all the great forces of nature, he 
slowly and silently prepares his plans, until, when the 
results follow, men stand amazed at the mighty power 
which is so suddenly developed. The thunderbolt that 
rushes from the bosom of an angry cloud and rends the 
stalwart oak which has for centuries defied the storm, 
excites the wonder and amazement of the vulgar, who 
stand awe-struck at this sudden display of irresistible 
force ; while to the philosopher the even processes of 
nature, which slowly by evaporation keep the oceans 
and rivers of the globe in a constant circle of dimi- 
nution and replenishment, are much greater causes for 
admiration and wonder. He knows that in these silent 
causes lies the storehouse of countless thunderbolts.. 

Of the crowds of tourists who year by year gaze with 
a fearful awe at the immense sheet of Niagara, as it 
plunges from the cliff down to the seething depths be- 
low, how many realize that quiet summer days have 
raised every drop of the water, which rushes now with 
such an angry roar over the falls, to many times that 
height, and that their mild influence exerts insensibly 
the force of countless Niagaras ? 

It was well that a negro should give the desired cup 



and a Statesman. 213 

of water to the captor of Vicksburg, while the proud 
enslavers of his race should sit in sullen silence by. 
Their haughty dominion was overthrown, and this trib- 
ute came the more fitly to him who had overthrown it, 
from the hands of one representing those made free 
men by his genius, than it could have come from the 
proudest of the conquered but unconverted who had 
opposed their futile resistance to the man repre- 
senting in action the spread of the democratic idea in 
this country. This giving of a " cup of cold water " is 
one of the deeds which has not, and shall not lose its 
reward. 

It was during- this interview that Pemberton asked 
Grant to supply the garrison with rations, to which 
Grant immediately assented, and asked how many would 
be needed. " I have thirty-two thousand men," was the 
answer. This was the first intimation Grant had of 
the extent of his victory ; he had supposed the garri- 
son comprised not more, at the outside, than twenty 
thousand. But nothing showed his gratified surprise ; 
he remained as coolly imperturbable as ever. 

In less than four hours after the national flag had 
been flung: to the breeze from the dome of the Court 
House, as an evidence of the surrender, the levee was 
crowded with steamers; up to that time at least seventy- 
five had arrived, and others were coming in constantly. 
All the boats from above and below the city came to 
swell the number, and give to the city the appearance 
of a busy inland commercial metropolis, which had so 
long deserted it for the sad desolation of war. The levees 
were almost instantly covered with busy, moving crowds, 
pushing herp, there, and everywhere, while already, some 



214 Grant as a Soldier 

of the steamers having commenced to discharge their 
cargoes, men and teams made an unwonted activity in 
the streets, while transporting the cargoes to their va- 
rious destinations. It was a transformation almost like 
magic. The material results of the campaign were thus 
summed up by General Grant in his official report : — 

" The defeat of the enemy in five battles outside of Vicksburg, 
the occivpation of Jackson, the capital of the State of Mississippi, 
and the capture of Vicksburg and its garrison and munitions of 
war; a loss to the enemy of thirty-seven thousand prisoners, 
among whom were fifteen general officers ; at least ten thousand 
killed and wounded ; and among the killed, Generals Tracy, Tilgh- 
man, and Green ; and hundreds, and perhaps thousands of stragglers, 
who can never be collected and organized. Arms and munitions 
of war for an army of sixty thousand have fallen into our hands, 
besides a large amount of other public property, consisting of rail- 
road, locomotives, cars, steamboats, cotton, &g. ; and much was de- 
stroyed to prevent our capturing it." 

The following extract from General Halleck's report 
will also be read with interest in this connection: — 

" When we consider the character of the country in which this 
army operated, the formidable obstacles to be overcome, the num- 
ber of forces and the strength of the enemy's works, we cannot fail 
to admire the courage and endurance of the troops, and the skill 
and daring of their commander. No more brilliant exploit can be 
found in military history. It has been alleged — and the allegation 
has been widely circulated by the press — that General Grant, in the 
conduct of his campaign, positively disobeyed the instructions of 
his superiors. It is hardly necessary to remark that General Grant 
never disobeyed an order or instruction, but always carried out to 
the best of his ability every icish or suggestion made to him by the 
government. Moreover he has never complained that the govern- 
ment did not furnish him all the means and assistance in its power 
to facilitate the execution of any plan he saw fit to adopt." 



and a Statesman. 215 

When the news of the surrender reached President 
Lincoln officially, he wrote the following autograph let- 
ter to Grant: — 

Executive Mansion, Washington, July 13, 18G3. 
To Major General Grant. 

My dear General, : I do not remember that you and I ever 
met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment 
for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. I 
wish to say a word further. When you first reached the vicinity 
of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did — 
march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the trans- 
ports, and thus go below; and I never had any faith, except a 
general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass 
expedition, and the like, could succeed. When you got below and 
took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should 
go down the river and join General Banks; and when you turned 
northward east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now 
wish to make a personal acknowledgment that you were right and 
I was wrong. 

Yours very truly, 

A. Lincoln. 



216 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTEE XXIII. 

THE RESULTS OF THE SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG. — PRE- 
PARING FOR FURTHER SERVICE. — THE FINAL CAPTURE 
OF JACKSON. 

It was not until the 6th that Grant took up his 
headquarters in Vicksburg. On the evening of the 
4th he announced the surrender to the government as 
follows : " The enemy surrendered this morning. The 
only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. 
This I regard as a great advantage to us at this mo- 
ment. It saves probably several days in the capture, 
and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate 
service. Sherman, with a large force, moves immedi- 
ately on Johnston, to drive him from the state. I will 
send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the Ninth 
Army Corps to Burnside." 

Seven hundred of the garrison refused to be paroled, 
preferring to be sent north as prisoners. Pemberton pro- 
tested against this, and wished Grant to force these men 
to be paroled ; he also desired that Grant should allow 
him arms for some of his troops, to guard the others on 
their march home ; but this also Grant refused, since 
it was desirable to have as many of them desert as 
chose. On the 11th the paroles were completed, and 
the garrison marched out between a guard of national 
troops, extending on both sides of the road, for some 



and a Statesman. 217 

distance beyond the intrenchments. As they reached 
the fortifications, each man's name was called, and 
checked off on the rolls. Grant's orders were, " In- 
struct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these 
prisoners pass, to make no offensive remarks, and not 
to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have 
passed." These orders were obeyed. In fact, immedi- 
ately after the surrender the two armies affiliated. The 
rebels were treated with kindness, and appreciated it, 
and the late combatants were frequently seen walking 
arm in arm while they remained together. 

One of the most immediate effects of the surrender 
of Vicksburg was the surrender of Port Hudson. On 
the 7th of July, the commander of that post, Frank 
Gardner, sent a despatch to Banks, asking if it was true 
that Vicksburg had surrendered ; and on receiving an 
assurance that such was the fact, he proposed to do the 
same, and did so the next day, so that on the 8th of 
July the Mississippi flowed " unvexed to the sea." On 
the 16th of July the steamboat Imperial arrived at 
New Orleans from St. Louis, the first boat which had 
passed over the route for two years. On the 28th of 
the same month she returned to her wharf at St. Louis, 
amid the welcoming cheers of thousands who gathered 
on the banks to see her arrive. 

After the capture of Vicksburg General Grant re- 
ported that several weeks' repose was necessary for his 
troops, who were worn out with the fatigue of their 
long and forced marches, the labors of the siege, and 
the excitement incident to the active operations of the 
past campaign. But as it was evident that Johnston 
was collecting a force, as soon as Vicksburg surrendered 



218 Grant as a Soldier 

Grant determined to attack and scatter it. It had been 
Grant's intention to order another assault on the works 
of Vicksburg on the 6th of July ; but the surrender on 
the 4th having prevented this, he determined to send 
the expedition against Johnston as soon as possible. 
In answer to his inquiry when he could be ready to 
move, Sherman reported that he would move at once, 
and doing so, reached Jackson on the 10 th, where John- 
ston had taken up his position. In his report, written 
subsequently to the events we are about to narrate, 
Johnston says that it was his intention to hold this 
place only until he could draw off his army and remove 
his stores ; but from the amount of labor he had ex- 
pended in fortifying the position, it would seem that 
he had formed his previous plans from the facts 
brought under his observation by the subsequent 
events. Though such a course of action is perhaps 
difficult, and certainly is somewhat unusual, yet we are 
almost tempted to believe that anything is possible 
to a commander who could publish such an order as 
we give below, even though it was for the purpose of 
" firing the southern heart." But, of course, a set of 
men who, in the nineteenth century, in a representa- 
tive government like ours, in a time when the whole 
world is rising to the recognition of the dignity of 
productive labor, the right of the laborer to the result 
of his industry, and the necessity of guaranteeing this 
right in the amplest way, in order to preserve anything 
like stability in the social body, since this sacred right 
of labor is the corner-stone of all possible social life. - — 
a set of men who, at such a time, had commenced a 
revolution to maintain and extend slavery, are not 



and a Statesman. 219 

to be held to the ordinary rules. Their politicians in 
office, when the crisis came, showed their contempt for 
the restraints of honesty. Such restrictions may be well 
enough for a hireling crew, but not for the genuine 
chivalry. Their military men felt their obligations to the 
government sit as lightly upon them ; and how, there- 
fore, is it to be supposed that the shackles of rhetoric 
or the rules of logic should be expected to confine 
the expression of their ardent souls, any more than 
the rules of honesty or honor should have confined 
the aspirations of their pockets. Johnston's report, 
therefore, is the fit accompaniment of the following 
proclamation : — 

Headquarters on the Field, July 9, 1863. 

Fellow-Soldiers : An insolent foe, flushed with hope by his 
recent success at Vicksburg, confronts you, threatening the people, 
whose homes and liberty you are here to protect, with plunder 
and conquest. Their guns may even now be heard as they 
advance. 

The enemy it is at once the duty and the mission of you, brave 
men, to chastise and expel from the soil of Mississippi. The com- 
manding General confidently relies on you to sustain his pledge, 
which he makes in advance, and he will be with you in the good 
work, even unto the end. 

The vice of " straggling " he begs you to shun and to frown 
on. If needs be, it will be checked by even the most summary 
remedies. 

The telegraph has already announced a glorious victory over the 
foe, won by your noble comrades of the Virginia army on Federal 
soil : may he not, with redoubled hopes, count on you, while de- 
fending your firesides and household gods, to emulate the proud 
example of your brothers in the east ? 

The country expects in this, the great crisis of its destiny, that 
every man will do his duty. 

Joseph E. Johnston, General commanding. 



220 Grant as a Soldier 

The orders given to Sherman on the 4th were as 
follows : " The orders will be made as you suggest, the 
moment Vicksburg is ours. Orel and Steele have both 
been notified to move the moment Vicksburg falls. I 
will let you know the moment Pemberton's answer 
arrives. I have no suggestions or orders to give. I 
want you to drive Johnston out in your own way, and 
inflict on the enemy all the punishment you can. I 
will support you to the last man that can be spared." 

On the 5th Sherman's forces reached the Big Black, 
constructed bridges, crossed the next day, and on the 
7th and 8th marched to Clinton. Johnston fell back 
on Jackson, and on the 9th Sherman arrived at that 
place. The Confederate works now protected Jackson 
by a line commencing and ending on the Pearl River, 
and encircling the city. Sherman resolved to hold the 
Confederate army there, and with infantry and cavalry 
destroy the railroads, at the same time threatening to 
cross the river, and destroy the enemy's only line of 
communications with his rear. Johnston hoped that 
Sherman would attempt an assault, but, finding that he 
would not, telegraphed to Davis, "If the enemy will 
not attack, we must, or at the last moment withdraw. 
We cannot attack seriously without risking the army." 

On the 13th Sherman's army extended so that both 
flanks rested on the river, and he sent back for ammu- 
nition to commence the siege. Meanwhile his expedi- 
tions extended in all directions, some of them as far as 
sixty miles, destroying the railroads, and devastating 
the country. On the 16th his ammunition arrived, 
and Johnston, having received information of its arrival, 
resolved to evacrate the place ; and the next day it was 



and a Statesman. 22] 

found that lie had done so, the Confederates having 
crossed the river, burning the bridges after them. 

Knowing that a pursuit under the hot July sun 
would be more injurious to his command than to the 
enemy, Sherman resolved to return, and after spending 
a few days more- in completing his work of destruction, 
returned to Vicksburg, where he arrived on the 25th. 

On the 8th of July Halleck replied to Grant's 
despatch, announcing the surrender, — 

"I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg, without actual 
delivery to a proper agent, as required by the seventh article of 
the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that 
these men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. 
Such has been the case elsewhere. If these prisoners have not 
been allowed to depart, you will retain them until further orders." 

This order came, however, too late, and unquestion- 
ably most fortunately. The parole had bound those 
who took it not to take up arms against the govern- 
ment until exchanged by the proper authorities, and 
its advantages to us were, that it did not necessitate 
the support of so many men, nor the guarding or trans- 
porting them, and thus left our men and vessels free 
for other uses. Besides this, the prisoners having been 
well treated, Grant supposed that they would by their 
presence tend to demoralize the South, and tend to 
disafiect them with the war ; and it is hardly a question 
but that he was right. 

Though this order may appear to find fault with 
his action, yet Grant was, however, appointed a Major 
General in the regular army for this capture, his com- 
mission dating from the occupation of Vicksburg, July 
4, 1863. 



22'2 Grant as a Soldier 

The country at this period was greatly depressed ; for 
a long time it had seemed as though disaster attended 
our arms. On the 4th of July, 1863, the entire loyal 
population was in an agony of suspense and doubt, 
since on that day Lee was at Gettysburg, and the bat- 
tle was to be fought which should decide whether as a 
victor he should remain, or be driven out baffled and 
defeated. To receive therefore upon one day the news 
of two such victories as Gettysburg and Vicksburg, 
raised the country from doubt and despair to confidence 
and security. Perhaps at no period of the war did the 
loyal heart of the people throb faster at the receipt of 
joyful news than on this day, unless it may be when 
it was announced that Lee had surrendered. 

At this time Grant recommended both Sherman and 
McPherson for promotion to the rank of Brigadier Gen- 
eral in the regular army. " The first reason for this," 
he said, " is their great fitness for any command that it 
may ever become necessary to intrust to them. Sec- 
ond, their great purity of character, and disinterested- 
ness in anything except the faithful performance of 
their duty and the success of every one engaged in the 
great battle for the preservation of the Union. Third, 
they have honorably won this distinction upon many 
well-fought battle-fields. The promotion of such men 
as Sherman and McPherson always adds strength to 
our army." 

These promotions were made, and also many others 
of the same kind, which Grant also suggested. 

The army under Grant's command having finished 
its immediate work, and being desirous of some rest, 
he issued the following order : — 



and a Statesman. 223 

General Orders, No. 45. 

IIeadquabtehs Department of the Tennessee, > 
Vickjsburg, Miss., July 20, 18(33. ] 

In pursuance of section 32 of an act entitled "An act for en- 
rolling and calling ont the national forces, and for other purposes," 
approved March 3, 1863, furloughs may be granted for a period 
not exceeding thirty days at one time, to five per centum of the 
non-commissioned officers and privates of each regiment, battery, 
independent company, and detachment, present with their respec- 
tive commands in this department, for good conduct in their line 
of duty, by their immediate commanding officers, approved by in- 
termediate and army corps commanders. Furloughs thus granted 
are intended for the benefit of well men, and the sick who have 
become so from fatigue or exposure in the line of duty. 

Under no circumstances will furloughs be given to men who 
have shirked duty, or straggled on the march, or from camps. 
Such men must be made to perform extra fatigue duty by their 
immediate commanding officers; and in cases where this is not 
regarded as sufficient punishment, they will be fined in an amount 
not beyond that which a regimental court martial is authorized to 
impose. The amount of such fine will be entered on the proper 
muster and pay rolls, opposite their respective names, and the 
cause for which it is imposed stated. 

By order of Major General U. S. Grant. 

T. S. Boweks, A. A. G. 

Finding that many of his soldiers, who took advan- 
tage of their furloughs to return home, were charged 
exorbitant fares by the captains of the steamboats 
which commenced immediately to ply on the Missis- 
sippi, he issued a special order, fixing the price of 
passage from Vicksburg to Cairo at five dollars for 
enlisted men, and seven dollars for officers ; and the 
necessity of obeying it was impressed upon the captains 
by making one of them, who had overstepped the 

15 



224 Grant as a Soldier 

limits, refund the overcharge, or submit to imprison- 
ment, and to having his boat confiscated. 

On the 4th of July the Secretary of the Treasury, 
Mr. Chase, wrote to Grant, " I find that a rigorous line 
"within districts occupied by our military forces, from 
beyond which no cotton or other produce can be 
brought, and within which no trade can be carried 
on, gives rise to serious and to some apparently well- 
founded complaints." The Secretary, therefore, urged 
the propriety of " substituting bonds, to be given by 
all persons receiving permits, for the rigorous line now 
established ; or, at least, of substituting them partially." 
To this letter Grant responded, on the 11th, as fol- 
lows : — 

Headquarters Department op the Tennessee, ") 
Vicksbukg, Miss., July 21, 1S63. j 

Sir : Your letter of the 4th instant to me, enclosing a copy of a 
letter of same date to Mr. Mellen, special agent of the treasury, is 
just received. My Assistant Adjutant General, by whom I shall 
send this letter, is about starting for Washington ; hence I shall be 
very short in my reply. 

My experience in West Tennessee has convinced me that any 
trade whatever with the rebellions states is weakening to us of at 
least thirty-three per cent, of our force. No matter what the re- 
strictions thrown around trade, if any whatever is allowed, it will 
be made the means of supplying the enemy with what they want. 
Restrictions, if lived up to, make trade unprofitable, and hence 
none but dishonest men go into it. I will venture to say that no 
honest man has made money in West Tennessee in the last year, 
while many fortunes have been made there during that time. 

The people in the Mississippi Valley are now nearly subjugated. 
Keep trade out for a few months, and I doubt not but that the 
work of subjugation will be so complete, that trade can be opened 
freely with the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi; that 
the people of these states will be more anxious for the enforcement 



and a Statesman. 225 

and protection of our laws than the people of the loyal states. 
They have experienced the misfortune of being without them, 
and are now in a most happy condition to appreciate their 
blessings. 

No theory of my own will ever stand in the way of my execut- 
ing, in good faith, any order I may receive from those in authority 
over me ; but my position has given me an opportunity of seeing 
what would not be known by persons away from the scene of Avar; 
and I venture, therefore, to suggest great caution in opening trade 
with rebels. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Major General. 

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury. 

Grant's conviction was, that military success alone 
could finish the war, and that until this should be 
done, all political, commercial, or other considerations 
should be held subservient to military success. On 
the 26th of July he said, "I am very much opposed 
to any trade whatever until the rebellion in this part 
of the country is entirely crushed out." On the 13th 
of August, " My opinion is, that all trade with any enemy 
with whom we are at war is calculated to weaken us 
indirectly. I am opposed to selling to or buying from 
them whilst war exists, except those within our lines." 
On the 26th of August he wrote to the Secretary of 
War, " If trade is opened under any general rule, all 
sorts of dishonest men will engage in it, taking any 
oath or obligation necessary to secure the privilege. 
Smuggling will at once commence, as it did at Memphis, 
Helena, and every other place where trade has been 
allowed within the disloyal states, and the armed enemy 
will be enabled to procure from northern markets every 



226 Grant as a Soldier 

article they require." On the 13th he wrote to Mr. 
Mellen, treasury agent, — 

" The moment purchasers of cotton are allowed in the market, 
that moment all the cotton in the Southern States becomes the 
property of that class of persons who are authorized to sell and 
receive pay. More than half of the cotton now in the South is 
the property of the so-called Southern Confederacy, for their ben- 
efit. This, of all others, will find its way to market, and will be 
sold by actual agents of the so-called Confederate government for 
their benefit. Thus, while we are making such efforts to close their 
ports, we shall be opening a better market for them. Our money, 
being always worth a known price in New Fork city, will have a 
commercial value in Europe. This will enable the South to ship 
at much less risk the means of exchange for imported articles, than 
by sending the bulky article of cotton." 

These arguments did not, however, have all the effect 
they Avere intended to have upon the policy of the 
government, and a limited trade was opened, from which 
the results foreseen and predicted by Grant followed. 
The government, however, could never be induced to 
follow out his views in this matter. 

The following order, of the 1st of August, will show 
the policy Grant pursued in his department, to stop all 
guerrilla fighting, and also to regulate the trade in cot> 
ton, to provide for the destitute, and put an end to all 
plundering by his own soldiers : — 

General Orders, No. 50. 

ITEADQUARTEnS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, ? 

Vicksburg, Miss., August 1, 1SIJ3. $ 
1. All regularly organized bodies of the enemy having been 
driven from those parts of Kentucky and Tennessee west of the 
Tennessee River, and from all of Mississippi west of the Mississippi 



and a Statesman. 227 

Central Railroad, ami it being to the'intercst of those districts not 
to invite the presence of armed bodies of men among them, it is 
announced that the most rigorous penalties will hereafter be in- 
flicted upon the following classes of prisoners, to wit : All irregu- 
lar bodies of cavalry not mustered and paid by the Confederate 
authorities ; all persons engaged in conscripting, enforcing the con- 
scription, or apprehending deserters, whether regular or irregular ; 
all citizens encouraging or aiding the same ; and all persons de- 
tected in firing upon unarmed transports. 

It is not contemplated that this order shall affect the treatment 
due to prisoners of war captured within the districts named, when 
they are members of legally organized companies, and when their 
acts are in accordance with the usages of civilized warfare. 

2. The citizens of Mississippi, within the limits above described, 
are called upon to pursue their peaceful avocations, in obedience to 
the laws of the United States. While doing so in good faith, all 
United States forces are prohibited from, molesting them in any 
way. It is earnestly recommended that the freedom of negroes be 
acknoicledged, and that, instead of compulsory labor, contracts on 
fair terms be "entered into between the former masters and servants, 
or between the latter and other persons who may be willing to give 
them employment. Such a system as this, honestly followed, will 
result in substantial advantages to all parties. 

All private property will be respected, except when the use of it 
is necessary for the government, in which case it must be taken 
under the direction of a corps commander, and by a proper detail 
under charge of a commissioned officer, with specific instructions 
to seize certain property, and no other. A staff officer of the Quar- 
termaster or Subsistence Department will, in each instance, be des- 
ignated to receipt for such property as may be seized, the j)roperty 
to be paid for at the end of the Avar on proof of loyalty, or on 
proper adjustment of the claim, under such regulations or laws as 
may hereafter be established. All property seized under this order 
must be taken up on returns by the officers giving receipts, and 
disposed of in accordance with existing regulations. 

3. Persons having cotton, or other produce not required by the 
army, will be allowed to bring the same to any military post within 



228 Grant as a Soldier 

the State of Mississippi, and* abandon it to the agent of the Treas- 
ury Department at said post, to be disposed of in accordance with 
such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may establish. 
At posts where there is no such agent, the post Quartermaster will 
receive all such property, and, at the option of the owner, hold it 
till the arrival of the agent, or send it to Memphis, directed to 
Captain A. R. Eddy, Acting Quartermaster, who will turn it over 
to the properly authorized agent at that place. 

4. Within the county of Warren, laid waste by the long pres- 
ence of contending armies, the following rules, to prevent siuTering, 
will be observed : — 

Major General Sherman, commanding the Fifteenth Army Corps, 
and Major General McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth 
Army Corps, will each designate a commissary of subsistence, icho 
will issue articles of ywime necessity to all destitute families call- 
ing for them, under such restrictions for the protection of the 
government as they may deem necessary. Families who are able 
to pay for the provisions drawn, will in all cases be required to 
do so. 

5. Conduct disgraceful to the American name -has been fre- 
quently reported to the Major General commanding, particu- 
larly on the part of portions of the cavalry. Hereafter, if the 
guilty parties cannot be reached, the commanders of regiments 
and detachments will be held responsible, and those who prove 
themselves unequal to the task of preserving discipline in their 
commands, will be promptly reported to the War Department 
for " muster out." Summary punishment must be inflicted upon 
all officers and soldiers apprehended in acts of violence or law- 
lessness. 

By order of Major General U. S. Graj\ t t. 

T. S. Bowers, Acting A. A. G. 

The treatment of the negroes being a subject of 
great importance, Grant issued the following order on 
the 10th of August: — 



and a Statesman. 229 

General Orders, No. 51. 
Headquarters Department of the Tehttesbbb, ) 
Vicksburg, Miss., August 10, 18G3. ) 

1. At all military posts in states within this department where 
slavery has been abolished by the proclamation of the President 
of the United States, camps will be established for snch freed 
people of color as are out of employment. 

2. Commanders of posts or districts will detail suitable officers 
from the army as Superintendents of such camps. It will be the 
duty of such Superintendents to see that suitable rations are drawn 
from the Subsistence Department for such people as are confided 
to their care. 

3. All such persons supported by the government will be 
employed in every practicable way so as to avoid, as far as pos- 
sible, their becoming a burden upon the government. They may 
be hired to planters or other citizens, on proper assurance that the 
negroes so hired will not be run off beyond the military jurisdic- 
tion of the United States; they may be employed on any public 
works, in gathering crops from abandoned plantations, and gen- 
erally in any manner local commanders may deem for the best 
interests of the government, in compliance with law and the policy 
of the administration. 

4. It will be the duty of the Provost-marshal at every military 
post to see that every negro within the jurisdiction of the military 
authority is employed by some white person, or is sent to the 
camps provided for freed people. 

5. Citizens may make contracts with freed persons of color for 
their labor, giving wages per month in money, or employ families 
of them by the year on plantations, &c, feeding, clothing, and sup- 
porting the infirm as well as able-bodied-, and giving a portion, not 
less than one twentieth of the commercial part of their crops, in 
payment for such services. 

6. Where negroes are employed under this authority, the parties 
employing will register with the Provost-marshal their names, oc- 
cupation, and residence, and the number of negroes so employed. 
They will enter into such bonds as the Provost-marshal, with the 
approval of the local commander, may require, for the kind treat- 
ment and proper care of those employed, and as security against 
their being carried beyond the employee's jurisdiction. 



230 Grant as a Soldier 

7. Nothing of this order is to be construed to embarrass the 
employment of such colored persons as may be required by the 
government. 

By order of Major General U. S. Grant. 

T. S. Bowees, Acting A. A. G. 

He also recognized the value of using the negroes as 
soldiers, and on the 11th of July, had said to the Ad- 
jutant General of the army, " I am anxious to get as 
many of these negro regiments as possible, and to have 
them full, and completely equipped. ... I am par- 
ticularly desirous of organizing a regiment of heavy 
artillerists from the negroes, to garrison this place, and 
shall do so as soon as possible." On the 24th of July, 
"The negro troops are easier to preserve discipline 
among than our white troops, and I doubt not will 
prove equally good for garrison duty. All that have 
been tried have fought bravely." 

On the 9th of August, the President wrote to Grant, 
" General Thomas has gone again to the Mississippi 
Valley, with the view of raising colored troops. I have 
no doubt that }'ou are doing what you reasonably can 
upon the same subject. I believe it is a resource which, 
if vigorously applied now, will soon close this contest. 
It works doubly — weakening the enemy, and strength- 
ening us. We were not fully ripe for it until the river 
was opened. Now, I think, at least one hundred thou- 
sand can, and ought to, be organized along its shores, 
relieving all the white troops to serve elsewhere. Mr. 
Davis understands you as believing that the Emancipa- 
tion Proclamation has helped some in your military 
operations. I am very glad if this is so." 

The Confederates, at first refusing to recognize the 



and a Statesman. 231 

negroes as soldiers, threatened that they and their 
white officers should be treated, if captured, as run- 
away slaves, and thieves who had stolen slaves. It 
having been reported to Grant that a white captain 
and some negro soldiers captured at Milliken's Bend 
had been hung, he wrote to General Richard Taylor, 
then in command of the Confederate forces in Louisiana, 
" I feel no inclination to retaliate for the offences of 
irresponsible persons; but if it is the policy of any 
General intrusted with the command of troops to show 
no quarter, or to punish with death prisoners taken in 
battle, I will accept the issue. It may be you propose 
a different line of policy towards black troops, and 
officers commanding them, to that practised towards 
white troops. If so, I can assure you that these colored 
troops are regularly mustered into the service of the 
United States. The government, and all officers under 
the government, are bound to give the same protection 
to these troops that they do to any other troops." 

General Taylor replied that he would punish all 
such acts, "disgraceful alike to humanity and the 
reputation of soldiers," but declared that officers of 
the " Confederate States army " were required to turn 
over to the civil authorities, to be dealt with according 
to the laws of the states wherein such were captured, 
all negroes captured in arms. 



232 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XXIV. 

PROPOSES THE CAPTURE OF MOBILE. — VISITS NEW ORLEANS. 
— MEETS WITH A SEVERE ACCIDENT. — THE POSITION OF 
ROSECRANS AT CHATTANOOGA. — GRANT'S DEPARTMENT 
ENLARGED. 

On the 18th of July General Grant announced to 
Halleck the evacuation of Jackson, and the completion 
of the Vicksburg campaign, and in the same despatch 
said, " It seems to me now that Mobile should be cap- 
tured, the expedition starting from Lake Pontchartrain." 
But Halleck was of a different opinion. To use his 
own language, he thought it best, before attempting 
Mobile, to "clean up a little." The character of the 
two men's minds was different, and this fact appeared 
nowhere stronger than in their military conceptions. 
Halleck would do everything according to the strict 
rules and precedents heretofore obtaining in the art of 
war, forgetting that, since these were laid down, the rail- 
road had been invented ; while Grant, making the pres- 
ent object in view his only rule and precedent, was so 
completely a master of the railroad, that he used it as 
one of the factors in his combinations. On the 24th of 
July Grant wrote, u It seems to me that Mobile is the 
point deserving the most immediate attention." On 
the 1st of August, "Mobile can be taken from the Gulf 
Department, with only one or two gunboats to protect 



and a Statesman. 233 

the debarkation. I can send the necessary force. With 
your leave I would like to visit New Orleans, particular- 
ly if the movement against Mobile is authorized." On 
the 25th of September, "I am confident that Mobile 
could now be taken with comparatively a small force. 
At least a demonstration in that direction would either 
result in the abandonment of the city, or force the 
enemy to weaken Bragg's army to hold it." On the 
30th, "I regret that I have not got a movable force 
with which to attack Mobile or the river above. As I 
am situated, however, I must be content with guarding 
•territory already taken from the enemy. I do not say 
this complainingly, but simply regret that advantage 
cannot be taken of so fine an opportunity of dealing 
the enemy a heavy blow." 

The Department at Washington was, however, more 
impressed at this time with the necessity of reestablish- 
ing, as soon as possible, the national authority in West- 
ern Texas. The whole course of the European govern- 
ments had, from the first, been as open an expression of 
their desire to see the power of this government over- 
thrown as they dared to make. England had made in- 
decent haste to recognize, almost before there was a re- 
bellion, the Confederacy as a belligerent power. Then 
came the suggestion to mediate between the contending; 
parties, and finally upon the flimsiest of pretences, but 
really to gain a foothold from which to interfere with 
this government, the Mexican expedition was pro- 
jected, and seemed now in a fair way to succeed. Such 
a course on the part of the monarchical governments 
of Europe cannot be wondered at. It was as instinctive 
an attempt at self-preservation as the rebellion was on 



234 Grant as a Soldier 

the part of the fanatical supporters of slavery. Both 
conditions of society belong to the barbarism of a past 
feudal age, and to both of them the democratic idea, 
as realized in our free republican institutions, gave 
warning that their days were numbered ; that the time 
had come for a higher and nobler civilization ; that the 
people, having outgrown the need of the leading-strings 
of their childhood, were now desirous and fitted to obtain 
and enjoy their prerogative of self-government. The 
forms of society, and government, are as subject to the 
laws of development, of growth, of change as is every- 
thing in the material universe. The "eternal hills n 
are not to-day what they were yesterday. The thoughts 
that form the basis of all governments, are in as con- 
stant a condition of evolution and development, as the 
nations, so governed, are by the constant births and 
deaths of the individuals who form them. The nine- 
teenth century has raised the great questions of the 
philosophy of religion, of history, and of philosophy 
itself, and in science the persistence, the correlation, the 
identity of force ; and how could government expect to 
avoid being subjected to the application of the same 
spirit of investigation ? In the moral as in the physical 
world the principle of polarity runs through and per- 
vades all force, and in these two attempts to withstand 
the energy of the democratic idea, found its natural 
expression. Therefore, in the larger view, the govern- 
ment was probably right in its opinion of the impor- 
tance of securing Texas, and thus closing the evident 
channel through which European interference in 
Mexico would flow into this country. 

On the 7th of August, Grant, having received orders 



and a Statesman. 235 

from Washington, sent the Thirteenth Corps to Banks. 
He was informed that " General Banks has been left 
at liberty to select his own objective point in Texas, and 
may determine to move by sea. If so, yonr movement 
will not have his support, and should be conducted 
with caution. You will confer on this matter freely 
with General Banks. The government is exceed- 
ingly anxious that our troops should occupy some 
points in Texas with the least possible delay." 

On the 30th of August, accordingly, Grant started 
in person for New Orleans, notifying Halleck of his 
departure : " General Banks is not yet off, and I am 
desirous of seeing him before he starts, to learn his 
plans and see how I may help him." 

Before starting upon this visit Grant proposed to 
Sherman that, as he was the next in command, he 
should be left in direction during his (Grant's) absence; 
but Sherman suggesting that the continuance of the 
present routine would facilitate public business, during 
Grant's absence all orders were issued in his name 
with Sherman's concurrence. ? With such men," said 
Grant, " as Sherman and McPherson, commanding corps 
or armies, there will never be any jealousies or lack of 
hearty cooperation. Between the two I would have 
no choice, and the army does not afford an officer 
superior to either, in my estimation." 

Just before this, Grant, on the 25th of August, had 
paid a visit to Memphis, and was received there with 
great enthusiasm. A committee of the loyal citizens 
tendered him the hospitality of the city. In his letter 
of acceptance he says, — 

"In accepting this testimonial, which I do at a great sacrifice of 



236 Grant as a Soldier 

my personal feelings, I simply desire to pay a tribute to the first 
public exhibition in Memphis of loyalty to the government which 
I represent in the department of the Tennessee. I should dislike 
to refuse, for considerations of personal convenience, to acknowl- 
edge anywhere, or in any form, the existence of sentiments which 
I have so long and so ardently desired to see manifested in this 
department. The stability of this government and the unity of 
this nation depend solely on the cordial support and the earnest 
loyalty of the people. "While, therefore, I thank you sincerely for 
the kind expressions you have used towards myself, I am pro- 
foundly gratified at this public recognition, in the city of Memphis, 
of the power and authority of the government of the United 
States." 

On the 2d of September lie arrived at New Orleans, 
and on the 4th assisted at a review of the Thirteenth 
Corps, at Carrollton, near the city. He was thus de- 
scribed by a correspondent, as he sat out from his hotel 
for the review : " He was in undress uniform, without 
sword, sash, or belt; coat unbuttoned, a low-crowned 
black felt hat, without any mark upon it of military 
rank ; a pair of kid gloves, and a cigar in his mouth." 

On the return to his hotel his horse became fright- 
ened by the letting off of steam, with a shrill whistle, 
by a railroad locomotive, and sprang wildly with such 
violence against a carriage that was coming in an oppo- 
site direction, that both horse and rider were thrown 
upon the street. The result was a most serious acci- 
dent. His hip was temporarily paralyzed by the tre- 
mendous concussion, and he was for a time quite 
helpless; nor, indeed, did he recover so as to walk 
without crutches, or mount his horse without assistance, 
until after he had reached Chattanooga, near the end 
of October. There really seemed to be clanger that his 
services would be lost to the country. 



and a Statesman. 237 

On the ICth of September, lie, however, returned to 
Vicksburg, being carried on a litter to the steamboat, 
and was compelled to keep his bed until the 25th of 
September. 

At this time Rosecrans was operating in Tennessee 
and Northern Georgia, and had possession of Chatta- 
nooga, upon the Tennessee River, a strategical point, 
which is perhaps the most important between Rich- 
mond and the Mississippi, since it is the centre of the 
great southern railroads. His base of supplies was 
Nashville, and the Confederate army under Bragg was 
apparently attempting to move west of him, through 
Northern Alabama, in order to cut off his base of sup- 
plies. On the 13th of September Ilalleck telegraphed 
Grant, "All of Major General Grant's available force 
should be sent to Memphis, thence to Corinth and Tus- 
cumbia, to cooperate with General Rosecrans." At this 
time there was telegraphic communication from Wash- 
ington only as far as Cairo, and thence by boat to 
Memphis and Vicksburg. The messenger to whom this 
despatch was intrusted failed to deliver it promptly. 
On the 15th the order was repeated, and on the 22d, 
when Grant received it, he immediately forwarded the 
required reinforcements, and gave orders to detain all 
steamers then at Vicksburg, or which should arrive 
there, in order to afford transportation. Within fortj 7 - 
eight hours after the receipt of the order, the troops 
were on their way. On the 25th Grant wrote, " I am 
just out of bed, and find that I can write only with 
great difficulty. During the twenty days that I have 
been confined to one position, on my back, I have ap- 
parently been in the most perfect health, but now that 



238 Grant as a Soldier 

I am np on crutches, I find nvyself very weak ; " and 
on that day he notified Sherman to hold himself in read- 
iness to go to support Rosecrans, and on the 27th the 
column set out. In order to divert the attention of 
the enemy, and prevent their interfering with Sher- 
man's march, Grant ordered McPherson to send an 
expedition to Canton and Jackson. 

On the 19th and 20th of September Rosecrans had 
been severely repulsed on the Chickamauga River, nine 
miles from Chattanooga, and forced to fall back upon 
that place, with heavy loss. Here he was nearly sur- 
rounded by the Confederate army, which was larger 
than his, and his only line of communication nearly 
cut off. 

On the 10th of October Grant received orders to 
report at Cairo, and leaving on the same clay, and ar- 
riving there on the 16th, telegraphed, "I have just 
arrived. My staff and headquarters are with me." He 
was in roply ordered to proceed to Louisville, Ken- 
tucky, taking his staff with him, for immediate opera- 
tions in the field, and that there he would meet an officer 
of the War Department, with his orders. Starting im- 
mediately, he met at Indianapolis, on his way, the Secre- 
tary of War, Mr. Stanton, with an order he had brought 
from Washington, giving Grant a new command — 
the Military Division of the Mississippi, including all 
the territory between the Alleghanies and the Missis- 
sippi, except such territory as might be occupied by 
Banks. The three departments of the Tennessee, the 
Cumberland, now under Rosecrans, and the Ohio, now 
under Burnside, were made subordinate to him. The 
advantage of some such change had been suggested by 



and a Statesman 239 

Grant nearly a year before, and its necessity had be- 
come painfully apparent to the government. The three 
armies had been acting apparently without reference 
to each other's operations. For some time Halleck 
j had been trying to make Rosecrans cooperate with 
Grant, but without success, and his last disaster had 
determined the government to concentrate the com- 
mand of all the western forces under one head, and 
Grant had been selected to occupy this position. The 
operations in the west would now be planned for mu- 
tual support, and tend towards a single result. We 
shall see that eventually the government concluded that 
it would be best to pursue this course with the military 
operations of the whole country. 

The Secretary brought with him also two other 
orders, one relieving Rosecrans, and substituting Gen- 
eral Thomas in his place, and the other continuing 
Rosecrans in command. Grant was offered his choice, 
and preferred the one removing Rosecrans. Great 
anxiety was felt for the safety of the army under him. 
Proceeding together to Louisville, the Secretary directed 
Grant to assume his new position at once, and to relieve 
Rosecrans by telegraph. This was clone, and on the 
19th of October he started for Chattanooga. 

16 



240 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XXV. 

THE CONDITION AT CHATTANOOGA. — THE MEANS TAKEN 
TO IMPROVE IT. — THE RESULT OF A WEEK'S WORK. 

Chattanooga, while it is the key of the Tennessee 
River, is also the junction of the railways leading from 
Memphis to Charleston, from Richmond to Nashville, 
and south to Atlanta, from whence again the numerous 
branches supplying the South meet. The railway lines 
converging here were the interior strategic lines of the 
Confederacy, enabling them to transport their troops 
with promptness and facility from one part of the 
theatre of the war to another, as the necessity arose, 
and also made their lines of transportation by which 
the supplies were forwarded from the rich regions of 
the south-west to their armies in the field. Besides these 
considerations, situated as this point was at the junc- 
tion of several states, and at the end of the mountain 
range of the Alleghanies, it was the centre of the 
population which remained, all throughout the war, 
loyal to the national government. The people of East 
Tennessee, of West Virginia, and North Carolina, and 
of Northern Alabama and Georgia, had never been 
false to the Union. The nature of their soil had 
prevented slavery from becoming a profitable system 
of labor, and they had not therefore become corrupted 
by its influence. The record of the sufferings and per- 



and a Statesman. 241 

seditions they endured for their devotion to the Union 
cause has not yet been fully written, and probably 
never will be. The gallows and the bullet did their 
work so thoroughly, that until the grave yields up 
its dead, we can never know how many brave hearts 

j perished in this region of country for their loyalty to 
the Union. The possession of Chattanooga would 
secure safety for this population, and the reestablish- 

j ment of the national authority would be the realiza- 
tion of their daily prayers for years. 

In May, 1862, after the evacuation of Corinth, Hal- 
leck had sent Buell, with more than forty thousand 
men, across the States of Alabama and Tennessee, to 
Chattanooga ; but Bragg, having started for the same 
point, finally forced Buell to fall back towards the Ohio; 
and when, after months of marching and fighting, Buell 
was further from Chattanooga than when he started, 
he was relieved, and Rosecrans placed in command of 
this army of the Cumberland, with the same object — 
the possession of Chattanooga — as its aim. 

After finally fighting the battle of Murfreesboro', 
in which the Union army remained in possession of the 
field, Rosecrans remained stationary until the 24th of 
June, 18G3, when he moved out with about seventy 
thousand men. During Grant's operations at Vicks- 
burg he had tried to have Rosecrans make at least a 
sufficient demonstration against Bragg to prevent him 
from sending reinforcements to Johnston. But though 
ordered to do so from the Department at Washington, 
he would not budge, but held a council of war, and 
decided that it was a maxim in war not to fight two 
decisive battles at the same time. When, however, he 



242 Grant as a Soldier 

moved out, Bragg was still before him, with an inferior 
force, and retreated. Continuing to advance, Rose- 
crans outgeneralled Bragg, and finally, on the 9th of 
September, occupied Chattanooga. Bragg, however, 
being largely reenforced, his army numbered about 
sixty thousand men, while Rosecrans, having been 
obliged to garrison the places he had left in his rear, 
had about forty-five thousand, divided into three corps, 
commanded by Thomas, McCook, and Crittenden. Crit- 
tenden held Chattanooga, while the other corps were in 
the mountains, separated by about twenty miles. Be- 
ing threatened by Bragg, the army was brought to- 
gether with difficulty at Chickamauga Creek, about nine 
miles from Chattanooga, and on the 19th of September 
was attacked by Bragg, who, after two days' fighting, 
pierced the centre and scattered the right wing. Rose- 
crans himself hastened to Chattanooga in order to pre- 
pare it for defence, and McCook and Crittenden also 
left the field. Thomas, however, remained firm, and 
resisted the attempt of the entire Confederate army to 
get between him and Chattanooga, until, finding it use- 
less, Bragg desisted from the attempt. 

Withdrawing all his army into Chattanooga, Rose- 
crans determined to hold it if possible ; and a formi- 
dable line of works was thrown up just outside of the 
town. Having, however, abandoned Lookout Mountain, 
which commands the river and the Nashville and 
Chattanooga Railway, by which all his supplies were 
brought, Rosecrans found himself besieged, as soon as 
the Confederates, seeing his error, took possession of 
the mountain and fortified it. From this point they 
could throw shells into Rosecrans's camp, and as his 



and a Statesman. 243 

only means of communication was by a wagon road 
over the mountains, which, from the rains, became 
nearly impassable, the army was soon reduced to half 
rations. 

Here Bragg felt that he had the army of the Cum- 
berland secure, and that starvation would soon make 
them surrender both Chattanooga and themselves. He 
says in his report, " These dispositions, faithfully sus- 
tained, insured the speedy evacuation of Chattanooga, 
for want of food and forage. Possessed of the shortest 
route to his depot, and the one by which reenforce- 
iments must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and 
his destruction was only a question of time." 

When, on the 19th of October, 1863, Grant took com- 
mand of the army, it was reduced to worse straits than 
airy other of our armies was during the war. The men, 
suffering from insufficient food and insufficient clothing, 
seeing nothing before them but starvation and sur- 
render, were dispirited and listless ; the camp was filled 
with animals, dead or djing for want of forage, and the 
stock of ammunition was enough for only one battle. 

After the battle of Chickamauga, two corps from the 
army of the Potomac, under the command of Hooker, 
had been sent to protect Rosecrans's line of railroad 
[between Nashville and Bridgeport, and were ordered 
to stop at this last place, since their presence at Chat- 
tanooga would only have been a further tax upon the 
already scanty stock of supplies. Burnside, who was 
in command of the department of the Ohio, had also 
(been operating in East Tennessee, and had taken 
Knoxville, on the Tennessee Eiver, about one hundred 
and ten miles above Chattanooga, and after the defeat 



244 Grant as a Soldieu 

at Chickamauga, Bragg had despatched a column to j 
hold him in check. 

When Grant telegraphed Thomas, from Louisville, to 
assume command of the army of the Cumberland, he 
sent him also the following message: "Hold Chat- 
tanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as pos- 
sible." Thomas replied at once, " I will hold the town 
till we starve." 

On the morning of the 20th Grant started by rail 
from Louisville, and that night arrived at Nashville, 
where he telegraphed Burnside, " I will be in Steven- 
son to-morrow night, and Chattanooga the next night." 
He also telegraphed Admiral Porter at Cairo, " General 
Sherman's advance was at Eastport on the 15th. The 
sooner a gunboat can be got to him, the better. Boats 
must now be on the way from St. Louis, with supplies, 
to go up the Tennessee, for Sherman." 

Sherman's arm}-, it will be remembered, had started 
from Memphis, to go across the country to the aid of 
Eosecrans. At Eastport they had reached the Tennes- 
see River. Grant also telegraphed Thomas, "Should 
not large working parties be put upon the road be- 
tween Bridgeport and Chattanooga at once?" We 
see that he was busy with all the various interests of 
the several armies in his extended command, and was 
combining them to work towards a single purpose. At 
Stevenson he met Eosecrans and Hooker, the former 
on his way north. He was cordial in his behavior, and 
gave Grant all the information he could concerning 
the condition of affairs. At Bridgeport Grant tele- 
graphed to Nashville, " Send to the front, as speedily 
as possible, vegetables for the army. Beans and 
hominy are especially required." 



and a Statesman. 245 

From Bridgeport to Chattanooga the party travelled 
on horseback. The mountain roads, which at best are 
not the easiest, were now in a dreadful state from the 
rains, and were strewn with the wrecks of wagons and 
bodies of horses, the remains of the attempts to supply 
the army after the railroad communications had been 
cut, Frequently the whole party had to dismount and 
lead their horses over the most difficult parts. At such 
times Grant, who was still too lame to walk, had to be 
carried in the arms of soldiers. But despite all obstacles 
he pressed on, and reached Chattanooga just at dark, 
during a heavy rain, the whole party being wet, hungry, 
and tired. Grant went immediately to Thomas's head- 
quarters, and at half past nine, on the night of the 23d, 
telegraphed to Halleck, " Have just arrived. I will 
write to-morrow. Please approve order placing Sher- 
man in command of department of the Tennessee, with 
headquarters in the field." 

The next morning Grant, with Thomas and W. F. 
Smith, the chief engineer of the department of the 
Cumberland, made a reconnoissance of the territory, 
with a view of opening a line for supplies, by obtaining 
command of Brown's Ferry. Rosecrans had had an 
idea of some such plan. Smith had proposed it ; so had 
Halleck ; and Thomas had resolved upon it even before 
Grant came. The details of the movement were as 
follows : Smith was to take a party of four thousand 
men down the river to Brown's Ferry, on the river, six 
miles below Chattanooga, at night, past the pickets 
of the enemy without alarming them, and seize the 
range of steep hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley, 
three miles below Lookout Mountain, and which were 



246 Grant as a Soldier 

held in small force by the enemy, and which were of 
value to him, since they offered him the means of 
bringing at any time an overwhelming force to block- 
ade the river. This attempt was to be a surprise, and, 
if successful, would force the enemy between Lookout 
Creek and Shell Mountain to fall back behind the 
creek, and would thus open the way for Hooker to 
bring up his force from Bridgeport into Lookout 
Valley. 

The plan was successfully carried out. On the night 
of the 26th Smith sent sixty pontoon boats, each con- 
taining thirty men, down the river from Chattanooga, 
and secured the position almost before the enemy were 
aware that any attempt was made to secure it. On 
the morning of the same day Hooker started, and at 
six in the evening of the 28th the command went into 
camp within a mile of Brown's Ferry. 

The enemy, finding that the Union army had secured 
their base of supplies, attacked Hooker the night after 
his arrival. The attack was made by Longstreet's 
corps in force ; but after a struggle of some hours they 
were repulsed, and Hooker held Lookout Valley there- 
after without opposition. 

Thus, in five days after Grant's arrival at Chat- 
tanooga, his connection with Nashville, the base of his 
supplies, was opened, and the danger of starvation 
removed. Only a week before Jefferson Davis had 
visited Lookout Mountain, and from its summit gazed 
upon the Union army encamped below, comuieiing 
them caged and secure. But the conditions were now 
changed. Grant had assumed the offensive, — the posi- 
tion he liked, — and Bragg was forced to act on the 



and a Statesman. 247 

defensive. Not only had the line of supplies been 
opened, but the army had also been reenforced by the 
two corps under Hooker, who from their position 
threatened the Confederate force on Lookout Mountain. 
Forage was at once obtained for the starving animals 
of the army, fresh horses were forwarded, and full 
rations were issued again. 

The men felt the inspiriting effect, and their listless- 
ness disappeared. On the 28th Grant wrote, " If the 
rebels give us one week more time, I think all clanger 
of losing territory now held by us will have passed 
away, and preparations may be made for active opera- 
tions." In the mean time Grant also turned his atten- 
tion to providing for the wants of Burnside's army, 
in East Tennessee, and Sherman's army, on the march 
across the country to join the force at Chattanooga. 
The supplies for both of these bodies had to be looked 
after, and Grant was indefatigable, foreseeing what 
would be required, and urging upon all his subordi- 
nates the necessity for promptness and despatch. 

When Grant had sent Sherman from Vicksburg to 
Memphis, on his way to reenforce Kosecrans, he said, 
" I hope you will be in time to aid in giving the rebels 
the worst, or best, thrashing they have had in this war. 
I have constantly had the feeling that I shall lose you 
from this command entirely. Of course I do not object 
to seeing your sphere of usefulness enlarged, and think 
it should have been enlarged long ago, having an eye 
to the public good alone. But it needs no assurance 
from me, General, that, taking a more selfish view, while 
1 would heartily approve such a change, I would deeply 
regret it on my own account." 



248 Grant as a Soldier 

It was then supposed that Sherman would relieve 
Rosecrans in the command of the army of the Cum- 
berland. While he was at Memphis, however, Sherman 
heard that Grant was ordered north, and suspecting 
what was about to occur, he wrote, on the 14th of Oc- 
tober, nearly a week before the new division was cre- 
ated, or Grant placed at its head, "Accept the command 
of the great army of the centre ; don't hesitate. By 
your presence at Nashville you will unite all discordant 
elements, and impress the enemy in proportion. All 
success and honor to you!" And again, on the 15th, 
" I am very anxious you should go to Nashville, as fore- 
shadowed by Halleck, and chiefly as you can harmonize 
all conflicts of feeling that may exist in that vast crowd. 
Rosecrans, and Burnside, and Sherman, with their sub- 
ordinates, would be ashamed of petty quarrels, if you 
were behind and near them, between them and Wash- 
ington. Next, the union of such armies, and the direc- 
tion of it, is worthy your ambition. I shall await news 
from you with great anxiety." 

About the middle of October, Sherman, in his advance 
from Memphis, struck the Tennessee at Eastport, where, 
it will be remembered, one of Grant's first orders, after 
taking his present command, was to order supplies to 
be sent him. On the 24th, the day after his arrival at 
Chattanooga, Grant sent the following to Sherman, who 
received it on the 27th : " Drop everything east of Bear 
Creek, and move with your entire force towards Ste- 
venson, until you receive further orders. The enemy 
are evidently moving a large force towards Cleveland, 
and may break through our lines and move on Nash- 
ville, in which event your troops are the only forces at 
command that could beat them there." 



and a Statesman. 249 

Following this order, on the 1st of November, Sher- 
man passed to the front at Florence. On the 7th Grant 
sent him the following: "The enemy have moved a 
great part of their force from this front towards Burn- 
side. I have to make an immediate move from here 
towards their lines of communication, to bring them 
back if possible. I am anxious to see your old corps 
here at the earliest moment." When Sherman reached 
Fayetteville, he received still farther instructions: 
" Come on to Stevenson and Bridgeport, with your 
four divisions. I want }onr command to aid in a 
movement to force the enemy back from their pres- 
ent position, and to make Burnside secure in his." 

On the 13th the army arrived at Bridgeport, and 
from this point Sherman telegraphed to Grant, and was 
summoned in person to Chattanooga, Grant's anxiety 
for Sherman's advance was caused by Burnside's posi- 
tion, against whom Bragg had sent a force detached 
from his army. On the 3d of November, Longstreet 
was also sent by Bragg, with orders to drive Burnside 
out of East Tennessee, or, if possible, to capture or de- 
stroy him ; and the force given Longstreet for this pur- 
pose was about fifteen thousand men, with, also, about 
five thousand cavalry and eighty guns. Longstreet had 
asked for twenty thousand men, but could not obtain 
them, and says, in his report, "As my orders w T ere to 
drive the enemy out of East Tennessee, or, if possible, 
capture him, 1 determined that the only possible chance 
of succeeding in either or both, was to move and act as 
though 1 had a sufficient force to do either. I endeav- 
ored, therefore, to do as I should have done, had the 
twenty thousand men that I asked for been given me." 



250 Grant as a Soldier 

Grant had foreseen the possibility of this move, and 
on the 5th, the day after Longstreet had started, he sent 
to Burnside the following : " I will endeavor, from here, 
to bring the enemy back from your right flank as soon 
as possible. Should you discover him leaving, you 
should annoy him all you can with your cavalry, and 
in fact with all the troops you can bring to bear. Sher- 
man's advance will be at Bridgeport about Monday 
next. Whether Thomas makes any demonstration be- 
fore his arrival, will depend upon advices of the enemy's 
movements." 

On the 7th Thomas was ordered to attack Bragg's 
army. " The news," said Grant, a is of such a nature, 
that it becomes an imperative duty for your force to 
draw the attention of the enemy from Burnside to your 
own front. I deem the best movement to attack the 
enemy to be, an attack on the northern end of Mission- 
ary Ridge, w T ith all the force you can bring to bear 
against it ; and, when that is carried, to threaten and 
even attack, if possible, the enemy's line of communi- 
cation between Dalton and Cleveland. Rations should 
be ready to issue a sufficiency to last four days the mo- 
ment Missionary Ridge is in our possession ; rations to 
be carried in haversacks. Where there are not horses 
to move the artillery, mules must be taken from the 
teams, or horses from ambulances ; or, if necessary, offi- 
cers dismounted, and their horses taken. Immediate 
preparations should be made to carry these directions 
into execution. The movement should not be made a 
moment later than to-morrow morning." On the same 
day Grant said to Burnside, "I have ordered an imme- 
diate move from here to carry Missionary Ridge, and 



and a Statesman. 251 

to threaten or attack the railroad between Cleveland 
and Dalton. This must have the effect to draw the 
enemy back from your western front." 

Thomas, however, declared himself utterly unable to 
move before Sherman's force came up. He had no 
horses to drag his artillery, and therefore Grant was 
forced to leave Burnside to take care of himself. The 
government at this juncture was more anxious con- 
cerning Burnside than Grant was, and its despatches 
show they felt great alarm lest his army should be 
forced to surrender or else destroyed. All that could 
be done, however, in the emergency, Grant did. It 
was impossible for Thomas to attack ; so he had to con- 
tent himself with exhorting Burnside to keep firm, and 
with seeing that Sherman was kept furnished with sup- 
plies at the various points he reached in his advance, 
and with preparing the means for supplying the entire 
army, when it should concentrate, with supplies and 
material, so that it would be able to take the offen- 
sive when the time came for so doing. It was annoy- 
ing, however, to be forced to remain stationary while 
Bragg had detached a force from his command; yet 
there was nothing else to be done. 

There was, however, no fault to be found with any 
one. Thomas's army was temporarily tied by causes 
that were beyond his control. It required time, what- 
ever means were now at his disposal, to put it again in 
a condition to take the initiative. Sherman also was 
completing a march over land of four hundred miles, 
through an enemy's country. He had been forced to 
skirmish, to build bridges, to ford streams, to repair the 



252 Grant as a Soldier 

railroads, and had here acquired the experience, and 
displayed the qualities, which fitted him for his sub- 
sequent march to the sea. 

The reader, who quietly at home, enjoying the re- 
pose of peace, reads of the operations of an army in 
the field, can hardly realize, without an effort, the 
enormous amount of labor, of careful preparation, of 
far-seeing combination and accurate performance, 
requisite in the active operations of war. Here for 
this battle of Chattanooga, which was a struggle be- 
tween the contending parties for the possession of the 
stand-point from which to arrange and realize still more 
far-reaching combinations, and which, if the Union army 
was successful, would be made the base for penetrating 
the very heart of the Confederacy, or, if the Confed- 
erates were successful, would form the point for driving 
the armies of the government back to the limits of the 
territory claimed for secession, and perhaps for even 
carrying the war into the loyal states, — for this battle 
half the whole continent was laid under contribution, 
and a hundred centres of industry were resounding 
with the busy hum of preparation. From St. Louis to 
Pittsburg, the Mississippi, the Ohio, and their tribu- 
taries, were crowded with steamers, bringing supplies 
of food, of clothes, to feed and clothe, and ammunition 
and arms to defend and destroy, these hostile armies. 
From the Lakes to the Gulf, from Maine to Missouri, 
the workshops of the country were occupied in prepar- 
ing material for the armies to be soon engaged in the 
fierce struggle. Two hundred thousand armed men 
were by the North alone kept in the field, either concen- 



and a Statesman. 253 

trating or guarding the supplies for this battle-field 
Over all this bustle of preparation Grant was the ruling 
spirit. Grasping at once the main features, as well as 
the minutest details, he kept control of them all, and, 
by ceaseless activity and care, kept the whole vast 
and complicated machinery working evenly and har- 
moniously towards one object. 



254 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XXVI. 

BUENSIDE'S POSITION. — SHERMAN'S ARRIVAL. — THE ARMY 
PREPARING FOR ACTIVELY OFFENSIVE MEASURES. — THE 
BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. 

On the 14th of November Halleck telegraphed, 
"Advices received from East Tennessee indicate that 
Burnside intends to abandon the defence of Little Ten- 
nessee River, and fall back before Longstreet towards 
Cumberland Gap and the upper valley. Longstreet 
is said to be near the Little Tennessee, with from 
twenty to forty thousand men; Burnside has about 
thirty thousand in all, and can hold his position ; he 
ought not to retreat. I fear further delay may result 
in Burnside's abandonment of East Tennessee. This 
would be a terrible misfortune, and must be averted if 
possible." To this Grant replied, reassuringly, " Burn- 
side certainly can detain Longstreet in the Tennessee 
Valley until we can make such moves here as will en- 
tirely free him from present dangers. I have asked 
him if he could hold the Knoxville and Clinton line for 
one week ; if so, we can make moves here that will save 
all danger in East Tennessee. . . . Sherman is now at 
Bridgeport. He will commence moving to-morrow or 
next da} 7 , throwing one brigade from Whiteside into 
Trenton, thus threatening the enemy's left flank. The 
remainder of his force will pass over by Kelly's Ferry, 



and a Statesman. 255 

evading view from Lookout, and march up to the mouth 
of Chickamauga. Pontoons are made, and making, to 
throw across at that point, over which it is intended 
that ShermaH'S force and one division of Thomas's shall 
pass. This force will attack Missionary Ridge, with the 
left flank of Thomas supporting, from here. In the 
mean time Hooker will attack Lookout, and carry it, if 
possible. If Burnside can hold the line from Knoxville 
to Clinton, as I have asked, him, for six days, I believe 
Brag's: will be started back for the south side of Oosta- 
naula, and Longstreet cut off." 

On the 16th, again, despatches of about the same 
tenor were sent. On the 14th Grant sent to Burnside 
the following : " Sherman's advance has reached Bridge- 
port. His whole force will be ready to move from there 
by Tuesday at farthest. If you can hold Longstreet in 
check until he gets up, or, by skirmishing and falling 
back, can avoid serious loss to yourself, and gain time, 
I will be able to force the enemy back from here, anji 
place a force between Longstreet and Bragg that must 
inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes 
by every available road, to get to his supplies. Sher- 
man would have been here before this but for high water 
on Elk River driving him some thirty miles up that 
river to cross." On the same day he again telegraphed 
to Burnside, " Can you hold the line from Knoxville to 
Clinton for seven days ? If so, I think the whole Ten- 
nessee Valley can be secured from present danger." 
And again, at ten o'clock that night, " It is of the most 
vital importance that East Tennessee should be held. 
Take immediate steps to that end. Evacuate Kings- 
ton if you think best. As I said in a previous despatch, 
17 



256 Grant as a Soldier ' 

I think seven days more will enable us to make such 
movements as to make the whole valley secure, if you 
hold on that time." 

On the 17th he said, "I have not heard from you 
since the 14th. What progress is Longstreet making, 
and what are your chances for defending yourself? 
Sherman's forces have commenced their movement 
from Bridgeport, threatening the enemy. This alone 
may turn Longstreet back,a,nd if it does not, the attack 
will be prosecuted until we reach the roads over which 
all their supplies have to pass, while you hold East Ten- 
nessee." Later on the same day, "Your despatch re- 
ceived. You are doing exactly what appears to me to 
be right. I want the enemy's progress retarded at every 
point all it can be, only giving up each place when it 
becomes evident that it cannot longer be held with- 
out endangering your force to capture. I think our 
movements here must cause Longstreet's recall within 
a day or two, if he is not successful before that time. 
Sherman moved this morning from Bridgeport, with one 
division. The remainder of his command moves in the 
morning. There will be no halt until a severe battle is 
fought, or the railroads cut supplying the enemy." 

On the 18th Grant telegraphed Halleck, " Despatches 
from General Burnside received at ten P. M. yester- 
day. Troops had got back from Knoxville. Sherman's 
advance reached Lookout Mountain to-day. Movements 
will progress, threatening enemy's left flank, until forces 
can be got up and thrown across the river, to attack 
their right flank and Missionary Ridge. A battle or a 
falling back of the enemy is inevitable by Saturday, at 
the farthest. Burnside speaks hopefully." 



and a Statesman. 257 

This day also the written orders for the battle were 
given to Thomas and Sherman. The instructions given 
to Thomas were as follows : " All preparations should 
be made for attacking the enemy's position on Mis- 
sionary Ridge by Saturday morning, at daylight. . . . 
The general plan is for Sherman, with the force brought 
with him, strengthened by a division from your com- 
mand, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River just 
below the mouth of the Chickamauga ; his crossing to 
be protected by artillery from the heights of the north 
bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artil- 
lery), and to secure the heights (Missionary Ridge) 
from the northern extremity to about the railroad 
tunnel, before the enemy can concentrate against him. 
You will cooperate with Sherman. The troops in 
Chattanooga Valley should all be concentrated on 
your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to 
defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a 
movable column of one division, in readiness to move 
wherever ordered. This division should show itself, as 
threateningly as possible, on the most practicable line 
for making an attack up the valley. Your effort, then, 
will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your 
advance well towards the northern end of Missionary 
Riclge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as 
possible. The junction once formed, and the Ridge 
carried, connection will be at once established between 
the two armies by roads on the south bank of the 
river. Further movements will then depend on those 
of the enemy. 

"Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by 
Geary's division, and what troops you may still have 



2-58 Grant as a Soldier 

there of the old army of the Cumberland. Howard's 
corps can then be held in readiness to act, either with 
you at Chattanooga, or with Sherman. It should be 
marched, on Friday night, to a position on the north 
side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon 
bridge [at Chattanooga], and then held in readiness 
for such orders as may become necessary. All these 
troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations, 
in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition, 
on the person of each infantry soldier." 

A copy of these instructions was forwarded to Sher- 
man, for his guidance, and he was also informed — " It 
is particularly desirable that a force should be got 
through to the railroad, between Cleveland and Dal- 
ton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication 
with the South ; but, being confronted by a large force 
here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this 
is to be effected, until the result of our first effort is 
known." 

As was Grant's constant practice, he gave only 
general orders, since he knew that emergencies would 
constantly arise, and that plans must be formed then 
to meet them. It is impossible to foresee all the 
chances of war, and the part of a commander is to be 
ready, as the unexpected emergencies arise, to be able 
to meet them and turn them to his advantage. 

On the 20th Sherman reached Hooker's head- 
quarters, in his advance, and there found Grant's 
orders for a general attack the next day. But as 
only one division had got into position, and the roads 
wore so wretched, and were made worse just at this 
time by continuous rains, Sherman was obliged to 



and a Statesman. 259 

notify Grant that it was impossible for him to take part 
in the attack ; and so it was again postponed. 

On the 20th Grant wrote to Sherman, " To-morrow 
morning I had set for your attack. I see now it can- 
not possibly be made then ; but can you not get up for 
the following morning ? Every effort must be made to 
get up in time to attack on Sunday morning." On the 
20th Grant received the following communication from 
Bragg : — 

Headquarters Army of Tennessee, 1 
In the Field, Nov. 20, 1863. J 
Major General U. S. Grant, 

Commanding United States Forces at Chattanooga. 
General : As there may still be some non-combatants in Chat- 
tanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would 
dictate their early withdrawal. 

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Braxton Bragg, General commanding. 

This message did not deceive Grant, and, instead of 
leading him to fear an immediate attack, suggested to 
him that Bragg was about to evacuate his position, and 
made him the more anxious to attack him before he 
should get an opportunity to do so. On the 21st, how- 
ever, he was forced to again notify Thomas — "I have 
just received a report of the position of Sherman's 
forces. The rain, last night, has thrown them back so 
much, that it will be impossible to get into position for 
action to-morrow morning. He will be up, however, 
against all calamities that can be foreseen, to com- 
mence on Monday morning." 

The next day, however, the rise in the river having 
carried away the bridge, he was obliged again on the 
22d to write to Thomas, "The bridges at Brown's 



260 Grant as a Soldier 

Ferry being down to-day, and the excessively bad roads 
since the last rain, will render it impossible for Sher- 
man to get up either of his remaining two divisions in 
time for the attack to-morrow morning. . . . You can 
make your arrangements for this delay." 

In his despatch to Sherman, on this day, Grant said, 
"Let me know, to-morrow, at as early an hour as 
you can, if you will be entirely ready for Tuesday 
morning." 

On this day, the 22d, a deserter from the rebel army 
came into the lines, and gave information that Bragg 
was falling back from Missionary Ridge. The next 
day, therefore, Thomas advanced. From an early hour 
of the morning our artillery had opened on the enemy, 
and his replies woke the echoes of the mountains. At 
the given signal, however, at about two P. M., the dis- 
positions being completed, the troops marched out in 
such order and precision that the enemy thought it 
was a review, and from their heights looked down 
upon their evolutions as upon a pageant. Finally, 
however, a few shots from the line of skirmishers scat- 
tered the Confederate pickets, and the troops, advan- 
cing despite the heavy fire from the enemy, now aware 
of our intentions, carried the whole of the enemy's 
advanced line, securing Orchard Knoll, and a low range 
of hills about half way between Chattanooga and Mis- 
sionary Ridge, and about a mile within the outposts 
occupied by the enemy before the movement. That 
night the advanced position was fortified, the artillery 
placed in position, and pickets thrown out in front. 
That night Sherman's third division arrived opposite 
the mouth of the South Chickamauga, about four miles 



and a Statesman. 2G1 

above Chattanooga, and that night and next morning 
crossed the river, and at half past three in the after- 
noon had secured a position upon the end of Mission- 
ary Ridge, crossing it in a general direction, facing 
south-east. The same day, at Lookout Mountain 
Hooker's division had carried that position by a 
charge, and thus secured the other end of the enemy's 
line, and at four Hooker reported that his line was 
impregnable. 

Thus from Hooker's original position at Wauchatchie, 
to the mouth of the North Chickamauga, a distance of 
thirteen miles, the enemy had been attacked at the 
same time, and so successfully that on the night of the 
24th the national army held an unbroken line from 
the north end of Lookout Mountain, through Chat- 
tanooga Valley, to the farther end of Missionary Ridge. 
The day had been foggy and rainy, and this had 
favored our movements. While Hooker's men were 
scaling Lookout Mountain, the clouds w T hich hung 
about its sides concealed their advance from the spec- 
tators below, so that it was only from the flashes of 
fire through the clouds, the thunder-like roar of battle, 
and occasional glimpses of the advancing standards, as 
the shifting clouds for a moment rose and fell, that his 
position could be followed. During the night, firing 
still continued on the mountain, and the signal lights 
of the rebels remaining on the topmost summit re- 
vealed to Bragg, on Missionary Ridge, the extent of the 
defeat of his army. At times, too, sharp discharges 
of musketry, or jets of flame from cannon, seemed to 
issue from the mountain side, while the cries of battle 
and defeat seemed, to those below, to come from armies 
contending in the air. 



2G2 Grant as a Soldier 

At midnight the Generals received orders to press 
forward the attack early in the morning. Hooker was to 
try and cut off Bragg's retreat. At half past five on the 
afternoon of the 24th Grant telegraphed to Washing- 
ton, " The fight to-day progressed favorably. Sher- 
man carried the end of Missionary Ridge, and his right 
is now at the tunnel, and left at Chickamauga Creek. 
Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the 
mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and point 
high up. Hooker reports two thousand prisoners 
taken, besides which a small number have fallen into 
our hands from Missionary Ridge." The President 
replied in person to this, on the morning of the 25th, 
" Your despatches as to fighting on Monday and Tues- 
day are here. Well done ! Many thanks to all. Re- 
member Burnside." Halleck also telegraphed, " I con- 
gratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. 
I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any 
further delay may prove fatal. I know that you will 
do all in your power to relieve him." 

That night the rebels evacuated Lookout Mountain, 
retreating to Missionary Riclge. 

The morning of the 25th the sun shone brilliantly. 
Grant's main line faced south and east, towards Mis- 
sionary Ridge, and about a mile from it. Hooker was 
marching down the side of Lookout Mountain, towards 
Rossville Gap. Sherman was in possession of the ex- 
treme left of Missionary Ridge, but there were immense 
natural difficulties in his way for further advance, while 
the rebel works were also in his front. Bragg's head- 
quarters on the ridge, in the centre of his force, were 
plainly in sight, while Grant's position was on Orchard 



and a Statesman. 263 

Hill, overlooking the whole field. Early in the morn- 
ing Sherman advanced, carried and held a ridge about 
eighty yards from the enemy's intrenchments, and also 
the extreme edge of the work itself He also made a 
threatening move against the enemy's right flank, and 
also his stores and line of communications at Chicka- 
mauga Station. Though he could not push his advance 
any farther, yet, as he held the ground he had gained 
firmly, and threatened the enemy's rear, the object of 
his attack was fully gained, since this was to force Bragg 
to weaken his centre in order to support this threatened 
flank, and thus weaken the resistance Thomas would 
meet in his assault upon this portion of the rebel line. 

Grant, from his commanding position, soon saw that 
his plan was succeeding — that Bragg was drawing 
troops from his centre to concentrate them in front of 
Sherman — and though Hooker had been detained by 
the necessity of constructing the bridge over Chatta- 
nooga Creek, which the rebels had destroyed in their 
retreat from Lookout Mountain, and did not, therefore, 
on the left, arrive at his proposed position as soon as 
was expected, yet Grant, having received information 
that he was safely on his way there, he ordered Thomas, 
in the centre, to advance. 

Thomas's force now consisted of four divisions, under 
Johnson, Sheridan, Wood, and Baircl. His orders were 
to carry the rifle-pits at the foot of the Bidge, and then 
to re-form in them, with a view to carry the top of the 
Ridge. 

The men had become impatient at remaining within 
sight of the battle, and taking no active part in it ; and 
so, when ordered to advance, they started on the run, 



264 Grant as a Soldier 

with fixed bayonets. The artillery from the Ridge 
poured in a heavy fire upon them, as they crossed the 
open plain, varying from four to nine hundred yards in 
width, from their cover of timber, where they started, to 
the first line of rifle-pits ; but the line never wavered, 
and, charging through, captured the pits, and a thou- 
sand men in them, and then kept on up the Ridge. 
Their enthusiasm could not be checked, and up the 
whole five hundred yards of the steep and rugged as- 
cent, under a heavy fire of canister and musketry, 
climbing steadily, if slowly, they pressed on, carried the 
second line of rifle-pits, about midway in the ascent, and, 
without stopping, pressed on to the top. The whole 
ascent was a friendly race between the regiments. As 
many as five or six color-bearers were successively shot 
down ; but others took the flag, and still pressed on. 
During the last half of the ascent, from the second line 
of pits to the crest, a fire of thirty pieces of artillery 
and a storm of musketry were flung full in their faces. 
But nothing could stop them. Pushing the enemy up 
before them, they gained the crest, poured over the 
works that crowned it, and at the same moment break- 
ing through at six points, captured crowds of the enemy 
in the very trenches. The rout was overwhelming. 
Whole regiments of the enemy threw down their arms, 
and others fled down the eastern slope, pelted by our 
men with stones. The cannon which crowned the sum- 
mit were turned upon the retreating enemy, and in 
fifty-five minutes from the time the charge commenced 
the place was ours. 

Bragg had believed the position so secure, that as he 
said, " a line of skirmishers should have maintained it 



and a Statesman. 205 

against any assaulting column." He at first thought 
the attack had been repulsed, and was riding along the 
Ridge, congratulating his troops, when the facts were 
made plain to him, and proceeding to the rear he tried 
to rally his retreating men, but could not. " A panic," 
as he says in his report, " which I had never before wit- 
nessed, seemed to have seized upon officers and men, 
and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safe- 
ty, regardless of his duty or his character." Orders were 
given to retire to Chickamauga ; and as the roads were 
familiar to the rebels and equally unknown to us, the 
remains of the army retired. Grant rode up upon the 
Ridge immediately, to direct the pursuit, and followed it 
himself a mile or two. The approach of night, however, 
put an end to it, though Sheridan pushed on as far as 
Mission Mills, about seven miles. 

The success was complete, and at seven P. M. Grant 
telegraphed to Washington, "Although the battle lasted 
from early dawn until dark this evening, I believe I am 
not premature in announcing a complete victory over 
Bragg. Lookout Mountain-top, all the rifle-pits in Chat- 
tanooga Valley, and Missionary Ridge entire, have been 
carried, and are now held by us. I have no idea of 
finding Bragg here to-morrow." A half hour later 
he despatched again: "I have heard from Burnside, to 
the 23d, when he had rations for ten or twelve days, 
and expected to hold out that time. I shall move a 
force from here on to the railroad between Cleveland 
and Dalton, and send a column of twenty thousand men 
up the south side of the Tennessee, without wagons, 
carrying four days' rations, and taking a steamer loaded 
with rations, from which to draw, on the route. If 



2G6 Grant as a Soldier 

Burnside holds out until this force gets beyond King- 
ston, I think the enemy will fly, and with the present 
state of the roads, must abandon almost everything. I 
believe Bragg will lose much of his army by desertion, 
in consequence of his defeat in the last three days' 
fight." On the 26th Halleck replied to Grant's an- 
nouncement of success, " I congratulate you and your 
army on the victories of Chattanooga. This is truly a 
day of thanksgiving." 

To Sherman, on the night of the 25th, Grant said, 
" My plan is to move your forces out gradually, until 
they reach the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. 
Granger will move up the south side of the Tennessee. 
. . . We will push Bragg with all our strength, to-mor- 
row, and try if we cannot cut off a good portion of his 
new troops and trains. His men have manifested a 
strong desire to desert for some time past, and we will 
now give them a chance. . . . Move the advance force 
on the most easterly road taken by the enemy." The 
same night Thomas was ordered — "You will start a 
strong reconnoissance in the morning at seven A. M., to 
ascertain the position of the enemy. If it is ascer- 
tained that 'the enemy are in full retreat, follow them 
with all your force, except that which you intend Gran- 
ger to take to Knoxville. . . . Four days' rations should 
be got up to the men between this and morning, and 
also a supply of ammunition. I shall want Granger's 
expedition to get off by the day after to-morrow." 

At Ringgold, in their retreat, Cleburne, who had been 
covering the rear of the Confederate army, was ordered 
to take up a naturally very strong position in the gorge 
of the mountains, and check the pursuit. Here a severe 



and a Statesman. 267 

struggle took place. The enemy, however, were 
chiefly contending to preserve their train of supplies, 
and when they had clone this, fell back. Here Grant 
ordered the pursuit to be discontinued, since it was 
absolutely necessary to move to the aid of Burnside. 

Of Grant's bearing in action, the following notice by 
Colonel E. S. Parker, one of his staff, is interesting : 
" It ha's been a matter of universal wonder in this army 
that General Grant himself was not killed, and that 
no more accidents occurred to his staff; for the Gen- 
eral was always in the front (his staff with him, of 
course), and perfectly heedless of the storm of hissing 
bullets and screaming shell flying around him. His 
apparent want of sensibility does not arise from heed- 
lessness, heartlessness, or vain military affectation, but 
from a sense of the responsibility resting upon him 
when in battle. When at Ringgold, we rode for half a 
mile in the face of the enemy, under an incessant fire 
of cannon and musketry; nor did we ride fast, but 
upon an ordinary trot ; and not once, do I believe, did 
it enter the General's mind that he was in danger. I 
was by his side, and watched him closely. In riding 
that distance we were going to the front, and I could 
see that he was studying the positions of the two armies. 
Another feature in General Grant's personal move- 
ments is, that he requires no escort beyond his staff, so regard- 
less of danger is he. Roads are almost useless to him, for 
he takes short cuts through fields and woods, and will 
swim his horse through almost any stream that ob- 
structs his way. Nor does it make any difference to 
him whether he has daylight for his movements, for 
he will ride from breakfast until two o'clock in the morning, 



2G8 Grant as a Soldier 

and that too without eating. The next day he ivill repeat the 
dose, until he finishes his work. Now, such things come 
hard upon the staff, but they have learned how to 
bear it." 

The Union loss in the battle of Chattanooga was 
seven hundred and fifty-seven killed, four thousand five 
hundred and twenty-nine wounded, and three hundred 
and thirty missing; a total of five thousand six hundred 
and sixteen. Six thousand one hundred and forty-two 
prisoners were captured, forty pieces of artillery, and 
seven thousand stands of arms, though the reported 
loss was less than ours. The Union force en paired was 
over sixty thousand men, and the Confederate force 
about forty-five thousand ; but these last had an ad- 
vantage of position, which more than counterbalanced 
the disparity. Taken all together, the battle was the 
grandest, and the victory the most brilliant, gained 
during the war. 

At Fort Donelson, the victory was gained by hard 
fighting and the intuitive knowledge of when to take 
the initiative ; at Shiloh, it had been gained by dogged 
perseverance and hard fighting ; at Vicksburg, it had 
been by strategy ; and here at Chattanooga, by skilful 
dispositions of the troops, by manoeuvring in the face of 
the enemy, and by the instinct of success. A General 
is of course unable to carry out his plans without the 
aid of an army to execute them ; but the spirit of his 
army is in a great measure dependent upon his own. 
It is of course impossible to make heroes of poltroons, 
or poltroons of heroes, but it is quite possible to infuse 
into an army a confidence in themselves, and in their 
leader, which will make them capable of great deeds, as 



and a Statesman. 2G0 

it is also possible to so break the spirit of true men, as 
to make them down-hearted and indisposed to take the 
initiative. We have seen in this campaign instances 
of both these eiiects. The army of the Cumberland, 
when Grant took its command, was listless and dis- 
pirited ; it felt that it was in a trap, and its tenure of 
Chattanooga was dependent upon the forbearance of 
the blockading army. The duties of every day kept 
thrusting the dangers of the position before the men : 
their rations were short; their artillery was practically 
useless on account of the wretched condition of their 
animals from want of food ; an exultant enemy was 
strongly posted in their front; their retreat was almost as 
impossible as their advance > and the situation was grow- 
ing daily and hourly more precarious. In live days, how- 
ever, from the time Grant personally assumed the com- 
mand, he had secured their lines of supplies ; a bounti- 
ful supply of food had again become a part of the daily 
routine; reinforcements had been brought up; the initi- 
ative had been taken, and the result of this common 
sense applied to war was shown in the final struggle : 
the men who, a month before had been listless, on that 
day, with an enthusiasm of victory and a confidence of 
success which could not be restrained, had scaled, in the 
face of a furious fire, heights which it would be a task 
to scale in times of peace. In this faculty of inspiring 
masses lies one of the chief qualities of the leader ; and 
here at Chattanooga, Grant showed that he possessed 
it in a most eminent decree. Still suffering from his 
accident, and hardly able to walk alone, when he took 
command, yet his indomitable will, his constant energ\', 
made him almost ubiquitous, and set in motion, while 



270 Grant as a Soldier 

he supervised their working, the arrangements which 
organized, success. 

Of the technical skill displayed in the plan, and the 
operations of the battle, the following commendations 
by Halleck were strictly just and well deserved. In a 
supplementary report this officer said, " Considering the 
strength of the rebel position, and the difficulty of 
storming his intrenchments, the battle of Chattanooga 
must be regarded as one of the most remarkable in history. 
Not only did the officers and men exhibit great skill 
and daring in their operations on the field, but the 
highest praise is also due to the commanding General 
for his admirable dispositions for dislodging the enemy 
from a position apparently impregnable. Moreover, 
by turning his right flank, and throwing him back 
upon Ringgold and Dalton, Sherman's forces were 
interposed between Bragg and Longstreet, so as to 
prevent any possibility of their forming a junction." 



and \ Statesman 271 



CHAPTER XXVII. 

THE RELIEF OF BURNSIDE. — LONGSTREET'S ATTACK ON 
KNOXVILLE. — HE IS ALLOWED TO FALL BACK UNPUR- 
SUED. 

On the 28th of November Grant returned to Chat- 
tanooga, from the front of the pursuit of Bragg, and 
found that Granger had not started with his force upon 
the expedition for the relief of Burnside, and hurried 
him off. 

In the mean while General Foster had been sent to 
supersede Burnside, but Knoxville was so closely be- 
sieged that he could not approach it nearer than Cum- 
berland Gap, where a force of about three thousand 
national soldiers were posted. On this day Grant 
telegraphed Foster, " The Fourth Corps, Major General 
Granger commanding, left here to-day, with orders to 
push with all possible speed through to Knoxville. 
Sherman is already in motion for Hiawassee, and will 
go all the way, if necessary. Communicate this in- 
formation to Burnside as soon as possible, and at any 
cost, with directions to hold to the very last moment, and 
we shall not only relieve him, but destroy Longstreet." 
The next day he wrote to Granger at length, " On 
the 23d instant, General Burnside telegraphed that his 
rations would hold out ten or twelve days ; at the end 
of this time, unless relieved from the outside, he must 
18 



272 Grant as a Soldier 

surrender or retreat. The latter will be an impossi- 
bility. You are now going for the purpose of relieving 
this garrison. You see the short time in which relief 
must be afforded or be too late, and hence the neces- 
sity for forced marches. I want to urge upon you, in 
the strongest possible manner, the necessity of reaching 
Burnside in the shortest possible time." 

Not satisfied, however, with Granger's promptness, 
Grant on the 29th sent to Sherman, " Granger is on 
the way to Burnside's relief; but I have lost all faith in 
his energy and capacity to manage an expedition of 
the importance of this one. I am inclined to think, 
therefore, that I shall have to send you. Push, as 
rapidly as you can, to the Hiawassee, and determine 
for yourself what force to take with you from that 
point. Granger has his corps with him, from which 
you will select, in conjunction with the forces now with 
you. In plain words, you will assume command of all 
the forces now moving up the Tennessee." 

On the 2d of December Sherman arrived at Loudon, 
but, finding the bridge destroyed, turned east, to cross 
the Little Tennessee at Morgantown, while a cavalry 
force was sent to ford the Little Tennessee, and push 
into Knoxville, a distance of forty miles, at any ex- 
pense, and notify Burnside of Sherman's approach. At 
Morgantown it was found impossible to ford the river, 
as was intended ; and so a bridge was built, by using 
houses in the vicinity for material, and on the evening 
of the 4th the principal portion of the army crossed, 
when, the bridge having broken down, the balance had 
to be left on the other side. Here information was 
received from Burnside that, having become aware of 



and a Statesman. 273 

Longstreet's advance against him, he had resolved to 
fall back npon Knoxville, condensing all his forces 
there, and thus drawing Longstreet farther from 
Bragg's army. 

On the 15th he was attacked, on his way, at Camp- 
bell's Station, but fell back the next day to Knoxville, 
and fortified that place immediately. Burnside's force 
consisted of about fifteen thousand men, of whom about 
three thousand were loyal Tennesseeans from the sur- 
rounding country. Longstreet's forces, before the end 
of the siege, consisted of about twenty-two thousand. 
By the 20th of November Burnside's line of defence 
was considered so strong that he had no fear of his 
ability to hold the place ; yet still the position was fur- 
ther strengthened, while Longstreet did nothing active- 
ly to take it. When Longstreet heard of the defeat of 
Bragg, he determined to attempt to carry the place by 
assault, though against the opinion of his subordinate 
officers ; and at dark, on the 28th, an attack was com- 
menced on Fort Sanders, one of the strongest points 
of the defensive works about Knoxville, but also 
the commanding position to be taken. Early next 
morning a furious cannonade was opened upon the 
fort, and then an assault was commenced. The first 
column was repulsed, and a second, pushed forward as 
desperately as the first, met with the same fate. In' 
this attack Longstreet lost over a thousand men, while 
Burnside lost only thirteen. This disparity arose from 
the protection afforded the besieged by their works, 
while the Confederates had to advance to the attack 
about two hundred and fifty yards without cover. 

About half an hour after this repulse, Longstreet 



274 Grant as a Soldier 

received an order from Jefferson Davis, announcing 
Bragg's defeat, and ordering Longstreet to cooperate 
with his retreating army, and at once commenced to 
move with this purpose ; but soon after getting reports 
of the advance of Sherman's army to prevent this junc- 
tion, he resolved to return and continue the siege, 
arguing correctly that by this process he would most 
effectually prevent Grant from following Bragg. 

On the 2d Burnside received intelligence of Sher- 
man's approach, and the next day Longstreet com- 
menced a retreat in the direction of Virginia, with- 
drawing the last of his troops on the night of the 4th, 
unmolested by Burnside. On the 5th Sherman, at 
Marysville, communicated with Burnside — "I am here, 
and can bring twenty-five thousand men into Knox- 
ville to-morrow; but Longstreet having retreated, I 
feel disposed to stop, for a stern chase is a long one. 
But I will do all that is possible. Without you specify 
that you want troops, I will let mine rest to-morrow, 
and ride to see you." 

At the meeting of the Generals, Burnside said that 
he required no aid, except Granger's command, and 
advised that Sherman should return. The next clay, 
therefore, Granger moved into Knoxville, and a force 
being sent out after Longstreet, Sherman commenced 
his return. 

On the 8th the President sent the following despatch 
to Grant. " Understanding that your lodgment at 
Chattanooga and at Knoxville is now secure, I wish to 
tender you, and all under your command, my more 
than thanks, my profoundest gratitude, for the skill, 
courage, and perseverance with which you and they, 



and a Statesman. 275 

over so great difficulties, have effected that important 
object. God bless you all." 

Grant's orders had been to drive Longstreet from the 
limits of his department, or else annihilate his force ; 
but, as it was, Burnside, who was Sherman's superior 
officer, having ordered his return, and making the mis- 
take of supposing that without the aid of his command 
his own forces were sufficient, Grant's intentions were 
not carried out. Longstreet retired to ; Russelville, and 
remained there for the winter, living off the country, 
rendering the occupation of Knoxville insecure, and 
causing a great deal of anxiety to both the government 
and to Grant. The following despatch of the 20th of 
January, from Grant to Halleck, will show what course 
Grant had intended should have been pursued, and also 
his consideration for the reputation of his subordinate 
officers : " It was a great oversight, in the first place, to 
have ever permitted Longstreet to come to a stop with- 
in the State of Tennessee, after the siege was raised. 
My instructions were full and complete on this subject. 
Sherman was sent with forces sufficient, alone, to defeat 
Longstreet, and, notwithstanding the long distance the 
troops had marched, proposed to go on, and carry out 
my instructions in full. General Burnside was san- 
guine that no stop would be made by the enemy in the 
valley. Sherman then proposed to leave any amount 
of force Burnside thought might be necessary to make 
his position perfectly secure. He deemed two divisions 
ample. ... I write this now particularly to show that 
the latter named officer [Sherman] is in nowise to blame 
for the existing state of affairs in East Tennessee." 

The position at Chattanooga being now secure, on the 



276 Grant as a Soldier 

7th of December Grant, in a despatch to Washington, 
writes as follows : " The country south of this is ex- 
tremely mountainous, affording but little for the support 
of an army ; the roads are bad at all times, and the sea- 
son is so far advanced that an effective campaign from 
here, this winter, may be looked upon as impossible. 
Our supplies and means of transportation would not 
admit of a very early campaign, if the season did. . . . 
I propose, with the concurrence of higher authority, to 
move by way of New Orleans and Pascagoula, on Mo- 
bile. I would hope to secure that place, or its invest- 
ment, by the last of January" 

The government, however, did not favor this sug- 
gestion, and Longstreet's remaining in Tennessee led 
Grant's thoughts in another direction, so that on the 
17th he writes, " I feel deeply interested in moving the 
enemy beyond Saltville this winter, so as to be able to 
select my own campaign in the spring, instead of having 
the enemy dictate it for me." 

On the 10th of December Grant issued the following 
congratulatory order to his troops : — 

General Orders, No.- 9. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, > 
In the Field, Chattanooga, Tenn., December 10, 1863. \ 

The General commanding takes this opportunity of returning 
his sincere thanks and congratulations to the brave armies of 
the Cumberland, the Ohio, the Tennessee, and their comrades 
from the Potomac, for the recent splendid and decisive successes 
achieved over the enemy. In a short time, you have recovered 
from him the control of the Tennessee River froni Bridgeport 
to Knoxville. You dislodged him from his great stronghold 
upon Lookout Mountain ; drove him from Chattanooga Valley ; 
wrested from his determined grasp the possession of Missionary 



and a Statesman. 277 

Ridge ; repelled, with heavy loss to him, his repeated assaults 
upon Knoxville, forcing him to raise the siege there; driving 
him at all points, utterly routed and discomfited, beyond the 
limits of the state. By your noble heroism and determined cour- 
age, you have most effectually defeated the plans of the enemy 
for regaining possession of the States of Kentucky and Tennessee. 
You have secured positions from which no rebellious power can 
drive or dislodge you. For all this, the General commanding 
thanks you, collectively and individually. The loyal people of 
the United States thank and bless you. Their hopes and prayers 
for your success against this unholy rebellion are with you daily. 
Their faith in you will not be in vain. Their hopes will not be 
blasted. Their prayers to Almighty God will be answered. You 
will yet go to other fields of strife ; and with the invincible bra- 
very and unflinching loyalty to justice and right which have char- 
acterized you in the past, you will prove that no enemy can 
withstand you, and that no defences, however formidable, can 
check your onward march. 

By order of Major General IT. S. Gkant. 

T. S. Bowers, A. A. G. 

After the defeat at Chattanooga, General Bragg, at 
his own request, was relieved from the command of the 
army on the 2d of December, and Hardee put in his 
place. When Grant heard this, he is reported to have 
said, " He is just my choice." Bragg was " charged with 
the conduct of the military operations of the armies of 
the Confederacy ; " and his last appearance on the pub- 
lic stage was as commander in North Carolina, when 
Fort Fisher fell. 



278 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XXVIII. 

PLANS FOR THE NEXT CAMPAIGN. — SHERMAN'S EXPEDITION. 
— GRANT VISITS ST. LOUIS. —HIS SPEECHES THERE. 

About Christmas Grant went in person to Knoxville, 
to inspect the condition of the army there, and found 
the men in great want of clothing, particularly of shoes. 
The difficulties of the route, and the season of the year, 
rendered it almost impossible to remedy this, but all 
that could be done was done. On the 11th he wrote 
to McPherson, who had been left in command of Vicks- 
burg, concerning a cavalry expedition to move through 
Mississippi, and " clean out the state entirely of all reb- 
els." On the loth he returned to Nashville, where his 
headquarters were now established, coming by way of 
Cumberland Gap, which had been a point so frequently 
contested. On the 15th he wrote to Halleck, "Sher- 
man has gone down the Mississippi to collect, at Vicks- 
burg, all the force that can be spared for a separate 
movement from the Mississippi. He will probably have 
ready, by the 24th of this month, a force of twenty 
thousand men. ... I shall direct Sherman, therefore, 
to move out to Meridian, with his spare force, the cav- 
alry going from Corinth, and destroy the roads east 
and south of there so effectually, that the enemy will 
not attempt to rebuild them during the rebellion. He 
will then return, unless opportunity of going into Mo- 



and a Statesman. 279 

bile with the force he has appears perfectly plain. 
Owing to the large number of veterans furloughed, I 
will not be able to do more, at Chattanooga, than to 
threaten an advance, and try to detain the force now in 
Thomas's front. Sherman will be instructed, whilst left 
with these large discretionary powers, to take no extra 
hazard of losing his army, or of getting it crippled too 
much for efficient service in the spring." 

The same letter contained an exposition of Grant's 
plan of campaign for the following spring. " I look 
upon the next line for me to secure to be that from 
Chattanooga to Mobile; Montgomery and Atlanta being 
the important intermediate points. To do this large 
supplies must be secured on the Tennessee River, so as 
to be independent of the railroad from here [Nashville] 
to the Tennessee for a considerable length of time. 
Mobile would be a second base. The destruction which 
Sherman will do to the roads around Meridian will be 
of material importance to us in preventing the enemy 
from drawing supplies from Mississippi, and in clearing 
that section of all large bodies of rebel troops. ... I 
do not look upon any points, except Mobile in the 
south, and the Tennessee River in the north, as pre- 
senting practicable starting-points from which to op- 
erate against Atlanta and Montgomery. They are 
objectionable, as starting-points, to be all under one 
command, from the fact that the time it will take to 
communicate from one to the other will be so great. 
But Sherman or McPherson, either one of whom could 
be intrusted with the distant command, are officers of 
such experience and reliability, that the objections on 
this score, except that of enabling the two armies to act 
as a unit, would be removed." 



280 Grant as a Soldier 

A copy of this letter was sent to Sherman with the 
following remarks: " The letter contains all the instruc- 
tions I deem necessary in your present move. . . . 
Nearly all the troops in Thomas's and Dodge's com- 
mand, having less than one year to serve, have re- 
enlisted, and many of them have been furloughed. 
This, with the fact that Longstreet's force in East Ten- 
nessee makes it necessary for me to keep ready a force to 
meet them, will prevent my doing much more than is 
indicated in my letter to General Halleck. I will have, 
however, both Dodge and Logan ready, so that, if the 
enemy should weaken himself much in front, they can 
advance." 

On the 19th Thomas was informed of this contem- 
plated movement, and directed to cooperate with it as 
follows: "To cooperate with this movement," said 
Grant, " you want to keep up the appearance of prep- 
aration for an advance from Chattanooga. It may be 
necessary even to move a column as far as La Fayette. 
Logan will also be instructed to move at the same time 
what force he can from Bellefontaine towards Rome. 
We will want to be ready at the earliest possible mo- 
ment in the spring for a general advance. I look 
upon the line for this army to secure, in its next cam- 
paign, to be that from Chattanooga to Mobile ; Atlanta 
and Montgomery being the important intermediate 
points." 

On the 23d he wrote to Halleck, " I am now collect- 
ing as large a cavalry force as can be spared, at Savan- 
nah, Tennessee, to cross the Tennessee River, and co- 
operate with the cavalry from Hurlbut's command in 
clearing out entirely the forces now collecting in West 



and a Statesman. 281 

Tennessee, under Forrest. It is the design that the 
cavalry, after finishing the work they first start upon, 
shall push south, through East Mississippi, and destroy 
the Mobile road as far south as they can. Sherman 
goes to Memphis and Vicksburg in person, and will 
have Grenada visited, and such other points on the 
Mississippi Central Railroad as may require it. I want 
the State of Mississippi so visited that large armies can- 
not traverse it this winter." 

Sherman left Vicksburg on the 3d of February ; on 
the 14th he entered Meridian, a railroad centre, be- 
tween Vicksburg and Montgomery, and for five days 
ten thousand men were engaged in destroying the rail- 
roads centring here ; and the injury they suffered now 
did good service, the next year, in preventing Hood 
from conveying his troops quickly against Thomas in 
the battle at Nashville, so that Thomas had time to 
prepare for his reception, by bringing together his re- 
enforcements even from as far as Missouri. 

On the 28th Sherman returned to Vicksburg, having 
destroyed the railroads of the state, so as to render it 
impossible for the Confederates to make use of them in 
maintaining an army in Mississippi, or in operating 
against our possession of the Mississippi River. He 
had also maintained his army principally from the 
enemy's country, and had learned the secret he was 
afterwards to display so brilliantly. He had brought 
away four hundred prisoners, five thousand negroes, 
about a thousand white refugees, and three thousand 
animals. He had inarched ■ about four hundred miles 
in a month, and his army was in better health and 
condition than when they started. His loss was twenty 



282 Grant as a Soldier 

one killed, sixty-eight wounded, and eighty-one missing, 
and he had terrified the country. Never before in the 
war had an army penetrated the enemy's country so 
far without a base. Their finally interior lines of com- 
munication were cut ; the places that had fancied them- 
selves most secure were visited with the ruthless 
scourge of war, and troops were even sent from John- 
ston's army, lying in front of Thomas, to check him. 

On the 24th of January Grant obtained leave to 
visit St. Louis, to see his son, who was lying there sick, 
and before leaving gave orders to Thomas to keep up 
a show of advancing, in order to prevent Johnston, who 
had succeeded Hardee in command of the Confederate 
army in his front, from sending troops to interfere with 
Sherman. He travelled quickly and quietly, without 
any display, and on the 26th arrived at St. Louis, 
having given no notice of his intention, and registered 
his name upon the hotel book simply as U. S. Grant, 
Chattanooga. The news of his arrival spread quickly 
through the city, and the next day he was tendered a 
public reception ; the following extract from the invita- 
tion will show the spirit which prompted this honor : 
" As citizens of a republic consecrated to constitutional 
liberty, and duly appreciating the destinies of the 
future for our own and other lands which hang upon 
the results of the present conflict, we glory in the 
brilliant deeds and unparalleled triumphs of yourself, 
officers, and men. To you and the gallant soldiers 
whom you have led a nation's honor and gratitude 
are due." 

The invitation was numerously signed, and was ac- 
cepted by General Grant in the following letter: — 



and a Statesman. 283 

St. Louis, Mo., January 27, 1864. 
Colonel John O'Fallax, Hon. John IIoav, 
And Citizens of St. Lonis. 
Gentlemen: Your highly complimentary invitation "to meet 
old acquaintances and make new ones," at a dinner to be given by 
citizens of St. Louis, is just received. 

1 will state that I have only visited St. Louis on this occasion to 
see a sick child. Finding, however, that he has passed the crisis 
of his disease, and is pronounced out of danger by his physicians, 
I accept the invitation. My stay in this city will be short — prob- 
ably not beyond the 1st proximo. On to-morrow I shall be en- 
gage* 1. Any other day of my stay here, and any place selected by 
the citizens of St. Louis, it will be agreeable for me to meet them. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
Your obedient servant, 

IT. S. Grant, Major General XT. 8. A. 

On the 29th the reception- was given in the Lindell 
Hotel, and the enthusiasm with which the leader of 
the western armies was greeted was heartfelt and 
sincere. During the evening, in answer to a toast, 
" Our Distinguished Guest, Major General Grant," the 
General rose amid a perfect storm of applause, and 
said, " Gentlemen, in response, it will be impossible for 
me to do more than to thank you." 

During the evening an immense crowd gathered 
outside, and the General was greeted with a serenade. 
When he appeared upon the balcony, he was received 
with enthusiastic cheers, and called upon for a speech. 
Nothing else would seem to satisfy the multitude ; so 
that, finally, in self-defence, he took off his hat, and, 
amid profound silence, said : — 

Gentlemen, I thank you for this honor. I cannot make a 
speech. It is something I have never done, and never intend to 
do, and I beg you will excuse me. 



284 Grant as a Soldier 

Loud cheers followed this brief address, at the con- 
clusion of which the General replaced his hat, took a 
cigar from his pocket, lit it, and stood on the balcony 
in the presence of the crowd, puffing his Havana and 
watching the rockets as they ascended and burst in 
the air. 

" Speech ! speech ! " vociferated the multitude ; and 
several gentlemen near him urged the General to say 
something to satisfy the people, but he declined. Judge 
Lord, of the Land Court, appeared very enthusiastic, 
and, placing his hand on General Grant's shoulder, 
saidj "Tell them you can fight for them, but can't talk 
to them — do tell them that ! " 

"I must get some one else to say that for me," 
replied the General ; but . the multitude continuing to 
cry out, " Speech ! speech ! " he leaned over the rail- 
ing, blew a wreath of smoke from his lips, and said, 
" Gentlemen, making speeches is not my business. I 
never did it in my life, and never will. I thank you, 
however, for your attendance here;" and with that the 
General retired. 

On the 5th of February Grant had returned to Nash- 
ville, and, receiving information the next day that 
Johnston had forwarded reinforcements to Longstreet, 
ordered Thomas to send a detachment of troops to 
East Tennessee. This department had now been trans- 
ferred to the command of Schofield, at Grant's desire. 
Foster had requested to be relieved, an old wound, 
received in the Mexican war, having reopened. Scho- 
field was informed of this action, and that it was Grant's 
desire to drive Longstreet out of the state, so as to 
"prepare for a spring campaign of our own choosing, 



and a Statesman. 285 

instead of permitting the enemy to dictate it for us." 
At the same time he wrote, " We will have some sharp 
fighting in the spring, and, if successful, I believe the 
war will be ended within the year." 

On his way north, Foster stopped at Nashville, and 
consulted with Grant, and argued that the contem- 
plated campaign against Longstreet would not have a 
decided effect, since that portion of the country was ex- 
hausted, and Schofield's position was secure, without 
the necessity of further fighting ; while Longstreet, if 
driven back, had only to retreat into Virginia, and the 
difficulties of following him were greatly increased by the 
necessity of carrying all supplies. These views decided 
Grant, and he turned his attention towards Dalton, 
which he desired to make a point of value in the south- 
ern campaign, in the spring, and also at present to create 
a diversion in favor of Sherman. 



286 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XXIX. 

THE EXTRA MILITARY DUTIES OF THE DEPARTMENT, AND 
THE MEANS TAKEN TO PERFORM THEM. 

It will be well to return a little from the narrative 
of the active military operations, and consider Grant's 
action in the interests other than military which came 
naturally under his supervision. After the victory at 
Chattanooga, deserters from the Confederate army be- 
gan to come into our lines in great numbers. To meet 
their case, and to protect them should they be recap- 
tured by the Confederates after being paroled, the 
following order was issued : — 

General Orders, No. 10. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,") 
In the Field, Chattanooga, Tenn., December 12, 1863. j 

To obtain uniformity in the disposition of deserters from the 
Confederate armies coming within this military division, the fol- 
lowing order is published : — 

1. All deserters from the enemy coming within our lines will be 
conducted to the commander of division or detached brigade who 
shall be nearest the place of surrender. 

2. If such commander is satisfied that the deserters desire to 
quit the Confederate service, he may permit them to go to their 
homes, if within our lines, on taking the following oath : — 

THE OATH. 

" I do solemnly swear in the presence of Almighty God, that I will hence- 
forth faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 



and a Statesman. 287 

States, ami the Union of States thereunder, and that T will in like manner 
abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed during the exist- 
ing rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and so far as not yet repealed, 
modified, or held void by Congress or by decision of the Supreme Court, and 
that I will in like manner abide by and faithfully support all proclamations 
of the President made during the existing rebellion having reference to slaves, 
so long and so far as not modified or declared void by decision of the Su- 
preme Court. So help me God. 

" Sworn and subscribed to before me at this day of 1SG ." 

3. Deserters from the enemy will at once be disarmed, and their 
arms turned over to the nearest ordnance officer, who will ac- 
count for them. 

4. Passes and rations may be given to deserters to carry them 
to their homes, and free passes over military railroads and on 
steamboats in government employ. 

5. Employment at fair wages will, when practicable, be given to 
deserters by officers of the Quartermaster and Engineer Depart- 
ments. 

To avoid the danger of recapture of such deserters by the 
enemy, they will be exempt from the military service in the 
armies of the United States. 

By order of Major General U. S. Geant. 

T. S. Boweks, A. A. G. 

He also ordered that "no encouragement will be 
given to traders or army followers, who have left their 
homes to avoid enrolment or the draft, and to specu- 
late upon the soldiers' pay; and this class of persons 
will not be tolerated in the armies of the military 
division of the Mississippi." 

The country in which his military operations were 
at this time carried on contained a great many persons 
who had remained loyal to the government ; and the 
following orders show the course of treatment he 
adopted for their protection, and also for placing, as 
far as possible, the burden incidental to the military 
occupation of a country upon those whose disloyalty 
had caused the war: — 
19 



288 Grant as a Soldier 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, ) 
In tiie Field, Chattanooga, Tenn., December 13, 18G3. > 

All Quartermasters within the military division of the Missis- 
sippi who now have, or may hereafter receive, moneys for rents 
accruing from abandoned property, or property known to belong 
to secessionists within this military division, are hereby directed 
to pay such moneys into the hands of the nearest treasury agent, 
taking his receipt therefor, excepting such sums out of said moneys 
so collected as may be requisite to pay the necessary expenses of 
collection, and the taxes due the United States upon the same. 

Any property now held by any Quartermaster, and upon which 
rents are collected by him, shall, when satisfactorily proven to 
belong to loyal citizens, be restored to the possession of the own- 
ers, together with all moneys collected for rents upon the same, 
excepting only such sums as may be required to pay the necessary 
expenses of collection, and the taxes due to the United States 
upon the same. 

Department and corps commanders and commandants of mili- 
tary posts and stations within this military division are hereby 
required and directed, whenever called upon by proper authority, 
to promptly afford all necessary assistance in enforcing the collec- 
tion of the taxes due upon all property within this command. 

Corps commanders within this military division are directed 
to immediately seize, or cause to be seized, all county records 
and documents showing titles and claims to property within the 
revolted states in their respective districts, and hold the same 
until they can be delivered to an authorized tax commissioner of 
the United States. 

Where property is used by the government without paying 
rent, the collection of taxes on it will be suspended until further 
orders. 

By order of Major General U. S. Grant. 

llEADQUArvTEKS MILITARY DIVISION OP THE MlSSISSirPI, > 

In the Field, Chattanooga, Tenn., December 16, 18G3. J 
1. All seizures of private buildings will be made by the Quarter- 
master's department, on the order of the commanding officer. 
The buildings of disloyal persons alone will be taken to furnish 
officers with quarters, and the need for public offices and store- 
houses must be supplied in preference. 



and a Statesman. 289 

2. When the urgent exigencies of the service require it, the 
buildings of loyal persons may be taken for storehouses and offices, 
but only after all suitable buildings belonging to disloyal persons 
have been seized. 

3. In the seizure of buildings, the owner will be allowed to retain 
all movables except the means of heating. 

4. All officers will remain in the immediate vicinity of their 
commands, and if having a less command than a division or a 
post, when the command is in tents they will occupy tents them- 
selves. 

5. Commanding officers are prohibited from quartering troops 
in houses without the special written authority of the General com- 
manding the corps or department to which they belong. 

6. In furnishing quarters to officers not serving with troops, 
the Quartermaster's department will be governed by existing 
regulations. 

7. Ten days after the receipt and distribution of this order, 
corps commanders will cause an inspection of their commands to 
be made by their Assistant Inspectors General, and will arrest and 
perfer charges against every officer who may be occupying quarters 
not assigned to him by the Quartermaster's department, or in 
violation of paragraph 4 of this order. 

By order of Major General U. S. Grant. 

His care for the comfort of his soldiers prompted the 
following order, giving authority to secure the trans- 
portation of their supplies : — 

All requisitions made by Captain J. A. Potter, Assistant Quarter- 
master United States army, for military supplies, will be im- 
mediately and promptly filled. 

In case of delay or refusal on the part of any railroad, Captain 
Potter is authorized to take such means as may be necessary to 
enforce compliance. 

By order of Major General U. S. Grant. 

Robert Allen, 

Brigadier General and Chief Quartermaster. 



290 Grant as a Soldier 

Very soon after his arrival at Chattanooga, the sub- 
ject of the practice of guerrilla warfare having at- 
tracted his attention, and the damage done to the 
Unionists who lived in this district of country having 
assumed proportions which required immediate action, 
he issued the following order, which, by his strict 
adherence to its provisions, went very far towards 
having the desired effect : — 

General Orders, No. 4. 

Headquarters Military Division of tiie Mississippi, V 
In the Field, Chattanooga, Tenn., November 5, 1863. j 

The habit of raiding parties of rebel cavalry visiting towns, vil- 
lages, and farms where there are no Federal forces, and pillaging 
Union families, having become prevalent, department commanders 
will take immediate steps to stop the evil, or make the loss by such 
raids fall upon secessionists and secession sympathizers in the 
neighborhood where such acts are committed. For every act of 
violence to the person of an unarmed Union citizen, a secessionist 
will be arrested and held as hostage for the delivery of the of- 
fender. For every dollar's worth of property taken from such, 
citizens, or destroyed by raiders, an assessment will be made upon 
secessionists of the neighborhood, and collected by the nearest 
military forces, under the supervision of the commander thereof, 
and the amount thus collected paid over to the sufferers. When 
such assessments cannot be collected in money, property useful to 
the government may be taken at a fair valuation, and the amount 
paid in money by a disbursing officer of the government, who will 
take such property upon his returns. Wealthy secession citizens 
will be assessed in money and provisions for the support of Union 
refugees who have been and may be driven from their homes and 
into 6ur lines by the acts of those with whom secession citizens are 
in sympathy. All collections and payments under this order will 
be through disbursing officers of the government, whose accounts 
must show all money and property received under it, and how 
disposed of. 

By order of Major General U. S. Gkant. 

T. S. Bowers, A. A. G. 



and a Statesman. 291 

The result of Grant's administration in his depart- 
ment was such, that in February of this year it was 
publicly stated, " that all through the country to the 
rear of the Union lines, a Union officer, in his uniform, 
can ride unmolested to any portions of Mississippi, 
Tennessee, and Alabama, halting at farm-houses along 
the road for such refreshments and shelter as he may 
desire." 

The gratitude of the country for Grant's services and 
those of the brave men under him, found expression in 
Congress by the following motion to present him with 
a gold medal. The resolution was introduced in the 
house by Mr. Washburne, and was put upon the mili- 
tary record by a general order from the War Depart- 
ment dated December 21, 18G3, as follows: — 

General Orders, No. 898. 

Joint Resolution of thanks to Major General Ulysses S. Grant 
and the officers and soldiers who h,ave fought under his com- 
mand during this rebellion ; and providing that the President 
of the United States shall cause a medal to be struck, to be 
presented to Major General Grant in the name of the United 
States of America. 

Be it resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the 
thanks of Congress be, and they hereby are, presented to Major 
General Ulysses S. Grant, and through him to the officers and 
soldiers who have fought under his command during this rebel- 
lion, for their gallantry and good conduct in the battles in which 
they have been engaged ; and that the President of the United 
States be requested to cause a gold medal to be struck, with 
suitable emblems, devices, and inscriptions, to be presented to 
Major General Grant. 

Sec. 2. And be it further resolved, That, when the said medal 
shall have been struck, the President shall cause a copy of this 



292 Grant as a Soldier 

joint resolution to be engrossed on parchment, and shall transmit 
the same, together with the said medal, to Major General Grant, 
to be presented to him in the name of the people of the United 
States of America. 

Sec. 3. And be it further resolved, That a sufficient sum of 
money to carry this resolution into effect is hereby appropriated 
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated. 

Schuyler Colfax, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

H. Hamlin, 

Vice-President of the United States and 

President of the Senate. 

Approved, December 17, 1863 : Abraham LracoLN. 

The design for this medal was made by Leutze, and 
is thus described : On one side was the profile of Grant, 
surrounded by a wreath of laurels, with his name, the 
year 1863, and a galaxy of stars; on the reverse, a 
figure of Fame, with a trump, and a scroll bearing the 
names of his victories. The motto was, "Proclaim 
Liberty throughout the Land." 



and a Statesman. 293 



CHAPTER XXX. 

THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL REVIVED. — GRANT 
SELECTED TO FILL IT. — CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN 
GRANT AND SHERMAN. —VISITS WASHINGTON AND RE- 
CEIVES HIS COMMISSION. 

On the 2d of March Grant received the intelligence, 
through rebel sources, of Sherman's successful return 
from his raid upon the railroads of Mississippi, and on 
the 3d was himself ordered to report to Washington in 
person, in the following despatch : " The Secretary of 
War directs that you report in person to the War 
Department as early as practicable, considering the 
condition of your command. If necessary, you will 
keep up telegraphic communication with your com- 
mand while en route for Washington." The next day 
Grant started for the East, and before setting: out sent 
his instructions to Sherman, directing him to use the 
negro troops, as far as practicable, in guarding the Mis- 
sissippi, and to assemble the remainder of his command 
at Memphis, in order to " have them in readiness to 
join your column on this front, in the spring campaign." 
This was the campaign against Atlanta, which Grant 
intended to lead in person. His purpose was from 
there to advance against either Mobile or Savannah, 
as should seem best ; and in this despatch to Sherman 
he says, "I am ordered to Washington \ but as I am 



294 Grant as a Soldier 

directed to keep up telegraphic communication with 
this command, I shall expect in the course of ten or 
twelve days to return to it." 

He was, however, to be called to another field of 
action. The necessity of some one commanding mind 
to combine the operations of all our armies had been 
for some time growing more and more evident. The 
approaching presidential nomination had increased and 
heightened the political dissensions, which, during the 
whole of the war, had been a hinderance in the way of 
the government, and had made too many military ap- 
pointments wear a political aspect. There was want- 
ing some one commanding mind to overlook the varied 
offensive operations of our armies, and direct them 
with a unity of purpose. Heretofore most of our 
armies had operated independently, and frequently to 
each other's injury. The advantage of some such ar- 
rangement, in a partial field, had been already seen in 
the successive enlargements of Grant's command, and 
it was proposed to carry out the same course of action, 
by putting all the armies under one control, and giving 
this control to Grant. 

At the session of Congress during the winter of 
18G3-G4, Mr. Washburne, the representative of Illinois 
from Galena, Grant's place of residence, introduced a 
bill " to revive the grade of Lieutenant General of the 
arm};" and the intention was, of course, to give the 
position to Grant. This grade in the army was created 
in 17U8, for Washington, who held it but one year be- 
fore his death. In 1855 it was bestowed, by brevet, upon 
General Scott. The debate upon the bill lasted some 
time, and finally on the 2Gth of February, 18G4, received 



and a Statesman. 295 

the sanction of both Houses of Congress, was approved 
on the 1st of March by the President, who nominated 
Grant for the position, and on the 2d the nomination 
was approved by the Senate. In the debate upon the 
bill in the House, before it was brought to a vote, Mr. 
Washburne, in the course of his remarks, spoke as 
follows : — 

" I have spoken of the interest I feel in this bill, but, if I know 
myself, it is a feeling that rises far above the considerations of per- 
sonal friendship which I entertain for the distinguished soldier 
whose name has been connected with it. I am not here to speak 
for General Grant. No man with his consent has ever mentioned 
his name in connection with any position. I say what I know to 
be true when I allege that every promotion he has received since 
he first entered the service to put down this rebellion, was moved 
without his knowledge or consent; and in regard to this very matter 
of Lieutenant General, after the bill was introduced and his name 
mentioned in connection therewith, he wrote me, and admonished 
me that he had been highly honored already by the government, 
and did not ask or deserve anything more in the shape of honors 
or promotion ; and that a success over the enemy was what he 
craved above everything else ; that he only desired to hold such 
an influence over those under his command, as to use them to the 
best advantage to secure that end. Such is the language of this 
patriotic and single-minded soldier, ambitious only of serving his 
country and doing his whole duty. Sir, whatever this House may 
do, the country will do justice to General Grant. We can see that. 
I think I can appreciate that myself." 

The bill, as finally passed, was worded as follows : — 

JBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That 
the grade of Lieutenant General be, and the same is hereby, 
revived in the army of the United States of America ; and the 
President is hereby authorised, whenever he shall deem it expo- 



29G Grant as a Soldier 

client, to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen- 
ate, a commander of the army, to be selected, during war, from 
among those officers in the military service of the United States, 
not below the grade of Major General, most distinguished for cour- 
age, skill, and ability; and who, being commissioned as Lieutenant 
General, shall be authorized, under the direction of the President, 
to command the armies of the United States. 

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Lieutenant General, 
appointed as hereinbefore provided, shall be entitled to the pay, 
allowances, and staff specified in the fifth section of the act ap- 
proved May 28, 1798; and also the allowances described in the 
sixth section of the act approved August 23, 1842, granting addi- 
tional rations to certain officers : Provided, That nothing in this 
bill contained shall be construed in any way to affect the rank, pay, 
or allowances of Winfield Scott, Lieutenant General by brevet, now 
on the retired list of the army. 

Mr. Badeau, who was on Grant's staff at the time the 
debate upon the bill was in progress, writes, concerning 
Grant's behavior during this time, as follows : — 

" Grant himself used no influence, wrote no line, spoke no word 
to bring about the result. I was with him while the bill was being 
debated, and spoke to him more than once on the subject. He 
never manifested any anxiety, or even desire, for the success of the 
bill ; nor did he ever seem to shrink from the responsibilities it 
would impose upon him. If the country chose to call him to higher 
spheres and more important services, whatever ability or energy 
he possessed he was willing to devote to the task. If, on the con- 
trary, he had been left at the post which he then held, he would 
not have felt a pang of disappointed pride." 

The day Grant left his department to report person- 
ally at Washington, he sent the following letter to 
Sherman : — 

Dear Sherman : The bill reviving the grade of Lieutenant 
General in the army has become a law, and my name has been 
sent to the Senate for the place. I now receive orders to report 



and a Statesman. 297 

to Washington immediately, in person, which indicates a confirma- 
tion, or a likelihood of confirmation. I start in the morning to 
comply with the order. 

"Whilst I have been eminently successful in this war, in at least 
gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how 
much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and the harmoni- 
ous putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom it has been 
my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me. 

There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable 
to a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers ; 
but what I want is, to express my thanks to you and McPher- 
son, as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for what- 
ever I have had of success. 

How far your advice and assistance have been of help to me, 
you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given 
to you to do, entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you can- 
not know as well as I. 

I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the 
most flattering construction. 

The word you I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson 
also. I should write to him, and will some day ; but starting in 
the morning, I do not know that I will find time just now. 

Your friend, XJ. S. Grant, Major General. 

Sherman received this letter near Memphis, on the 
10th of March, and immediately replied, — 

Dear General : I have your more than kind and character- 
istic letter of the 4th instant. I will send a copy to General 
McPherson at once. 

You do yourself injustice, and us too much honor, in assigning 
to us too large a share of the merits which have led to your high 
advancement. I know you approve the friendship I have ever 
professed to you, and will permit me to continue, as heretofore, to 
manifest it on all proper occasions. 

You are now Washington's legitimate successor, and occupy a 
position of almost dangerous elevation ; but if you can continue, 
as heretofore, to be yourself, — simple, honest, and unpretending, — ■ 
you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends and the 



298 Grant as a Soldier 

homage of millions of human beings that will award you a large 
share in securing to them and their descendants a government of 
law and stability. 

I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much 
honor. At Belmont you manifested your traits — neither of us 
being near. At Donelson, also, you illustrated your whole charac- 
ter. I was not near, and General McPherson in too subordinate 
a capacity to influence you. 

Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by 
the terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves 
at every point ; but that admitted a ray of light I have followed 
since. I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just as the great 
prototype "Washington — as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest as 
a man should be; but the chief characteristic is the simple faith 
in success you have always manifested, which I can liken to noth- 
ing else than the faith a Christian has in the Saviour. 

This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also, 
when you have completed your best preparations, you go into 
battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga — no doubts — no 
reserves ; and I tell you it was this that made us act with confi- 
dence. I knew, wherever I was, that you thought of me, and if I 
got in a tight place you would help me out, if alive. 

My only point of doubt was in your knowledge of grand 
strategy, and of books of science and history; but, I confess, your 
common sense seems to have supplied all these. 

Now, as to the future. Don't stay in Washington. Come 
West : take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley. Let us make 
it dead sure — and I tell you the Atlantic slopes and Pacific shores 
will follow its destiny, as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with 
the main trunk. We have done much, but still much remains. 
Time, and time's influences, are with us. We could almost afford 
to sit still, and let these influences work. 

Here lies the seat of the coming empire ; and from the West, 
when our task is done, Ave will make short work of Charleston and 
liichinond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic. 

Your sincere friend, W. T. Siieumax. 

On the 29th of December, Sherman had written to 
Grant, "In relation to the conversation we had in 






and a Statesman. 299 

General Granger's office, the day before I left Nashville, 
I repeat, you occupy a position of more power than 
Halleck or the President. There are similar instances 
in European history, but none in ours. For the sake 
of future generations, risk nothing. Let us risk — and 
when you strike, let it be as at Vicksburg and Chat- 
tanooga. Your reputation as a General is now far 
above that of any man living, and partisans will ma- 
noeuvre for your influence ; but, if you can escape them, 
as you have hitherto clone, you will be more powerful 
for good than it is possible to measure. You said that 
you were surprised at my assertion on this point ; but I 
repeat that, from what I have seen and heard here, I 
am more and more convinced of the truth of what I 
told you. Do as you have heretofore done — preserve a 
plain military character; and let others manoeuvre as 
they will, you will beat them, not only in fame, but in 
doing good in the closing scenes of this war, when 
somebody must heal and mend up the breaches made 
by war." 

The journey to Washington was made rapidly and as 
privately as possible ; but wherever it was known that 
Grant was coming, the people gathered in eager crowds 
to see and to welcome him. On the 8th of March he 
arrived at Washington, and proceeded quietly to the 
hotel. At dinner he was recognized by some one who 
had seen him before, and it was quickly buzzed about 
the room that the Lieutenant General w r as present. A 
member of Congress w T ho was at the table, rising, an- 
nounced, " The hero of Vicksburg is among us," and 
proposed his health, which was the signal for enthusias- 
tic cheering. Rising to his feet, Grant simply bowed 
his acknowledgments and resumed his seat. His 



300 Grant as a Soldier 

honors he receives as he does his appointments; he 
seeks and schemes for neither, but does his duty, and 
if they come to him, receives them calmly, with no 
feigned modesty, and no hypocritical self-abasement. 
That evening he attended, unannounced, a reception at 
the White House. President Lincoln had never seen 
him before, but, when he was presented, received him 
with great cordiality, and he soon became the centre 
of attraction. In the course of the evening he escorted 
Mrs. Lincoln round the East Room, and is said to have 
remarked afterwards that it was his " warmest cam- 
paign during the whole war." 

The next day, the 9th of March, 1864, at one P. M., 
Grant was received by the President in his cabinet 
chamber, and formally presented with his commission 
as Lieutenant General. At this ceremony there were 
present all the members of the cabinet, Major General 
Halleck, Brigadier General Rawlins, and Lieutenant 
Colonel Comstock, both members of General Grant's 
staff, the President's private secretary, Mr. Lovejoy, a 
member of the House of Representatives, Grant's eldest 
son, a boy of about thirteen, President Lincoln, and 
General Grant. At his entrance the President pre- 
sented Grant to the members of the cabinet, and then 
read the following remarks : — 

" General Grant : The nation's appreciation of what 
you have done, and its reliance upon you for what 
still remains to be accomplished in the existing great 
struggle, are now presented with this commission, con- 
stituting you Lieutenant General in the army of the 
United States. With this high honor devolves upon 
you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the coun- 



and a Statesman. 301 

try herein trusts you, so, under Cod, it will sustain 
you. I scarcely need to add, that with what I here 
speak for the nation goes my own hearty personal 
concurrence." 

In reply, Grant read the following from a slip of 
paper : — 

" Mr. President : I accept the commission, with grati- 
tude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the 
noble armies that have fought on so many fields for our 
common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to 
disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of 
the responsibilities now devolving on me, and I know 
that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and, 
above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads 
both nations and men." 

The next day, the 10th, Grant, in company with 
General Meade, the commander of the army of the 
Potomac, made a brief visit to that army, and the next 
day, in the morning, started for the West, and was at 
Nashville when he received the despatch from Pres- 
ident Lincoln, which he embodied in the following 
order : — 

Headquarters of the Armies of the United States, ) 
Nashville, Tenn., March 17, 1864. $ 

In pursuance of the following order of the President, — 

Executive Mansion, Washington, March 10, 18G4. 
Under the authority of the act of Congress to appoint to the 
grade of Lieutenant General in the army, of March 1, 1864, Lieu- 
tenant General Ulysses S. Grant, United States army, is ap- 
pointed to the command of the armies of the United States. 

Abraham Lincoln". 

I assume command of the armies of the United States. Head- 
quarters will he in the field, and, until further orders, will he with 



302 Grant as a Soldier 

the army of the Potomac. There will be an office-headquarters 

in Washington, to which all official communications will be sent, 

except those from the army where the headquarters are at the 

date of their address. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

The following order from the War Department was 
issued the day after Grant left Washington : — 

War Department, Adjutant General's Office, ~^ 
Washington, March 12, 1864. j 

The President of the United States orders as follows: — 

1. Major General Halleck is, at his own request, relieved from 
duty as General-in-chief of the army, and Lieutenant General 
U. S. Grant is assigned to the command of the armies of the 
United States. The headquarters of the army will be in Wash- 
ington, and also with Lieutenant General Grant in the field. 

2. Major General Halleck is assigned to duty in Washington, as 
Chief of Staff of the army, under the direction of the Secretary of 
War and the Lieutenant General commanding. His orders will 
be obeyed and respected accordingly. 

3. Major General W. T. Sherman is assigned to the command 
of the military division of the Mississippi, composed of the depart- 
ments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ar- 
kansas. 

4. Major General J. B. McPherson is assigned to the command 
of the department and army of the Tennessee. 

5. In relieving Major General Halleck from duty as General-in- 
chief, the President desires to express his approbation and thanks 
for the zealous manner in which the arduous and responsible 
duties of that position have been performed. 

By order of the Secretary of War. 

E. D. Townsend, Assista?it Adjutant General. 



and a Statesman. 303 



CHAPTER XXXI. 

A REVIEW OF THE SITUATION. — HEADQUARTERS IN THE 
FIELD. — THE NEW CAMPAIGN — THE ARMY OF THE PO- 
TOMAC CROSSES THE RAPIDAN. 

We had at this time about eight hundred thousand 
men in the field. The Mississippi River was opened 
from its source to its mouth, and garrisoned at various 
points, principally by negro troops. General Banks 
commanded at the south-west, with his headquarters at 
New Orleans, and a portion of his force was in Texas. 
The army in Arkansas was under the command of 
General Steele, while the department of Missouri was 
under General Rosecrans. Sherman was preparing for 
his March to the Sea. McPherson was in command of 
the army of the Tennessee, Schofield was in com- 
mand at Knoxville, and Thomas of the army of the 
Cumberland. In Virginia, the army of the Potomac 
was under the command of General Meade. Along the 
coast the navy was keeping an almost perfect blockade, 
and on the main land we had footholds at various 
points. West of the Mississippi the Confederate army 
was estimated at about eighty thousand men ; but it 
was scattered, partially disbanded, and disintegrated 
from want of an opposing force to hold it together. 
Yet still it could easily be called together, should occa- 
sion arise. In front of Chattanooga lay an army under 
20 



304 Grant as a Soldier 

Johnston, while in Virginia Lee held command of the 
army there, which, with his troops in West Virginia 
and North Carolina, was estimated at over a hundred 
thousand men. The Confederates held the advantage 
of the inside of the circle, while we had the outside. 
The task of combining the action of our armies, of 
looking after their supplies, was so vast and so com- 
plicated that it required great self-confidence for any 
one who could appreciate the difficulties to assume it. 
Grant had, however, never hesitated during the war to 
assume any position to which his duty called him, and 
accepted with the same modest self-confidence the 
position now given him. 

The main question of the war was the overthrow of 
the military power of the Confederacy. Upon this its 
entire organization depended, and to do this only the 
armies of Lee and Johnston need be considered. Slier- 
man, in whose military capacity Grant had a confidence 
which the results show was well founded, was given the 
task of operating against Johnston, while Grant himself, 
with the army of the Potomac, commanded by Meade, 
should operate against Lee. Each of them was to hold 
his antagonist so fast as to prevent the interchange 
of reinforcements from one to the other. Grant had 
consulted frequently and fully with Sherman; they 
each knew the plan, and they each had confidence in 
the other's ability to carry out his respective part of 
it. Grant's attention had been directed to the sub- 
ject before he had accepted his present position, and 
he saw that the military operations must be continuous 
and aggressive. The question was one partly of re- 
sources ; and, if not possible in any other way, it was by 



and a Statesman. 305 

continued attrition that the armies of the Confederacy 
were to be worn out. The Confederacy had lapsed into 
so definite a military despotism, that it was useless to 
have any longer any hope of the people expressing 
their opinion, and forcing the government to regard 
their wishes. 

In the history of nations, considered philosophically, 
we -find that the system of slavery in labor, as it is a 
characteristic of barbarism, presupposes always slavery 
in government ; and the history of the despotism estab- 
lished in the Confederacy during their foolish attempt 
to found a nationality, in the nineteenth century, upon 
slavery, would add a further proof, if further proof were 
necessary, that the form of a people's government is 
an evidence and a test of their development. 

The army in Virginia under Lee, and which Grant 
was now to meet, was posted along the south bank of 
the Eapidan, governing the advance upon Richmond. 
This army had as its commander a leader who had 
skilfully used its valor and determination in defending 
all approach to the Confederate capital for three years, 
and in many fierce engagements. Lee was a graduate 
of West Point, and during the war was the only gen- 
eral, on either side, who had enjoyed the advantage of 
commanding substantially the same army in the same 
section of country during the entire continuance of the 
war. He and his men had become thoroughly ac- 
quainted with every foot of the territory they were to 
defend ; they had also the prestige of success to inspirit 
them, and besides this the sense of responsibility that 
upon them especially the existence of the Confederacy 
depended. By their years of active operation in the 



306 Grant as a Soldier 

field, they had also become thoroughly inured to war, 
and were probably as formidable a body of men as ever 
were gathered together in an army. 

On the other hand, the army of the Potomac had not 
as yet been successful, despite the persistent bravery 
they had always shown ; and they had suffered further 
by having their commanders changed frequently. The 
army, however, despite its long-continued series of dis- 
appointments, had undergone its long drill in active 
service, and was a real army, able to march, to ma- 
noeuvre, to fight, to persist, and endure with the best; 
and its spirit was strong ; while the fact announced in 
the Lieutenant General's order, that his headquarters 
would be in the field with them, tended the more to 
inspirit them, and gratified them as a recognition of 
their importance. 

On the 2.3d of March Grant returned to Washington, 
and on the 24th the army was reorganized. The corps 
were consolidated and reduced to three, the Second, 
Fifth, and Sixth. The Second was placed under Han- 
cock, the Fifth under Warren, and the Sixth under 
Sedgwick, while the combined command was kept in 
the hands of Meade. The command of the cavalry was 
given to Sheridan, who at Chattanooga, under Grant's 
own supervision, had displayed the qualities of a leader, 
and who in his first campaign justified the selection. 

Before active operations commenced the army was 
rcenforced by the Ninth Corps, under Burnside, which 
had returned from East Tennessee. The entire strength 
of this army was about one hundred and forty thousand 
men. On the 3d of May the order was given for the 
advance. The army at this time occupied a position 



and a Statesman. 307 

along the north bank of the Rapidan, while Lee's army 
was upon the southern bank of the river, with its front 
strongly protected by field-works, its left flank covered 
by the river, and its right by intrenchments. 

The first question that arose in taking command of 
the army of the Potomac w r as, which route should be 
taken for the advance upon Richmond. Should it be 
the overland route, over the Peninsula? or should it 
be that south of the James ? The first had been re- 
peatedly tried, and had failed as often as it had been 
tried. The distance to Richmond from any position 
upon either the Rappahannock or the Rapidan is be- 
tween sixty and seventy miles, through a country 
peculiarly fitted for defence, and as full of difficulties 
in the way of keeping open the communications for 
supplies. Its advantage, however, was, that by this 
route the attacking army, while it pressed towards 
Richmond, at the same time served to cover and defend 
Washington. The route from the south of the James, 
while it saved all the difficulties of this advance through 
a hostile country, since the army could move down 
the coast, presented, however, the great and seemingly 
insuperable objection that it uncovered Washington. 
This objection might be met, however, by having two 
armies in the field, one to take the route south of the 
James, and the other to protect Washington. 

It is known that before his elevation to his present 
position General Grant had expressed his opinion as in 
favor of the route from below the James. On taking 
command of the army, however, by some means he 
Was forced to abandon his plan, and by a sort of com- 
promise, ar independent force was to operate south of 



303 Grant as a Soldier 

the James, while the main army should follow the over- 
land route. The command of this cooperating force 
was intrusted to General Butler, who, starting from 
Fortress Monroe, with about thirty thousand men, was 
to go up the James River, and intrenching himself near 
City Point, was to operate against Richmond, either 
investing the city on the south, or getting into a posi- 
tion to join the army of the Potomac, coming down 
from the .north. Besides this, Richmond was to be 
threatened from the west by a force which should oper- 
ate against the Virginia and East Tennessee Railway, 
and another which should advance up the Shenandoah 
Valley, and force Lee to weaken himself in order to 
protect his western line of supplies. These forces were 
respectively under the command of General Cook and 
General Siegel, and numbered ten thousand and seven 
thousand men. 

The immediate commander of the army of the Po- 
tomac was General Meade ; and Grant says of him in 
his report, " Commanding all the armies, as I did, I 
tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in inde- 
pendent command of the army of the Potomac. My 
instructions for that army were all through him, and 
were general in their nature, leaving all the details and 
execution to him. The campaigns that followed proved 
him to be the right man in the right place. His com- 
manding always in the presence' of an officer superior 
to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that pub- 
lic attention which his zeal and ability entitled him to, 
and which he would otherwise have received." 

On the 3d of May the army moved at midnight, and 
crossed the Rapidan in two columns. The right, com- 



and a Statesman. 309 

posed of "Warren's and Sedgwick's corps, crossed at the 
Germania Ford, and the other, of Hancock's corps, at 
Ely's Ford, six miles below. 

The following letters, which passed between the Pres- 
ident and the Lieutenant General just before the re- 
sumption of active operations, will show the relations 
existing between these two representative men : — 

Executive Mansion, Washington, April 30, 1SG4, 
Lieutenant General Grant: Not expecting to see you 
before the spring campaign opens, I wish to express, in this way, 
my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so 
far as I understand it. The particulars of your plans I neither 
know nor seek to know. 

You are vigilant and self-reliant ; and, pleased with this, I wish 
not to obtrude any restraints or constraints upon you. While I 
am very anxious that any great disaster or capture of our men in 
great numbers shall be avoided, I know that these points are less 
likely to escape your attention than they would be mine. If there 
be anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail 
to let me know it. And now, with a brave army and a just cause, 
may God sustain you. 

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln. 

Headquarters Armies United States, ~) 
Culpepper C. H., Virginia, May 1, 18G4. j 

The President: Your very kind letter of yesterday is just 
vceeived. The confidence you express for the future, and satisfac- 
tion for the past, in my military administration, is acknowledged 
srith pvije. It shall be my earnest endeavor that you and the 
country shall not be disappointed. From my first entrance into 
the voluntary sendee of the country to the present day, I have 
never had cause of complaint, have never expressed or implied 
a complaint again3t the Administration or the Secretary of War, 
for throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorously 
prosecuting what appeared to be my duty. Indeed, since the pro- 
motion which placed me in comroanc? ci -O &e armies, and in view 



310 Grant as a Soldier 

of the great responsibility <ind importance of success, I have been 
astonished at the readiness with which everything asked for lias 
been yielded, without even an explanation being asked. 

Should my success be less than I desire and expect, the least I 
can say is, the fault is not with you. 

Very truly, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 



and a Statesman. 311 



CHAPTER XXXII. 

THE CAMPAIGN COMMENCED. — THE BATTLE OF THE 
WILDERNESS. 

On the 4th, the crossing having been successfully ac- 
complished without resistance, it appeared as though 
Lee's right flank was turned. The value of this pas- 
sage of the Rapidan is evident from the estimate Grant 
gives of it in his report. He sa} 7 s, " This I regarded as a 
great success, and it removed from my mind the most se- 
rious apprehensions I had entertained — that of crossing 
the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, 
and ably-commanded army, and how so large a train 
was to be carried through a hostile country and pro- 
tected." 

From the Rapidan southward and westward extends 
the country known as the Wilderness. The character 
of this country is expressed in its name. It is a mining 
region, and rests on a bed of mineral rock. The forests 
having been cut away for mining purposes, the whole 
region is covered with a dense new undergrowth, 
which prevents all military operations, while the roads 
.hrough it are simple paths, such as are always found in 
<&ich a country. The use of artillery or cavalry in this 
ticket of scrub oaks and stunted pines is impossible, 
and the nature of the ground will be most apparent 
when it is realized that the movements of the army 



312 Grant as a Soldier 

could be directed only by the use of the compass. 
It was not here, however, that Grant expected to 
meet the enemy. The orders for May 5, as the ex- 
tract given below will show, prove that it was not here 
that he expected to fight. 



Headquarters Army op the Potomac 



ac, ) 



The following movements are ordered for the 5th of May, 1864: 

1. Major General Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, will move 
with Gregg's and Torbert's divisions against the enemy's cavalry 
in the direction of Hamilton's Crossing. General Wilson, with the 
Third Cavalry Division, will move at five A. M. to Craig's Meeting- 
house, on the Catharpin Road. He will keep out parties on the 
Orange Court-house pike and plank road, the Catharpin Road, 
Pamunkey Road (road to Orange Springs), and in the direction 
of Troyman's Store and Andrews's Store, or Good Hope Church. 

2. Major General Hancock, commanding Second Corps, will move 
at five A. M. to Shady Grove Church, and extend his right towards 
the Fifth Corps at Parker's Store. 3. Major General Warren, 
commanding Fifth Corps, will move at five A. M. to Parker's 
Store on the Orange Court-house plank road, and extend his right 
towards the Sixth Corps at Old Wilderness Tavern. 4. Major 
General Sedgwick, commanding Sixth Corps, will move to Old 
Wilderness Tavern on the Orange Court-house pike as soon as the 
road is clear. 

By such a movement it was expected that the army, 
having turned Lee's right by the passage of the Rapi- 
dan, would be able to pass the Wilderness, and then, by 
a rapid advance towards Gordonsville, place itself be- 
tween Lee and Richmond. But Lee, having received 
timely notice of the crossing, instead of falling back, 
took the offensive, and from Orange Court-house, which 
was the centre of his position, marched by two parallel 
roals, the Orange plank road and the Fredericksburg 



and a Statesman. 313 

turnpike, so as to strike Grant's advance at right angles, 
and force him to fight in the Wilderness. 

On the morning of the 5th, when Grant and Meade 
reached the Old Wilderness Tavern, they found Warren's 
corps in position there, and Sedgwick's coming up, and 
received information that the enemy were advancing 
upon them by the turnpike. It was at first supposed 
that this was merely a diversion to prevent any inter- 
ference with Lee's design of retiring to take up another 
position ; and it was resolved to push this force away. 
This movement was at first successful ; the enemy's ad- 
vance was driven back, but soon, being reenforced by 
the main body, the Confederates resumed the offensive. 
This was the opening of the battle, which soon became 
general, and raged all day with great fury, neither party 
gaining a decided advantage ; and at night the troops 
of both armies passed the long hours until morning 
where darkness had found them. 

The complicated nature of the ground, and the 
impossibility of manoeuvring large bodies of men 
through the narrow roads, and the dense underbrush, 
made the contest a confused struggle, more like an old 
Indian battle, than a modern one, and renders any 
clear account of it next to impossible. It was a test of 
the enduring valor of both sides, and nobly both sides 
bore the test. 

Both armies the next morning assumed the offensive. 
By dawn of the 6th, the Union line was formed. It ex- 
tended about five miles, facing westward, with Sedg- 
wick on the right next Warren, and Burnside and 
Hancock on the left. With the Confederates, Long;- 
street's corps, which had the day before been march- 



314 Grant as a Soldier 

ing up from Gordonsville, arrived so as to be present 
the second day, while the army held the same ground 
as the day before — Ewell on the left, covering the 
turnpike, and Hill on the right, covering the plank 
road, and meeting so as to form a continuous line. 

The orders for the Union army were to make a gen- 
eral attack along the line, while Lee determined, by 
threatening the Union right, to distract Grant's atten- 
tion, and then, by an overwhelming attack upon his 
left, as soon as Longstreet should come up, to force 
him back to the Rapidan. The Confederates com- 
menced the battle upon our extreme right, and the 
contest raged again almost continuously that whole day, 
swaying backwards and forwards with changing suc- 
cess, but neither army gaining any decisive advantage. 

The next morning, Saturday, the 7th of May, neither 
army seemed inclined to take the offensive. Both had 
Buffered severely, and both remained behind their in- 
trenchments. The following summing up by the his- 
torian of the Army of the Potomac is the best statement 
to be given of the results of these two days' terrible 
fighting. " The battle of the Wilderness is scarcely to 
be judged as an ordinary battle. It will happen in the 
course, as in the beginning of every war, that there 
occur actions in which ulterior purposes and the com- 
binations of a military programme play very little part, 
but which are simply trials of strength. The battle 
of the Wilderness was such a mortal combat — a com- 
bat in which the adversaries aimed each, respectively, 
at a result that should be decisive — :Lee to crush the 
campaign in its inception, by driving the army of the 
Potomac across the Rapidan ; Grant to destroy Lee. 



and a Statesman. 315 

a Out of tins fierce determination came a close and 
deadly grapple of the two armies — a battle terrible 
and indescribable in those gloomy woods. There is 
something horrible, yet fascinating, in the mystery 
shrouding this strangest of battles ever fought — a 
battle which no man could see, and whose progress 
could only be followed by the ear, as the sharp and 
crackling volleys of musketry, and the alternate Union 
cheer and Confederate yell, told how the fight surged 
and swelled. The battle continued two days ; yet such 
was the mettle of each combatant, that it decided 
nothing. It was in every respect a drawn battle ; and 
its only result appeared in the tens of thousands of 
dead and wounded in blue and gray that lay in the 
thick woods. The Union loss exceeded fifteen thou- 
sand, and the Confederate loss was about eight thou- 
sand." 



316 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 

THE FIRST OF THE SERIES OF FLANK MOVEMENTS. — THE 
BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE. 

On Saturday, the 7th of May, Grant resolved to 
move south from the Wilderness, and plant himself at 
Spottsylvania Court-house, between Lee and Richmond. 
This point is fifteen miles south-east of the battle-field 
of the Wilderness, and the march was to be begun that 
night ; but the noise of the trains informed Lee that 
some movement was commenced, though it gave no idea 
of what it was. The routes to this point for both armies, 
from their present position, were about the same length. 
The Fifth Corps was to lead and seize the Court-house. 
The advance began at nine P. M. on the 7th. At the 
same time Longstreet's division of the Confederate 
army set out for the same spot; and early the next 
morning, when Warren's troops reached the ground, 
they were met by the advance of Longstreet's division, 
and the day was occupied with each army hastening to 
its position ; and in so doing every one of the corps of 
our army was more or less engaged during this day. 
The 9th was spent in taking up positions and strength- 
ening them, and on the 10th the attack upon the 
enemy was ordered along the line, to carry his in- 
trenchments, but failed. The next day, the 11th, was 
spent in preparation for another attack against the 



and a Statesman. 317 

enemy's right centre, and at early dawn on the 12th 
Hancock's division marched to the assault, and carried 
a point in the first line of intrenchments, which we 
held that day despite all the enemy's attempts to re- 
capture it. Five separate times fresh troops were led 
hy the enemy up to the assault, and each time they were 
forced to retire. The struggle here was of the fiercest 

Oct 

and most deadly character. Frequently the rival stan- 
dards were planted on opposite sides of the breastworks 
So continuous and dense was the fire, that there is now 
in Washington the trunk of a tree, eighteen inches in 
diameter, which was actually cut in two by the bullets. 
At midnight Lee withdrew to his inner line of defence. 
Our loss this day was above eight thousand, and that 
of the Confederates quite as much. 

On the 11th Grant sent his first despatch to Wash- 
ington since the advance. It was as follows : — 

Headquarters in the Field, May 11, 1864 — 8 A. M. 

We have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting. The 
result, to this time, is much in our favor. 

Our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. I 
think the loss of the enemy must be greater. 

We have taken over five thousand prisoners by battle, while he 
has taken from us but few, except stragglers. 

I PROPOSE TO FIGHT IT OUT ON THIS LINE, IP IT TAKES ALL 
SUMMER. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General, 

Commanding the Armies of the United States. 

And again on the 12th : — 

Spottstlvania C. H., May 12, 1864. 
The eighth day of battle closes, leaving between three and four 
thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work, including two 
general officers and over thirty jneces of artillery. 



318 Grant as a Soldier 

The enemy is obstinate, and seems to have found the last ditch. 
We have lost no organization, not even a company, while we have 
destroyed and captured one division, one brigade, and one regi- 
ment entire of the enemy. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

As the result of the fighting of the 12th was Lee's 
retiring to his inner line of works, the succeeding week 
was spent in endeavoring to find some spot in which 
his line could be pierced ; and to this end movements 
were made from flank to flank, but were skilfully met at 
every point, the Confederates extending their line to 
meet every new attempt, so that in ten days the posi- 
tion had changed from a line extending four or five 
miles to the north-west of Spottsylvania Court-house to 
a position almost due east of that place. The amount 
of labor in marching and fighting, the amount of priva- 
tion and suffering, that our army underwent in these 
ten days, was enormous, and can hardly be estimated. 
At the end of these attempts, finding, however, that 
carrying the position was hopeless, Grant resolved to 
turn it, and commenced preparations for this move- 
ment on the afternoon of the 19th ; but the enemy, dis- 
covering them, attacked our right, and delayed the 
movement until the following night, that of the 20th 
of May, when, moving by the left, the army took up its 
march again for Richmond. 



and a Statesman. 319 



CHAPTER XXXIV. 

THE COOPEKATING MOVEMENTS IN THE SHENANDOAH 
VALLEY, AND SOUTH OF THE JAMES. 

It will be well now to glance at the cooperating 
movements of Sheridan, of Butler, and in West Virginia. 
On the 9th of May, Sheridan set out from Spottsylvania 
Court-house, with a portion of his cavalry force, with 
orders to engage the enemy's cavalry, to destroy the 
Virginia Central and the Richmond and Fredericks- 
burg Railroads, to threaten Richmond, and finally to 
communicate and draw his supplies from Butler's army 
on the James. To deceive the enemy, this force set 
out at first towards Fredericksburg, and then, turning 
southward, pushed to the North Anna River, which it 
crossed by Anderson's bridge, and the next day reach- 
ing Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia Central Rail- 
road, destroyed two locomotives, three trains of cars, 
ten miles of the track, and a million and a half of 
rations, and recaptured four hundred Union prisoners, 
on their way to the horrors of the Libby Prison in 
Richmond. 

Here Sheridan was attacked by the enemy in flank 
and rear, but repulsed them with inconsiderable loss, 
and continued on his route. The South Anna was 
crossed at Ground Squirrel Bridge, and at daylight on 
the 11th Ashland Station, on the Richmond and 
21 



320 Grant as a Soldier 

Fredericksburg Railroad, was captured by a brigade 
detached from the main body, and the depot, six miles 
of the road, a train of cars, and quantities of stores, 
destroyed, when, uninjured, this brigade rejoined the 
main body, which had been pushing southward towards 
Richmond. 

At Yellow Tavern, a few miles from this city, Stuart, 
in command of the enemy's cavalry, had managed to 
interpose himself, by a detour between Sheridan's force 
and the Confederate capital, with all the troops he could 
gather. Sheridan promptly attacked him on the 11th, 
and after an obstinate contest, in which Stuart, the 
most brilliant cavalry leader of the Confederates, was 
killed, finally drove the enemy back, gained possession 
of the turnpike, and forced his opposers across the 
north fork of the Chickahominy. Continuing his course, 
Sheridan dashed boldly upon the outer defences of 
Richmond, and, with a rush, carried the first line. 
Finding, however, that the second line was too strong 
to be carried by assault, and that the garrison was 
rallying for its defence, he retired to the Chickahominy, 
at Meadow Bridge. Here he found that the enemy had 
partially destroyed the bridge, and were posted so as to 
prevent his crossing. Rebuilding the bridge, however, 
under a heavy fire, he drove the opposing force away, 
and repulsing an attack upon his rear, made by infan- 
try from the garrison at Richmond, he destroyed the 
railway bridge over the Chickahominy, proceeded to 
Haxell's Landing, where he arrived on the 14th, and 
sent a messenger to Butler, and after remaining here 
three days to recuperate, set out again, by way of 
Hanover Court-house, and rejoined the army of the 



and a Statesman. 321 

Potomac on the 25th of May, in the position it then 
held on the Pamunkey River. The raid had been em- 
inently successful, and established the fitness of the 
command to which Grant had elevated Sheridan ; while 
the boldness and dashing valor with which the whole 
affair was conducted astonished and dismayed the 
enemy. 

Butler's cooperative force, which was to act offen- 
sively upon the southern approach to Richmond, con- 
sisted of the Eighteenth Corps, commanded by General 
W. F. Smith, and the Tenth, commanded by General 
Gill more, who had gained a reputation in the operations 
at Charleston, South Carolina, while General Smith had 
so distinguished himself at Chattanooga, that Grant, 
in his report, recommending him for promotion, said 
that he " felt under more than ordinary obligations to 
the masterly manner in which he had discharged his 
duties." With these forces, and his cavalry under Gen- 
eral Kautz, Butler's army numbered something more 
than thirty thousand men. 

During the month of April his forces assembled at 
Yorktown and Gloucester Point; and here the route 
was open towards Richmond, either up the Peninsula 
or by the line of the James, threatening that capital 
from the south side. This last course was the one it 
really was intended to take ; but to deceive the enemy 
as to our real intention, a feint was made in the other 
direction. 

On the 4th of May, the troops being embarked in 
transports, Butler moved at night, unobserved by the 
enemy, down the York and up the James, and took up 
a position on its south bank, the major portion of his 



322 Grant as a Soldier 

force being stationed at Bermuda Hundred, a strong 
position, situated in a bend of the river, three miles 
above the mouth of the Appomattox, and here rapidly 
intrenched, while the fleet of gunboats which had con- 
voyed the transports served to guard the flanks. This 
point is between the cities of Richmond and Petersburg, 
about ten miles north of the last, and twenty miles south 
of the first. The landing was a complete surprise to 
the enemy, and was conducted cleverly and without 
interference, for, in fact, at this time the enemy's 
force about Richmond and Petersburg was quite in- 
considerable. 

By the 6th the debarkation was finished, and the 
position strengthened. In front of Butler's line, about 
three miles distant, ran the Petersburg and Richmond 
Railroad, and its destruction was the first thing which 
attracted his attention, and the same day a brigade was 
sent out to perform this duty. Meeting a small force 
of the enemy, they retired, after a slight skirmish. That 
night the advance of Beauregard's army, drawn from 
Charleston, Savannah, and Florida, reached Petersburg, 
and the next day (the 7th) when a larger column was 
sent to destroy the railroad, the enemy were found in 
a position covering it, and an engagement commenced. 
At first the Union forces were successful ; but the ene- 
my, rallying, regained the position they had lost, and 
both parties withdrew. 

The next day (the 9th) another advance was made 
in this direction, the position carried, the railroad de- 
stroyed, an# the enemy driven back to within three 
miles of Petersburg, at Swift Creek, where his posi- 
tion was strongly defended by earth-works. Butler 



and a Statesman. 323 

determined the next clay to drive him back to Peters- 
burg, but that night having received from Washington 
accounts of Lee's being in " full retreat to Richmond," 
resolved to turn northward and aid in the investment 
of that capital. On the 12th this advance was made, 
and the enemy driven back, until they were found, on 
the 15th, in a strong position on the left bank of Proc- 
tor's Creek, their left resting on Drury's Bluff It was 
designed to assault this position the next day ; but that 
night, the enemy, taking advantage of a dense fog, 
which rose just before morning, and was so thick as to 
make it impossible to see ten yards in advance, sallied 
out and attacked the Union forces with such desperate 
bravery, that at one time it seemed as though we 
would be overwhelmed. The army, however, stood 
firm, but was finally forced to withdraw again to its 
position at Bermuda Hundred, and the Confederates 
following, took up an intrenched position in our front, 
so that, as Butler said, his army was " bottled up and 
hermetically sealed," and was powerless for any oper- 
ation against Richmond, while at the same time rein- 
forcements for Lee could be spared from Beauregard's 
army. 

In this last engagement our loss was about four thou- 
sand, while that of the Confederates was about three 
thousand. While thus rendered inactive, it was still 
possible for Butler to cross to the south bank of the 
Appomattox and seize Petersburg, and he was prepar- 
ing for this important move, when he was ordered to 
detach the greater part of his army, in order to re- 
enforce the army of the Potomac, which was then 
approaching the Chickahominy. 



324 Grant as a Soldier 

The cooperative movements in Western Virginia 
were commenced on the 1st of May. The forces were 
divided into two columns. One under Crook was to 
move by the Kanawha, and operate against the East 
Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, and the other, under 
Siegel, to penetrate as far as possible up the Shenandoah 
Valley. Siegel advanced up the Valley, and on the 
15th met an opposing force under Breckinridge, which 
had been hastily collected. A severe engagement fol- 
lowed, in which Siegel was defeated with severe loss, 
and retired behind Cedar Creek. At Grant's request 
Siegel was then relieved, and General David Hunter 
put in command, and, under Grant's instructions, took 
the offensive, meeting the enemy on the 5th of June 
at Piedmont, and there, after an action of several hours, 
defeating him, capturing fifteen hundred prisoners and 
three pieces of cannon. Before this engagement, how- 
ever, Lee had recalled Breckinridge's division to re- 
enforce his own army. 

On the 8th Hunter formed a junction with Crook's 
column, which had destroyed the railway as far as 
Newbern from Dublin, and moved towards Lynchburg, 
by way of Lexington. Finding that this place was, 
however, strongly defended, and that reinforcements 
were arriving there from Lee's army, he determined to 
return, and did so through the mountains, suffering 
great privations, but in no way cooperating with the 
movements of the army of the Potomac. 






and a Statesman. 325 



CHAPTER XXXV. 

ANOTHER FLANK MOVEMENT. — THE POSITION ON THE 
NORTH ANNA. 

Thus the design of having the cooperating armies 
aid the army of the Potomac in the realization of its 
purpose, by cutting the communications, distracting 
the attention, and preventing reinforcements from 
reaching the army covering Richmond, had not suc- 
ceeded. The impossibility of carrying the enemy's 
position at Spottsylvania was also apparent, and it was 
determined to flank the position, and, by a movement 
similar to that performed in the Wilderness, to get the 
Union army between Richmond and Lee's army. 

Such a movement is always difficult and hazardous 
in the presence of an active and vigilant foe ; but in 
this case it was conducted with skill, and was a com- 
plete success. On the night of the 20th the move- 
ment began. In a movement such as this, the flank- 
ing army of course lays itself open, during its motion, 
to the favorable attack of the enemy. Lee, however, 
did not attempt this ; but becoming immediately aware 
of Grant's movements, he contented himself with mov- 
ing along the interior line, and stationing his army in 
a favorable position for again resisting the Union 
advance ; but still the military possibilities of the situa- 
tion obliged the Lieutenant General, during the whole 



326 Grant as a Soldier 

of the movement, to keep his troops well together, and 
always ready to form in line, to receive any attack that 
might be made upon them. 

Wellington once said that there were very few gen- 
erals in Europe who could march one hundred thou- 
sand men through Hyde Park Gate in perfect order 
and without interfering with or jostling each other. 
Here, however, the task was very much more difficult : 
the country was hostile, and an active enemy was 
vigilantly on the watch . to take immediate advantage 
of any favorable opportunity that should offer itself 
for attack. On the 23d of May, in the afternoon, the 
entire Union army, with the exception of Burnsicle's 
corps, which was still on the march, had reached the 
north bank of the South Anna River. The route to the 
present position of the army, from that they recently 
held at Spottsylvania, led them through a rich agricul- 
tural country, which was at the time in the full beauty 
of spring. It had never been overrun with hostile 
armies, and in place of the bare and barren fields, 
which war had for three years laid ruthlessly waste, 
here was the tender green of young vegetation, and all 
the rich glory of Nature in her most generous mood. 

On the 20th, not more than half an hour after the 
movement of Grant's army commenced, Lee had also 
set his troops in motion, and following the subsequent 
moves of his antagonist, withdrew his troops from their 
lines at Spottsylvania as fast as Grant did his from 
their lines, and having the advantage of moving on 
the chord of the arc while Grant was obliged to use the 
arc itself, he had reached and posted himself upon the 
south bank of this stream, when our forces came up to 



and a Statesman. 327 

the opposite bank. This position was one he would of 
course defend, since it covered the Virginia Central 
Railroad, by which he was receiving reinforcements 
from the Shenandoah Valley. 

In its advance Grant's army struck the North Anna 
near the point at which the Fredericksburg and Rich- 
mond Railroad crosses that stream ; the left, consisting 
of Hancock's corps, which led the advance, at a point 
one mile above where the telegraph road crosses this 
stream on a wooden bridge, while the right, under 
Warren, touched the river four miles higher up, at 
Jericho Ford. Hancock, on his arrival, found the bridge 
strongly guarded and protected by works which were 
built the year before, and prepared to carry it by as- 
sault. While the column was getting into position, the 
artillery prepared their way, and an hour before sunset 
the assault was made. On the approach of our men 
on the double quick, the enemy deserted their defen- 
sive works and retreated across the river, and we took 
possession of the bridge. During that night the enemy 
tried several times to burn the bridge, but were pre- 
vented by our vigilance ; and the next morning, it be- 
ing found that they had also deserted their defensive 
works on the other side, the corps crossed the bridge 
and took up their position on the other side. Warren 
found no opposition in crossing, and the head of the 
column waded over, formed on the other side, and pro- 
tected the building of a pontoon bridge, over which the 
remainder of the corps passed, and formed in line of 
battle, but met only slight opposition, and about 
five had begun intrenching, when they were furiously 
attacked by a force which had been sent against them. 



328 Grant as a Soldier 

and a severe struggle ensued in which we were finally 
successful in holding the position, and in capturing 
nearly a thousand prisoners, while our loss was about 
three hundred and fifty. 

Thus both wings of our army had crossed the North 
Anna, at points distant from each other about four 
miles, and made their positions good ; but Lee's centre 
still extended to the stream, and when our centre at- 
tempted to cross the river, they were prevented, and 
suffered severely in the attempt, and Lee, holding his 
position, divided the right wing of the Union army 
from the left, necessitating a double crossing of the 
stream in order for one to support or reenforce the 
other. 

Grant therefore resolved to withdraw his force, and 
in his report gives his reason for so doing : " Finding 
the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger 
than either of his previous ones, I withdrew, on the 
night of the 26th, to the north bank of the North 
Anna." After remaining, therefore, two days in their 
position, which were occupied in making reconnois- 
sances and in destroying some miles of the Virginia 
Central Railroad, the withdrawal commenced on the 
evening of the 26th of May, and the army retired by 
the bridges to the opposite bank. The movement was 
made secretly and with perfect success, and it was 
nearly daylight before the last of the long columns had 
crossed, and the army took up its march to its next 
position, on the Pamunkey. 

This river is formed by the confluence of the North 
and South Anna, and in its turn unites with the Mat- 
tapony, forming the York, and empties into Chesa- 
peake Bay. 



and a Statesman. 329 

By this move Grant avoided the necessity of driving 
Lee from the strong position he had taken on the North 
Anna, and prevented his making the same use of what 
would have been the same advantages upon the South 
Anna, while, in addition, he secured for himself a base 
of supplies by water carriage, which, in anticipation 
of this move, had been sent to White House, on the 
Pamunkey. 



330 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTEE XXXVI. 

THE BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR.— THE MOVEMENT TO THE 
SOUTH SIDE OF THE JAMES. 

On the 23d, Sheridan, on the cavalry expedition we 
have already spoken of, had reached White House, and 
on the 25th rejoined the army of the Potomac, and 
that same night was sent down the Pamunkey, and on 
the 27th, by noon, had seized the ferry crossing at 
Hanovertown, fifteen miles from Richmond, and thrown 
a pontoon bridge across. On this day and the next, 
the 28th of May, the army crossed the river, the Fifth 
and Ninth Corps at Hanover Ferry, and the Second and 
Sixth at Huntley's Ford, above. On Sunday, the 29th, 
the Union army was across the river and three miles 
beyond it, and continued the advance next day, with 
Hancock in the centre, Warren on the left, and Wright 
on the right. The flanks and rear were protected by 
cavalry, and at two P. M. the cavalry pickets on our 
left, which were advancing on the Cold Harbor road, 
were driven in, and, Warren was attacked in force 
about five. As soon as it was known that the enemy 
had been met, an attack was ordered along the line ; 
but the orders were received too late, except by Han- 
cock, who carried the enemy's advanced line, but found 
the main position too strong to be carried. It was 



and a Statesman. 331 

evident that the enemy was here in force, and in a 
strong position covering the advance to the Chick- 
ahoininy, and that to drive him away in order to force 
our advance would cost another battle. 

To cover the Chickahominy, and prevent our advance 
upon Richmond, Lee had taken up a position parallel 
to our front, exencling on his left from Hanover Court- 
house to Bottom's Bridge on his right; and it being 
evident that to attempt to force a passage directly in 
front would be attended with the severe loss incident 
to a desperate battle, Grant resolved to attempt a 
passage by his left, at Cold Harbor, a spot which, as it 
was the point of convergence for the roads leading both 
to Richmond and to White House, our base of supplies, 
was as important for us to gain as it was necessary for 
the enemy to guard. On the afternoon of the 31st, 
this place had been secured by Sheridan with a force 
of cavalry, after a spirited contest, and the same night 
the Sixth Corps was directed to the same place. They 
arrived in time, on the afternoon of June 1, to support 
Sheridan, who was hard pressed by the enemy, the 
importance of the place having become so evident that 
strong efforts had been made to recapture it. The 
result of the contest here, which was quite severe, 
costing us the loss of some two thousand men, was that 
we held Cold Harbor, and thus protected our base of 
supplies at White House. 

Finding that Butler's force was useless at Bermuda 
Hundred, Grant had ordered him to send all the troops 
he could spare to join the anny of the Potomac ; and 
accordingly, on the 29th of May, a column of sixteen 
thousand men embarked on transports, and, passing 



332 Grant as a Soldier 

down the James, ascended the York and the Pamunkey, 
and disembarked the next day at White House. Owing 
to some error in the orders received by General W. F. 
Smith, their commander, it was not until the afternoon 
of the 1st of June that the column reached Cold Har- 
bor, and took up its position on the right of the Sixth 
Corps, ready to cooperate in the battle which was im- 
minent. 

The headquarters of the Union army was established 
at Cold Harbor, which is simply a locality, designating 
the convergence of the roads at this point, and is quite 
inland, with the Chickahominy running behind, and near 
Gaines's Mills, the place where McClellan fought the 
first of his battles in his retrograde movement over, 
the Peninsula, though in the present action the po- 
sitions of the armies were reversed, Grant holding the 
position the Confederate army held then. 

Lee's army was admirably posted for defence, on this 
side of the Chickahominy, with its front obstructed by 
marshes and thickets; while the right of the Union 
army rested on Tolopotomy Creek, and its left across 
the Despatch Station roacl, making a line of about six 
miles, Hancock occupying the left, Warren and Burn- 
side the right, the Sixth Corps and Smith's command 
the centre. The order was a general assault along 
the whole line, at half past four in the morning. 

At the appointed hour, in the dim gray of the early 
morning, the line advanced, and the lingering darkness 
was lit up with the lurid gleams of battle. There was 
a rush, a bitter struggle, a rapid interchange of deadly 
fire, and the army became conscious that the task was 
more than it could do. Hancock, on the left, carried, 



and a Statesman. 333 

with severe loss, the first line of the enemy's defence, 
but his corps was in turn forced back, and intrenching 
themselves in a wonderfully short space of time, kept 
their ground in advance of where they started, and 
about one to two hundred feet from the enemy. 

This was the result along the whole line ; the as- 
sault was everywhere repulsed ; the men everywhere 
showed themselves brave to rashness; but the most that 
could be done was to take a position more or less close 
to the enemy's line, according to the varying nature of 
the ground, and holding the positions thus taken against 
the enemy, who in his turn tried by assault to drive us 
from them, and at half past one all offensive operations 
were stopped. The loss was very severe, and in this 
respect, as the attacking party, we suffered much more 
severely than the enemy, having lost about seven thou- 
sand five hundred men, all told. Again, it was found 
impossible to drive the opposing army away, or to break 
through its opposition ; and again Grant determined to 
flank the position, and, by passing round Lee's right, lay 
siege to the southern defences of Richmond. During 
the next few days the armies remained substantially 
as they were, our position being strengthened by in- 
trenchments, and the lines being so close that the sharp- 
shooters, on both sides, could pick off the men and 
officers at work in the trenches. 

Meanwhile Sheridan was sent with the cavalry to 
destroy the Virginia Central Railroad thoroughly, to 
join Hunter, and then return to the army of the Po- 
tomac, all railroad communication between Richmond 
and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg being thus 
destroyed. The first part of this programme was sue- 



334 Grant as a Soldier 

cessfully accomplished. Moving rapidly up the railroad, 
destroying it as he went, he encountered the enemy's 
cavalry, under Wade Hampton, at Trevillian Station, on 
the 11th of June, and defeated them severely. The 
next day, continuing, he met Hampton again about 
five miles from Gordonsville, in an intrenched position, 
and also reenforced with infantry. Our first assault 
was repulsed, and night coming on, Sheridan, finding 
his supplies giving out, and hearing nothing of Hunter, 
who, it will be remembered, was withdrawing over the 
mountains, he himself withdrew to White House, w.hich 
he reached on the 19th, at an opportune moment for 
driving away the enemy's cavalry, who were preparing 
to attack this place. Here his orders were to break 
up the depot of supplies, and escort the garrison to 
the James, which he did, keeping off the enemy and 
repelling his attacks, and on the 25th of June reached 
the James, and, crossing it, joined the army of the 
Potomac. 

The next move was to transfer the army to the 
south side of the James, and approach Richmond from 
this quarter. The overland route had been tried — tried 
with persistence and vigor ; but it had been found im- 
possible to cut through or to destroy the opposing 
army. At every advance Lee had been able to meet 
the army of the Potomac, and with the advantage of 
position in his favor. The loss had been enormous 
in this month of battles. From the Wilderness to Cold 
Harbor, the aggregate, all told, amounts to about sixty 
thousand men, killed, wounded, and missing. The rec- 
ord looks ghastly, but the work was to be done. War 
is at best a ghastly butchery, a " stupendous imbecil 






and a Statesman. 335 

ity," and an evidence of the want of development of 
the interests of productive industry. This was the debt 
we had to pay for our national connivance during more 
than sixty years in the injustice of slavery. Had the 
rights of labor, the first claim of mankind to the prod- 
| uct of their toil, been recognized by the nation, slavery 
would have been impossible, and the rebellion would 
never have occurred. The law of retributive justice is 
as inexorable in its workings with nations as it is with 
individuals. To support the individual in health, he 
must preserve the conditions necessary for health, and 
must be free to choose them. Bad food, bad air, con- 
finement, oppression, must produce their ill results. 
And as the law of liberty, the freedom of development, 
which is the basis of the democratic idea, is found to be 
absolutely necessary for the individual, so is it the law 
for nations. And further, too, as we know that we can 
judge easier of the causes of ill health in others than 
we can in our own cases, as we see easier the motes 
in the eyes of our friends than the beams in our own, 
since our prejudices, our vanity, our self-esteem, and our 
pride obscure our vision in this respect, we find the same 
rule holds with nations. Though there may be still 
some who deny that slavery was the cause of the war, 
and that the suffering and death it entailed upon this 
nation was in requital for our maintenance of that gi- 
gantic system of oppression of labor, yet few of us can 
fail to see. that in the case of England, her centuries of 
oppression of Ireland have caused her present condition, 
when she presents to the world the ludicrously tragic- 
aspect of a nation quaking with fear before a cause 
which does not boast an armed man in its defence, and 
22 



336 Grant as a Soldier 

in her terror the cabinet calling upon Parliament to re- 
peal the habeas corpus. As it is the part of the wise 
man to know himself, and if his right eye offends to 
pluck it out and cast it from him, so too with nations ; 
and while with gratitude and grief we cherish the mem- 
ory of those whose lot it was to offer themselves a sac- 
rifice for our sin, let the lesson the necessity has taught 
us not be lost upon us, and let us further recognize the 
decisive firmness of the man who with all modesty, but 
with the self-reliance of genius, took upon himself the 
responsibility, and carried us through suffering to vic- 
tory. 

It is questioned still by many whether much of this 
loss could not have been avoided by a different course ; 
but all such suggestions depend upon an if for their 
conclusions, and can only be answered in the same way. 
If this had not been done, would the war not have lasted 
longer than it did, and would not the suffering and loss 
have been much greater than it was ? But to rise from 
the discussion of probabilities, in which anything is pos- 
sible to ingenuity, let us look at the facts. The victory 
was gained ; to gain it, fighting, severe, deadly, persis- 
tent fighting, was necessary ; and this being so, — 

"If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well 
It were done quickly." 

And in this view of the case, — which, though appar- 
ently unfeeling, is that of the surgeon who amputates 
the limb in order to save the patient's life, — the justi- 
fication of the result is complete and full. 

Sherman's criticism upon the battle at Shiloh may 
also, with slight modifications, be applied to this case. 
These reflections are perhaps necessary here, when we 



and a Statesman. 337 

consider the amount of objurgation which was heaped 
upon Grant at the time for his course, and the remains 
of which are still occasionally met with. But it is a 
noticeable fact that most of the tender delicacy which 
was horrified at this disregard of human life came, as a 
rule, from the men whose sympathies were principally 
with the rebellion ; to whom the wrongs which were to 
be redressed by this lavish expenditure excited simply 
contempt and derision ; who excused everything to the 
slaveholders in rebellion, but had, and have, no pity or 
sympathy for the slave — the men who stand in the 
nineteenth century as representatives of the seven- 
teenth, and whose value is principally that of a species 
of moral fossils, serving as specimens to show the eras 
through which the world has passed in its progress to 
the evolution of the democratic era. 

During this month of continuous battles Grant was 
in constant receipt of reinforcements ; and though the 
loss of experienced officers could not be replaced im- 
mediately, yet the spirit and temper of his army had 
not suffered as severely as it would be natural to ex- 
pect that it would. 

The loss in Lee's army is estimated at twenty thou- 
sand men ; and though this difference appears too great, 
yet it must be remembered that it had generally had the 
great advantage of position, and of being the attacked 
and not the attacking force. Its spirit is also said to 
have been high ; in fact, that it was never better than 
after the battle of Cold Harbor; and this opinion, it is 
claimed, is founded upon the " unanimous and emphatic 
testimony of its officers." 

The movement to transfer the army of the Potomac to 



338 Grant as a Soldier 

the south side of the James necessitated the apparent 
uncovering of Washington. In the series of movements 
from the Eapidan to the James, the army of the Poto- 
mac had been constantly interposed to prevent any 
offensive movement, on the part of the enemy, having 
Washington as its object ; and to the army of politicians 
and office-seekers who make Washington the field and 
base of their campaigns against the national purse, this 
protection of their precious persons in the undisturbed 
pursuit of their favorite art, seemed to be the chief 
occupation of the army of the Potomac. It was natu- 
rally to be expected, therefore, that such a movement 
should excite their extremest fear and disgust, and that 
they should express their disapprobation of it in no 
measured terms, and in so far as they could, by influ- 
encing at once both the government and public opinion, 
prevent it. 

The changing by an army of its base is also an 
operation which Napoleon has pronounced to be " the 
ablest manoeuvre taught by military art," and requires 
great skill to be performed successfully and well. 

In disregarding, therefore, the objections of igno- 
rance of military affairs and of self-interest, Grant showed 
the moral firmness which he has displayed in his whole 
course. Being resolved to do only his duty, as he best 
understands it, and to the best of his ability, having 
once come to a conclusion concerning his course of 
action, his only object is to carry it out, regardless of 
all other considerations, in the promptest and most 
efficacious way. His conception of the necessity of the 
move was as accurate and comprehensive as the ability 
he showed in the manner of its execution. Gradually 



and a Statesman. 339 

withdrawing the right, and extending his left flank, the 
army was brought within easy distance of the lower 
crossings of the Chickahominy, and on the night of the 
12th the movement began. Warren's corps, preceded 
by a division of cavalry, took the lead, and crossing the 
Chickahominy at Long Bridge, threatened an advance 
on Richmond, and covered the movement of the army. 
The distance across the Peninsula was here fifty-five 
miles, and it was marched by the army in two days. 
The movement was, therefore, a perfect success. 

On the morning of the loth Lee discovered that the 
army had withdrawn, and retired towards Richmond. 
The points at which Grant's army should cross had 
been selected by Brigadier General Weitzel, and a pon- 
toon bridge, which was a triumph of engineering skill, 
being over two thousand feet long, and the channel 
boats being anchored in water thirteen fathoms deep, 
was commenced under the direction of Brigadier Gen- 
eral Benham, on the forenoon of the 14th, and completed 
by midnight. Over this and in ferry boats the army 
crossed, and on the 16th was entirely on the south side 
of the stream. During this movement Smith's com- 
mand had returned to Bermuda Hundred, and on land- 
ing, on the 14th, was sent by Butler to take Petersburg. 
This city is situated on the south bank of the Appo- 
mattox, twenty-two miles from Richmond, and about 
ten from City Point, where the Appomattox empties 
into the James, and is a centre of the Lynchburg, 
Weldon, and the Norfolk Railways. 

The Appomattox is navigable to the wharves of Peters- 
burg for vessels of one hundred tons, while six miles 
below the city, at a place called Walthall's, vessels of a 



340 Grant as a Soldier 

larger size unload. It is the third city of Virginia, but 
obtained now, as an outpost of Richmond, a great stra- 
tegic value, and was strongly fortified by the enemy, 
whose lines were admirably constructed to defend it, 
and protect its valuable railroads. 

Grant had gone in person to superintend the opera- 
tions which were to capture this place, and on the 10th, 
before the works had been greatly strengthened, and 
before its importance had become so manifest, Butler 
had sent Gillmore, with thirty-five hundred men, over 
the Appomattox, to move by the river turnpike and 
capture the city if possible. This movement was sup- 
ported by an attack made by gunboats upon Fort Clin- 
ton, below the city, and by a cavalry expedition under 
Kautz, which was to move across the Norfolk Railroad 
and enter the city from the south. Gillmore advanced, 
drove in the enemy's skirmishers, and penetrated to 
within two miles of the city, and then retired, finding 
the enemy's works too strong and his own force too 
weak. Meanwhile, Kautz, with cavalry, crossed the 
railroad, and rapidly penetrated into the town, but was 
repulsed by the enemy, who, unengaged by Gillmore, 
concentrated to resist this rear attack. 



and a Statesman. 341 



CHAPTER XXXVII. 

THE POSITION BEFORE PETERSBURG. — TIIE ATTEMPTS TO 
CAPTURE THIS CITY. 

After this failure, Grant again returned to Bermuda 
Hundred, and gave Butler verbal instructions to use 
Smith's command in another attack, engaging to return 
to the army of the Potomac, and send them down as 
speedily as possible to take part in the attack, or to 
support those engaged in it. As we have seen, Smith's 
column arrived at Bermuda Hundred on the night 
of the 14th, and during that night passed over the 
Appomattox, and the next morning was pushed to- 
wards Petersburg, distant seven miles. After advan- 
cing two miles, a line of rifle trenches was encountered, 
which were captured by the colored division in a 
spirited charge, and the forces advanced to the line of 
fortifications. The clay was occupied in these opera- 
tions and in bringing up the troops, and at seven P. M. 
a line of skirmishers was thrown out, and the outposts 
of the defences were carried. This statement is based 
upon the report of General Smith, which differs in some 
minor points with Grant's report, but is probably the 
more exact of the two, since it was made by one who 
was on the spot. It seems, however, decided that a 
great mistake was made in not pushing forward, since 
at this time the works were but weakly defended, and 



342 Grant as a Soldier 

might have been easily carried. Meanwhile the army 
of the Potomac was crossing the James, Hancock having 
crossed this same day, and Lee was also bringing his 
army to the south side of the James, crossing near 
Drury's Bluff. On the 16th, Burnside, with the Ninth 
Corps, reached Petersburg about noon. Warren reached 
the same spot in the evening, and Hancock, with two 
divisions, the evening before. The army remained, 
however, in the position it had gained on the night of 
the 15th, and was found there by Burnside and Warren. 
This day also General Meade, after consultation with 
General Grant, proceeded from City Point to Peters- 
burg, and taking command, ordered an assault that 
night. During the day, the enemy, however, had re- 
enforced the garrison, and were ready for the attack, 
which commenced at six in the evening and lasted 
until next morning, and resulted in our gaining only a 
temporary advantage. During the 16th and 17th, the 
attack was continued with further reinforcements, and 
the fighting was of the severest description; yet the 
result was not what had been hoped. Our movements 
were too slow, and the enemy, by celerity of movement, 
was enabled to reenforce the place and keep it against 
our repeated assaults, and it became evident that it 
would be necessary to reduce the place by a siege. 

The few following days brought our intrenched lines 
to such a state of forwardness, that the front of our 
position could be held by only a portion of the army, 
leaving the rest of the troops free for offensive opera- 
tions, in extending the line of investment, and threat- 
ening to cut the railroad lines of communication by 
which the enemy obtained his supplies. 



and a Statesman. 343 

On Monday, the 20th of June, preparations were 
made for a movement in the direction of the enemy's 
right, the object of which was to extend our lines so as 
to cover the Weldon Railroad, which was a very im- 
portant branch of the enemy's lines of communication, 
both for Petersburg and Richmond. On the morning 
of the 21st, therefore, the Second and Sixth Corps were 
moved rapidly out, across the Norfolk Railroad, then 
across the Jerusalem plank road, to which the lines of 
the Fifth Corps already extended. The movement, 
however, advanced only to a point known as Davis's 
Farm, on the plank road, between the two railroads, 
where they encountered the enemy in such force, that 
after a severe but brief action, they were compelled to 
retire. On the 22d and the 2 3d, the attempt was re- 
newed, but without success. We were able to advance 
only about half way to the point desired ; for the pos- 
session of the road was felt by the enemy to be of such 
vital importance to him, that he made every effort to 
retain its possession. 

During the time spent in these unsuccessful attempts, 
the rest of the army did not remain idle. In every 
part of the line, each day had its battle, and every hour 
was marked by the restless energy which the spirit of 
the commander infused into the operations of the army. 
During the two weeks thus passed, the losses of the 
army amounted to about fifteen thousand men, while 
the enemy, by a vigilance which was as untiring as our 
attacks, had finally succeeded in surrounding Peters- 
burg with a line of defences which made it impossible 
to take the place by assault. This line, beginning at 
the south bank of the Appomattox, surrounded Peters- 



344 Grant as a Soldier 

burg on the east and south, extending westward be- 
yond the left flank of our army, while a continuation 
of the same series of defensive works upon the north 
side of the Appomattox defended the city and the rail- 
road to Richmond from any attack by Butler with the 
force at Bermuda Hundred. 

On the night of the 20th, Deep Bottom, a place only 
ten miles from Richmond, and on the north bank of the 
James, had been occupied by a force sent by General 
Butler,, under the command of Brigadier General Foster, 
and connected with Bermuda Hundred by a pontoon, 
bridge, while at the same time the force at this last place 
was strengthened by the withdrawal from the army 
of the Potomac of the balance of the Eighteenth Corps. 
At Deep Bottom an intrenched camp was formed, and 
by thus holding this position Grant was enabled at any 
time to threaten Richmond by an approach from the 
north bank of the James, upon which side of this 
stream Richmond itself is situated. To meet this pos- 
sibility, Lee laid a pontoon bridge over the James, near 
Drury's Bluff, between Richmond and Deep Bottom, 
which would enable him to make a counter move with 
the same ease. In protecting his lines of communica- 
tion, and preventing access to Richmond, the line to be 
guarded by Lee was about thirty miles long, so that 
the opportunities were offered to Grant to keep him 
busily engaged in varying the position of his troops, 
in order to meet any threatened attack, until a weak 
point should be found at which his line could be broken 
through. The energy of the army was devoted to the 
erection of a strong line of defence, so that the position 
could be kept with a small force, and a column could 



and a Statesman. 345 

be spared for active operations to the above ends, and 
this work was completed about the end of July. 

The army of the Potomac, thus in its position before 
Petersburg, protected Washington from any threaten- 
ing attack from the army in its front, while, at the 
same time, itself threatening Richmond. But owing 
to the comparative failure of Hunter's expedition in 
the Shenandoah Valley, this route was open for the 
Confederates to threaten an invasion of the north, and 
the possible capture of Washington j and we shall see 
presently that they did not fail to avail themselves 
of it. 



>4G Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

THE MINE, AND WHY IT FAILED. 

Before, however, looking to this part of the theatre 
of war, let us follow the army of the Potomac in its 
doings; and the next important occurrence which 
engages our attention is the famous mine. A spot in 
front of General Burnside's lines, where a hollow oc- 
curred just behind a deep cut in the City Point Railroad, 
was selected for the mine. The idea was started ori- 
ginally by Lieutenant Colonel Pleasants, of the Forty- 
eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, who was a practical 
miner, and whose regiment was recruited in the mining 
districts of Pennsylvania. When the idea was broached 
to General Burnside, he warmly approved it, and Colo- 
nel Pleasants was set to work with his regiment, but 
found the greatest difficulty was caused by the want 
of proper tools. At first the plan elicited nothing but 
derision, but finally excited more attention. The work 
was begun on the 25th of June, and completed, despite 
the obstacles arising from the want of proper appliances, 
on the 23d of July, and charged with four tons of 
powder on the 25th of July. 

The main gallery extended five hundred and ten 
feet, ending directly under the parapet of one of the 
enemy's redoubts, and though the line here reentered, 
exposing the position to an enfilading fire from both 



and a Statesman. 347 

sides, } r et it was seen that if a crest just behind it could 
be carried, Petersburg might be secured. The morning 
of the 30th of July was fixed for the explosion and 
assault, and the operations of the army just at this 
juncture were auspicious auguries of success. On the 
26th of July, General Hancock with the Second Corps, 
and two divisions of the cavalry under Sheridan, had 
been sent to Deep Bottom, with instructions to proceed 
to Chapin's Bluff to prevent reinforcements from Lee's 
army crossing on his pontoon bridge at this place, 
while Sheridan was to proceed to the Virginia Central 
Railroad and operate against Richmond, the defensive 
force in which was supposed to be small. Foster's 
position at Deep Bottom had caused Lee to send a 
force against him, which held a position in his front. 
On the 27th, Hancock turned the right flank of this 
force, while Foster threatened its front, and obliged it to 
fall back to another line of works, behind Bailey's 
Creek, where it checked Hancock's further advance. 
Meanwhile the cavalry had attempted to get at the 
enemy's rear, but were unsuccessful, and Lee, hearing 
of the attack, sent heavy reinforcements to oppose 
Hancock, detaching for this purpose five out of the 
eight divisions of his army. 

Grant, becoming aware of how Lee had weakened his 
force, ordered Hancock to retain a defensive position, 
and secretly to return on the night of the 29th,. in 
order to take part in the assault of the next morning. 
This was done. The plan was to explode the mine at 
half past four in the morning, and then, through the 
breach thus made, to assault. The assaulting party 
was chosen by lot, and it fell to the first division, under 



348 Grant as a Soldier 

Brigadier General Lecllie. The following order was 
issued by General Meade on the night of the 29th, for 
the disposition of the forces and their duty : — 

The following instructions are issued for the guidance of all 
concerned : — 

1. As soon as it is dark, Major General Burnside, commanding 
Ninth Corps, will withdraw his two brigades, under General 
White, occupying the iutrenchments between the plank and Nor- 
folk roads, and bring them to his front. Care will be taken not to 
interfere with the troops of the Eighteenth Corps, moving into 
their position in rear of the Ninth Corps. General Burnside will 
form his troops for assaulting the enemy's works at daylight on 
the 30th, prepare his parapets and abatis for the passage of the 
columns, and have the pioneers equipped for work in opening pas- 
sages for artillery, destroying enemy's abatis, and the intrenching 
tools distributed for effecting lodgment, &c, &c. 

2. Major General Warren, commanding Fifth Corps, will reduce 
the number of his troops holding the intrenchments of his front to 
the minimum, and concentrate all his available force on his right, 
and hold them prepared to support the assault of Major General 
Burnside. The preparations in respect to pioneers, intrenching 
tools, &c, &c, enjoined upon the Ninth Corps, will also be made 
by the Fifth Corps. 

3. As soon as it is dark, Major General Ord, commanding 
Eighteenth Corps, will relieve his troops in the trenches by Gen- 
eral Mott's division of the Second Corps, and form his corps. in 
rear of the Ninth Corps, and be prepared to support the assault of 
Major General Burnside. 

4. Every preparation will be made for moving forward the field 
artillery of each corps. 

5„ At dark, Major General Hancock, commanding Second Corps, 
will move from Deep Bottom to the rear of the intrenchments 
now held by the Eighteenth Corps, resume the command of Mott's 
division, and be prepared at daylight to follow up the assaulting 
and supporting columns, or for such other operations as may be 
found necessary. 

6. Major General Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, will 



and a Statesman. 349 

proceed at dark from the vicinity of Deep Bottom to Lee's Mill, 
and at daylight will move with his whole corps, including Wil- 
son's division, against the enemy's troops defending Petersburg on 
the right, by the roads leading to that town from the southward 
and westward. 

7. Major Duane, acting chief engineer, will have the pontoon 
trains parked at convenient points in the rear, prepared to move. 
He will see that supplies of sand-bags, gabions, fascines, &c, &c, 
are in depot near the lines, ready for use. 

He will detail engineer officers for each corps. 

8. At half past three (3i) in the morning of the 30th, Major 
General Burnside will spring his mine, and his assaulting columns 
will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in 
the rear, and effect a lodgment there. He will be followed by 
Major General Ord, who will support him on the right, directing 
his movement to the crest indicated, and by Major General War- 
ren, who will support him on the left. 

Upon the explosion of the mine, the artillery of all kinds in bat- 
tery will open upon those points of the enemy's works whose fire 
covers the ground over which our columns must move, care being 
taken to avoid impeding the progress of our troops. Special in- 
structions respecting the direction of fire will be issued through the 
chief of artillery. 

9. Corps commanders will report to the commanding General 
when their preparations are complete, and will advise him of every 
step in the progress of the operation, and of everything important 
that occurs. 

10. Promptitude, rapidity of execution, and cordial cooperation, 
are essential to success ; and the commanding General is confident 
that this indication of his expectations will insure the hearty efforts 
of the commanders and troops. 

11. Headquarters, during the operations, will be at the head- 
quarters of the Ninth Corps. 

By command of Major General Meade. 

At the appointed hour the fuse was lighted, but the 
mine did not explode. Lieutenant Colonel Pleasants, 
who had superintended the work, knew that the dif- 



350 Grant as a Soldier 

ficulty arose from a splice he had been forced to make 
in the fuse, and Lieutenant Jacob Douty and Sergeant 
Henry Reese, of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania, volun- 
teered to enter the mine and relight it. To do so they 
went along the gallery one hundred feet before coming 
to the place where the fuse had gone out, and having 
relighted it, the mine exploded at forty-two minutes 
past four. 

The earth above the excavation rose, by the force 
of the explosion, in a solid mass, some two hundred 
feet in the air, like a dense and heavy cloud, through 
which the burning powder flashed like lightning. The 
quiver of the explosion shook the earth like an earth- 
quake. The entire mass seemed to rest poised a moment 
in mid-air, and then, as it broke to pieces and fell, a 
thick, black cloud of smoke floated away, the wrecks of 
men and guns returned, with the mingled earth, back to 
the ground, and the artillery fire opened rapidly from 
every gun we had bearing upon the position. The 
assaulting column then marched out, but as sufficient 
openings had not been prepared for them in our own 
lines, the advance was very slow. 

The explosion had made a crater two hundred feet 
long, sixty wide, and thirty deep, and opened the en- 
emy's line for an assault, and had so paralyzed them 
that their artillery was silent. In this crater the troops 
halted, though there was nothing to prevent their going 
forward, since the enemy remained inactive for half an 
hour. The other troops, sent forward to support the 
first, were also forced to remain in the crater; and a 
scene of hopeless confusion ensued, as disgraceful as it 
was disastrous, for the enemy, recovering from his sur- 



and a Statesman. 351 

prise, commenced to plant his artillery so as to command 
the crater, and to mass his infantry in a ravine to the 
right. At seven, two hours after his first advance, Led- 
lie was still in the crater, his men in a state of confused 
entanglement, and in the way of others. A division of 
colored troops was then sent forward, and passing be- 
yond the crater, advanced towards the crest, but were 
driven back. The crater now became a slaughter-pen, 
in which whites and blacks were confusedly mingled, 
and into which the enemy rained every kind of deadly 
missile. To remain was certain death, to advance was 
impossible, and to retreat almost as dangerous as to re- 
main. Above four thousand men were killed or cap- 
tured in " this miserable affair," as Grant termed it. 

This failure led to a great deal of crimination and 
recrimination, and finally was examined by a Congres- 
sional Investigating Committee, who found that the 
failure was due to the following causes : 1. The fact 
that the charge was led by w T hite instead of black troops. 
This they considered " the first and great cause of dis- 
aster." 2. The fact that General Meade directed that 
the assaulting column should push at once for the crest 
of Cemetery Hill, instead of first clearing the enemy's 
lines to the right and left of the mine. This last opin- 
ion appears to be a conclusion drawn from an acquaint- 
ance with the tactics of party politics, and applied to 
military affairs. A military court of inquiry which was 
instituted soon after, and composed of Generals Han- 
cock, Ayres, and Miles, found as follows : — 

The causes of failure are, — 

1. The injudicious formation of the troops in going forward, 
the movement being mainly by flank instead of extended front. 
23 



352 Grant as a Soldier 

General Meade's order indicated that columns of assault should 
be employed to take Cemetery Hill, and that proper passages 
should be prepared for those columns. It is the opinion of the 
court that there were no proper columns of assault. The troops 
should have been formed in the open ground in front of the 
point of attack, parallel to the line of the enemy's works. The 
evidence shows that one or more columns might have passed 
over at and to the left of the crater, without any previous prepa- 
ration of the ground. 

2. The halting of the troops in the crater instead of going 
forward to the crest, when there was no fire of any consequence 
from the enemy. 

3. No proper employment of engineer officers and working 
parties, and of materials and tools for their use, in the Ninth 
Corps. 

4. That some parts of the assaulting columns were not prop- 
erly led. 

5. The want of a competent common head at the scene of 
the assault, to direct affairs as occurrences should demand. 

Had not failure ensued from the above causes, and the crest 
been gained, the success might have been jeoparded by the fail- 
ure to have prepared in season proper and adequate debouches 
through the Ninth Corps' lines for troops, and especially for 
field artillery, as ordered by Major General Meade. 

The reasons why the attack ought to have been successful are, — 

1. The evident surprise of the enemy at the time of the ex- 
plosion of the mine, and for some time after. 

2. The comparatively small force in the enemy's works. 

3. The ineffective fire of the enemy's artillery and musketry, 
there being scarcely any for about thirty minutes after the ex- 
plosion, and our artillery being just the reverse as to time and 
power. 

4. The fact that some of our troops were able to get two hun- 
dred yards beyond the crater, towards the crest, but icould not 
remain there or proceed farther for want of supports, or because 
they were not properly formed or led. 

That the colored troops engaged in this affair showed 



and a Statesman. 353 

the bravery they showed constantly whenever they 
were employed, appears from the following report of 
the casualties they met with ; but it is also said that the 
rebels, infuriated at seeing them employed in the army, 
singled them out for slaughter whenever it was possible, 
and did so in this case with especial savageness, while 
they were helplessly involved in the crater : — 

Twenty-third IT. S. Colored — Fifteen officers killed and wound- 
ed; four hundred men, including the missing. 

Twenty-eighth U. S. Colored — Eleven officers, and about one 
hundred and fifty men killed, wounded, and missing. 

Twenty-seventh U. S. Colored — Six officers, and about one 
hundred and fifty men killed, wounded, and missing. 

Twenty-ninth U. S. Colored — Eight officers, and about two 
hundred and seventy-five men killed, wounded, and missing. 

Thirty-first U. S. Colored — Seven officers, and about two hun- 
dred men killed, wounded, and missing. 

Forty-third U. S. Colored — Six officers, and a large number of 
men killed, wounded, and missing. 

Thirty-ninth U. S. Colored — Several officers, and about two 
hundred and fifty men killed, wounded, and missing. 



354 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XXXIX. 

OPERATIONS IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. — EARLY'S 
ADVANCE AGAINST WASHINGTON. 

Let us now turn to the operations in the Shenan- 
doah Valley. Hunter, as will be remembered, had re- 
treated by way of Western Virginia, so as to leave the 
path open for the enemy to advance upon the loyal 
states, and advantage was taken of this condition of 
things by Lee, who sent General Jubal Early, with about 
twenty-five thousand men, down the Shenandoah Val- 
ley, to threaten Washington, and make a diversion in 
favor of Lee's army, held tightly at Petersburg by the 
army of the Potomac. On the 3d of July Early was 
before Martinsburg, and Siegel, who held this place with 
a small force, retreated across the Potomac at Shepherds- 
town. Harper's Ferry, in the possession of General 
Weber, was also evacuated, the force retiring to the 
Maryland Heights. 

Hunter, who was in Western Virginia, had been or- 
dered to move as rapidly as possible to Harper's Ferry, 
but the obstacles and difficulties in his way had dela} T ed 
him. The river was low, and the railroad was broken 
in several places. The way being thus open to him, 
Early crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and on the 
6th of July was at Hagerstown, and on the 7th at Fred- 
erick, from which point he threatened both Washington 
and Baltimore. 



and a Statesman. 355 

Early in July, as soon as he heard that the enemy 
was on the way, Grant sent troops from the army of 
the Potomac to protect Washington. This force con- 
sisted of the Sixth Corps, which was forwarded on 
transports to Washington. At this time, also, the 
Nineteenth Corps, which had been ordered to return 
from New Orleans, had just arrived at Hampton Roads, 
and was sent, without landing, after the Sixth. Be- 
sides these reinforcements, the only troops available for 
opposing Early were those under General Wallace, who 
had command of the department of Annapolis, with 
his headquarters at Baltimore, and consisted of a few 
thousand foot artillerists, the hundred days' men, and 
the invalids. With these, and the advance of the Sixth 
Corps, which had fortunately arrived, Wallace moved 
promptly forward, and took a position on the Monocacy, 
near the railroad crossing, where, on the 8th of July, 
he fought the advancing enemy, and though driven 
back, and forced to retreat to Baltimore, yet the stand 
he had made delayed the enemy, and gave time for 
the rest of the reinforcements from the army of the 
Potomac and the Nineteenth Corps to arrive at Wash- 
ington. 

Elated by their success, on the 8th Early's troops 
advanced upon Washington, on the 10th were at Roch- 
ville, fourteen miles from that capital, and on the 
next day approached the fortifications of the city, and 
by the afternoon showed a strong line in front of Fort 
Stevens. During this day the remainder of the Sixth 
Corps arrived at Washington, and soon after the Nine- 
teenth Corps. During the 12th the Confederates held 
their position, and there was skirmishing during that 



356 Grant as a Soldier 

whole day, though the enemy did not show great vigor. 
Had he attacked with promptness and energy as soon 
as he had arrived, it is hardly questionable but that 
he might have captured the capital, though, if he had 
carried off the majority of the politicians, who are gen- 
erally to be found there in great numbers, he would 
have done the nation more service than injury. Per- 
haps the consciousness of this fact had some influence 
in causing the feebleness of Early's action ; but, be this 
as it may, that night Early withdrew his troops, and 
retired across the Potomac. His expedition had cer- 
tainly been successful, if it was undertaken for the 
purpose of frightening the entire population of Wash- 
ington, or if for the purpose of gathering booty of all 
kinds ; for his troops retired laden with this, and had, 
in addition, destroyed quite a long piece of the North- 
ern Central Railroad, burned bridges, and also collected 
money from some of the towns they passed through, 
under the threat of burning them if their demands 
were not complied with 

On the night of the 12th Grant telegraphed to have 
General Wright take command, and urged a pursuit 
of the retreating Confederates, which was commenced 
next day ; but the enemy were not overtaken until they 
had reached the Shenandoah Valley, at Snicker's Ferry, 
where, after a sharp skirmish with the rear-guard, the 
Confederates retired, and the Union troops returned to 
Washington. 

One of the main objects of this expedition of the 
enemy had been to force Grant to transfer his army 
from the James to the defence of Washington; and 
during the successful progress of Early, the pressure 



and a Statesman. 357 

brought to bear upon Grant by the administration, in 
order to induce him to do this, was so severe, that any 
one having less than his firmness and persistence would 
have succumbed. To do so would have been to give up 
all that had been gained by the whole campaign ; and 
it is fortunate for the country that we had at the time 
a man at the head of our armies, who, like Grant, could 
take a comprehensive military view of the situation, 
and see that the important thing was holding his army 
where it was, since the whole expedition was a con- 
fession on the part of the enemy that this was so. 

It was evident, however, that something must be 
done to prevent a recurrence of such an affair ; and 
finding that Early designed staying in the valley of the 
Shenandoah, and that this rich country was made the 
chief resource of Lee's army for its supplies, he felt 
the importance of some plan which should forever stop 
this condition of things. On the 24th, Early, again 
advancing, drove Hunter's forces through Winchester 
and across the Potomac, and the next day, threatening 
to cross himself, Grant ordered the Sixth Corps to 
Harper's Ferry, and on the 2d of August ordered Sher- 
idan to Washington, in order to have him ready to 
take command of the Middle Military Division, which 
he designed forming. On the 4th of August Grant 
left City Point, and on the 5th had a consultation with 
General Hunter, and finding him desirous of being 
relieved, sent for Sheridan to come up to Harper's 
Ferry from Washington, and gave him command of 
the Middle Military Division, in which were united the 
departments "of Western Virginia, Washington, and the 
Susquehanna, which, up to this time, had been separate 



358 Grant as a Soldier 

commands, and strengthened his force with two cavalry 
divisions from the army of the Potomac. Giving then 
his instructions to Sheridan, Grant returned to City 
Point. The result soon showed the excellence of this 
arrangement, and the merits of this selection. Our 
disgraceful failures in the Shenandoah Valley, as in 
some larger fields of action, had been caused as much 
by the petty jealousies of the rival commanders as by 
anything else. Many of our Generals, during the war, 
showed themselves as contemptible, by their selfish 
ambition for personal aggrandizement and jealous in- 
trigues against each other, as any set of politicians, not, 
perhaps, excepting the local rings of New York city, 
or the lobby interests that gather about Washington. 
In this respect Grant's military record is most admirable. 
Prompt and generous as he has always been in fully 
recognizing the merits of others, he has. when slighted 
himself, been man enough to rise above the personal 
pique of rank, and being anxious only to see the re- 
bellion put down, has been willing to do any duty 
assigned him, and to do it in any position. In so far 
he is the best representative of the democratic idea 
which has appeared in our army, for the spirit of this 
idea tends to replace the isolation of barbarism, where 
all men are enemies, by the union of civilization, where 
the interests of all are bound together, since those of all 
and each are identical. It is this spirit which is uniting 
Europe, which fought the battles of the Union, and 
which is influencing all societies. As, in all social move- 
ments, the upper classes, or those who call themselves 
by this invidious name, are the last to be influenced, 
wu cannot wonder that the officers of the army were 



and a Statesman. 359 

more backward than the men in displaying this new 
spirit. The enlisted men from any section fraternized, 
and even accepted the cooperation of the negro as 
readily as though there was no tradition of a curse laid 
upon all of Ham's hypothetical descendants. But the 
officers were inclined to be as punctilious concerning 
technicalities of rank, and all such petty conventions, as 
we find the doctors are concerning the various schools 
of practice in their profession — as though it were 
better the patient should die by allopathy than be 
cured by homoeopathy, and vice versa ; or as the preach- 
ers are jealous of each other's creeds — as though 
the important thing is not that men should be made 
better and happier by whatever means ; or as the 
lawyers, the politicians, the diplomatists, who are all 
engaged in nullifying each other's work, instead of com- 
bining to extend the rule of justice in all individual, 
party, and national concerns. 

Sheridan's force consisted of the troops Hunter had 
brought from Western Virginia, the Nineteenth Corps 
and the Sixth Corps, with the cavalry from the army 
of the Potomac. This force he posted in front of 
Berryville, while the enemy was on the west bank of 
Opequan Creek, covering Winchester. Here, with 
constant skirmishing, he kept Early stationary until 
his own troops should be prepared. Assuming the com- 
mand on the 7th of August, and in September feeling 
confident of success, and receiving on the 15th a per- 
sonal visit from General Grant, he obtained permission 
to assume the offensive. In his report Grant says, 
" He was off promptly to time ; and I may here acid, 
that I have never since deemed it necessary to visit 
General Sheridan before giving him orders." 



360 Grant as a Soldier 

On the 19th Sheridan, therefore, advanced, and met 
the enemy at Winchester, and drove them through 
the town, night stopping the pursuit. Early, however, 
retreated to Fisher's Hill, thirty miles south of Win- 
chester, and Sheridan arrived in front of this position 
on the morning of the 22d, and attacking again, drove 
him back ; nor did Early stop until he had reached the 
passes of the Blue Ridge, with the loss of half his 
army. Sheridan pushed the pursuit as far as Staunton, 
destroyed the Virginia Central Eailroad, and returned 
to Strasburg, laying the country completely waste on 
his return. This course has been thought to be inde- 
fensible, and can be justified only on the grounds that 
anything in war can be justified. Certain it was, that 
this course, by beggaring the inhabitants, laying waste 
the fields, destroying the crops, burning the mills, and so 
on, prevented the people in this region from continuing 
to aid the enemy on every occasion, as they had re- 
peatedly done before. It is difficult, if not impossible, 
to draw a line that shall accurately divide the allowa- 
ble from the unallowable in war ; the entire system is 
one of violence and injury, and if these are necessary, 
who shall say how far they shall go ? Of course there 
is a difference between a love of carnage and destruc- 
tion for their own sake, such as the savage displays, and 
severity for the purpose of accomplishing the object 
which every civilized nation engaged in war has, that 
is, of putting a stop to the war; and it cannot be said 
that Sheridan here overstepped the bounds allowed to 
this last. 

The next month, while Sheridan still occupied a 
position on the north bank of Cedar Creek, Early, 



and a Statesman. 361 

having been reenforced from Lee's army, assumed the 
offensive, and having made his dispositions at Fisher's 
Hill, moved forward, on the night of the 18th of October, 
to surprise the Union force. Fording the north fork of 
the Shenandoah, and under the cover of a fog, the^y at- 
tacked our forces early in the morning of the 19 th, 
while Sheridan was absent at Winchester, and came 
very near causing a most serious disaster. When day- 
light came, the whole of our left and centre was a con- 
fused mass ; the Sixth Corps stood, how T ever, firm, and 
protected the retreat, which now seemed the only 
course left, and it was not until a position was reached 
between Middletown and Newtown, and the pursuit of 
the enemy slackened, that the line could be re-formed. 
At about half past ten A. M., Sheridan, who had heard 
the guns at Winchester, came riding up post haste, and, 
inspiriting his men, led them back, and routed the 
enemy entirely, and finished the war forever in the 
Shenandoah Valley, so that most of his troops returned 
to the army of the Potomac, and the scattered rem- 
nants of Early's force to Lee's army, since the want of 
forage in the valley rendered it impossible for the 
Confederates to support an armed force there. 

There is no doubt that it was Sheridan's personal 
bearing, and his magnetic influence over men which 
enabled him to thus pluck victory from the jaws of 
defeat; but it must not be forgotten that General 
Wright had already stayed the rout, and formed the 
line anew. General Early afterwards ascribed the rout 
of his army to the men, and some commissioned of- 
ficers yielding " to a disgraceful propensity for plunder," 
and leaving their ranks in order to " appropriate " the 
" abandoned property of the enemy." 



362 Grant as a Soldier 

For this action Sheridan was made a Major General 
in the regular army, in the following order from the 
President, to fill the place resigned by McClellan, the 
order to take effect on the 8th of November : — 

" That for personal gallantry, military skill, and just 
confidence in the courage and patriotism of his troops, 
displayed by Philip H. Sheridan on the 19th of October, 
at Cedar Run, whereby, under the blessing of Prov- 
idence, his routed army was reorganized, a great na- 
tional disaster averted, and a brilliant victory achieved 
over the rebels for the third time in pitched battle 
within thirty clays, Philip H. Sheridan is appointed 
Major General in the United States army, to rank as 
such from the 8th day of November, 1864." 

The operations in the Shenandoah being thus brought 
to a happy conclusion, let us return to the army of the 
Potomac in its position before Petersburg. 



and a Statesman. 3G3 



CHAPTER XL. 

THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. — THE ACTIVE OPERATIONS OF 
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC DURING THE SUMMER AND 
WINTER MONTHS. 

During the summer and autumn months of 1864, the 
army of the Potomac remained in its position before 
Petersburg, but not lying idly in its trenches. The 
restless activity and indomitable perseverance of its 
commander kept it constantly employed, either in 
attempts to cut the enemy's lines of communication, 
and thus completely invest the city, or else, by diver- 
sions upon the north side of the James, to threaten 
Richmond itself directly. The first of the movements 
of this latter class was begun on the 12 th of August. 
In order to deceive the enemy as to the destination of 
the expeditionary force, the transports upon which it 
embarked were sent ostentatiously down the river, as 
though they were destined for Fortress Monroe or 
Washington. During the night of the 12th, however, 
they returned up the river, and landed the troops at 
Deep Bottom, where General Foster still continued to 
hold his intrenched camp. 

The task of embarkation was found so difficult, from 
the ill-adapted character of the boats used in this 
movement, and the want of proper appliances, that it 
was not completed until the morning of the 13th. The 



364 Grant as a Soldier 

force sent on this expedition consisted of the Second 
and the Tenth Corps, with a cavalry division, the whole 
under the command of General Hancock. General 
Grant in person visited the field of operations. On the 
13 th, the force moved against the enemy, encounter- 
ing but little opposition until they reached Bailey's 
Creek, the point where a similar advance, some little 
time ago, had been arrested. It had been supposed 
that the enemy's force on the north side of the James 
had been weakened by the sending of three divisions 
to the Shenandoah Valley ; but the result proved that 
only one had gone, the two others, which were under 
marching orders when the movement began, being 
retained to resist it. The advantage gained on this 
day was slight, the enemy's lines being pierced in one 
spot, and four guns captured. On the 14th Hancock 
manoeuvred for a better position, and another slight 
success was gained, six guns being captured. The 
next day new dispositions were made, and on the 16th a 
direct attack was made, and the line was carried, but re- 
captured by the enemy. The 17th, 18th, and 19th were 
passed in unimportant skirmishes, though on the night 
of the 18th a sally by the enemy upon our line was 
repulsed, and on the 20th the force returned to their 
position before Petersburg, the loss during this series 
of eno-ao-ements being about fifteen hundred. 

While this expeditionary force was engaged in the 
movement we have just described, and the enemy's 
attention was thus attracted to the north of the James, 
a movement was also made against the Weldon Rail- 
road, the principal line of communication with the South 
and Petersburg. On the 18th, Warren was sent to take 



and a Statesman. 365 

possession of it, and did so without encountering any 
serious opposition. In the afternoon the enemy at- 
tacked the forces in possession of the railroad, and 
gained a temporary advantage, but were finally driven 
back, leaving us in possession of the road. The posi- 
tion was strengthened, and the next afternoon, the 19th, 
another attack was made by the enemy, with an in- 
creased force, but again unsuccessfully. During this 
attack, the enemy had pressed our troops severely, and 
the result appeared doubtful, when the opportune ar- * 
rival of reinforcements enabled the Union force to 
assume the offensive, and the enemy was driven back 
in confusion to his intrenchments, leaving us in full 
possession of the coveted position. Supposing that the 
importance of the road, as a means of communication 
for supplies, would lead to a renewal of the attempt to 
regain it, Warren busied himself with posting his artil- 
lery advantageously to defend the position, and waited 
the attack. His expectations were not disappointed, 
for on the morning of the 21st, the enemy opened with 
some thirty pieces of artillery, and then attacked in 
front, while at the same time they attempted to turn 
our left. Both these attacks were repulsed, and the 
second with such success that the result was the cap- 
ture of five hundred prisoners. The position, being 
thus held, was made perfectly secure, and this line of 
supplies cut off permanently. The loss sustained in 
this struggle reached an aggregate in killed, wounded, 
and missing of nearly five thousand, while that of the 
enemy was much greater. 

As soon as Warren's position was made secure, the 
Second Corps, under Hancock, was sent down the Wei- 



366 Grant as a Soldier 

don road on the 21st, to the rear of Warren, and de- 
stroyed the road as far as Reams's Station, and in this 
work the troops employed two clays. As Hancock's 
instructions were to destroy the road as far as Rowanty 
Creek, eight miles farther south than Reams's Station, 
the troops were sent upon this mission on the 25th, but 
had hardly moved out when they encountered the 
enemy in force, who advanced to the attack, and after 
a severe struggle obtained an advantage, breaking a 
portion of our defensive line, which had been con- 
structed some time before, by another corps, and was 
faulty in its location. Reinforcements, which had been 
sent to Hancock upon receipt of the intelligence that 
he was hard pressed, did not arrive until the engage- 
ment was over; and that night both parties retired 
from the field of action. 

The possession of the Weldon road remained, how- 
ever, in our hands, and our position here was con- 
nected by intrenchments with the Jerusalem plank 
road, and by the 12th of September, a railroad was 
completed from our position on the Weldon road to 
City Point, thus insuring the constant and easy dis- 
tribution of supplies along the whole of the line, and 
the army rested for a time. 

Grant being resolved, however, to cut all the lines 
of communication, and the next in order being the 
Southside Railroad, a movement was prepared for this 
purpose; but before actively commencing the advance 
upon this left flank, an advance was made upon the 
right Hank, on the north side of the James. On the 
28th of September, the first move was made in this 
direction, in order to test whether the force of the 



and a Statesman. 3G7 

enemy was weak in this portion of his line, and if so to 
take advantage of it, or at least to prevent his massing 
to prevent the extension of our lines upon the left. 

This force sent on this duty moved under the com- 
mand of General Ord, and was composed of the Tenth 
and Eighteenth Corps. Crossing on the night of the 
28th, they moved against the enemy's intrenched lines 
just below Chapin's Farm, carried these, took Fort Har- 
rison, and secured a strong position, having possession 
of the New Market road, with the works defending it. 
An assault was also made upon Fort Gilmer, but with- 
out success, while the cavalry penetrated to within two 
or three miles of Eichmond itself, but were forced to 
retire. The enemy made several determined attempts 
to dislodge the menacing position thus secured, but 
without success, and with severe loss to themselves. 

On the 30th, the movement to extend our left began. 
Two divisions of the Fifth Corps under Warren, and 
two of the Ninth under Parke, moved towards Poplar 
Spring Church and Peeble's Farm, at which points the 
enemy were strongly intrenched, in order to cover our 
advance upon the Southside Railway, and with success. 
The next day the enemy attacked during the after- 
noon, but were repulsed with considerable loss. The 
advanced positions thus gained led to an advance along 
the whole line on the 2d of October, when the enemy 
was found to have withdrawn to his main intrenchments, 
and preparations were made to advance our lines, so 
as to cover the ground thus gained. 

The season was now approaching when active opera- 
tions would have to be discontinued; but before settling 
down to winter quarters, Grant resolved to make an- 
24 



368 Grant as a Soldier 

other attempt to gain the Boyclton plank road, which, 
since the capture of the Weldon Railroad, had become 
doubly valuable and necessary to the enemy for his 
supplies. At this time our line upon the left extended 
two miles west of the Weldon Railroad, and three miles 
farther was this plank road, running to Petersburg, and 
protected by an extension of the enemy's line, which 
covered that road for some distance below the point 
where it crosses Hatcher's Run. These defences also 
covered the Southside Railroad, which was two miles 
farther, running at this point parallel with the plank 
road. The country to be operated in here was so 
thickly wooded that the movement became a confused 
one ; the cooperating columns failing to support each 
other, and it becoming manifest that the enemy's flank 
could not be reached, the troops were withdrawn with- 
out having attained the object of the movement. 

From this time until the opening of the spring cam- 
paign, the operations of the army of the Potomac were 
principally confined to extending and defending the 
lines, until they reached Hatcher's Run, which was 
brought into our lines on the 5th of February, after a 
severe struggle. On the 1st of January, also, the Dutch 
Gap Canal was opened. This was an experiment made 
by General Butler to cut a canal, which it was hoped 
would make a passage for our iron-clads, through a 
peninsula formed by a bend in the James River, and 
known as Farrer's Island, and which is only half a mile 
wide in its narrowest part. The work was commenced 
on the 10th of August, and was done principally by 
negroes, though Butler, with his characteristic in- 
genuity, used it also as a means for retaliating upon 



and a Statesman. 3G9 

the rebels for the outrageous cruelty they showed in 
the treatment of our prisoners, by makinsr those we 
captured work in the ditch, within range of the rebel 
fire. The canal was not, however, a success, since it 
was raked from end to end by the enemy's guns. 

During the month of December, a movement was 
made to destroy entirely, for a distance of twenty-five 
miles, the Weldon Railway. The possession we had of 
it did not entirely prevent the enemy from making it 
of service, since they brought their supplies up to a 
certain point, and then wagoned them the remainder 
of the way. The force started on the 7th, under 
Warren, and completely destroyed the road for about 
twenty miles, returning as successfully as they had 
advanced. They started with four days' rations, and 
besides thus injuring the road, were almost constantly 
engaged in conflict with the enemy. 

Let us now give a hasty glance at the military 
operations in other portions of the country, and see 
what success Grant's plans for the overthrow of the 
rebellion, by the destruction of its military power, have 
met with ; for as he sits in his wooden hut at City Point 
during this winter, upon these, in great measure, will 
depend his action in the coming spring. 



370 



Grant as a Soldier 



NOTE. 

[The tabular statements given below are made from data 
furnished by a staff officer of General Grant.] 

Tabular Statement of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac 
from May 5, 1864, to November 1, 1864. 





DATES. 


KILLED. 


WOUNDED. 


Missmo. 


Aggre- 
gate. 


BATTLES. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
Men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
Men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
Men. 


Wilderness . . . 
Spottsylvania . . 
North Anna. . . 
Cold Harbor. . . 

Trenches 

Weldon RR. . . 
Keams's Station . 
Peeble's Farm . . 

Trenches 

Boydton Pl'k r'd. 


May 5 to 12 . . . 
May 12 to 21.. . 
May 21 to 31,. . . 
June 1 to 10 . . . 
June 10 to 20. . . 
June 20 to July 30 

Aug. 1 to 18 . . . 
Aug. 18 to 21 . . 

Aug. 25 

Sept. 30 to Oct. 1 . 
Aug. 18 to Oct. 30 
Oct. 27 to 28. . . 


269 
114 
12 
144 
85 
29 
47 
10 
21 
24 
12 
13 
16 


3,019 

2,032 

138 

1,501 

1,113 

576 

372 

128 

191 

93 

129 

284 

140 


1,017 

259 

67 

421 

361 

120 

124 

58 

100 

62 

50 

91 

66 


18,261 
7,697 
1,003 
8,621 
6,492 
2,374 
1,555 

626 
1,055 

484 

738 
1,214 

981 


177 

31 

3 

51 

46 

10S 

91 

1 

104 

95 

56 

4 

8 


6,667 

248 

324 

2,355 

1,508 

2,109 

1,819 

45 

3.072 

1,674 

1,700 

800 

619 


29,410 
10,381 
1,007 
13,153 
9,C>()5 
5,316 
4,008 
868 
4,543 
2,432 
2,685 
2,406 
1,830 




796 


9,776 


2,790 


51,161 


775 


23,000 


88,304 



Statement showing the Number of Colors captured from the Ene- 
my during the Operations of the Army of the Potomac, from 
May 4, 1864, to November 1, 1864. 

Number of Colors captured 67 

Captured by Cavalry Corps 3 

Captured by Second Corps 40 

Captured by Fifth Corps 10 

Captured by Sixth Corps 3 

Captured by Ninth Corps 11 

Note. — The foregoing statement is made up. from the reports 
of captured colors that had been received at this time. 

Two divisions of the Cavalry Corps and the Sixth Corps having 
been transferred from the army of the Potomac, it is not certainly 
known that all the colors captured by these troops prior to their 
transfer are here reported. 



and a Statesman. 



371 



Statement showing the Number of Prisoners captured by the Army 
of the Potomac, during the Operations from May 4, 1864, to 

November 1, 1864. 

» 

From May 1 to May 12 7,078 

From May 12 to July 31 6,506 

From July 31 to August 31 573 

From August 31 to September 30 78 

From September 30 to October 31 1,138 

Total 15,373 



Statement showing the Number of Guns captured from the Enemy, 

also the Number of Guns lost during the Operations of the 

Army of the Potomac, from May 4, 1864, to November 1, 1864. 

Thirty-two guns were captured, and twenty-five guns lost, as 

follows : — 



May 5 
" 10 

" 11 

" 12 

June 17 

ci 22 

" 29 

July 28 
" 28 

Aug. 15 
" 25 

Sept. 30 





NUMBER. 


CORPS. 




Capt'd. 


Lost. 


Fifth. 


— 


2 


Second. 


- 


1 


Cavalry. 

Second. 

Ninth. 

Second. 

Cavalry. 


2 

20 
4 


4 

8 


Second. 
Cavalry. 
Second. 
Second. 


4 
1 


1 
9 


Fifth. 


1 


- 


32 


25 



Wilderness. 

South of the Po 

Kiver. 
Yellow Tavern. 
Spottsylvania. 
Petersburg. 

Ditto. 
Reams's Station. 

Jones's Neck. 
Deep Bottom. 

Reams's Station. 

Poplar Gr. Ch. 



Winslow's battery " D," First N. Y. 

Artillery. 
Brown's battery " B," First B. L 

Light Artillery. 



McKnigTit's Twelfth N. Y. battery. 
Maynadier's, " K," First U. S. 4; 
Fitzhugh's, " C " and " F," 4. 

Denison's, " A," Second U. S. 

Sleeper's Tenth Mass. battery, 4. 
McKnigfct's, Twelfth N. Y., 1. 



172 Geant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XLI. 

OPERATIONS ELSEWHERE IN THE FIELD. — SHERMAN ON 
HIS MARCH TO THE SEA. — THOMAS AT NASHVILLE.— 
THE ATTACK ON FORT FISHER. — SHERIDAN ON A RAID. 

As Grant now held the position of General of all our 
armies, it comes of course naturally in the record of 
his influence during the war to describe the military 
actions which in other parts of the country, and under 
his general though not under his personal supervision, 
put an end to the rebellion, and vindicated the theory 
of the progress of nations, of the spread of the demo- 
cratic idea, of the recognition of the dignity of labor, 
and that justice should and must be the foundation of 
all social organization. 

The principal cooperating army was that led by Sher- 
man, which gathered at Chattanooga, and on the 1st of 
May, 1864, reached an aggregate of nearly one hun- 
dred thousand n\en, with two hundred and fifty-four 
guns, and commenced to move on the 6th of May. In 
and about Dalton, Georgia, lay the opposing army, 
under the command of Johnston, and numbering about 
sixty thousand men. 

To give a minute account of the brilliant manoeuvres 
by which Sherman forced his antagonist to fall back 
constantly in order to maintain his lines of communi- 
cation, would occupy us too long, and would hardly be 



and a Statesman. 373 

in place here. On the 10th of July, however, after a 
most brilliant series of movements, varied with fierce 
fighting, Sherman and his army found themselves " un- 
disputed masters north and west of the Chattahoochie," 
and within eight miles of Atlanta. Here the Confed- 
erate government relieved Johnston from the com- 
mand, and gave it to Hood, who met with no better 
success than his predecessor ; since a furious attack on 
the Union forces, with which he inaugurated his com- 
mand, did more injury to his own army than to that of 
his antagonist, while Sherman, by again threatening 
its base of supplies, forced the rebel army to evacuate 
Atlanta, which thus fell into our hands on the 2d of 
September. Here the army rested to recruit and pre- 
pare for its march to the sea, while Hood, abandoning the 
South, which Sherman was now preparing to invade, ad- 
vanced to cut Sherman's lines of communication, which 
Sherman himself was now about to abandon. 

Leaving, therefore, Thomas to look after Hood, on 
the 14th of November Sherman commenced his south- 
ern march, and, living off the country, met hardly 
any opposition until he reached Savannah, where Fort 
McAllister was carried by storm, while the garrison of 
the city, under Beauregard and Hardee, escaped, and 
the army entered Savannah without further opposition, 
and communicated with the fleet. 

The plan of this march Sherman had submitted to 
General Grant, and received his sanction for attempting 
it. Fort McAllister was carried on the loth of De- 
cember, just one month after the army had cut loose from 
Atlanta, a distance of over three hundred miles, and 
Savannah was occupied on the 21st of the same month. 



374 Grant as a Soldier 

During this time, Hood, in Iiis march north, had, on 
the 30 th of November, been checked at Franklin by a 
corps of observation under Schofield, which had been 
watching his advance, and made a stand here to pro- 
tect the trains of the army gathering under Thomas, 
at Nashville. 

After this battle, which fulfilled all it was intended 
to do, Schofield fell back to Nashville, and Hood, press- 
ing on, commenced the establishment of his line be- 
fore that city on the 2d of December. On the 15th 
of this month, Thomas, having matured his prepara- 
tions, attacked Hood in his position, and, after a battle 
of two clays, routed him thoroughly, and drove his 
army away as a confused, unorganized crowd. Hood 
had advanced into Tennessee with fifty thousand men, 
and left it with one half that number, and these in such 
a condition that they never again were of any value as 
an organized military force. 

From Savannah Sherman's army could have been 
brought up by sea to cooperate with the army of the 
Potomac before Petersburg, or could take the over land 
route, marching through the Carolinas until it formed 
a junction with Grant's. This last course was decided 
upon, and on the 19th of January, 18G5, all prepara- 
tions being complete, the orders for inarching were 
given, and the army set out, expecting to reach Golds- 
boro', North Carolina, by the 15th of March, and then, 
by the extension of the railroad from Newborn, again 
communicate with the sea. 

Thus, [it the commencement of the year 18G5, the 
entire military operations of the country were working 
together towards a single object, and that was the over- 



and a Statesman. 375 

throw of the armed resistance of the rebellion, and 
this resistance was centred about Richmond. By his 
superior military skill, by the character of the men 
forming- his army, and by the combination of fortuitous 
circumstances, Lee had been enabled to prolong the 
resistance at this point, which was almost an outpost 
of the Confederacy. Had it not been for this, the 
course of the war would have demonstrated, even more 
decidedly than it has, the absolute necessity, from the 
geographical character of the country, that the interests 
of its inhabitants are interdependent upon each other, 
and that Nature herself had preordained, by a law as 
inexorable as that by which water seeks its level, that 
the portion of mankind inhabiting this section of the 
world should be united, and not divided. A map of 
the country, showing the principal features of its phys- 
ical geography, the course of its rivers, the lines of its 
mountain ranges, and the various modifications of sur- 
face and production, which physical geography treats, 
would prove as conclusively as the bitter experience of 
civil war has proved, that it would be impossible to 
draw division lines, and would have made the theory 
of secession as absurd as the attempt has been futile 
and disastrous. 

While the army of the Potomac remained quiet but 
watchful before Petersburg during the winter months, 
various movements were planned and executed, having 
the object of preparing for the spring campaign, or co- 
operating with Sherman's advance. One of these move- 
ments was the expedition against Fort Fisher, which 
was prepared in November and started early in De- 
cember. The capture of this place would close the 



376 Grant as a Soldier 

port of Wilmington, which was the most important port 
remaining for the blockade runners. The arrange- 
ments were completed during a personal visit from 
Grant to Hampton Roads, and detailed in the following 
order to General Butler, from whose department the 
troops were drawn, and in which it is shown that 
General Weitzel was to command the expedition : — 

City Point, Va., December 6, 1864. 

General: The first object of the expedition under General 
Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If suc- 
cessful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington itself 
There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can 
be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces 
now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The directions you have 
given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all 
right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark, 
and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. The object of 
the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main 
land between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the 
north entrance to the river. Should such landing be effected 
whilst the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and the batteries guard- 
ing the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench 
themselves, and by cooperating with the navy, effect the reduction 
and capture of those places. These in our hands, the navy could 
enter the harbor, and the port of Willmington would be sealed. 
Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall 
into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will 
be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march 
and surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the 
expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration. 

The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer 
immediately in command of the troops. 

Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing 
at or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operat- 
ing against Richmond without delay. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General 

Major General B. F. Butler. 



and a Statesman. 377 

On the 13th of December the fleet of transports 
got under way, but from various delays the expedi- 
tionary force did not disembark until the 25th, and 
after a bombardment of the fort by the fleet, returned 
without making an assault. The fleet, however, re- 
mained, and the expedition was sent back with General 
Terry in command, with the following instructions from 
Grant : — 

City Point, Va., January 3, 18G5. 

General: The expedition intrusted to your command has 
been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, 
N. C, and Wilmington, ultimately, if the fort falls. You will then 
proceed, with as little delay as possible, to the naval fleet lying off* 
Cape Fear River, and report the arrival of yourself and command 
to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic Blockading 
Squadron. It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete 
understanding should exist between yourself and the naval com- 
mander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral 
Porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by 
each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity 
of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid 
down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know 
that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what 
he proposes. I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is con- 
sistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to be at- 
tained is, to get a firm position on the spit of land on which Fort 
Fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. You 
want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and 
to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by 
any of the avenues left open to the enemy. If such a position can 
be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will not be abandoned until 
its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is or- 
dered from these headquarters. 

My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought 
to run a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, whilst the bal- 
ance of it operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort 



373 Grant as a Soldier 

Fisher, or cut it off from supplies or reinforcements whilst the 
river is in possession of the enemy. 

A siege-train will be loaded on vessels, and sent to Fort Mon- 
roe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies 
can be drawn from Beaufort as you nee'd them. 

Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. 
When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of 
them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders. 

In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back 
to Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instruc- 
tions. You will not debark at Beaufort- until so directed. 

General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops 

to Baltimore, and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops 

will be brought to Fort Monroe, and kept there on the vessels 

until you are heard from. Should you require them, they will be 

sent to you. 

IT. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Brevet Major General A. H. Terry. 

On the 6th of January the expedition started from 
Fortress Monroe, on the 13th and 14th the troops were 
landed, and on the 15th the fleet commenced a bom- 
bardment at a quarter before seven in the morning, 
which lasted until the guns of the fort were silenced 
in the early afternoon, when an assault was made, and 
the fort captured, with a total loss of about nine hun- 
dred men. A portion of this loss was in an assaulting 
column made up of sailors from the fleet, who behaved 
with the greatest gallantry. The next day the defences 
on the opposite side of the river were taken, and Wil- 
mington was sealed. The necessity of the capture was 
shown in the fact that two or three blockade-runners 
ran in and were captured after we had taken the fort 

On the 15th of February General Schofield, who had 



and a Statesman. 379 

been detached from Thomcis's army after Hood's defeat 
at Nashville, was put in command of the department 
of North Carolina, and, having arrived, took command 
of the troops, in obedience to the following order : — 

City Point, Va., January 31, 18G5. 

General: . . . Your movements are intended as cooperative 
with Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina. 
The first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' 
will then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington 
or Newbern, or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able 
to reach Goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of rail- 
way connecting that place with the sea-coast, as near to it as you 
can, building the road behind you. The enterprise under you has 
two objects : the first is, to give Sherman material aid, if needed, 
in his march north ; the second, to open a base of supplies for him 
on his line of march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine 
which of the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best 
use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will commence 
the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty 
thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of these 
as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior 
as you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has re- 
ceived some instructions direct from General Sherman on the sub- 
ject of securing supplies for his army. You can learn what steps 
he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. 
A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary. 

Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective depart- 
ments in the field with me at City Point. Communicate with me 
by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any 
time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you 
can communicate by telegraph. 

The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of 
those required for your own command. • 

The movements of the enemy may justify you, or even make it 
your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for 
the interior to aid Sherman. In such case, you will act on your 



380 Grant as a Soldier 

own judgment, without waiting for instructions. You will report, 
however, what you propose doing. The details for carrying out 
these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, how- 
ever, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the im- 
portance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the 
neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of 
February. This limits your time very materially. 

If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it 
can be supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad-men 
has already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics Avill go to 
Fort Fisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed you 
by telegraph. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General J. M. Schofield. 

On the 16th Schofield advanced against Fort Ander- 
son, and on the 18th prepared for an assault, which the 
enemy made needless by evacuating that work early 
the next morning, and, pushing forward, on the 22d 
the army entered the city of Wilmington, from which 
the enemy had also retreated. 

The following orders, sent to Thomas, will show how 
the force under his command was to be occupied : — 

City Point, Va., February 14, 1S65. 
General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against 
Mobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of 
about twenty thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The 
cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. 
It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move 
from there eastward in cooperation. Hood's army has been ter- 
ribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, 
by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the with- 
drawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large 
portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so asserted 
in the Richmond papers; and a member of the rebel Congress said 



and a Statesman. 381 

n few days since, in a speech, that one half of it had been brought 
to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, or even 
if it is not true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention 
of the enemy, and leave an advance from your stand-point easy. 
I think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cav- 
alry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. 
The object would be threefold : First, to attract as much of the 
enemy's force as possible, to insure success to Canby; second, to 
destroy the enemy's line of communications and military resources : 
third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. 
Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the 
expedition against. This, however, would not be so important as 
the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion should 
be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, ac- 
cording to the information he may receive, he will best secure the 
objects named above. 

Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know 
what number of men you can put into the field. If not more than 
five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. 
It is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the 
one leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a 
week. I do not know when it will start, but will inform you by 
telegraph as soon as I learn. If you should hear through other 
sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information 
received. 

To insure success, your cavalry should go with as little wagon- 
train as possible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would 
also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of bat- 
teries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. No guns or 
caissons should be taken with less than eight horses. 

Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force 
you think you will be able to send, under these directions. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General George H. Thomas. 

About this time also Sheridan was sent to encircle 
the Confederate position at Richmond and Petersburg, 



382 Grant as a Soldiek 

thus cutting all their connections, and finally make a 
junction with Sherman coming up from the South. 

Starting, therefore, from Winchester on the 27th of 
February, Sheridan rode through the Valley of the 
Shenandoah, scattering the remnants of an army which 
still remained with Early, and, striking Charlottesville, 
destroyed the Richmond and Lynchburg Railroad. His 
orders were to reach Lynchburg, destroy the railroad 
and canal, and then, passing west of Danville, join Sher- 
man when he should arrive. While waiting, however, 
at Charlottesville for his trains, the James River became 
so swollen that he could not cross, and, therefore, 
changing his plan, he destroyed the canal, and sought 
a crossing of the James between Lynchburg and Rich- 
mond. The destruction of the bridges having, however, 
made this also impossible, he resolved to turn in the 
direction of White House, and from thence make a junc- 
tion with the army of the Potomac. This plan w T as suc- 
cessfully carried out, and reaching White House on the 
19th of March, he finally pushed across the peninsula, 
and joined the army before Petersburg on the 26th of 
March. The following order contains the instructions 
under which Sheridan acted during this most success- 
ful expedition : — 

Citt Point, Va., February 20, 18G5 — 1 P. M. 
General : As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will 
have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force 
alone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in 
every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. 
Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after Mosby's 
gang. From Lynchburg, if information you might get there would 
justify it, you could strike south, heading the streams in Virginia, 



and a Statesman. 383 

to the -westward of Danville, and push on and join Sherman. 
This additional raid, with one now about starting from East Ten- 
nessee, under Stoneman, numbering four or five thousand cavalry; 
one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry; 
one from Eastport, Mississippi, numbering ten thousand cavalry ; 
Canby, from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed 
troops, — these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and 
Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals 
of South Carolina, — is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for 
the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to overcome great 
obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated on Tues- 
day last. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General P. H. Sheridan. 
25 



3S4 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XLII. 

THE OPENING OF THE LAST CAMPAIGN.— PETERSBURG AND 
RICHMOND EVACUATED. 

The clay appointed for the movement of the army 
of the Potomac was the 29th of March, 18G5. This 
was now the position of affairs. Lee was sorely beset 
by his indomitable antagonist. Sherman had arrived 
at Goldsboro', and the army opposing him, under John- 
ston, made up as it was of all the various small detach- 
ments of men the Confederacy could gather, was unable 
to resist his further advance. Thomas had sent out 
two cavalry expeditions, one into Northern Alabama, 
and the other into Eastern Tennessee, while Pope was 
taking care of the west of the Mississippi; and Han- 
cock was in the Valley of the Shenandoah, at Win- 
chester, ready to cooperate with Grant's army by a 
march against Richmond. The real difficulty now was 
to prevent Lee from leaving his position, and, by hasten- 
ing south, form a junction with Johnston's army, and 
then, thus reenforced, prolong the war by retreating 
to the mountainous portions of West Virginia and East 
Tennessee. 

On the 24th the following orders for the move- 
ment on the 29th were given to the various com- 
manders: — 



and a Statesman. 385 

City Point, Va., March 24, 18C5. 

General: On the 29th instant the armies operating against 
Richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of 
turning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg, 
and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan, 
Which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and de- 
stroy the Southside and Danville Railroads. Two corps of the 
army of the Potomac will be moved, at first, in two columns, taking 
the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run nearest where the present 
line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards Din- 
widdie Court-house. 

The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now 
under General Davies, will move, at the same time, by the Weldon 
road and the Jerusalem plank road, turning west from the latter 
before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column 
reaching Stony Creek. General Sheridan will then move inde- 
pendently under other instructions, which will be given him. All 
dismounted cavalry belonging to the army of the Potomac, and 
the dismounted cavalry from the middle military division not re- 
quired for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, 
will report to Brigadier General Benham, to be added to the 
defences of City Point. Major General Parke will be left in com- 
mand of all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg 
and City Point, subject, of course, to orders from the commander 
of the army of the Potomac. The Ninth Army Corps will be left 
intact to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line 
now occupied by us is held. If, however, the troops to the left of 
the Ninth Corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be 
thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior 
to the capture of the Weldon road. All troops to the left of the 
Ninth Corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest 
notice by such route as may be designated when the order is 
given. 

General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one col- 
ored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and 
march for the present left of the army of the Potomac. In the 
absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the 
white divisions will follow the left column of the army of the 



386 Grant as a Soldier 

Potomac, and the colored division the right column. During the 
movement Major General Weitzel will be left in command of all 
the forces remaining behind from the army of the James. 

The movement of troops from the army of the James will com- 
mence on the night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave 
behind the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty 
in the absence of the main army. A cavalry expedition from 
General Ord's command will also be started from Suffolk, to leave 
there on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, for 
the purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford. This, if 
accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and, therefore, from three 
to five hundred men will be sufficient. They should, however, be 
supported by all the infantry that can be spared from Norfolk and 
Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the Black- 
water. The crossing should probably be at Uniteu. Should Colonel 
Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon road, he will be instruct- 
ed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between 
Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad bridge at Weldon 
being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to 
destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have col- 
lected south of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four 
days' rations in haversacks, and eight days' in wagons. To avoid 
as much hauling as possible, and to give the army of the James 
the same number of days' supplies with the army of the Potomac, 
General Ord will direct his Commissary and Quartermaster to have 
sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up 
in passing. Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in 
wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will 
carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. The 
densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making 
the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the 
army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the 
option of the army commanders. 

All necessary preparations fur carrying these directions into 
operation may be commenced at once. The reserves of the Ninth 
Cups should be massed as much as possible. Whilst I would not 
now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, 
they should be ready, and should make the attack, if the enemy 
weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. In 



and a Statesman. 387 

case they carry the line, then the whole of the Ninth Corps could 
follow up so as to join or cooperate with the balance of the army. 
To prepare for this, the Ninth Corps will have rations issued to 
them the same as the balance of the army. General Weit/.el will 
keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable 
to break through at any point, he will do so. A success north of 
the James should be followed up with great promptness. An 
attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has 
detached largely. In that case, it may be regarded as evident that 
the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the 
defence of Richmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning 
all the line north of the James, except enclosed works ; only to be 
abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the 
enemy. 

By these instructions, a large part of the armies operating 
against Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, 
as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the 
hope of advantage not being taken of it, whilst they hurl every- 
thing against the moving column, and return. It cannot be im- 
pressed too strongly uj)on commanders of trooj)s left in the trenches 
not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. The 
very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might 
be regarded as conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his 
lines. I would have it particularly enjoined upon corps com- 
manders, that in case of an attack from the enemy, those not 
attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of 
the army to Avhich they belong, but that they will move promptly, 
and notify the commander of their action. I wish also to enjoin 
the same action on the part of division commanders, when other 
parts of their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge 
the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major Generals Meade, Ord, and Sheridan. 

It appears to be certain that Lee at this time had 
formed the intention to retreat, and, leaving both Pe- 
tersburg and Richmond, make a junction with John- 
ston somewhere on the Danville Railroad; and it i,^ 



388 Grant as a Soldier 

asserted that arrangements were made for carrying out 
this design : the line of retreat was chosen, and supplies 
were ordered to be sent beforehand, early in March, to 
meet the retreating army at Amelia Court-house. In 
this plan Lee designed taking the south bank of the 
Appomattox, which would be the shortest route to 
Amelia Court-house ; but as the extension of the left of 
the army of the Potomac interfered with the roads by 
which the retreat was to be effected, Lee resolved by 
making an attack upon the right flank of the army, to 
force the weakening of the left flank to support the right, 
and thus open the desired road for him. The point 
at which it was evidently best that such a bold stroke 
should be directed was Fort Steadman, one of the works 
of our line, the capture of which would give the victor 
control of the railroad to City Point, and thus threaten 
the supplies. The morning of the 25th of March was 
selected for this attack, and at early dawn the assault- 
ing column charged and carried the fort. It was a 
surprise, and the majority of the garrison were taken 
prisoners. The guns of the fort were immediately 
turned upon the other adjacent points of our line to the 
right and left, and batteries nine, ten, and eleven were 
consequently abandoned also. 

Thus far the success of the Confederate commander's 
plan was most perfect, but its continuance was short-lived. 
The assaulting column was to be supported with a large 
body of troops, in fact by all that could be gathered for 
this duty, since such was the construction of the Union 
lines, that the capture of any single isolated point in 
them, if not supported by the capture of the contiguous 
parts of the line, was of no avail, since the point would 



and a Statesman. 389 

be commanded by those contiguous. This support, for 
some reason or other, the assaulting column did not 
have, and so they soon found that their success was 
their misfortune. The fort they had taken they could 
not expect to hold isolated and alone, while retreat 
was equally impossible, since the ground over which it 
must be made was swept by such a murderous fire 
that to pass through it was certain death. Thus they 
were caged, and forced to surrender, and about two 
thousand of them did so. This attack also served to 
awaken our army; and a general advance being ordered, 
the advance picket lines of the enemy, which were 
strongly intrenched, were carried, and held, and were 
of service subsequently. 

On the 27th of March, Sherman, whose army had 
arrived on the 21st at Goldsboro', where it was resting 
for a few days and receiving supplies, paid a visit to 
Grant at City Point, and a conference was held, at 
which President Lincoln was present, with Sheridan, 
Meade, and other Generals. Sherman said he would 
be ready to move on the 10th of April against John- 
ston, with twenty days' supplies, and having been in- 
formed of the plan of action decided upon for the army 
of the Potomac, returned to Goldsboro'. 

On the 28th the following instructions were given to 
Sheridan. 

City Point, Va., March 28, 18C5. 
General : The Fifth Army Corps will move by the Vaughan 
road at three A. M. to-morrow morning. The Second moves at 
about nine A. M., having but about three miles to march to reach 
the first point designated for it to take on the right of the Fifth 
Corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court-house. Move 



390 Grant as a Soldier 

your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being 
confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the 
nearest roads in rear of the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, and 
passing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of 
the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack 
the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out if 
possible. Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where 
he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own 
way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or fol- 
low, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will 
probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, 
and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, 
you may cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it 
practicable, I would like you to cross the Southside road, between 
Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I 
would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the 
Danville road, which I would like you to strike as near to the 
Appomattox as possible. Make your destruction on that road as 
complete as possible. You can then pass on to the Southside road, 
west of Burkesville, and destroy that in like manner. 

After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, 
which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may 
return to this army, selecting your road farther south ; or you may 
go on into North Carolina, and join General Sherman. Should 
you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as 
possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'. 

IT. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General P. H. Sheridan. 

The force under Sheridan's command amounted to 
about nine thousand men, and on the afternoon of 
the 29th he was at Dinwiddie Court-house, thus form- 
ing the extreme left of our line. At the same time 
the left of the army had been also advanced, and on 
the 29th, Grant, who was with the advance at Gravelly 
Run, sent the following despatch to Sheridan: — 






and a Statesman. 391 

Gravelly Run, March 29, 1805. 

General : Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to 
Dinwiddle. We are all ready, however, to give up all from the 
Jerusalem plank road to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can 
be used advantageously. After getting into line south of Hatch- 
er's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position. General 
Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker road intersects the 
Boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred 
men. Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushing on 
when last heard from. 

I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before 
going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go 
after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning, push round 
the enemy if you can, and get on to his right rear. The move- 
ments of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. 
"We will act all together as one army here, until it is seen what can 
be done with the enemy. The signal-officer at Cobb's Hill report- 
ed, at 11.30 A. M., that a cavalry column had passed that point 
from Richmond towards Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General P. H. Sheridan. 

This movement had been successfully carried out 
with but very little loss, and with great celerity ; yet 
it had not escaped Lee's observation. It was evident 
that his vital lines of communication were being cut, 
and the existence of his army depended upon his pre- 
serving these, or else cutting his way out in retreat. 
At the same time, also, it was necessary that he should 
preserve his lines, covering Petersburg and Richmond ; 
and from his left to his right these lines extended 
thirty-five miles. His army, however, had suffered 
greatly during the last campaign, and the spirit of 
desertion was now rife among the remainder. The 
Confederate leaders had shown for the rights of the 
people of the Confederacy as contemptuous a disre- 



392 Grant as a Soldier 

gard as they had displayed for their duties to the 
nation. Every branch of their pretended government 
was characterized by as mad folly and wickedness as 
was displayed in the whole conception of secession. 
Their financial system was conceived and managed in 
a spirit as contemptuously ignorant of the people's 
rights, as their attempt to found a nationality based 
upon slavery was for the rights of labor, and of course 
resulted in the same disastrous failure. Their system 
of conscription was marked by the same imbecile spirit 
of despotism, and while it failed to replete their armies, 
filled the country with discontent. Their commissary 
department was a system of organized theft, and in so 
far was, perhaps, the fairest exposition of the whole 
movement, since in not even a single state was any 
attention paid to the law or the people's rights in the 
passage of the pretended secession ordinances. How, 
then, can it be wondered at that a movement commenced 
in treason, carried on by injustice and falsehood, should 
fail to display these qualities in its every detail ? * 

While Lee, therefore, could not entirely abandon his 
lines in front of Richmond, and before Bermuda Hun- 
dred, he did not even dare to weaken his effective force 
there, since he was unaware that Grant had withdrawn 
the greater portion of his troops threatening the ad- 

* Mr. Swinton reports a conversation held, after the war, with the rebel 
General Johnston, from which we take the following extracts. Speaking of 
the conscription, he says, " Finally, it resulted that it required as many men 
to enforce the conscription as it was expected to raise by the operation. 
Then ensued evasion ; those who wished to shirk service, or aid others to 
do so, opened their ranks, allowed them to slip through, and closed up behind. 
Supplies also, instead of being honestly raised, were impressed by a band 
of Commissaries and Quartermasters, who only paid one half the market 
value. As might have been expected, this was enough to prevent their getting 



and a Statesman. 393 

vance at these points, in order to mass them in his at- 
tempt upon our left. It was not until four days after- 
wards that he found how weak was the force Grant had 
left threatening Richmond directly. Collecting, how- 
ever, all the force he could make available, Lee trans- 
ferred them to protect his threatened right. 

The morning of the 30th, a heavy rain-storm, which 
had set in the night before, and which continued stead- 
ily all that day, prevented any active operations, since 
it made the roads wholly impassable. Nothing could 
be done but advance the corps of Humphreys and 
Warren, who held the extreme left, next to Sheridan, 
close to the Confederate line, while Sheridan moved a 
body of cavalry to Five Forks, but found it so strongly 
held by the enemy, that the force sent could not carry 
it. Friday, the 31st, the ground was still so swampy 
that it w r as decided that active operations were impos- 
sible, but Warren was advanced still farther upon the 
left, touching the extreme right of the Confederate po- 
sition on the White Oak road. Sheridan, at this time, 
was still some miles farther to the left, and Warren was 
directed, if he found he could gain possession of the 
White Oak road, to do so. 

The. advance in this direction had, however, hardly 
begun, when, at half past ten in the morning, Lee took 

anything. These they took hy force, and did it with the greatest injustice. 
You can imagine what disorganization of labor and discontent this produced. 
The mismanagement of the Confederate executive in these two regards was 
enough to ruin the cause." 

The cause was not ruined by these systems ; they were the direct results of 
the cause itself. No one but a fool would expect to gather figs from thistles, 
and the world has advanced to the point where we know, that to expect from 
men who profess to believe in slavery, and who do really fight for its support, 
anything but injustice and dishonesty, is an equal folly. 



394 Grant as a Soldier 

the initiative, and by a heavy attack upon Warren, who 
held the exposed right flank of the army, sought to 
prevent our extension in this direction. It was the 
same move he had often tried before with greater or 
less success; and in this case all the troops he had been 
able to collect were put in this attack, in order to make 
it of sufficient weight to secure success. The attack 
came suddenly, and at first promised success ; but the 
corps soon rallied, and, holding their own, took, in their 
turn, the aggressive, and forced the Confederates back 
to their old line on the White Oak road. 

Foiled, therefore, in this attempt, "Lee withdrew his 
troops, and turned them against Sheridan, who, on the 
morning of the 31st, had taken Five Forks, a position 
about eight miles north of Didwidclie Court-house, and 
only four miles east of Lee's intrenched position in front 
of Warren and Humphreys, and from which position 
he threatened to turn Lee's right. The attack was 
made in such force that Sheridan was compelled to 
fall back upon Dinwiddie Court-house, and the Confed- 
erates following up their advantage, pressed the troops 
heavily; but they held their position until night put an 
end to the contest. That night reinforcements were 
sent to Sheridan ; but Lee, finding that keeping a.strong 
force at Dinwiddie weakened his line, withdrew the 
troops, at ten P. M., to Five Forks, leaving only a cavalry 
picket. 

The next, day, the 1st of April, Sheridan, with his re- 
enforcements, advanced against Five Forks ; and it was 
evident that this was the important point along the 
entire line. Here, after a brilliant engagement, in which 
Sheridan, combining his infantry and cavalry, using 



and a Statesman. 395 

the last as a mask for his first, and displaying great 
skill not only as an impetuous and dashing cavalry of- 
ficer, but also as a sagacious tactician, finally succeeded 
in entirely routing the enemy, driving him out of the 
position, capturing over five thousand prisoners and 
many guns and standards. It was a complete victory, 
and broke the line of defence against the advance of 
the army of the Potomac. The enemy, fleeing west, 
was pursued until after dark by the cavalry. As soon 
as the result was known, the guns along the entire line 
opened upon the enemy's defences, and all night the 
darkness was made luminous by the bursting of hun- 
dreds of shells. The object of this bombardment was 
to prevent Lee from leaving his works either to retreat 
or to fall upon Sheridan in his isolated position. The 
firing began at nightfall on the 1st, and continued until 
the dawn of the next day, which was Sunday, the 2d 
of April, when an assault was made along the entire 
line, from the Appomattox to Hatcher's Run. 

This attack was successful in driving the enemy from 
their intrenchments, and forcing them back to the 
chain of works immediately about Petersburg, where 
Lee made a last and desperate stand, in order to pre- 
pare for the evacuation of the town as soon as night 
should come. This design he communicated to Davis 
at Richmond, about eleven in the morning of this 
Sunday. 

The despatch found the Confederate president at 
church ; reading it, he rose hastily and left the place, 
while, as he passed down the aisle, the ghastliness of his 
face told the tale of disaster to all who saw it. Lee 
was about to abandon Petersburg and Richmond that 



396 Grant as a Soldier 

night, and it behooved the chief conspirator to look out 
for his own personal safety. 

Expecting Lee's retreat, Grant, that night, took 
measures to prevent it. There was but one safe line 
opened for the Confederate retreat, and that was up 
the Appomattox, west of the Danville Eailroad ; but on 
the night of the 2d, Sheridan was at Ford's Station, and 
this forced Lee to take the north side of the Appomat- 
tox. Meanwhile, the lines round Petersburg were close- 
ly held, and Weitzel on the north was set to watch 
Richmond. 

That night, however, Lee's army withdrew, marching 
noiselessly through the town, and filing over to the 
north bank of the Appomattox. Thence turning to- 
wards Chesterfield Court-house, it was joined by the 
troops withdrawn from in front of Bermuda Hundred, 
together with whatever force remained on the Rich- 
mond side, and started westward. 

The retreat was conducted with such celerity that 
by morning the army, now reduced to twenty-five 
thousand men, were sixteen miles away. So quietly 
was this done, that on the morning of the 3d the 
skirmishers before Petersburg found the town evac- 
uated, while at the same time on the north, Weitzel, 
startled by the reports and flames of the explosions in 
Richmond, surmised that the place was being evac- 
uated, and with a body of forty troopers rode in and 
took possession of the capital, which had for years baf- 
fled all our attempts to capture it. The rear-guard, on 
leaving Richmond, had blown up the iron-clads in the 
James, and also the bridges on the river; and the 
government officials appropriately finished their reign 



and a Statesman. 397 

of control by setting fire to the store-houses of supplies. 
From these the fire spread to the houses of the city, 
and though the energies of the Union troops were im- 
mediately devoted to overcoming the conflagration, a 
large part of the city was consumed before their efforts 
were successful. 

This incident is a fit commentary upon the purposes 
of the two parties, one maddened by its disappointed 
ambition, scattering fire and destruction, regardless of 
consequences, the other hastening to save ; and not 
only was the city preserved by our troops, but, the 
supplies being destroyed, our army gave food to the 
inhabitants. 

The news of the capture of Richmond was sent 
to "Washington, in the following despatch, and from 
there spread all over the country: — 

City Point, Virginia, April 3 — 11 A. M. 

General Weitzel telegraphs as follows : — 

" "We took Richmond at 8 : 15 this morning. I captured many- 
guns. The enemy left in great haste. 

" The city is on fire in one place. We are making every effort 
to put it out. 

" The people received us with enthusiastic expressions of joy. 

"General Grant started early this morning, with the army, 
towards the Danville road, to cut ofT Lee's retreating army, if 
possible." 

President Lincoln has gone to the front. 

T. S. Bowers, Assistant Adjutant General. 

E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 



398 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XLI1I. 

THE PURSUIT. — THE SURRENDER OF LEE. — END OF THE 
TEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. 

Thus on Monday morning, the 3d of April, 1865, the 
news of the evacuation of Richmond, and that it was in 
possession of the Union forces, had spread all over the 
country, and the day was spent in universal rejoicing. 
All business was suspended by a tacit universal con- 
sent. The nation gave itself up to congratulations and 
every kind of expression of joy. The long agony of 
the war was over, and the sight of a nation rejoicing 
will never be forgotten by those who saw it. In the 
city of New York, it seemed as though the houses 
clothed themselves in flags as naturally as the trees put 
forth their foliage in the spring. The streets were 
filled with smiling crowds ; even the well-known haunts 
of secession, making a virtue of necessity, put on an air 
of rejoicing. 

But while the country was thus busy in expressing 
its happiness, Grant lost no time in organizing a vigor- 
ous pursuit of the retreating Confederate army. Early 
on the morning of Monday, the 3d of April, the ad- 
vance of our skirmishers before Petersburg found the 
city evacuted, and the pursuit began immediately. 
Lee's army, as we have seen, retreated by the north 
bank of the Appomattox. Pursuing this route for a 



and a Statesman. 399 

distance of about thirty miles, they then crossed this 
stream at Goode's Bridge, in order to strike the Dan- 
ville road at Amelia Court-house. This place is situated 
about thirty-eight miles west of both Eichmond and 
Petersburg, and was reached by the army on the 4th. 

In anticipation of his retreat, Lee had sent a train 
with supplies to this spot, but an order having met the 
train when it arrived, on Sunday, from the authorities 
at Richmond, that the train was wanted there for the 
purpose of transporting the officers of the Confederate 
government and their baggage, the train was sent to 
Eichmond without being unloaded, and with its sup- 
plies was consumed in the conflagration of the next day. 
On his arrival, therefore, at Amelia Court-house, on 
the morning of the 4th, Lee found his army wearied 
with their forced march, without any supplies, and con- 
sequently was forced to remain here the rest of this 
day and the following one, while foraging parties were 
sent out through the neighboring country to obtain 
the needed food. This accidental delay gave an op- 
portunity for the advance of the pursuing army under 
Sheridan to strike Peterson, on the Danville Railroad, 
seven miles south-west of Amelia Court-house on the 
afternoon of the 4th, and thus interpose themselves and 
cut off the line of retreat Lee had selected. On the 
4th General Grant telegraphed the following report to 
Washington : — 

Wilson's Station, Virginia, April 4, 1865. 
Ho>\ E. M. Staxton, Secretary of War. 

The army is pushing forward, in the hope of overtaking or dis- 
persing the remainder of Lee's army. 

Sheridan, with his cavalry and the Fifth Corps, is between this 
and the Appomattox, General Meade, with the Second and Sixth, 
26 



400 Grant as a Soldier 

following; General Ord following the line of the Southside Rail- 
road. All of the enemy that retain anything like organization 
have gone north of the Appomattox, and are apparently heading 
for Lynchburg, their losses having been very heavy. 

The houses through the country are nearly all used as hospitals 
for wounded men. In every direction I hear of rebel soldiers 
pushing for home, some in large and some in small squads, and 
generally without arms. The cavalry have pursued so closely 
that the enemy have been forced to destroy, probably, the greater 
part of their transportation, caissons, and munitions of war. 

The number of prisoners captured yesterday will exceed two 
thousand. From the 28th of March to the present time, our loss, 
in killed, wounded, and captured, will probably not reach seven 
thousand, of whom from fifteen hundred to two thousand are 
captured, and many but slightly wounded. 

I shall continue the pursuit as long as there appears to be any 

use in it. 

TJ. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

The next day he also sent the following despatch to 
General Sherman : — 

Wilson's Station, April 5, 1865. 

General : All indications now are, that Lee will attempt to reach 

Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up 

with him last night, reports all that is left — horse, foot, and 

dragoons — at twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to 

reduce this number one half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and 

if a stand is made at Danville, will in a few days go there. If you 

can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if 

we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. 

"Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro', or 

nearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when you 

receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to 

Btrike at. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General "W. T. Sherman. 

In the afternoon of the 5th, General Meade, with the 



and a Statesman. 401 

Second and Sixth Corps, joined Sheridan at Jetters- 
ville, where Sheridan, well intrenched, had held his 
position that day, keeping his cavalry operating well 
to his left, in order to see that Lee made no move in 
that direction to escape. Early in the afternoon 'of 
this day Sheridan sent the following despatch to 
Grant : — 

Jettersviixe, April 5, 1865 — 3 P. M. 
To Lieutenant General U. S. Grant. 

General : I send you the enclosed letter, which will give you 
an idea of the condition of the enemy and their whereabouts. I 
sent General Davies's brigade this morning around on my left flank. 
He captured at Fame's Cross five pieces of artillery, about two 
hundred wagons, and eight or nine battle-flags, and a number of 
prisoners. The Second Army Corps is now coming up. I wish 
you were here yourself. I feel confident of capturing the army 
of Northern Virginia, if we exert ourselves. I see no escape for 
Lee. I will send all my cavalry out on our left flank, except 
McKenzie, who is now on the right. 

P. H. Sheridan, Major General. 

Amelia Court House, April 5, 1865. 
Dear Brammia : Our army is ruined, I fear. We are all safe 
as yet. Theodore left us sick. John Taylor is well; saw him 
yesterday. We are in line of battle this evening. General Rob- 
ert Lee is in the field near us. My trust is still in the justice of 
our cause. General Hill is killed. I saw Murray a few moments 
since. Bernard Perry, he said, was taken prisoner, but may get 
out. I send this by a negro I see passing up the railroad to 
Michlenburg. Love to all. Your devoted son, 

W. B. Taylor, Colonel. 

On the morning of the 5th a heavy train of supplies 
for the Confederate army had been intercepted at a 
place called Paine's Cross-roads, and destroyed, and 
both parties being reenforced, a somewhat severe en- 



402 Grant as a Soldier 

gagement ensued, in which the Confederates were 
worsted. 

The next morning (the 6th) the whole army of the 
Potomac, having concentrated at Jettersville, advanced 
towards Amelia Court-house, to attack the Confederate 
army, but found that during the night Lee had again 
retreated, and was hurrying to Farmville, thirty-five 
miles farther west, where, by crossing the Appomat- 
tox again, destroying the bridges after him, he could 
escape into the mountains beyond Lynchburg. The 
course of the army was then changed, and hurried in 
pursuit of the retreating foe, in three columns, one 
upon the road taken by Lee, and the others upon 
parallel roads to the north and south. The army of 
the James, which was also on the road, having reached 
Burkseville, was, on the morning of the 6th, directed 
towards Farmville, the point to which Lee was hasten- 
ing, and an advance-guard, pressing vigorously forward, 
consisting of two regiments of infantry and a squadron 
of cavalry under Brigadier General Theodore Read, 
met the advance of Lee's army near Farmville, and, 
despite the disparity of their numbers, heroically de- 
termined to hold their position in the way of the 
retreating army, and thus detain them until the army 
of the James should arrive. In this heroic attempt, 
which was successful, General Read lost his life, and his 
command was overwhelmed ; but the point was gained, 
and, the army of the James coming up, the Confederates 
immediately intrenched themselves. 

On the same day (the 6th) Sheridan, with the cav- 
alry forming the advance of the army of the Potomac, 
came up near Deatonsville, with the wagon train of 



and a Statesman. 403 

the retreating army, guarded by a strong escort, and 
immediately attacked and finally captured it, destroy- 
ing four hundred wagons, and capturing sixteen pieces 
of artillery, and a great many prisoners. Ewell's corps, 
which was following the train, being thus cut off from 
its line of retreat, was also, after a sharp engagement, 
forced to surrender. Meanwhile Lee, with the remains 
of his arm}', withdrew that night to the north bank of 
the Appomattox, by the bridges near Farmville, and 
continued his retreat. The sufferings of this fragment 
of his army during these last few days were terribly 
intense. On the 5th and the 6th, hundreds dropped to 
the ground from exhaustion, and thousands had not 
strength enough to carry their muskets. The retreat 
had been commenced with one day's rations, and the 
accident which deprived them of the supplies forwarded 
to Amelia Court-house forced them to depend upon 
the exhausted country through which their race for life 
was held, and the young twigs of the trees, just bloom- 
ing in spring, was all that many of them could find to 
serve as food. Meanwhile the Union forces were press- 
ing closer and closer upon them, and all hope in the 
future was fading fast away. On the night of the 6th 
a council of officers, at which General Lee was not 
present, consulted informally as to what should be 
their course of action, and the conclusion being that 
surrender was all that was left to them, one of 
their number was deputed to acquaint General Lee 
with the result of their conference. The Confederate 
commander did not, however, agree with this opinion, 
though if he had arrived at the same conclusion a 
month before, and acted upon it, such a course would 



404 Grant as a Soldier 

have been a proof that he was more than simply a 
skilful soldier. But in the beginning of the war, his 
course in holding a position of confidence and trust 
as General Scott's aid, while knowing that he was not 
loyal to the country whose uniform he wore, and whose 
cause he professed to serve, until the necessity for active 
service forced him to declare himself a partisan of seces- 
sion, the principles and objects of which he professed 
were abhorrent to him, show that he was not a man to 
follow principle regardless of personal consequences, or 
of a nature large enough and grand enough to take 
the initiative. During also the whole continuance of the 
war, his course had been the same. While our soldiers 
were starving and rotting with disease in the southern 
prison pens, a word from him would have removed this 
disgrace from the cause he was serving as the military 
head ; but no such word was ever spoken. And now, 
in these last scenes of the war, he appears as unable to 
grasp the large military necessities of the occasion, the 
considerations which a large-hearted humanity would 
have dictated, as he had ever shown himself during 
the whole four years of the conflict. He was a skilful 
soldier, but the soldier of slavery, in the last armed 
conflict which this organized system of injustice and 
disregard for human labor, human happiness, and hu- 
man life, will ever maintain upon this soil 

The whole of the Confederate army had not crossed 
the Appomattox until nearly daylight on the 7th, and 
were engaged in burning the bridges over which they 
had crossed, when the Second Corps of the army of the 
Potomac, under Humphreys, coming up, prevented their 
destruction, and, crossing, hurried on in the pursuit to- 



and a Statesman. 405 

wards Farmville, where a portion of the enemy was found 
burning the bridges, but who retired and joined the main 
body. The pursuit being continued, the remainder of 
Lee's army was found intrenched about five miles north 
of Farmville, covering the roads to Lynchburg. The 
advance of the army of the Potomac consisted of the 
Second Corps, and finding the position held by the 
enemy was very strong, and that they were not numer- 
ous enough to take it, halted in position until the rest 
of the army should come up ; and when they did, it was 
too late that day to commence active operations. This 
night of the 7th, Grant sent the following note from 
Farmville to Lee : — 

April 7, 1865. 
General R. E. Lee, Commander C. S. A. 

General : The result of the last week must convince you of the 
hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of North- 
ern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as 
my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further 
effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of 
the Confederate States army known as the army of Northern 
Virginia. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General, 

Commanding Armies of the United States. 

To this Lee responded as follows : — 

April 7, 1865. 
General : I have received your note of this date. Though not 
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further 
resistance on the part of the army of Northern Virginia, I recipro- 
cate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, 
before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer, 
on condition of its surrender. 

R. E. Lee, General. 
To Lieutenant General TJ. S. Grant, 

Commanding Armies of the United States. 



406 Grant as a Soldier 

This night Lee again retreated, and the next day 
had put a night's march between his army and his 
pursurers. Grant, however, on the morning of the 8th 
wrote him as follows : — 

April 8, 18C5. 
To General R. E. Lee, 

Commanding Confederate States Army. 
General : Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same 
date, asking the conditions on which I will accept the surrender 
of the army of Northern Virginia, is just received. 

In reply, I would say that, peace being my first desire, there is 
but one condition that I insist upon, namely, — 

That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for 
taking up arms again against the government of the United States 
until properly exchanged. 

I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers 
you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, 
for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the 
surrender of the army of Northern Virginia will be received. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General, 

Commanding Armies of the United States. 

Lee's retreat, however, upon the night of the 7th, 
obliged the army of the Potomac to recommence the 
pursuit upon the morning of the 8th. Lee, however, 
during the retreat, received Grant's note, and answered 
it as follows : — 

April 8, 1865. 
General : I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In 
mine of yesterday, I did not intend to propose the surrender of the 
army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. 
To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for 
the surrender of this army ; but as the restoration of peace should 
be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your proposals 
would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view 
to surrender the army of Northern Virginia; but as far as yoiu 



and a Statesman. 407 

proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my com- 
mand, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to 
meet you at ten A. M. to-morrow on the old stage road to Rich- 
mond, between the picket lines of the two armies. 

R. E. Lee, General. 
Lieutenant General U. S. Grant. 

Lee's line of retreat was up the narrow neck of land 
enclosed by the Appomattox and James Rivers ; and if 
the outlet towards Lynchburg should be closed by our 
army, before he had had time to pass through, he would 
then be caged. This was done by Sheridan on the even- 
ing of the 8th, when, after a march of over thirty miles, 
he reached Appomattox Station, on the Lynchburg 
Railroad, five miles south of Appomattox Court-house. 
Here he captured a train of supplies for the Confederate 
army, and drove the van-guard protecting it back to 
Appomattox Court-house. Knowing that he was in 
possession of the line of retreat of the army, he deter- 
mined to hold his position firmly, keeping the enemy 
in check until the army of the James, which was has- 
tening to join him, should arrive and strengthen him in 
the morning, while the army of the Potomac should 
also 'arrive to strike the enemy in the rear. But one 
course remained to Lee, and that was to cut his way 
through the force that checked his advance. This he 
attempted to do, and the attempt was made with great 
vigor and impetuosity, so much so that our troops were 
forced somewhat back; but Sheridan, at this juncture 
arriving personally upon the ground from Appomattox 
Station, where he had been to hasten the advance of 
the army of the James, ordered his dismounted troopers 
to retire slowly, so as to give the reinforcements time 



408 Grant as a Soldier 

to form their lines. As soon as this was done, and the 
Confederates saw the bayonets of the advancing army 
of the James, they fell back. Sheridan then, ordering 
his troopers to mount, prepared to charge, when a white 
flag was seen advancing, bearing a letter requesting a 
cessation of hostilities. 

In answer to Lee's last letter, Grant had written the 
following, on the 9th : — 

April 9, 1865. 
General: Your note of yesterday is received. I have no author- 
ity to treat on the subject of peace ; the meeting proposed for ten 
A. M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, Gen- 
eral, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the 
whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which 
peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying 
down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save 
thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property 
not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may 
be settled without the loss of another life, 
I subscribe myself, &c, 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 
General R. E. Lee. 

The answer to this note, borne by the flag of truce, 
was as follows, and was received by Grant while on his 
way to join Sheridan : — 

April 9, 18C5. 
General : I received your note of this morning, on the picket 
line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely 
what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday, with 
reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview 
in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday, 
for that purpose. 

R. E. Lee, General. 
Lieutenant General U. S. Grant. 

To this note Grant responded as follows : — 



and a Statesman. 409 

April 9, 1865. 
General R. E. Lee, Commanding C. S. A. 

Your note of this date is but this moment (11 : 50 A. M.) received. 

Iu consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and 

Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road, I am at 

this writing about four miles west of Walter's Church, and will 

push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. 

Notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to 
take place will meet me. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

The meeting was arranged at the residence of Mr. 
W. McLean, at Appomattox Court-house ; and here in 
a plain room, seated at an ordinary deal table, the two 
commanders, attended each by members of their re- 
spective staffs, reduced to writing the agreement which 
blotted from existence the army that for years had 
been the main stay of the Confederacy. The terms 
of surrender were given and accepted in the following 
correspondence : — 

Appomattox Court-house, April 9, 1SG5. 
General R. E. Lee, Commanding C. S. A. 

In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 
8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the army of 
Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit : — 

Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one 
copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to 
be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. 

The officers to give their individual paroles not to take arms 
against the United States until properly exchanged, and each 
company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men 
of their commands. 

The arms, artillery, and public property to be packed and 
stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to re- 
ceive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers^ 
nor their private horses or baggage. 



410 Grant as a Soldier 

This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to 
their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority so 
long as they observe their parole and the laws in force where 
they may reside. 

Very respectfully, 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 



Headquarters Akmy of Northern Virginia, 

April 9, 1865. 



1 

Lieutenant General U. S. Grant, 

Commanding IT. S. A. 
General : I have received your letter of this date, containing 
the terms of surrender of the army of Northern Virginia, as pro- 
posed by you ; as they are substantially the same as those expressed 
in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed 
to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

R. E. Lee, General. 

The campaign of ten days was over, and, like all 
of Grant's campaigns, was decisive ; its result being 
the complete removal of all armed resistance in the 
district in which it was actively carried on, by the 
destruction of all the armed force opposing the legal 
sway of the government of the United States. The 
terms accorded by General Grant were as liberal and 
magnanimous as only a great nation, conscious of the 
strength and security of its national life, — based as 
these are upon the principles of freedom and justice, — 
could grant. There was no vindictiveness, no desire 
for revenge, but the large charity that Nature gives to 
all who outrage her laws from ignorance or passion, 
when, forced by suffering, they acknowledge the error 
of their ways. The delicacy with which Grant bore 
himself through this ever-memorable interview, was 
such as only a great soul naturally displays, and ex 
cited the admiration even of his enemies. The inter- 



and a Statesman. 411 

view was short, and as Lee rode back from it, dressed 
gayer than usual, and wearing his sword, the rumor of 
immediate surrender ran like wildfire through the Con- 
federate ranks, and the scene that took place is thus 
described by an eye-witness : " Whole lines of battle 
rushed up to their beloved old chief, and, choking with 
emotion, broke ranks and struggled with each other to 
wring him once more by the hand. Men who had fought 
throughout the war, and knew what the agony and hu- 
miliation of that moment must be to him, strove, with 
a refinement of unselfishness and tenderness which he 
alone could fully appreciate, to lighten his burden and 
mitigate his pain. With tears pouring down both cheeks, 
General Lee at length commanded voice enough to say, 
i Men, we have fought through the war together. I 
have done the best that I could for you.' Not an eye 
that looked on that scene was dry. Nor was this the 
emotion of sickly sentimentalists, but of rough and 
rugged men, familiar with hardships, clanger, and death 
in a thousand shapes, mastered by sympathy and feel- 
ing for another which they never experienced on their 
own account." 

As the armies were now no longer enemies, and the 
men had learned to respect each other by the rough 
experience of war, they now fraternized together, and, 
as was seen at Vicksburg, they could be seen walking 
and talking together. The necessities of the Confeder- 
ates were provided for ; supplies, which were very wel- 
come after the intense sufferings of the past ten days, 
were distributed, and the first fruits these men, who had 
for years been in armed resistance to the government, 
obtained from their submission to the defenders of law 
and order was, that their physical needs were amply 



412 Grant as a Soldier 

provided for. It is a pity that all of their leaders and 
politicians had not been subjected to the same hard- 
ships, in order that the practical lesson they thus ob- 
tained of the absurdities of secession and the advantages 
of submission could have taught them the folly and 
wickedness of their course, and the most mortifying 
chapter in history of the incompetence of the leading 
classes of our present condition of society, and the 
gullibility of the people, would have been not enacted 
in vain. If the energy and enthusiasm the South had 
displayed in conducting the war, had been organized 
in the interests of productive labor, instead of in the 
destructive work of the four long years ; if the treas- 
ure wasted in the munitions of destruction to life and 
property, had been devoted to the construction of the 
railroads necessary for the free circulation of labor and 
the products of labor, in manufactories for the applica- 
tion of industry, and schools for the education of labor, 
how different would have been the condition, physically 
and morally, of its people after the passage of these 
four years ! The sight of these gaunt and starving men, 
clothed in rags, penniless, far away from their homes, 
demoralized by war and defeat, would have cured all 
enthusiasm for the "pomp, pride, and circumstance of 
glorious war." Such an ending of the course of action 
undertaken by these misguided men, by the advice and 
under the direction of their leaders, would have been 
so decided and so sad a proof of incapacity on the part 
of the leaders, that it would seem as though forever 
after they would keep their peace, nor dare ever again 
to offer public advice, but with modesty and shame- 
faced ness remain forever silent and retired. That they 
have not done so, and that the people whom they have 



and a Statesman. 413 

once so fatally deceived should ever again listen to them, 
is a proof that the impudence and folly of men is as 
infinite for evil, as their energy and knowledge are in- 
finite for good, if properly organized and directed. 

Immediately after the surrender, the Fifth Corps was 
ordered to remain at Appomattox, to guard the public 
property and be present at the paroling of the Con- 
federate army, while Grant himself, with the remainder 
of his army, set out for Burkesville, which was, now that 
Lee's army had surrendered, the point at which the 
army under Johnston, the last armed body organized 
in resistance to the government, was opposed to Sher- 
man. The following is the form of the personal parole 
of officers, copied from the original document given by 
Lee and a portion of his staff: — 

We, the undersigned, prisoners of war, belonging to the army of 
Northern Virginia, having been this day surrendered by General 
R. E. Lee, commanding said army, to Lieutenant General Grant, 
commanding the armies of the United States, do hereby give our 
solemn parole of honor that we will not hereafter serve in the 
armies of the Confederate States, or in any military capacity what- 
ever, against the United States of America, or render aid to the 
enemies of the latter, until properly exchanged in such manner as 
shall be mutually approved by the respective authorities. 

R. E. Lee, General. 

W. H. Taylor, Lieutenant Colonel and A. A. G. 

Chas. S. Venable, Lieutenant Colonel and A. A. G. 

Chas. Marshall, Lieutenant Colonel and A. A. G. 

H. E. Praton, Lieutenant Colonel and Lis. General. 

Giles Booke, Major and A. A. Surgeon General. 

H. S. Young, A. A. General. 
Done at Appomattox Court-house, Va., this ninth (9th) day of 
April, 1865. 

The parole is the same given by all officers, and is 
countersigned as follows : — 



414 Grant as a Soldier 

The above-named officers will not be disturbed by United 
States authorities as long as they observe their parole and the 
laws in force where they may reside. 

Geoug-E II. Sharp, General Assistant Provost Marshal. 

The obligation of officers for the subdivisions under 
their command is in form as follows : — 

I, the undersigned, commanding officer t)f , do, for the 

within-named prisoners of war, belonging to the army of Northern 
Virginia, who have been this day surrendered by General Robert 
E. Lee, Confederate States army, commanding said army, to 
Lieutenant General Grant, commanding armies of the United 
States, hereby give my solemn parole of honor that the within- 
named shall not hereafter serve in the armies of the Confederate 
States, or in military or any capacity whatever against the 
United States of America, or render aid to the enemies of the 
latter, until properly exchanged in such manner as shall be mutu- 
ally approved by the respective authorities. 

Done at Appomattox Court-house, Va., this 9th day of April, 
1865. 

The within-named will not be disturbed by the United States 
authorities so long as they observe their parole and the laws in 
force where they reside. 

By the evening of the 12 th the paroles were gen- 
erally distributed, and the army of Northern Virginia 
was scattered over the country, returning to their 
homes. With the delicacy he had shown before on 
similar occasions, Grant was not seen after his inter- 
view with Lee. The petty vanity which would be 
gratified by a display, in the scene of its triumphs, has 
no part in his composition. He had done his work 
thoroughly and well, and now was hastening to an- 
other part of the country, where, perhaps, his presence 
was needed. 



and a Statesman. 415 



CHAPTER XLIV. 

THE SURRENDER OF JOHNSTON. — THE DISBANDING OF 
ALL ARMED AND ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO THE GOV- 
ERNMENT. 

It will be remembered that just previous to the com- 
mencement of this campaign, Sherman had paid a visit 
to Grant's headquarters at City Point, and having 
decided upon the course of action to be pursued by his 
army, in conjunction with that of the army of the 
Potomac, as soon as the campaign should actively com- 
mence, had returned to Goldsboro', in North Carolina. 
Upon the receipt of the letter from Grant which we 
have already given, Sherman moved at once upon 
Johnston, and entered Raleigh, on the 13th, Johnston 
retreating before him. The news of Lee's surrender on 
the 9th was received by Sherman on the 12th, and on 
the 14th Johnston sent a letter to Sherman, proposing 
a meeting. The next day Sherman replied, appointing 
a meeting for the 17th, provided the armies remained 
in statu quo until that time. This delay he felt was of 
importance in order to repair the railroad in his rear, 
and put it in running order, so that in case the negotia- 
tion failed, he would be able to cut off Johnston's 
retreat. At the time appointed the two commanders 
met, and, after consultation, agreed to meet the next 
day, in order to settle the minutiae of the terms. On 
27 



416 Grant as a Soldier 

the 18th, therefore, a suspension of hostilities was 
agreed to, either party to give forty-eight hours' notice 
before their resumption, in order to give time to submit 
the memorandum of agreement to the government for 
approval. On the 17th, the news of President Lincoln's 
assassination on the 14th reached General Sherman. 
On the 24th. the officer despatched by General Sherman 
to Washington, with the memorandum of agreement, 
returned accompanied by General Grant, and notice 
was given of the termination of the truce. On the 25th, 
however, there was another meeting between Generals 
Sherman and Johnston, the result of which was the sur- 
render of the Confederate army upon the same terms 
as those granted to Lee. This surrender Sherman re- 
ceived. The military power of the rebellion was now 
broken and destroyed. The few unimportant small 
forces still in arms in distant parts of the country, were 
too insignificant to require our attention here. Suffice 
it to say that, on the 26th of May, the last of these in 
Texas surrendered to Sheridan, who had been sent 
there for the purpose of forcing them to terms, should 
they prove contumacious. 

The final scene in the military drama was the review 
at Washington, which commenced on the 22d of May, 
and occupied two days. In it were embraced the 
armies of the Potomac and those under Sherman, and 
these fine bodies of men representing all sections of 
the country passed in review before the executive and 
military officers of the government, and then, disband- 
ing, doffed the army blue, and were quietly absorbed 
again in the peaceful pursuits of life. Perhaps the ease 
and quiet with which this was done gave even a stronger 



and a Statesman. 417 

proof of the strength and stability of freedom, than the 
sudden gathering of armed men, from the bosom of a 
peaeeful nation devoted to productive industry, to de- 
fend the sovereignty of law and order against the 
attacks of those who had been demoralized by living 
so long upon the oppression of labor. 

The war now was over ; the new phase of the 
old contest of freedom against slavery had ended in 
victory. Those whose first impulse to defend their 
system of society, founded upon injustice to labor, had 
been to grasp the sword, had been overthrown by the 
sword. But the end was not yet. The contest was 
simply transferred from the field of battle to the field 
of politics. 

If history teaches any one lesson, it is that the 
safet}' and security of political institutions are se- 
cured only as they rest upon the broad foundation of 
justice ; that what we mortals call our laws must, to 
he respected, resemble the laws of nature in their 
universality and freedom from all exceptions. The 
experience of men, in politics as in science, is rising up 
to the comprehension of the fact that nature's law is 
freedom of development, not repression. In physical 
science we have arrived at the demonstration of the 
correlation of force, and it now remains for us, in poli- 
tics and in moral science, to demonstrate, and act upon 
the demonstration, that the physical and moral laws of 
the universe are identical ; that the wealth, the power, 
the stability of nations, and consequently the happi- 
ness of those constituting them, depend upon the free- 
dom of development, individual and collective, enjoyed 
by each and every member of the nation. The moral 



418 Grant as a Soldier 

forces are physical forces, and act in the same way, and 
are as infinite in their might, when repressed, as they 
are harmonious and beneficent in their results, when 
allowed freedom of action. As the free circulation 
of light and air prevents pestilence and disease by 
removing their causes, so the free circulation of the 
light of intelligence and the air of liberty will remove 
the pestilences of the moral world — ignorance, poverty, 
crime, revolution, and war — by removing their causes. 
The cities of Europe, by conforming to the laws of 
physical hygiene, have freed themselves from the re- 
currence of the black death and the plagues of the 
middle ages, and it remains for the nations now, by 
conforming to the laws of moral hygiene, to remove the 
moral pestilences of mankind. The necessity is equally 
imperative, and the result is equally certain. 

As we see, in the South, that the education of labor, 
despite the legal, social, and other disabilities of the 
slave, had yet fitted him better for the comprehension 
of what the war meant, and what its results must cer- 
tainly be, than his masters were, than the whole class, 
of persons who believed themselves his superiors in 
intelligence, as they were in position, so, through the 
whole world, the producers — the class who create all 
wealth — are better fitted to judge how best to dispose 
of it than those who, priding themselves upon their 
superior intelligence, have, either by trickery, custom, 
or usurpation, obtained its control. * The universal tes- 

* More than a year before the commencement of the war, there was estab- 
lisbed in Charleston, South Carolina, a sort of club, called the "Association 
of 18G0," the object of which was to prepare the South for secession by the 
publication of pamphlets and similar means of propaganda. This association 
had among its members most of those who considered themselves, and were 



and a Statesman. 419 

timony of the Union prisoners who escaped is, that they 
never hesitated to confide in the negro, and were never 
betrayed. Despite all the influence of their masters 
brought in the other direction, the slave was not to be 
found who did not know that the success of the Union 
cause meant his freedom; and upon this faith they 
acted from the firing of the first gun against Fort 
Sumter, though for years the government failed to 
see the inevitable conclusion of the logic of events, 
and tried to compromise with justice. 

The war was now over. The four long years of 
struggle had ended in victory. The barbarism of the 
old world, represented in slavery, in the oppression of 
labor, had trusted to the sword for its maintenance, 
and had been conquered by the sword. The struggle 
had been most severe, and had assumed the vastest 
proportions since the system of slavery, though by 
its nature belonging to the barbarous period of the de- 
velopment of society, had yet in its possession all the 
appliances of war belonging to the nineteenth century, 
and fought with the desperation of a dying monster. 
It had also all the moral support of the aristocratic feel- 
ing of Europe, and as far as this feeling controlled the 

generally accepted as, the intelligent and cultivated leaders of society in that 
pseudo aristocratic city. Among the pamphlets they published was one 
written by W. D. Porter, Esq., a lawyer of considerable local reputation, 
which will show the whole tendency of the efforts of the Association. Its 
title ran as follows : " Slavery, its Doom in the Union, its Safety out of it." 
This was the creed they all held with an unquestioning faith, and the firing 
on Fort Sumter was hailed by them all as the first step towards the realiza- 
tion of their prophecies. But while this conviction was universal among the 
whites, the instinctive conviction among the slaves, that secession meant their 
freedom, was equally universal. This fact is worthy of most serious con- 
sideration, and can be either disregarded or applied in the study and the settle- 
ment of the labor question, which is the question of to-day for the whole world. 



420 Grant as a Soldier 

various governments of Europe, this sympathy was 
openly expressed, and backed up by material aid. The 
twin systems of barbarism, which had thrust themselves 
forward into the nineteenth century, — slavery and aris- 
tocracy, — had of course a brotherly sympathy with 
each other ; since whether the law oppresses one class 
or elevates another, the result must be the same. In 
both the class which suffers from injustice is oppressed, 
while that which gains by such injustice is corrupted. 
We find, therefore, that while the aristocratic classes of 
Europe sympathized with the slaveholders in their re- 
bellion, the people of Europe, those who by the educa- 
tion of labor had been fitted to a right comprehension 
of the logic of events, saw, as shrewdly and as quickly 
as the slaves of the South saw it, what was the mean- 
ing of the war, what must be its result, and steadfastly 
throughout, despite all the attempts of the so-called 
leading classes to mystify the question by sophistry, 
displayed their sympathy with the cause of freedom. 
The two most notable evidences of this were, first, in 
England, where the operatives in Lancashire, while 
suffering most severely themselves from the cotton fam- 
ine caused by the war, yet at the very point of their 
highest misery, expressed in public meetings their full 
sympathy with the Union cause ; while second, in Ger- 
many, during one of the darkest moments for the 
cause, the people, despite the penny-wise and pound- 
foolish wisdom of the financial leaders, invested largely 
in our bonds, leaving those of the Southern Confedera- 
cy to the bankers and moneyed classes, who, as they ape 
the manners of the aristocracy, followed their lead in 
their sympathies. 



and a Statesman. 421 

The end of the contest had come in the field of 
battle, and it is well to look over the record and 
see what we had gained. In the first place, slavery 
was abolished. The magnitude of this step in the 
progress of the nation towards the realization of the 
democratic idea, of the reign of justice, of the founda- 
tion of the national spirit, as expressed in its govern- 
ment, or in the relations of social life, upon the dignity 
of labor, and of the ample recognition of its rights, 
since all social advance, as all individual or national 
wealth, is derived from labor, cannot even now be fully 
appreciated. In the next place, the spirit of national 
unity had grown even out of the conllict of sections. 
If the war had proved anything, it had proved the 
geographical necessity that this nation must be one ; 
that there are no possible boundaries which can be 
established in this continent to divide different nations; 
while out of the necessities of the war, from the strain it 
caused upon the resources of the government, there 
had also grown a financial system which gave us a 
currency circulating at par all over the country. The 
pecuniary advantage of this system to the business of 
the country, in facilitating and cheapening the free cir- 
culation of the products of its industry, can hardly 
be estimated, but is second to the benefit it produces 
in demonstrating and strengthening the principle of 
national unity. Our armies had also been drawn from 
all sections of the country, and in their various cam- 
paigns had passed in company over all its various sec- 
tions. The men of the West had met personally those 
from the East, and opportunities had been offered io 
both, of seeing and becoming personally aware of the 



422 Grant as a Soldier 

merits and virtues of each ; and the result of all free 
circulation of men among their fellows is to stimulate 
the germ of the feelings of the unity of the human 
race, to weaken all sectional prejudices, and prepare 
the way for the final realization of the universal broth- 
erhood of man. In his last report of the active oper- 
ations in the field, Grant speaks thus eloquently and 
truthfully of the result of this feature of the war: "It 
has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West 
and East fight battles, and from what I have seen, I 
know there is no difference in their fighting qualities. 
All that it was possible for men to do in battle, they 
have done. The western armies commenced their bat- 
tles in the Mississippi Valley, and received the final 
surrender of the remnant of the principal army op- 
posed to them in North Carolina. The armies of the 
East commenced their battles on the river from which 
the army of the Potomac derived its name, and received 
the final surrender of their old antagonist at Appomat- 
tox Court-house, Virginia. The splendid achievements 
of each have nationalized our victories, removed all 
sectional jealousies, of which we have unfortunately 
experienced too much, and the cause of crimination 
and recrimination that might have followed had either 
section failed in its duty. All have a proud record, 
and all sections can well congratulate themselves and 
each other for having done their full share in restoring 
the supremacy of law over every foot of territory be- 
longing to the United States. Let them hope for per- 
petual peace and harmony with that enemy whose 
manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such 
herculean deeds of valor." 



and a Statesman. 423 



CHAPTER XLV. 

GRANT IN A NEW FIELD. — HIS COURSE AS COMMANDER OF 
THE ARMIES IN THE MATTER OF RECONSTRUCTION. 

The war was now over, and the practical application 
of the results of victory passed from the hands of the 
military commanders into those of the legislators. The 
entire social system of the South having been violently 
overturned, there was of course a pressing necessity to 
reorganize it in accordance with the new condition of 
things. The labor of the South, the application of its 
productive energies, by which alone all wealth is pro- 
duced, was no longer to be performed by slaves; but, as 
of course the prejudices which the old system had pro- 
duced, and by which those who had heretofore held the 
governing power had become demoralized and cor- 
rupted, still remained, it was necessary that, for the 
present at least, the labor of the South should be pro- 
tected in their new rights by the strong arm of the 
military power. The rebellion itself was a sufficient 
proof that the civil officers of the South were not fit to 
be trusted with the administration of justice, since, 
when the crisis came, they had been found basely and 
meanly derelict. In following General Grant through 
his course in the administration of this extra military 
authority, we shall find that he has distinguished him- 
self by the application of common sense to the affairs 



424 Grant as a Soldier 

of state, — embroiled as they were by the chicanery of 
politics and the violence of party feeling, — as he had 
in the application of the same qualities to war. 

As soon as Lee had surrendered, General Grant, be- 
fore going South, and without stopping to even visit 
Richmond, hastened to Washington, and feeling the 
necessity of reducing the expenses of the government, 
which were necessarily enormous while our vast armies 
were maintained in the field, busied himself in this 
important and practical reform. The result of his visit 
is seen in the following order, issued from the War 
Department on the 13th of April : — 

Wak Department, Washington, "> 
April 13 — 6 P. M. | 

To Major General Dix, New York. 

The Department, after mature consideration and consultation 
with the Lieutenant General upon the results of the recent cam- 
paign, has come to the following determinations, which will be 
carried into effect by appropriate orders to be immediately 
issued : — 

First. To stop all drafting and recruiting in the loyal States. 

Second. To curtail purchases of arms, ammunition, quarter- 
master and commissary supplies, and reduce the military establish- 
ment in its several brandies. 

Third. To reduce the number of general and staff officers to 
the actual necessities of the service. 

Fourth. To remove all military restrictions upon trade and 
commerce, so far as may be consistent with public safety. 

As soon as these measures can be put in operation, it will be 
made known by public order. 

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

On the 28th of April, the following order was issued, 
carrying these suggestions into practice : — 



and a Statesman. 425 

War Departjient, Adjutant General's Office, ~) 
Washington, April 28, 1SG5. j 

Ordered, First. That the chiefs of the respective bureaus of this 
department proceed immediately to reduce the expenses of their 
respective departments to what is absolutely necessary, in view of 
an immediate reduction of the forces in the held and garrisons, 
and the speedy termination of hostilities, and that they severally 
make out statements of the reductions they deem practicable. 

Second. That the Quartermaster General discharge all ocean 
transports not required to bring home troops in remote depart- 
ments. All river and inland transportation will be discharged, 
except that required for the necessary supplies of troops in the 
field. Purchases of horses, mules, wagons, and other land trans- 
portation will be stopped; also purchases of forage, except what 
is required for immediate consumption. All purchases for rail- 
road construction and transportation will also be stopped. 

Third. That the Commissary General of Subsistence stop the 
purchase of supplies in his department for such as may, with what 
is on hand, be required for the forces in the field on the 1st of 
June next. 

Fourth. That the Chief of Ordnance stop all purchase of arms, 
ammunition, and material therefor, and reduce the manufacturing 
of arms and ordnance stores in government arsenals, as rapidly as 
can be done without injury to the service. 

Fifth. That the Chief of Engineers stop work on all field 
fortifications, and other works, except those for which specific ap- 
propriations have been made by Congress for completion, or that 
may be required for the proper protection of works in progress. 

Sixth. That all soldiers in hospitals, who require no further 
medical treatment, be honorably discharged from service, with im- 
mediate payment. All officers and enlisted men who have been 
prisoners of war and are now on furlough or at parole camps, and 
all recruits in rendezvous, except those for the regular army, will 
be likewise honorably discharged. Officers whose duty it is, 
under the regulations of the service, to make out rolls and other 
final papers connected with the final discharge and payment of 
soldiers, are directed to make payment without delay, so that the 
order may be carried into effect immediately. 

Seventh. The Adjutant General of the army will cause irn- 



426 Grant as a Soldier 

mediate returns to be made by all commanders in the field, gar- 
risons, detachments, and forts, of their respective forces, with a 
view to their immediate reduction. 

Eighth. The Quartermasters of Subsistence, Ordnance, Engi- 
neers, and Provost Marshal General's departments, will reduce 
the number of clerks and employees to that absolutely required 
for closing the business of their respective departments, and will, 
without delay, report to the Secretary of War the number required 
of each class or grade. The Surgeon General will make a similar 
reduction of surgeons, nurses, and attendants in his bureau. 

Ninth. The chiefs of the respective bureaus will immediately 
cause proper returns to be made out of public property in their 
charge, and a statement of property in each that may be sold upon 
advertisement and public sale, without prejudice to the service. 

Tenth. That the Commissary of Prisoners will have rolls made 
out of the name, residence, time and place of capture, and occupa- 
tion of all prisoners of war, who will take the oath of allegiance to 
the United States, to the end that such as are disposed to become 
good and loyal citizens of the United States, and who are proper 
objects of Executive clemency, may be relieved, upon terms that 
the President shall deem fit and consistent with the public safety. 

By order of the Secretary of War. 

W. A. Nichols, A A. G. 

Official — Thos. M. Vincent, A. A. G. 



and a Statesman. 427 



CHAPTER XLVI. 

A RETROSPECT OF WHAT HAS BEEN DONE DURING THE 
WAR. — THE ARMY RETURNING TO THE PURSUITS OF 
PEACE. 

The war was over, and the army thus returned to 
the peaceful industries of life. A few statements from 
the report of the Secretary of War, presented in No- 
vember of 1865, at the first meeting of Congress after 
the termination of the war, will give an accurate idea 
of the magnitude of the struggle in which we had been 
engaged. On May 1, 1865, the army numbered, all 
told, one million five hundred and sixteen men, while 
the aggregate of men put in the service from April 
15, 1861, to April 14, 1865, was two million six hun- 
dred and fifty-six thousand five hundred and fifty- 
three. This aggregate embraces, of course, all the en- 
listments for short terms. The promptness with which 
this enormous body of soldiers had been organized 
ready for action, from citizens engaged in the peaceful 
avocations of daily life, will appear from the following 
statements, which show at the same time the admirable 
organization of the War Department, as well as the 
enthusiasm of the people in support of the war. 

In 1862, after the disasters on the Peninsula, in Vir- 
ginia, over eighty thousand troops were enlisted, organ- 
ized, armed, equipped, and sent to the field in less than 



428 Grant as a Soldier 

a month. During the continuance of the war, sixty 
thousand men had repeatedly been sent into the field 
within four weeks, while ninety thousand infantry were 
sent to the armies from the five States of Ohio, Indiana, 
Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin, within ninety days. 

But however assuring such an exhibition of the sta- 
bility of republican institutions may be, showing as it 
does the promptness and enthusiasm with which the 
people rush to the support of a government which they 
feel is their own, and which they have formed for their 
own purposes, and must therefore maintain, when its 
existence is imperilled, a still greater test, according to 
the experience of all European governments, was to be 
made of the stability, the inherent strength and mo- 
rality of democratic institutions, in the disbanding of 
this force. The experience of all the governments in 
Europe had shown that the disbanding of an army 
was always attended with serious demoralizing effects 
upon society. The reason of this lies not in the sim- 
ple fact of the disbanding of the army, but further 
back, in the organization of the army itself. 

We have seen, during the continuance of the war, 
that our army differed entirely in its composition from 
those of Europe. It was anything but a hired set of 
mercenaries: but, as we have seen, was drawn from 
the industrious producers of the country. Grant him- 
self, in one of his reports, speaks of the fact, that what- 
ever branch of industry was rendered necessary by the 
varied and multifarious duties resulting from the anom- 
alous position of our army in the field, he could find 
among the enlisted men in the ranks experts ready 
and capable of performing it. It is certain that an 



and a Statesman. 421) 

army composed of such materials is not either a demor- 
alizing or easily demoralized body of men. And there- 
fore, notwithstanding the predictions of the European 
press, who, judging from the evils arising from the dis- 
banding of armies in their own countries, and unaware 
of or unable to comprehend the essential difference be- 
tween the constitution of our army as a part and parcel 
of the industry of the country, from that of their own, 
we find the army disbanding, and returning to the 
peaceful occupations it had left temporarily, to engage 
in the pressing duty of defending its own government, 
without producing any of the evils prophesied by those 
to whom the realization of the democratic idea seems 
to be only the realization of discord and anarchy. The 
war ended in April, and on November the 15th of the 
same year, eight hundred thousand nine hundred and 
sixty-three men had been mustered out of the service. 
Never before in the world has such a sight been seen 
as this number of men, who had been for so long a 
time accustomed to the excitement and violence of 
war, returning to the peaceful pursuits of labor, and be- 
coming again citizens engaged in productive industry. 

That such a sight has been seen in this country, is as 
legitimate a cause for confidence in the stability and per- 
sistence of a government based upon the practical reali- 
zation of the democratic idea, as was the equally new and 
glorious spectacle of a nation turning its attention away 
from its ordinary pursuits, and taking up arms to de- 
fend its government from the attacks of those who, 
reared in a system which educated them in a contempt 
of productive industry, sought finally, in the madness 
of their scorn, to rebel against the government in order 



430 Grant as a Soldier 

to sustain and perpetuate a system of slavery. It can- 
not be wondered at that a people so deluded as to take 
up arms in such a monstrous cause, should be ignorant 
enough of the spirit of the northern army to suppose 
that they were a set of mercenaries. This term, we 
have found, was frequently applied to them by the lead- 
ers in the proclamations they issued for the purpose of 
"firing the southern heart;" but one fact is very no- 
ticeable — that whatever influence such epithets had in 
exciting the ignorant portion of the white population 
south, they never for a moment deceived the negro ; 
but on all occasions, wherever the opportunity offered, 
he recognized the " boys in blue " as his friends. The 
unanimous testimony of the Union prisoners who es- 
caped from the slaughter and starvation pens, which 
the South called its prisons, is, that the negro was 
always their friend, and that in no case did he fail to 
assist them on their road. At the same time, despite 
all that had been told them by their masters of the 
terrible purposes for which the " mercenary hoards of 
Yankees " invaded " the sunny south," the negroes wel- 
comed the advent of our armies with confidence and 
joy. The simple education of labor had given them 
intelligence enough to comprehend their own interest 
in freedom, better than their brethren whose social 
degradation was as great as their own, and who differed 
from them only in the color of their skins and in their 
contempt for industry; or even than the educated 
classes of the South, who prided themselves upon their 
culture and refinement, but who were equally wanting 
in the recognition of the truth that industry is the only 
foundation of the well-being of a state, and that justice 



and a Statesman. 431 

to labor is the only means of giving stability to its 
social arrangements, or of making their play har- 
monious. 

Besides the amount of strictly warlike energy the 
army had displayed in the field, it had also performed 
an enormous amount of productive work. The roads 
it had constructed, the railroads it had built and kept 
in order, the fortifications it had thrown up, the in- 
trenchments it had raised, may be estimated from the 
fact that fifteen thousand miles of military telegraph 
had been laid during the war. The amount of physical 
energy expended upon both sides during the war, would 
have sufficed, had it been valued according to the 
present standard of wages, and had it been directed in 
the interest of production, instead of in the interest of 
destruction, to have purchased, at the highest valuation, 
the entire negro population of the South, and have set 
them free, while such an application of the energies of 
both sections of the country, would have left the South, 
at the end of the four years, with its railway system 
perfected, instead of destroyed, with its roads built, its 
swamps drained, and its lands in a high state of culture, 
instead of being laid desolate with fire and sword. 

It is at present considered utopian to suppose that wars 
will ever cease ; but certainly, if ever reason and a wise 
self-interest, instead of subverted passions, shall come 
to govern men's actions, this result will be obtained. 
Whenever the industry of a country, which produces all 
its wealth, shall retain in its own possession the wealth 
it creates, and shall have thus in its own hands the 
disposition of its own energies, then war, since it is 
evidently never an aid, but always an injury to pro- 
28 



432 Grant as a Soldier 

ductive industry, will come to be classed among the 
follies of the world's childhood. That this result must 
inevitably arrive, and that it will arrive by the diffusion 
and practical realization of the democratic idea, is as 
evident, as that the war was inaugurated by the class at 
the South who lived by the spoliation of industry, and 
that if the labor of the South had for the last sixty 
years been treated with justice, slavery would have 
been abolished long ago, and the war would have be- 
come impossible for want of a moving cause. 

Thus it is seen that the spread of the democratic idea, 
and its practical realization in our social arrangements, is 
the growth of all real conservatism, if this word has the 
meaning of its derivation, — which is, to preserve, — since 
justice alone can guarantee that stability and peace, in 
which society moves forward to its ultimate destiny 
of freedom, by the gradual and persistent process of 
development which runs uninterruptedly through all 
nature. Change is the necessary condition of growth, 
and growth is the necessity of existence. As the Latin 
poet says, — 

" Immota labescunt, 

Et quae perpetuo sunt agitata manent." 

Or, expressing the same idea, the quaint old English 
poet, — 

" That which is motionless decays ; 
Only in constant change is length of days." 



and a Statesman. 433 



CHAPTER XLVII. 

THE FIRST YEAR OF RECONSTRUCTION, AND GRANT'S COURSE 
AS HEAD OF THE MILITARY AUTHORITY. — HIS ANSWER 
TO GENERAL LEES PETITION FOR PARDON.— THE TESTI- 
MONIALS GIVEN HIM BY THE PEOPLE. 

During the summer of 1865, Grant made a tour 
through the North, and was everywhere received with 
enthusiasm. Continuing his tour through the West, he 
visited at Springfield, Illinois, the tomb of Abraham Lin- 
coln, where reposes the body of the President, to whose 
firm confidence in his ability Grant was indebted for the 
opportunity for its display, and whose assassination, at 
the moment when victory came to reward his four years 
of care and anxiety, turned a nation's rejoicing to tears. 
At Galena, Illinois, Grant was presented by his fellow- 
townsmen with a furnished house, situated just out of 
the town, and commanding a fine view of the river and 
surrounding country. Early in November, having re- 
mained for some time in Washington after his return 
from the West, Grant paid a visit to New York, and 
was tendered a splendid reception by the citizens. The 
banquet was given at the Fifth Avenue Hotel, and the 
enthusiasm with which his entrance was greeted was 
such as rarely finds genuine expression in fashionable 
society, where the conventional restraints of respecta- 
bility repress the expression of every natural feeling, 



434 Grant as a Soldier 

on the supposition that such conduct is vulgar. Though 
he was the centre of attraction, Grant remained as im- 
passive and apparently unconcerned as he always does. 
Such ovations he receives, as he gains his victories, 
without surprise and without elation. 

On his return to Washington, Grant resolved to pay 
a visit to the South, and carried out his resolution as 
quietly and unostentatiously as he had made it. His 
first stopping-place was Richmond ; and though the cap- 
ture of this place will ever be connected with his name, 
yet this was the first visit he had paid to it, and now he 
entered with no flourish or display, but simply as an 
officer of the government, whose duty led him South on 
a tour of observation. On the 1st of December, he ar- 
rived in Charleston, South Carolina, the cradle of seces- 
sion, and was received there with enthusiasm. The 
Union League, composed of colored citizens, honored his 
presence with a torchlight procession and a serenade. 

The object of Grant's tour through the South was to 
inform himself by personal observation concerning the 
workings of the military government and of the Freed- 
men's Bureau, and also to observe the condition, physi- 
cally and morally, of the people. Though the time de- 
voted to this trip was but short, yet Grant made the best 
use of it, and by freely conversing with the people he 
met, and by investigating for himself the workings of the 
new system of things in the South, was able to report 
on his return. He arrived at Washington from this 
southern tour on the 11th of Pecember, 1865, and' 
on the 18th reported to the President the result of 
his observations. This report was a short one, and 
the following extract from it will show the result of 



and a Statesman. 435 

his observations concerning the most important mat- 
ter at this period, which was the harmonious working 
of the military authority and the Freedmen's Bureau. 
The evident necessity was to introduce a unity of action 
between these ; and upon the want of this unity Grant 
writes, — 

" It seems to me that this could be corrected by re- 
garding every officer on duty with troops in the South- 
ern States as an agent of the Freedmen's Bureau, and 
then have all orders from the head of the Bureau sent 
through the department commanders. This would cre- 
ate a responsibility that would cause uniformity of 
action throughout the South, and cause the orders 
and instructions from the head of the Bureau being 
carried out, and would relieve from duty and pay a 
large number of employees of the government." 

It is a pity that this practical suggestion was not 
then carried out, since it is evident that such an appli- 
cation of common sense to the new condition of affairs 
in the South could not fail to have produced the effects 
desired, and which are certainly most necessary. Econ- 
omy and efficiency — these are the needed reforms ; and 
these would have been secured by the adoption of this 
common-sense suggestion. 

On the 12th of January, 1866, the following order 
was issued from the War Department: — 

General Orders, JVb. 3. 

War Department, Adjutant General's Office, I 
Washington, January 12, 1SG6. i 
Military division and department commanders whose commands 
embrace or are composed of any of the late rebellious states, and 
who have not already done so, will at once issue and enforce or- 
ders protecting from prosecution or suits, in the state or municipal 



436 Grant as a Soldier 

courts of such states, all officers and soldiers of the armies of the 
United States, and all persons thereto attached, or in any way 
thereto belonging, subject to military authority, charged with of- 
fences for acts done in their military capacity, or pursuant, to 
orders from military authority, and to protect from suit or prose- 
cution all loyal citizens or persons charged with offences done 
against the rebel forces, directly or indirectly, during the existence 
of the rebellion, and all persons, their agents or employees, charged 
with the occupancy of abandoned lands or plantations, or the 
possession or custody of any kind of proj)erty whatever, who oc- 
cupied, used, possessed, or controlled the same, pursuant to the 
order of the President or any of the civil or military departments 
of the government, and to protect them from any penalty or dam- 
ages that may have been, or may be, pronounced or adjudged in 
said courts in any of such cases, and also protecting colored per- 
sons from prosecutions in any of said states, charged with offences 
for which white persons are not prosecuted or punished in the 
same manner or degree. 

By command of Lieutenant General Grant. 

E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General. 

The simple fact that the necessity should exist for 
such an order would serve to show that the injustice 
with which the negroes had been treated while slavery 
existed, and the foolish hatred which the South had 
cherished as a virtue against northern or loyal men, 
had not yet died out. The records of the time are, 
however, full of instances in which persecution, vio- 
lence, robbery, and murder had been exercised against 
both these classes of persons, while among those to 
whom these means of revenge were distasteful, or 
when opportunities to exercise them did not exist, the 
ordinary plan was to invoke the aid of the civil courts, 
and, under the guise of law, fine, imprison, or other- 
wise punish, those whose loyalty or whose complexion 
made them objectionable to the "chivalry." While 



and a Statesman. 437 

this condition of things remained in the South, and 
were so flagrant that the above order was felt 
to be a necessity, Governor Parsons, of Alabama, had, 
however, the effrontery to write to Grant asking for 
the withdrawal from the state of the United States 
troops, and for permission to arm the militia. To this 
request Grant responded as follows : " For the present, 
and until there is full security for equitably maintain- 
ing the right and safety of all classes of citizens in the 
states lately in rebellion, I would not recommend the 
withdrawal of the United States troops from them. 
The number of interior garrisons might be reduced, 
but a movable force sufficient to insure tranquillity 
should be retained. While such a force is retained in 
the South, I doubt the propriety of putting arms in 
the hands of the militia." 

The whole theory and practice of a wise reconstruc- 
tion could not be better stated than in this letter. 
The rebellion had arisen from the fact that the " rights 
and safety of all classes " in the South had not been 
maintained : those who, by the accident of birth, had 
been placed in the position of rulers, had ignored and 
despised the rights of the labor of the South, and, to 
maintain the system which enabled them to continue 
in this course, had rebelled. Now that their rebellion 
had been put down, they had not learned the lesson 
that justice is the only foundation for a stable condi- 
tion of society. It is the repetition of all the lessons 
of history. As with every aristocracy the world has 
seen, founding their power upon tyranny and their 
wealth upon the oppression of industry, the rulers of 
the South had supposed that they were all of society, 



438 Grant as a Soldier 

and that the realization of justice was the mainte- 
nance of their peculiar privileges and immunities, and 
in support of these had finally taken up arms. The 
history of all wars is the same. War is the natural 
method by which oppression seeks either to maintain 
or to increase its power. There is yet in the history 
of mankind the first instance to be found where pro- 
ductive industry has sought this means of extending 
its sway, since peace, good will, and justice are the 
necessary conditions for its well being. If the result 
of the war had not been enough to teach the late 
ruling classes of the South their error, it is hardly to 
be expected that they would learn immediately from 
any other source the lesson of the necessity of justice. 
A course of life-long oppression cannot be compen- 
sated for in a day. Time must enter as a necessary 
element into all the processes of moral as of physical 
growth and development. It is the part of a wise 
statesman, however, by the application of common 
sense to the condition of things brought under his 
observation, to influence and stimulate this growth as 
much as possible. With men, as with children, the 
sense of responsibility is one of the best educational 
influences. This wise course was pursued by Grant in 
showing the rulers of the South that the matter was 
in their own hands ; that, when the rights and safety 
of all classes were " equitably " maintained, then, but 
not until then, could their wishes be met. It is a 
pity that the same intelligent application of common 
sense to the circumstances of the present condition 
could not be equally found in all the departments of 
the government. 



and a Statesman. 439 

In February, 1866, the following order was issued 
by Grant to the various department commanders : — 

Headquarters Armies of the United States, "> 
Washington, February 17, 18G6. £ 

You will please send to these Headquarters, as soon as practica- 
ble, and from time to time thereafter, such copies of newspapers, 
published in your department, as contain sentiments of disloyally 
and hostility to the government in any of its branches, and state 
whether such paper is habitual in its utterance of such sentiments. 
The persistent publication of articles calculated to keep up an hos- 
tility of feeling between the people of different sections of the 
country cannot be tolerated. This information is called for with 
a view to their suppression, which will be done from these head- 
quarters only. 

By command of Lieutenant General Grant. 

T. S. Bowers, Assistant Adjutant General. 

This order was issued on account of the suppression 
of the Richmond Examiner, on the loth of February, 
by General Terry, who was in command of the depart- 
ment of Virginia. On the 19th of this month this 
journal was, however, given permission to continue its 
issue. The press of the South, which had used all its 
influence in " firing the southern heart," and in bring- 
ing on the rebellion, had, in the large majority, learned 
apparently nothing from the events of the past few 
years, and the undoubted evils which arise from the 
license of printing were never more fully manifested 
than here. It is a fault of the journalism all over the 
civilized world that it does not fulfil the possibilities 
of its mission, but degenerates from its rightful posi- 
tion into merely an organ of party. The best correc- 
tive of its faults is the education of the people, from 
whom it obtains its readers and supporters. The ques- 



440 Grant as a Soldier 

tion of the freedom of the press is like that of the 
freedom of the ballot : no restrictions upon either can 
be justified logically, while at the same time the free- 
dom of neither can be practically realized unless the 
people are sufficiently educated to be their own mas- 
ters, not the slaves of ignorance or the followers of 
demagogues. While, then, the people are in a transi- 
tional condition, it is the duty of a wise government to 
remove all obstacles in their way of improvement, and 
to foster all their attempts to develop themselves 
towards self-reliance and the freedom of self-govern- 
ment. In pursuing this course it is manifestly one of 
the main duties of the government, to restrain the 
open expression of impassioned appeals, tending to 
excite the mean prejudices of class hatred and to 
foster the love of injustice and tyranny. This is evi- 
dently the course necessary in the education of chil- 
dren, and " men are but children of a larger growth ; " 
and this has been the course pursued by Grant in the 
performance of his duties as commander-in-chief of the 
armies while the necessity remains for maintaining a 
military power in the South. This order, however, 
was revoked in August, 1866. 

In September, 1866, the following letter, which had 
been written more than a year before, and very soon 
after the surrender of Lee, was made public, and shows 
conclusively the opinion Grant then entertained con- 
cerning the position of those who had surrendered 
and been paroled. We shall have, further on, other 
proofs of his opinions upon this subject : — 



and a Statesman. 441 

Headquarters Armies of the United States, "J 
Washington, D. C, June 20, 1805. f 
General R. E. Lee, Richmond, Va. 

General : Your communication, of date 13th instant, stating 
the steps you had taken after reading the President's proclama- 
tion of the 29th ult., with the view of complying with its pro- 
visions, when you learned that, with others, you were to be in- 
dicted for treason by the grand jury at Norfolk ; that you had 
supposed that the officers and men of the army of Northern Vir- 
ginia were, by the terms of their surrender, protected by the 
United States government from molestation so long as they con- 
formed to its conditions ; that you were ready to meet any charges 
that might be preferred against you, and did not wish to avoid 
trial ; but that if you were correct as to the protection granted by 
your parole, and were not to be prosecuted, you desired to avail 
yourself of the President's Amnesty Proclamation, and enclosing 
an application therefor, with the request that in that event it be 
acted upon, — has been received and forwarded to the Secretary 
of War, with the following opinion indorsed thereon : — 

" In my opinion, the officers and men paroled at Appomattox 
Court-house, and since upon the same terms given to Lee, cannot 
be tried for treason so long as they observe the terms of their 
parole. This is my understanding. Good faith, as well as true 
policy, dictates that we should observe the condition of that con- 
vention. Bad faith on the part of the government, or a construc- 
tion of that covenant subjecting the officers to trial for treason, 
would produce a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the officers 
and men. If so disposed, they might even regard such an infrac- 
tion of terms by the government as an entire release from all 
obligations on their part. I will state further, that the terms 
granted by me met with the hearty approval of the President at 
the time, and of the country generally. The action of Judge 
Underwood, in Norfolk, has already had an injurious effect, and 
I would ask that he be ordered to quash all indictments found 
against paroled prisoners of war, and to desist from the further 
prosecution of them. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Headquarters Armies of the United States, ") 

June 16, 1865." j" 



442 Grant as a Soldier 

This opinion, I am informed, is substantially the same as that 
entertained by the government. I have forwarded your applica- 
tion for amnesty and pardon to the President, with the following 
indorsement thereon : — 

" Respectfully forwarded through the Secretary of War to the 
President, with the earnest recommendation that this application 
of General R. E. Lee for amnesty and pardon be granted him. 
The oath of allegiance required by recent order of the President 
does not accompany this, for the reason, I am informed by General 
Ord, the order requiring it had not reached Richmond when this 
was forwarded. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 



Headquarters Armies of the United State 

June 16, 1865 



tes, ") 






Very respectfully, 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

During the month of February, 1866, Grant visited 
New York, and was received with great enthusiasm 
wherever he appeared. One of the pleasantest inci- 
dents of his visit at this time was a reception given 
him by the leather dealers of that city, in the ware- 
rooms of Messrs. Armstrong and Sons, No. 19 Ferry 
Street, in what is called the "Swamp," which is the 
seat of the extensive leather business of the city. 
The warehouse was handsomely decorated with flags, 
and an elegant banquet was prepared. Grant, on his 
appearance, was greeted with enthusiasm, and in re- 
sponse to repeated calls for a speech, said, " Gentle- 
men, you know I never make speeches. I am happy 
to meet my old friends of the leather trade." 

During tnis visit to New York he also visited the 
rooms of the Union Relief Committee, and inspected 
the specimens of writing executed with their left 



and a Statesman. 443 

hands by soldiers who had lost their right arms in the 
war. There were on exhibition two hundred and 
seventy specimens of such work ; and, looking at them, 
Grant remarked, " These boys write better with their 
left hands than I do with my right." Before leaving 
the rooms, he wrote the following upon the visitors' 
book : — 

New York, February 24, 18GG. 
I have examined the large and exceedingly interesting collec- 
tion of the left hand manuscripts Avritten by our disabled soldiers, 
who have lost their right arms. They are eminently honorable to 
the authors, and from the excellence of the penmanship, it would 
require a task I should be sorry to accept, to decide on the merits 
of the competitors. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General U. S. Army. 

On the evening of the 26th he was given a public 
reception at the Brooklyn Academy of Music, and left 
that night, after the, reception, on a special train for 
Washington. 

During this visit to New York a purse of one hun- 
dred thousand dollars was contributed by a few of the 
capitalists of New York, and offered to Grant. The 
presentation was tnade quite informally, and was re- 
ceived in the same way. Up to this time Grant had 
been the recipient of the following testimonials from 
the people of various parts of the country : The citi- 
zens of Philadelphia had presented him with thirty 
thousand dollars; the citizens of Galena, Illinois, with 
a house and furniture ; some citizens of Boston had 
given him a library, and besides these he had been 
presented with various swords, horses, pistols, and other 
similar gifts. The -pecuniary value of all of these was, 
however, inconsiderable, in comparison with the re- 



444 Grant as a Soldier 

wards voted by the British Parliament to Wellington 
after his victory at Waterloo, or to Marlborough for his 
victories, and to both of these soldiers these rewards 
were given in the shape of estates and titles. This 
species of reward, since the money to furnish it is raised 
by taxation, is of course really given by the productive 
labor of the country ; but as their will is not consulted 
in England, and as the credit of such generosity ac- 
crues to those who vote it, but do not bear their share in 
paying it, such lavishness might naturally be expected. 
There is no such easy generosity as that which is prac- 
tised with other people's money. The theory and 
practice of such rewards in this country are entirely dif- 
ferent. The gratitude and admiration of the American 
people are not to be measured by a pecuniary standard. 
To the great men of our country, from Washington 
down, this course has never been pursued. The 
Washington Monument, despite even the assistance 
of Everett's " made-to-order " oratory, is to-day in no 
more imminent danger of completion than it has ever 
been. It is not in such modes, copied and adopted 
from the self-glorifications of aristocratical monopolies, 
that the American people desire to express their grati- 
tude and admiration ; and though in the present tran- 
sitional condition, the method of expressing the national 
gratitude is not yet entirely developed, yet it is a great 
step in advance to have discarded the pecuniary form, 
and it is equally certain that, with the social elevation 
of productive labor, this spread of justice in the daily 
distribution of the rewards for service performed, will 
find the fit means for -its expression in all such excep- 
tional cases, for exceptional services. 



and a Statesman. 445 



CHAPTER XLVIII. 

THE SECOND YEAR OF RECONSTRUCTION. — THE BLOCK IN 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF AFFAIRS. — GRANT'S POSITION 
AND ACTION. 

In April, 1866, Grant, accompanied by Mrs. Grant, 
paid a visit to Richmond, and was received there 
with great cordiality. In September of this year he 
accompanied the President in a tour through the coun- 
try to Chicago, undertaken for the purpose of assisting 
at the laying of the corner-stone of a monument to 
Stephen A. Douglas. The presence of Grant and Far- 
ragut on this trip was a piece of political diplomacy, 
upon the part of its originators, which, though appar- 
ently successful at first, turned finally, as all such 
petty tricks must, to the confusion of those who had 
designed it. The question of reconstruction at this 
time had commenced to assume great importance. 
When the armed resistance of the Confederacy was 
overthrown, the southern people were ready to accept 
any terms. The system of slavery being, however, 
abolished, manifestly the most important thing for them 
to do was to accept the change in good faith, and busy 
themselves in removing the traces of the ravages of war, 
and in developing, by a system of free labor, in which 
justice should be the foundation-stone, the wonderful 
agricultural and other resources of their territory. But 



446 Grant as a Soldier 

in time the old political leaders of the South found that 
they had in Washington a "humble individual," who 
would aid them in attempting to regain, by the tricks 
of politics, the dominion which they had lost by an 
appeal to the sword. This change in the spiiit of the 
administration finally culminated in July, 1866, in a 
riot in New Orleans, in which, under the form of law, 
the members of a state convention were murdered by 
the police, and their meeting dispersed. It was a dis- 
play of the old spirit of slavery, exercising its natural 
manner of killing out freedom of discussion by violence. 
General Sheridan, who was in command of the Depart- 
ment of the Gulf, wrote thus to General Grant, from 
New Orleans, under date of the 12th of August. Sher- 
idan had been absent from the city at the time the 
massacre occurred. " The more information I obtain 
of the affair of the 30th in this city, the more revolt- 
ing it becomes. It was no riot. It was an absolute 
massacre by the police, which was not excelled in 
murderous cruelty by that of Fort Pillow. It was a 
murder which the mayor and police of the city perpe- 
trated without the shadow of a necessity. I recommend 
the removing of this bad man. I believe it would be 
hailed with the sincerest gratification by two thirds of 
the population of the city. There has been a feeling 
of insecurity on the part of the people here, on account 
of this man, which is now so much increased that the 
safety of life and property does not rest with the civil 
authority, but the military." 

In his report before Congress of November of this 
year, Sheridan further says, " My own opinion is, that 
the trial of a white man for the murder of a freedman 



and a Statesman. 447 

in Texas would be a farce; and in making this state- 
ment, I make it because truth compels me, and for no 
other reason. It is strange that over a white man 
killed by Indians on our extensive frontier the great- 
est excitement takes place; but over the killing of 
many freedmen in the settlements nothing is done. 
I cannot help but see this, and I cannot but tell it 
to my superiors, no matter how unpleasant it may be 
to the authorities of Texas." 

In July of this year the grade of General was created 
in the army, and Grant was nominated and confirmed 
for the position on the 25th* of July, 18G6. It was 
soon after this that Grant's good nature was prevailed 
upon to accompany the President in his tour. But, 
as it became evident, during its continuance, that his 
presence was used as a sort of indorsement for the 
policy which led to the New Orleans riot, and which was 
drifting the South ba.ck to its old position, where " the 
right and safety of all classes" were not "equitably 
maintained," he took the first occasion to leave the 
party, and returned to Washington. During the bal- 
ance of this year, and until the meeting of Congress 
in December, the course of events continued drifting 
in the same direction. As chief of the armies, Grant 
presided over the military departments, and the tenor 
of his instructions continued the same. In September 
of this year, his correspondence with General Lee, which 
we have already given, was first made public. 

29 



448 Grant as a Soldier 



CHAPTER XLIX. 

THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CON- 
GRESS. — GRANT'S POSITION IN THIS CONTEST. 



In March, 1867. the Fortieth Congress assembled, 
and the necessity for a more definite line of action 
became more apparent. It is neither the place, nor have 
we the space, to enter into a lengthy examination of 
the disagreement between the Executive and Congress; 
all we can do is to show the course Grant took of- 
ficially, and how far his acts gave indication of what 
his opinions were, and upon which side his sympathies 
lay, in this transference of the contest between the 
" equitable " maintenance of the " rights " and " safety 
of all classes," and the injustice of class oppression, 
from the field of battle to the arena of political in- 
trigue and chicanery. It is not Grant's place, nor is 
it his nature, to express himself in any other way than 
by his acts. There can be but little doubt of the posi- 
tion he occupied during the time that this question was 
settled on the battle-field, and those who have followed 
him there, could have but little doubt concerning what 
his course would be in the more tortuous labyrinth 
of politics. So accustomed, however, have we become 
to the perpetual prattle of men who, filling public posi- 
tions, are either colled, or feel themselves called, on to 
declare their position, that Grant's reticence was con- 



and a Statesman. 449 

struecl by many into a denial of his own course of action, 
or an indorsement of the Executive, according to the 
malice or the obtuseness of those inquiring into it. 

On the 12th of July, 1867, in answer to a call from 
Congress, the following document was laid before it. 
It was a circular issued on the 22d of May previous, 
by the Secretary of War, addressed to General Grant, 
and by him forwarded to the several district command- 
ers for their guidance. This circular read as follows : 
" General : Recent occurrences in some of the military 
districts indicate a necessity of great vigilance, on the 
part of military commanders, to be prepared for the pre- 
vention and prompt suppression of riots and breaches 
of the public peace, especially in towns and cities ; and 
they should have their forces in hand, and so posted, on 
all occasions where disturbances may be apprehended, as 
to promptly check, and if possible to prevent, outbreaks 
and violence endangering public or individual safety. 
You will, therefore, call the attention of commanders 
of military districts to this subject, and issue such pre- 
cautionary orders as may be found necessary for the 
purpose indicated." 

Grant's indorsement of this order is as follows: 
" The above conveys all the instructions deemed neces- 
sary, and will be acted on by district commanders 
making special reports of precautionary orders issued 
by them to prevent the recurrence of mobs or other 
unlawful violence." 

The following official letter to General Ord, in com- 
mand of the Fourth District, will show most definitely 
what course of action in the matter of reconstruction 
he felt it was his duty to pursue : — 



450 Grant as a Soldier 

"Washington, June 23, 1867. 
Brevet Major General E. O. Ord, 

Commanding Fourth District. 
General : A copy of your final instructions to the Board of 
Registration of June 10, 1867, is just received. I entirely dissent 
from the views contained in paragraph 4. Your views as to the 
duties of registers to register every man who will take the required 
oath, though they may know the applicant perjures himself, is sus- 
tained by the Attorney General. My opinion is, that it is the duty 
of the Board of Registration to see, as far as it lies in their power, 
that no unauthorized person is allowed to register. To secure this 
end, registers should be allowed to administer oaths and examine 
witnesses. The law, however, makes District Commanders their 
own interpreters of their power and duty under it, and, in my 
opinion, the Attorney General or myself can no more than give 
our opinion as to the meaning of the law. Neither can enforce 
their views against the judgment of those made responsible for 
the faithful execution of the law — the District Commanders. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, General. 

The following correspondence is also of great impor- 
tance in forming an intelligent opinion concerning 
Grant's position upon the whole subject of reconstruc- 
tion. On the 7th of April, General Pope, in command 
of the Third District, wrote to General Grant, asking 
his views on the status of officers of the rebel army 
paroled at the end of the war. He wanted to know 
whether paroles still held good, or whether they were 
set aside by the proclamation of the President, He 
asked the question because he desired to know what 
action he ought to take against rebel officers thus 
paroled, who should actively and openly counsel the peo- 
ple of their district to resist the action of the Recon- 
struction Acts passed by Congress. He gave it as his 
opinion that the provisions of their paroles required 



and a Statesman. 451 

them to return to their homes and obey the laws; 
and also that they refrain from inciting others to neg- 
lect or resist the laws of the United States. He also 
asked whether an attempt on their part to keep up 
difficulty and prevent the settlement of the southern 
question in accordance with the recent action of Con- 
gress was not a violation of their parole. To this letter 
Grant replied, on the 13th of April, as follows: — 

" Your views on the obligation of a parole are in 
strict accordance with my own." 

On the 6th of August, 1867, Andrew Johnson, the 
then acting President of the United States, notified 
Mr. Stanton, then filling the office of Secretary of War, 
that he was dismissed from his position. Stanton re- 
fused to surrender his office, since under the provisions 
of a bill entitled the Tenure of Office Bill, which had 
been recently passed by Congress, he could not be re- 
moved without the concurrence of the Senate, and that 
body was not now in session. On the 12th of August 
Johnson notified Stanton that he should "cease to ex- 
ercise all the functions pertaining " to the office of Sec- 
retary of War, and " transfer to General U. S. Grant, who 
has this day been authorized and empowered to act as 
Secretary of War ad interim, all records, books, papers, 
and other public property now in your custody and 
charge." On the same day Grant was officially notified 
by the President of his appointment, and Stanton sur- 
rendered his position, notifying the President at the 
same time that, " under a sense of public duty I am 
compelled to deny your right under the constitution 
and laws of the United States, without the advice and 
consent of the Senate, to suspend me from office as 



452 Grant as a Soldier 

Secretary of War, or the exercise of any or all functions 
pertaining to the same. But inasmuch as the General 
commanding the armies of the United States has been 
appointed Secretary of War ad interim, and has notified 
me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no 
alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior 
force." 

The official notice given to Stanton by Grant, of 
his appointment, was sent in the following letter : — 

Headquarters Armies of the United States, \ 
Washington, August 12, 1867. ) 

The Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

Sir : Enclosed herewith I have to transmit to you a copy of a 
letter just received from the President of the United States, noti- 
fying me of my assignment as acting Secretary of War, and 
directing me to assume those duties at once. In notifying you 
of my acceptance, I cannot let the opportunity pass without ex- 
pressing to you my appreciation of the zeal, patriotism, firmness, 
and ability with which you have ever discharged the duty of Sec- 
retary of War. 

With great respect, your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, General. 

Grant's acceptance of this position was made the 
signal and the theme for any amount of the ill-con- 
sidered and malicious remark in the press, which passes 
under the dignified name of journalism. Every species 
of motive was ascribed to him, except the simple one, 
which his whole previous course should have shown was 
the only one that influenced him, namely, that of doing 
his duty, as he best conceived and understood it, for the 
benefit of the country. The practice of simple, straight- 
forward honesty is so unusual and strange in the 
cunning and trickery of party politics, that it never 



and a Statesman. 453 

occurs to the politicians and their dependants, that 
any man can be actuated by a motive so curiously 
anomalous. But here, as in war, Grant has shown that 
he is trustworthy and reliable. Sherman was right in 
feeling anxious concerning his remaining in Washing- 
ton, even after he had proved in war that his " common 
sense " had supplied all the aids which Sherman feared 
he needed, since the dangers of politics are greater than 
those of war ; but Grant has shown that with the simple 
clew of honesty of purpose, he has been able to walk 
securely through the mazes and pitfalls of political 
intrigue. To those whose scope of vision is bounded 
by the petty circle of a mean personal ambition, it 
seems incredible that any one should rise so far above 
such limitations, as to lose sight of them entirely for 
the broader and wider view' of a nation's well-being. 
It is not strange, then, that the politicians should fail to 
comprehend, and should misrepresent, Grant; but from 
the people, who in these matters are wiser than their 
pretended rulers and instructors, he will receive recog- 
nition and confidence. 

Despite the amount of objurgation which was aimed 
at him, Grant held his peace ; he knew he had done his 
duty, and did not feel that there was any need to vin- 
dicate himself; his record should do that. He had, 
however, written the following admirable letter to the 
President, protesting against the removal of Stanton, 
and also against the removal of Sheridan from the 
government of the Fifth Military District, which the 
President had also resolved upon. This letter, which 
was a private one, was not made public until December 
17, 1867, when it formed part of the documents laid 



454 Grant as a Soldier 

before the judiciary committee of the House of Rep- 
resentatives, on a demand made by them for informa- 
tion concerning the action of the President in this 
matter. 

[PRIVATE.] 

Headquarters Armies op the United States, > 
Washington, D. C, August 11, 18G7. ) 

His Excellency Andrew Johnson, 

President of the United States. 

Sip.: I take the liberty of addressing you privately on the sub- 
ject of the conversation we had this morning, feeling, as I do, the 
great danger to the welfare of the country should you carry out 
the designs then expressed. 

First. On the subject of the displacement of the Secretary of 
War. His removal cannot be effected against his will without 
the consent of the Senate. It was but a short time since the 
United States Senate was in session, and why not then have 
asked for his removal, if it was desired ? It certainly was the 
intention of the legislative branch of the government to place a 
cabinet minister beyond the power of the executive removal ; and 
it is pretty well understood that, so far as cabinet ministers are 
affected by the Tenure of Office Bill, it was intended specially to 
protect the Secretary of War, whom the country felt great confi- 
dence in. The meaning of the law may be explained away by an 
astute lawyer; but the common sense and the views of loyal 
people will give it the effect intended by its framers. 

Second. On the subject of the removal of the very able com- 
mander of the Fifth Military District, let me ask you to consider 
the effect it would have upon the public. He is universally and 
deservedly beloved by the people who sustained this government 
through its trials, and feared by those who would be still the ene- 
mies of the government. It fell to the lot of but few men to do 
as much against an armed enemy as General Sheridan did during 
the rebellion, and it is within the scope of the ability of but few 
in this, or any other country, to do what he has. His civil ad- 
ministration has given equal satisfaction. He has had difficulties 
to contend with which no other district commander has encoun- 



and a Statesman. 455 

tercel. Almost, if not quite, from the day lie was appointed dis- 
trict commander to the present time, the press has given out that 
he was to be removed, that the administration was not satisfied 
with him. This has emboldened the opponents of the laws of 
Congress within his command, to oppose him in every way in 
their power, and has rendered necessary measures which other- 
wise might never have been necessary. In conclusion, allow me 
to say as a friend, desiring peace and quiet, the welfare of the 
whole country, north and south, that it is, in my opinion, more 
than the loyal people of this country (I mean those who sup- 
ported the government during the great rebellion) will quietly 
submit to, to see the very man, of all others, in whom they have 
expressed their confidence, removed. 

I would not have taken the liberty of addressing the Execu- 
tive of the United States thus, but for the conversation on the 
subject alluded to in this letter, and from a sense of duty, feeling 
that I know I am right in this matter. 
With great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, General. 

Among the documents which were made public at 
this time, there was also a letter "from Sheridan to 
Grant, dated from New Orleans on the 25th of Jan- 
uary, 1867, in which he describes the horrible condi- 
tion of things in Texas. In it he says that the gov- 
ernment is denounced, freedmen are shot, and Union 
men persecuted if they express their opinions. On 
the 29th of January Grant forwarded this letter to 
the Secretary of War, with this indorsement : — 

Respectfully forwarded to the Secretary of War. Attention 
is invited to that portion of the within communication which 
refers to the condition of the Union men and freedmen in Texas, 
and to the powerlessness of the military to afford them protec- 
tion. Even the moral effect of the presence of troops is passing 
away, and a few days ago, a squad of soldiers on duty were fired 



456 Grant as a Soldier 

on by citizens in Brownsville. In my opinion, the great number 
of murders of Union men and freedmen in Texas, not only, as 
a rule, unpunished, but uninvestigated, constitute practically a 
state of insurrection; and believing it to be the province and duty 
of every good government to afford protection to the lives, liberty, 
and property of its citizens, I would recommend the declaration 
of martial law in Texas to secure these. The necessity of gov- 
erning any portion of our territory by martial law is to be de- 
plored. If restored to, it should be limited in its authority, and 
should leave all local authorities and civil tribunals free and 
unobstructed, until they prove their inefficiency or unwillingness 
to perform their duties. Martial law would give security, or com- 
paratively so, to all classes of citizens, without regard to race, 
color, or political opinions, and could be continued until society 
was capable of protecting itself, or until the state is returned to 
its full relation to the Union. The application of martial law to 
one of these states would be a warning to all, and, if necessary, 
can be extended to others. 

U. S. Grant, General. 

This document shows that Grant has always held 
very decided opinions upon the method necessary to 
be pursued in the matter of reconstruction, and that 
he foreshadowed the course which Congress has only 
partially pursued. 

Having accepted the position of Secretary of War 
ad interim, Grant, in obedience to an order from the 
President on the 19th of August, removed Sheridan 
from the Fifth Military District, and assigned him to 
the department of Missouri. Before doing so, how- 
ever, he again protested against such a course of ac- 
tion in the following letter to the President, which, as 
containing his views upon the duties of those holding 
office in a representative government, should be trans- 
ferred to our school books, and thus impressed upon 
our youth, in order to guide them when they come to 



and a Statesman. 457 

take their part in the political management of the 
country. 

Having accepted the position of Secretary of War 
ad interim, Grant, with his characteristic promptness, 
set himself to work in cutting down the expenditures 
of the military department of the government, and 
was here as successful as he has always been. In the 
administration of civil affairs, as in his practice of war, 
he directs his energies against the most important 
points; and now that the war was over, a return to 
the principles of economy, which, before the war, regu- 
lated our military expenditures, was the most impor- 
tant reform. The result of his labors here will be 
found in his report, in the Appendix. 

On the 19th of August, Sheridan was transferred 
from his command of the Fifth Military District to the 
Department of the Missouri. The order for this change 
was issued by the President, through General Grant. 
The letter from Grant to the President, which has been 
quoted above, was not the only protest he made against 
this ; but on the first receipt of the order, he also wrote 
as follows : — 

Headquarters Armies of the United States, \ 
Washington, D. C, August 17, 18G7. } 

His Excellency Andrew Johnson, 

President of the United States. 

Sir : I am in receipt of your order of this date, directing the 
assignment of General G. II. Thonias to the command of the 
Fifth Military District ; General Sheridan to the Department of 
the Missouri, and General Hancock to the Department of the 
Cumberland ; also your note of this date (enclosing these instruc- 
tions), saying, " Before you issue instructions to carry into effect 
the enclosed order, I would be pleased to hear any suggestions 



458 Grant as a Soldier 

you may deem necessary respecting the arrangements to which 
the order refers." 

I am pleased to avail myself of this invitation to urge, ear- 
nestly urge — urge in the name of a patriotic people who have 
sacrificed hundreds of thousands of loyal lives and thousands of 
millions of treasure to preserve the integrity and union of this 
country — that this order be not insisted on. It is unmistakably 
the expressed wish of the country that General Sheridan should 
not be removed from his present command. This is a republic 
where the will of the people is the law of the land. I beg that 
their voice may be heard. 

General Sheridan has performed his civil duties faithfully and 
intelligently. His removal will only be regarded as an effort to 
defeat the laws of Congress. It will be interpreted by the unre- 
constructed element in the South — those who did all they could 
to break up this government by arras, and now wish to be the 
only element consulted as to the method of restoring order — as 
a triumph. It will embolden them to renewed opposition to the 
will of the loyal masses, believing that they have the Executive 
with them. 

The services of General Thomas, in battling for the Union, en- 
title him to some consideration. He has repeatedly entered his 
protest against being assigned to either of the five military dis- 
tricts, and especially to being assigned to relieve General Sheridan. 

General Hancock ought not to be removed from where he is. 
His department is a complicated one, which will take a new com- 
mander some time to become acquainted with. 

There are military reasons, pecuniary reasons, why this order 
should not be insisted on. 

I beg to refer to a letter (marked private) which I wrote to the 
President when first consulted on the subject of the change in 
the War Department. It bears upon the subject of this removal, 
and I had hoped would have prevented it. 

I have the honor to be, with great respect, 
Your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, General U. S. Army, and 
Secretary of War ad interim. 



and a Statesman. 459 

In September of this year there was great fear felt 
lest there should be violence grow out of the political 
excitement incident to an election in Nashville, Ten- 
nessee. Grant ordered General Thomas, with troops, 
to proceed to this point, and his instructions were 
strictly to not interfere in any way between the parties, 
but only to put down violence, if it should break out. 
Fortunately the election passed off quietly ; and the cir- 
cumstance is not worth mentioning here, except as it 
affords another instance of the wise, conciliatory, and 
entirely impartial course Grant has always pursued, in 
the cases where his military duties have brought him 
into collision with the civil authorities. His position is 
plain : violence must be put down promptly ; and it is 
only wanting for the South to show that they are able 
to conduct their affairs peaceably, and that the presence 
of the military is not necessary in order to secure and 
guarantee freedom of action to all parties, to have the 
military power withdrawn. 

On the reassembling of Congress, the Senate refused 
to acquiesce in the removal of Stanton as Secretary of 
War, and on the reception of an official notice from that 
body to this effect, Grant immediately surrendered the 
office to Stanton, who was thus declared its legal oc- 
cupant. Shortly after this, a correspondence, which will 
be found in the Appendix, took place between the 
President and General Grant, in which the President 
seeks to show that Grant had not treated him with 
perfect fairness. This charge Grant repudiates, and the 
President attempts to further maintain by obtaining 
and publishing the recollections of the conversation, 
concerning which the disagreement has arisen, of those 



460 Grant as a Soldier 

members of his cabinet who were present. The whole 
matter is of very slight importance, except that it 
shows what are some of the pitfalls which lie in the 
path of a straightforward man, when he wanders in the 
company of politicians in Washington. The President 
and his friends say that their recollection of what Grant 
said is so and so, while Grant says he said nothing 
which could mean what they say they remember he 
said. In such a matter of contradiction, it is not 
strength of assertion, but the character of the assertor, 
that must carry the day; and in this view of the case 
there can be no doubt who was right. 



and a Statesman. 461 



CHAPTER L. 

PEESONAL APPEAEANCE AND CHAEACTEEISTICS. 

We have thus passed in review the record of Grant's 
public life, and have found that from the first to the 
last, as a soldier and a statesman, his chief character- 
istic is action. Calm, self-reliant, persistent, he accepts 
any duty laid upon him, and with a singleness of pur- 
pose devotes his whole energies to its accomplishment. 
"While singularly free from the narrowness of mind 
which generally distinguishes men who are only persist- 
ent, he is equally free from the personal vanity and 
self-conceit which passes generally for self-reliance. At 
the beginning of the war his services in organizing the 
volunteer troops in Illinois were hardly recognized at 
first, and it was only when the result of his ability was 
seen in the discipline and effectiveness of his men, that 
he began to be appreciated. The same simple straight- 
forward reliableness has characterized his entire career. 
Paducah, Belmont, Donelson, Shiloh, Vicksburg, Chat- 
tanooga, Richmond, Washington, — these names recall 
the almost uninterrupted course of his victories as a sol- 
dier and statesman. While never thrusting himself offi- 
ciously forward, he is patient under misconception and 
misrepresentation, as only a man who is conscious of 



462 Grant as a Soldier 

doing his duty, and whose ambition is not a merely 
personal one, can be. 

In person Grant is about the middle height, is solidly 
and compactly built, can bear great fatigue, and a long- 
continued strain upon his energies. His hair is light 
brown and abundant, his eyes are blue, while his beard 
and mustache are heavy and reddish. These last he 
keeps trimmed short. His face has become familiar to 
the people of the country from the numerous portraits of 
all kinds which have been made of him. The best of 
these is a steel portrait engraved by Marshall, whose 
fine likeness of Lincoln is the best we have of him. Both 
of these engravings are made from likenesses painted 
by Mr. Marshall himself, who is as skilful with his brush 
as with his burin. General Sheridan, on seeing this por- 
trait of Grant, pronounced it unquestionably the best 
ever made of the General. Besides this, there is a 
life-size wood-cut made by Mr. A. G. Holcomb, which, 
from its greater cheapness, will be more extensively 
circulated, and which, in its branch of art, is equal- 
ly commendable. Both of these portraits represent 
Grant as he is — a simple and unpretending man, 
with nothing of the traditional hero about him ; but a 
glance at his face shows that he can be relied upon. 

In his manners Grant is mild, even during the mo- 
ments of greatest excitement, and is readily approached 
by every one, since he surrounds himself with none 
of the conventionalities of rank or position. Mr. 
Marshall, while painting the portrait, in 1866, from 
which his likeness is engraved, expressed a desire that 
General Grant should give him a sitting in the uniform 



and a Statesman. 463 

of his rank. "Why," said the Lieutenant General, 
" the fact is, that I have not yet had a coat made ac- 
cording to the regulation ; but you can take the old. 
one, and put the necessary changes in it." A cor- 
respondent thus described him at the battle of Chat- 
tanooga: "He was there to be seen enveloped in a 
rather huge military coat, wearing a slouching hat, 
which seemed to have a predisposition to turn up be- 
fore and down behind, with a gait slightly limping, 
from his accident at New Orleans, giving his orders 
with as few words as possible, in a low tone, and with 
an accent which partook of the slight nervousness, 
intensity of feeling, yet perfect self-command, seen in 
all his movements. General Grant might be described 
best as a little old man — yet not really old — who, 
with a keen eye, did not intend that anything should 
escape his observation. At that battle he was not in 
his usual physical condition, his recent illness, added to 
his arduous labors, having made him lean in flesh, and 
given a sharpness to his features which he did not 
formerly have. Those features, however, go far to 
define the man of will and self-control that he is. At 
the critical moment of the day's operations, the muscles 
appeared to gather tighter and harder over his slightly 
projecting chin, which seems to have an involuntary 
way of working, and the lips to contract. There is in 
what he does or says nothing that has the slightest 
approach to ostentation or show, but the palpable 
evidence of a plain man of sense, will, and purpose, 
who has little idea that more eyes are turned on him 
than on any other man on the continent." 

30 



4C4 Grant as a Soldier 

One of his staff officers writes of him thus, in private 
life : " If 3 7 ou could see the General as he sits just over 
beyond me, with his wife and two children, looking 
more like a chaplain than a General, with that quiet 
air so impossible to describe, you would not ask me if 
he drinks. He rarely ever uses intoxicating liquors; 
more moderate in his habits and desires than any other 
man I ever knew ; more pure and spotless in Ids private 
character than almost any man I ever knew ; more brave 
than any man I ever saw ; with more power to com- 
mand and ability to plan than any man I ever served 
under ; cool to excess, when others lose nerve, always 
hopeful, always undisturbed, never failing to accomplish 
what he undertakes just as he expects to. He is the 
only General worthy to command Americans fighting 
for their national salvation." 

Of his bravery there can be no doubt, as it has been 
shown on all occasions. " I was at West Point," said 
General Sherman at a public dinner at Memphis, in 
1864, " with General Grant. The General is not a man 
of remarkable learning, but he is one of the bravest I ever 
saw. He smokes his cigar with coolness in the midst 
of flying shot. lie has no fear, because he is an honest man. 
I like Grant. I do not say he is a hero ; I do not be- 
lieve in heroes ; but I know he is a gentleman, and a 
good man." 

Grant's great passion is horses, and this tendency he 
has shown from his childhood. He makes friends with 
them, and they with him. There is a fine touch of 
quiet sarcastic humor in the facility with which he 
turns the conversation upon horses, when officious in- 



and a Statesman. 465 

traders attempt to sound him on political subjects. His 
taciturnity is a quality which has excited the most sur- 
prise and comment from the politicians. This species of 
man, characterized by Carlyle as " spouting wretches." 
have increased so marvellously under our free institu- 
tions, and are so constantly intent on attracting atten- 
tion to themselves, by proclaiming and explaining 
themselves aloud, in season and out of season, by de- 
fining their position, and by all the demagogic arts for 
obtaining notoriety, that they cannot understand a 
man who can hold his peace ; and silence is generally a 
proof to them that a man has neither opinions nor a 
mind capable of forming them. But it is not from 
any such reason that Grant is silent. His forte 
lies in action, not in words. And any one who will 
follow carefully his record will find that he has very 
decided opinions, that they are very decidedly on the 
side of right, and that he does not hesitate to express 
them by his actions, in the most decided manner, when 
the proper occasion for so doing occurs. But a few 
years ago unknown, he has risen, without the adventi- 
tious aid of friends, by the expression of his opinions in 
action, to the present position which he holds as the 
foremost man in this nation. That he is the fittest 
man among us to express in action the spirit of the 
nineteenth century, here in the United States, seems to 
be the almost universal opinion. While the country 
owes him a debt it can neither estimate nor discharge, 
for his services both in the field and in the cabinet, he 
has himself been educated by the popular movement 
during the past few years. It is earnestly to be hoped 



466 Grant as a Soldier. 

that this mutual recognition and influence may not be 
destroyed or diminished, but that in the future, as in 
the past, this nation may be found in the van of the 
world's progress towards the realization of the demo- 
cratic idea, and Grant be found its leader, in this noble 
task. 



APPENDIX. 



i. 

THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 

General Grant's Report. 

Headquarters Army in the Field, 1 
Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862. J 
General G. W. Cullttm, 

Chief of Staff, Department of 3fissouri. 

General : I am pleased to announce to you the unconditional 
surrender, this morning, of Fort Donelson, with twelve to fifteen 
thousand prisoners, at least forty pieces of artillery, and a large 
amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property. 

I left Fort Henry on the 12th instant, with a force of about fif- 
teen thousand men, divided into two divisions, under the command 
of Generals McClernand and Smith. Six regiments were sent 
around by water the day before, convoyed by a gunboat, or rather 
started one day later than one of the gunboats, with instructions 
not to pass it. 

The troops made the march in good order, the head of the col- 
umn arriving within two miles of , the fort at twelve o'clock M. 
At this point the enemy's pickets were met and driven in. 

The fortifications of the enemy were from this point gradually 
approached and surrounded, with occasional skirmishing on the 
line. The following day, owing to the non-arrival of the gunboats 
and reinforcements sent by water, no attack was made ; but the 
investment was extended on the flanks of the enemy, and drawn 
closer to his works, with skirmishing all day. The evening of the 

407 



468 Appendix. 

loth, the gunboats and reinforcements arrived. On the 14th, a 
gallant attack was made by Flag-officer Foote upon the enemy's 
works with his fleet. The engagement lasted, probably, one hour 
and a half, and bade fur to result favorably to the cause of the 
Union, when two unlucky shots disabled two of the armored gun- 
boats, so that they were carried back by th.3 cur /en t. The remain- 
ing two were very much disabled also, having received a number 
of heavy shots about the pilot-house and other parts of the vessels. 
After these mishaps, I concluded to make the investment of Fort 
Donelson as perfect as possible, and partially fortify and await re- 
pairs to the gunboats. This plan was frustrated, however, by the 
enemy making a most vigorous attack upon our right wing, com- 
manded by General J. A. McClernand, with a portion of the force 
under General L. Wallace. The enemy were repelled after a 
closely-contested battle of several hours, in wdiich our loss was 
heavy. The officers, and particularly field-officers, suffered out 
of proportion. I have not the means yet of determining our loss, 
even approximately, but it cannot fall far short of one thousand 
two hundred killed, wounded, and missing. Of the latter, I un- 
derstand through General Buckner, about two hundred and fifty 
were taken prisoners. I shall retain enough of the enemy to ex- 
change for them, as they were immediately shipped off, and not left 
for recapture. 

About the close of this action the ammunition in the cartridge- 
boxes gave out, which, with the loss of many of the field-officers, 
produced great confusion in the ranks. Seeing that the enemy 
did not take advantage of this fact, I ordered a charge ;ipon the 
left — enemy's right — with the division under General C. F. Smith, 
which was most brilliantly executed, and gave to our arms full as- 
surance of victory. The battle lasted until dark, giving us posses- 
sion of part of their intrenchments. An attack was ordered upon 
their other flank, after the charge of General Smith was commenced, 
by the divisions under Generals McClernand and Wallace, which, 
notwithstanding the hours of exposure to a heavy fire in the fore 
part of the day, was gallantly made, and the enemy further re- 
pulsed. At the points thus gained, night having come on, all the 
troops' encamped for the night, feeling that a complete victory 
would crown their lab >rs at an early hour in the morning. This 
morning, at a very early hour, General S. B. Buckner sent a nies- 



Appendix. 4C9 

sago to our camp, under a flag of truce, proposing an armistice, &c. 
A copy of the correspondence which ensued is herewith accom- 
panied. 

I cannot mention individuals who specially distinguished them- 
selves, but leave that to division and brigade officers, whose reports 
will be forwarded as soon as received. To division commanders, 
however, Generals McClernand, Smith, and Wallace, I must do the 
justice to say that each of them were with their commands in the 
midst of danger, and were always ready to execute all orders, no 
matter what the exposure to themselves. 

At the hour the attack was made on General McClernand's com- 
mand, I was absent, having received a note from Flag-officer 
Foote, requesting me to go and see him, he being unable to call. 

My personal staff, — Colonel J. D. Webster, Chief of Staff; Col- 
onel J. Riggin, Jr., Volunteer Aid ; Captain J. A. Rawlins, A. A. 
General ; Captains C. B. Lagow and W. S. Hilly er, Aids, and Lieu- 
tenant Colonel V. B. McPherson, Chief Engineer, — all are de- 
serving of personal mention for their gallantry and services. 

For full details and reports and particulars, reference is made to 
the reports of the Engineer, Medical Director, and commanders of 
brigades and divisions, to follow. 

I am, General, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Urigadier General. 



REBEL REPORTS. 
Jeff. Davis's Message accompanying the Reports. 

Executive Department, March 11, 1SG2. 
To the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

I transmit herewith copies of such official reports as have been 
received at the War Department, of the defence and fall of Fort 
Donelson. 

They will be found incomplete and unsatisfactory. Instructions 
have been given to furnish further information upon the several 
points not made intelligible by the reports. It is not stated that 
reinforcements were at any time asked for ; nor is it demonstrated 



470 Appendix. 

to have been impossible to have saved the army by evacuating the 
position ; nor is it known by what means it was found practicable 
to withdraw a part of the garrison, leaving the remainder to sur- 
render ; nor upon what authority or principles of action the senior 
General abandoned responsibility by transferring the command to 
a junior officer. 

In a former communication to Congress, I presented the propri- 
ety of a suspension of judgment in relation to the disaster at Fort 
Donelson, until official reports could be received. I regret that 
the information now furnished is so defective. In the mean time, 
hopeful that satisfactory explanation may be made, I have directed, 
upon the exhibition of the case as presented by the tico senior Gen- 
erals, that they should be relieved from command, to await further 
orders whenever a reliable judgment can be rendered on the mer- 
its of the case. 

Jefferson Davis. 

Extracts from tiie Report of John B. Floyd. 

Camp near Murfreesboro', February 27, 1862. 
General A. S. Johnston. 

Sir : Your order of the 12th of this month, transmitted to me 
by telegraph from Bowling Green to Cumberland City, reached 
me the same evening. It directed me to repair at once, with what 
force T could command, to the support of the garrison at Fort Don- 
elson. I immediately prepared for my departure, and effected it in 
time to reach Fort Donelson the next morning, 13th, before day- 
light. Measures had been already taken by Brigadier General 
Pillow, then in command, to render our resistance to the attack 
of the enemy as effective as possible. He had, with activity and 
industry, pushed forward the defensive works towards completion. 

Soon after my arrival, the intrenchments were fully occupied 
from one end to the other; and just as the sun rose, the cannonade 
from one of the enemy's gunboats announced the opening of the 
conflict, which was destined to continue for three days and nights. 
In a very short time the fire became general along our whole lines, 
and the enemy, who had already planted batteries at several points 
around the whole circuit of our intrenchments, opened a general 



Appendix. 471 

and active fire from all arms upon our trenches, which continued 
until darkness put an end to the conflict. They charged with un- 
common spirit at several points along on the line, but most partic- 
ularly at a point undefended by intrenchments, down a hollow 
which separated the right wing, under Brigadier General Buckner, 
from the right of the centre, commanded by Colonel Iliman. 

The enemy continued their fire upon different parts of our in- 
trenchments throughout the night, which deprived our men of 
every opportunity of sleep. We lay that night upon our arms in 
the trenches. We confidently expected, at the dawn of day, a 
more vigorous attack than ever ; but in this we were entirely mis- 
taken. The day advanced, and no preparation seemed to be 
making for a general onset. But an extremely annoying fire was 
kept up from the enemy's sharp-shooters throughout the whole 
length of the intrenchments, from their long-range rifles. Whilst 
this mode of attack was not attended with any considerable loss, 
it, nevertheless, confined the men to their trenches, and prevented 
their taking their usual rest. 

There was no place within our intrenchments but could be 
reached by the enemy's artillery from their boats or their bat- 
teries. It was but fair to infer that, while they kept up a sufficient 
fire upon our intrenchments, to keep our men from sleep and pre- 
vent repose, their object was merely to give time to pass a column 
above us on the river, both on the right and the left banks, and thus 
to cut off all our communications, and to prevent the possibility 
of egress. I thus saw clearly that but one course was left by which 
a rational hope could be entertained of saving the garrison, or a 
part of it. That was, to dislodge the enemy from his position on 
our left, and thus to pass our people into the open country lying 
southward towards Nashville. I called for a consultation of the 
officers of divisions and brigades, to take place after dark, when 
this plan was laid before them, approved and adopted, and at which 
it was determined to move from the trenches at an early hour on 
the next morning, and attack the enemy in his position.' 

Our troops were completely exhausted by four days and nights 
of continued conflict. To renew it with any hope of successful 



472 Appendix. 

result was obviously rain, and such I understood to be the unani- 
i mous opinion of all the officers present at the council called to 
consider what was best to be done. I thought, and so announced, 
that a desperate onset upon the right of the enemy's forces, on the 
ground where we had attacked them in the morning, might result 
in the extrication of a considerable proportion of the command 
from the position we were in, and this opinion I understood to be 
concurred in by all who were present. But it was likewise agreed, 
with the same unanimity, that it would result in the slaughter of 
nearly all who did not succeed in effecting their escape. The 
question then arose, wdiether, in point of humanity and a sound 
military policy, a course should be adopted from which the proba- 
bilities were, that the larger portion of the command would be cut 
to pieces in an unavailing fight against overwhelming numbers. I 
understood the general sentiment to be averse to the proposition. 
I felt that in this contingency, whilst it might be questioned 
whether I should, as commander of the army, lead it to certain 
destruction in an unavailing fight, yet I had a right, individually, 
to determine that I would not survive a surrender there. To sat- 
isfy both propositions, I agreed to hand over the command to Brig- 
adier General Buckner, through Brigadier General Pillow, and to 
make an effort for my own extrication by any and every means 
that might present themselves to me. 

I therefore directed Colonel Forrest, a daring and determined 
officer, at the head of an efficient regiment of cavalry, to be pres- 
ent for the purpose of accompanying me in what I supposed would 
be an effort to pass through the enemy's lines. I announced the 
fact, upon turning the command over to Brigadier General Buck- 
ner, that I would bring away with me, by any means I could, my 
own particular brigade, the propriety of which was acquiesced in 
on all hands. This, by various modes, I succeeded in accomplish- 
ing to a great extent. 

The command was turned over to Brigadier General Buckner, 
who at once opened negotiations with the enemy, which resulted 
in the surrender of the place. 

John B. Floyd, Brigadier General commanding. 



Appendix. 473 

Extracts from General Pillow's Report. 

Columbia, Tennessee, February 18, 18G2. 
Captain Clarence Derrick, A. A. General 

On the 18th instant General A. S. Johnston ordered me to pro- 
ceed to Fort Donelson, and take command at that post. On the 
19th instant I arrived at that place. In detailing the operations 
of the forces under my command at Fort Donelson, it is proper to 
state the condition of that work and of the forces constituting its 
garrison. 

The armament of the batteries consisted of eight thirty-two- 
pounders, three thirty-two pound carronades, one eight-inch colum- 
biad, and one rifled gun of thirty-two pound calibre. The selection 
of the site for the work was an unfortunate one. While its com- 
mand of the river was favorable, the site was commanded by the 
hills above and below on the river, and by a continuous range of 
hills all around the works to its rear. 

A field-work of very contracted dimensions had been construct- 
ed for the garrison to protect the battery ; but this field-work was 
commanded by the hills already referred to, and lay open to a fire 
of artillery from every direction except from the hills below. To 
guard against the effect of fire of artillery from these heights, a 
line of defence-work, consisting of rifle-pits and abatis for infantry, 
detached on our right, but continuous on our left, with defences 
for our light artillery, were laid off by Major Gilmer — engineer of 
General A. S. Johnston's staff, but on duty with me at the post — 
around the rear of the battery, and on the heights from which ar- 
tillery could reach our battery and inner field-work, enveloping 
the inner work and the town of Dover, where our principal sup- 
plies of quartermaster and commissary stores were on deposit. 

These works, pushed with the utmost possible energy, were not 
quite completed, nor my troops all in position, though nearly so, 
when Brigadier General Floyd, my senior officer, reached that sta- 
tion. The works were laid off with judgment and skill by Major 
Gilmer; were w T ell executed, and designed for the defence of the 
rear of the works. 

I had placed Brigadier General Buckner in command of the 
right wing, and Brigadier General Johnson in command of the left. 



474 Appendix. 

By extraordinary efforts, we had barely got the works in a defen- 
sible condition, when the enemy made an advance in force around 
and against the entire line of our outer works. 

The first assault was commenced by the enemy's artillery against 
the entire line of our left wing, which was promptly responded to 
by Captain Green's battery of field artillery. After several hours 
of firing between the artillery of the two armies, the enemy's 
infantry advanced to the conflict all along the line, which was 
kept up and increased in volume from one end of the line to the 
other for several hours, when at last the enemy made a vigorous 
assault against the right of our left wing. 

The result of the day's work pretty well tested the strength of 
our defensive lines, and established, beyond question, the gal- 
lantry of our entire command, all of which defended well their 
portion of the line. The loss sustained by our forces in this 
engagement was not large, our men being mostly under shelter 
of their rifle-pits ; but we, nevertheless, had quite a number of 
killed and wounded ; but owing to the continued fighting which 
followed, it was impossible to get any official report of the casu- 
alties of the day. 

On the 14th instant the enemy was busy throwing his forces 
of every arm around us, extending his line of investment around 
our position, and completely enveloping us. We were now sur- 
rounded by immense force, said by persons to amount to fifty-two 
regiments, and every road and possible avenue of departure were 
cut off, with the certainty that our sources of supply by the river 
would soon be cut off by the enemy's batteries placed upon the 
river above us. 

At a meeting of the general officers, called by General Floyd, 
it was unanimously determined to give the enemy battle next 
day at daylight, so as to cut open a route of exit for our troops 
to the interior of the country, and thus to save our army. "We 
had knowledge that the principal portion of the enemy's forces 
were massed in encampment in front of our extreme left, com- 
manding the two roads leading into the interior, one of which we 
must take in leaving our position. We knew that he had massed 
in encampment another large force on the Union Ferry Itoad, 



Appendix. 475 

opposite the centre of our left wing. His fresh arrival of troops 
which encamped on the bank of the river, two and a half miles 
below us, from which latter encampment a stream of fresh troops 
was continually pouring around us on his line of investment, and 
thus strengthening his general encampment on the extreme right. 
At each of his encampments and on each road he had a position, 
a battery of field artillery, and twenty-four pound iron guns on 
siege-carriages. 

The operations of the day had forced the entire command of 
the enemy around to our right wing, and in front of General 
Buckner's position in the intrenchments ; and when his command 
reached his position he found the enemy rapidly advancing to 
take possession of this portion of his work. He had a stubborn 
conflict, lasting one and a half hours, to regain it, and the enemy 
actually got possession of the extreme right of his position, and 
he held it so firmly that he could not dislodge him. The position 
thus gained by the enemy was a most commanding one, being 
immediately on the rear of our river battery and field-work for 
its protection. From it he could readily turn the intrenched 
work occupied by General Buckner, and attack him in reverse, or 
advance under cover of an intervening ridge directly upon our 
battery and field-work. While he held this position, it was mani- 
fest we could not hold the main work or battery. Such was the 
condition of the armies at nightfall, after nine hours of severe 
conflict on the 15th instant. 

In this condition the general officers held a consultation to 
determine what we should do. General Buckner gave it as his 
decided opinion that he could not hold his position one half hour 
against an assault of the enemy, and said the enemy would attack 
him next morning at daylight. The proposition was then made 
by the undersigned to again fight our way through the enemy's 
line, and cut our way out. General Buckner said his command 
was so worn out and cut to pieces and demoralized, that he could 
not make another fight ; that it would cost the command three 
quarters of its present number to cut its way through, and it was 
wrong to sacrifice three quarters of a command to save a quar- 
ter ; that no officer had a right to cause such a sacrifice. General 



476 * Appendix. 

Floyd and Major Gilmer I understood to concur in this 
opinion. 

I then expressed the opinion that we could hold out another 
day, and in that time we could get steamboats and set the com- 
mand over the river, and probably save a large portion of it. To 
this General Buckner replied that the enemy would certainly 
attack him at daylight, and that he could not hold his position 
half an hour. 

The alternative of these propositions was a surrender of their 
position and command. General Floyd said that he would nei- 
ther surrender the command, nor would he surrender himself a 
prisoner. I had taken the same position. General Buckner said 
he was satisfied nothing else could be done, and that, therefore, 
he would surrender if placed in command. General Floyd said 
he would turn over the command to him if he could be allowed 
to withdraw his command. To this General Buckner consented. 
Thereupon General Floyd turned the command over to me. I 
passed it instantly to General Buckner, saying I would neither 
surrender the command nor myself a prisoner. I directed Colo- 
nel Forrest to cut his way out. Under these circumstances Gen- 
eral Buckner accepted the command, and sent a flag of truce to 
the enemy for an armistice for six hours to negotiate for terms of 
capitulation. Before this flag and communication were delivered, 
I retired from the garrison. 

Gid. J. Pillow, Brigadier General C. S. A. 



Appendix. . 477 



II. 

LETTER FROM GENERAL SHERMAN CONCERNING THE BAT- 
TLE OF SIIILOH, OR PITTSBURG LANDING. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi. 
Professor Henry Coppee, Philadelphia. 

Dear Sir : In the June number of the United States Service 
Magazine I find a brief sketch of Lieutenant General U. S. Grant, 
in which I see you are likely to perpetuate an error, which General 
Grant may not deem of sufficient importance to correct. To Gen- 
eral Buell's noble, able, and gallant conduct you attribute the fact 
that the disaster of April 6, at Pittsburg Landing, was retrieved, 
and made the victory of the following day. As General Taylor is 
said in his later days to have doubted whether he was at the battle 
of Buena Vista at all, on account of the many things having tran- 
spired there, according to the historians, which he did not see, so I 
begin to doubt whether I was at the battle of Pittsburg Lnnding 
of modern description. But I was at the battles of April 6 and 
7, 1862. General Grant visited my division in person about ten 
A. M., when the battle raged fiercest. I was then on the right. 
After some general conversation, he remarked that I was doing 
right in stubbornly opposing the progress of the enemy, and, in 
answer to my inquiry as to cartridges, told me he had anticipated- 
their want, and given orders accordingly ; he then said his pres- 
ence was more needed over at the left. About two P. M. of the 
6th, the enemy materially slackened his attack on me, and about 
four P. M. I deliberately made a new line behind McArthur's drill- 
field, placing batteries on chosen ground, repelled easily a cavalry 
attack, and watched the cautious approach of the enemy's infantry, 
that never dislodged me there. I selected that line in advance of 
a bridge across Snake Creek, by which we had all clay been ex- 
pecting the approach of Lewis Wallace's division from Crump's 
Landing. About five P. M., before the sun set, General Grant 
came again to me, and after hearing my report of matters, ex- 
plained to me the situation of affairs on the left, which were not 
as favorable ; still, the enemy had failed to reach the landing of 
the boats. We agreed that the enemy had expended the furore 



478 Appendix. 

of his attack, and we estimated our loss, and approximated our 
then strength, including Lewis Wallace's fresh division, expected 
each minute. He then ordered me to get all things ready, and 
at daylight the next day to assume the offensive. That was before 
General Buell had arrived, but he was known to be near at hand. 
General Buell's troops took no essential part in the first day's 
fight ; and Grant's army, though collected together hastily, green 
as militia, some regiments arriving without cartridges even, and 
nearly all hearing the dread sound of battle for the first time, had 
successfully withstood and repelled the first day's terrific onset of 
a superior enemy, well commanded and well handled. I know I 
had orders from General Grant to assume the offensive before I 
knew General Buell was on the west side of the Tennessee. I 
think General Buell, Colonel Fry, and others of General Buell's 
staff, rode up to where I was about sunset, about the time General 
Grant was leaving me. General Buell asked me many questions, 
and got of me a small map, which I had made for my own use, 
and told me that by daylight he could have eighteen thousand 
fresh men, which I knew would settle the matter. 

I understood Grant's forces were to advance on the right of 
the Corinth road, and Buell's on the left ; and accordingly, at 
daylight, I advanced my division by the flank, the resistance 
being trivial, up to the very spot where the day before the battle 
had been most severe, and then waited till near noon for Buell's 
troops to get up abreast, when the entire line advanced and recov- 
ered all the ground we had ever held. I know that, with the 
exception of one or two severe struggles, the fighting of April 7 
was easy, as compared with that of April 6. 

I never was disposed, nor am I now, to question anything done 
by General Buell and his army, and know that, approaching our 
field of battle from the rear, he encountered that sickening crowd 
of laggards and fugitives that excited his contempt and that of 
his army, who never gave full credit to those in the front line, 
who did fight hard, and who had, at four P. M., checked the 
enemy, and were preparing the next day to assume the offensive* 
I remember the fact the better from General Grant's anecdote of 
his Donelson battle, which he told me then for the first time — 
that at a certain period of the battle he saw that either side was 
ready to give way, if the other show T ed a bold front j and he deter- 



Appendix. 479 

mined to do that very thing — to advance on the enem)', when, 
as he prognosticated, the enemy surrendered. At four P. M. of 
April G, he thought the appearances the same, and lie judged, 
with Lewis Wallace's fresh division, and such of our startled 
troops as had recovered their equilibrium, he would be justified 
in dropping the defensive and assuming the offensive in the morn- 
ing. And, I repeat, I received such orders before I knew General 
Buell's troops were at the river. I admit that I was glad Bueli 
was there, because I knew his troops were older than ours, and 
better systematized and drilled ; and his arrival made that certain 
which before was uncertain. I have heard this question much 
discussed, and must say that the officers of Buell's army dwelt 
too much on the stampede of some of our raw troops, and gave 
us too little credit for the fact that for one whole day, weakened 
as we were by the absence of Buell's army, long expected, of 
Lewis Wallace's division, only four miles off, and of the fugitives 
from our ranks, we had beaten off our assailants for the time. At 
the same time, our army of the Tennessee have indulged in 
severe criticisms at the slow approach of that army which knew 
the danger that threatened us from the concentrated armies of 
Johnston, Beauregard, and Bragg, that lay at Corinth. In a war 
like this, where opportunities for personal prowess are as plenty 
as blackberries to those who seek them at the front, all such 
criminations should be frowned down ; and were it not for the 
military character of your journal, I would not venture to offer 
a correction to a very popular error. 

I will also avail myself of this occasion to correct another very 
common mistake, in attributing to General Grant the selection of 
that battle-field. It was chosen by that veteran soldier, Major 
General Charles F. Smith, who ordered my division to disembark 
there, and strike for the Charleston Railroad. This order was 
subsequently modified, by his ordering Hurlbut's division to dis- 
embark there, and mine higher up the Tennessee, to the mouth 
of Yellow Creek, to strike the railroad at Burnsville. But floods 
prevented our reaching the railroad, when General Smith ordered 
me in person also to disembark at Pittsburg Landing, and take 
post well out, so as to make plenty of room, with Snake and Lick 
Creeks the flanks of a camp for the grand army of invasion. 

It was General Smith who selected that field of battle, and it 
31 



480 Appendix. 

was well chosen. On any other we surely would have been over- 
whelmed, as both Lick and Snake Creeks forced the enemy to 
confine his movement to a direct front attack, which new troops 
are better qualified to resist than where the flanks are exposed to 
a real or chimerical danger. Even the divisions of that army 
were arranged in that camp by General Smith's order, my divis- 
ion forming, as it were, the outlying picket, whilst McClernand 
and Prentiss's were the real line of battle, with W. H. L. Wallace 
in support of the right wing, and Hurlbut of the left ; Lewis Wal- 
lace's division being detached. All these subordinate dispositions 
were made by the order of General Smith, before General Grant 
succeeded him to the command of all the forces up the Tennessee 
— headquarters, Savannah. If there were any error in putting' 
that army on the west side of the Tennessee, exposed to the 
superior force of the enemy also assembling at Corinth, the mis- 
take was not General Grant's ; but there was no mistake. It was 
necessary that a combat, fierce and bitter, to test the manhood of 
the two armies, should come off, and that was as good a place as 
any. It was not then a question of military skill and strategy, 
but of courage and pluck; and I am convinced that every life lost 
that day to us was necessary, for otherwise at Corinth, at Mem- 
phis, at Vicksburg, we would have found harder resistance, had 
we not shown our enemies that, rude and untutored as Ave then 
were, we could fight as well as they. 

Excuse so long a letter, which is very unusual from me ; but of 
course my life is liable to cease at any moment, and I happen to 
be a witness to certain truths which are now beginning to pass 
out of memory, and form what is called history. 

I also take great pleasure in adding, that nearly all the new 
troops that at Shiloh drew from me official censure, have more 
than redeemed their good name ; among them, that very regi- 
ment which first broke, the Fifty-third Ohio, Colonel AppenJ 
Under another leader, Colonel Jones, it has shared every cam- 
paign and expedition of mine since, is with me now, and can 
march, and bivouac, and fight as well as the best regiment in this 
or any army. Its reputation now is equal to that of any from 
the State of Ohio. 

I am, with respect, yours truly, 

W. T. Siieeman, Major General 



Appendix. 481 



III. 

EXTRACTS FROM THE REMARKS OF HON. E. B. WASHBURNE, 
OF ILLINOIS, MADE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
MAY 2, 18C2. 

Ix time came the operations up the Cumberland and Tennessee 
Rivers, and I state what I know. By a singular coincidence, on 
the 29th day of January last, without any suggestion from any 
source, General Grant and Commodore Foote, always acting in 
entire harmony, applied for permission to move up those rivers, 
which was granted. The gunboats and land forces moved up to 
Fort Henry. After that fort was taken, it was determined to 
attack Fort Donelson. The gunboats were to go round and up 
the Cumberland River, while the army was to move over land 
from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson. 

The roads were the worst ever known, and almost any other 
general or any other troops would have despaired of moving. 
But they did move. If General Grant had been told that it was 
impossible to move his army there, he would have made a reply 
like to that of the royal Pompey, when he was told that his fleet 
could not sail : " It is necessary to sail, not necessary to live." It 
was necessary for this western army to march, but it was not 
necessary to live. The country knows the result — Donelson 
fell. The enemy, twenty thousand strong, behind his intrench- 
ments, succumbed before the unrelenting bravery and vigor of 
our troops, no more than twenty-eight thousand engaged. We 
took there, not twelve thousand, nor fifteen thousand, but more 
than sixteen thousand prisoners. I have it from General Halleck, 
that we have actually paid transportation for more than sixteen 
thousand prisoners. That, in most countries, would have been 
called a most brilliant military achievement. Napoleon sur- 
rounded old Mack at Ulm, and captured twenty thousand or 
more prisoners, and that exploit has filled a great space in 
history. 

While the capture of Donelson filled the country with joy, 
there was a cruel disposition to withhold from the commanding 
General the meed of gratitude and praise so justly his due. Cap- 



482 Appendix. 

tious criticisms were indulged in, that he did not make the attack 
properly, and that if he had done differently the work might have 
been better accomplished. It was not enough that he fought and 
gloriously conquered, but he ought to have done it differently, 
forsooth. Success could be no test of merit with him. That was 
the way the old Generals spoke of the young Napoleon when he 
was beating them in every battle, and carrying his eagles in 
triumph over all Europe. He did not fight according to the 
rules of war. But there was a more grievous suggestion touch- 
ing the General's habits. It is a suggestion that has infused itself 
into the public mind everywhere. There never was a more cruel 
and atrocious slander upon a brave and noble-minded man. There 
is no more temperate man in the army than General Grant. He 
never indulges in the use of intoxicating liquors at all. He is an 
example of courage, honor, fortitude, activity, temperance, and 
modesty, for he is as modest as he is brave and incorruptible. 
To the bravery and fortitude of Lannes he adds the stern repub- 
lican simplicity of Guvion St. Cyr. It is almost vain to hope that 
full justice will ever be done to men who have been thus attacked. 
Truth is slow upon the heels of falsehood. It has been well said 
that " falsehood will travel from Maine to Georgia while truth is 
putting on its boots." 

Let no gentleman have any fears of General Grant. He is no 
candidate for the Presidency. He is no politician. Inspired by 
the noblest patriotism, he only desires to do his whole duty to his 
country. When the war shall be over he will return to his home, 
and sink the soldier in the simple citizen. Though living in the 
same town with myself, he has no political claims on me, for, so 
far as he is a politician, he belongs to a different party. He hag 
no personal claims upon me more than any other constituent. 
But I came here to speak as an Illinoisian, proud of his noble and 
patriotic state ; proud of its great history now being made up ; 
proud, above all earthly things, of her brave soldiers, who are 
shedding their blood upon all the battle-fields of the republic. 
If the laurels of Grant shall ever be withered, it will not be done 
by the Illinois soldiers who have followed his victorious banner. 

But to the victory at Pittsburg Landing, which has called forth 
such a flood of denunciation upon General Grant. When we 
consider the charges of bad generalship, incompetency, and sur- 



Appendix. 483 

prise, do we not feel that "even the joy of the people is cruel"? 
As to the question of whether there was, or not, what might be 
called a surprise, I will not argue it ; but even if there had boon, 
General Grant is nowise responsible for it, for he was not surprised. 
He was at his headquarters at Savannah when the fight com- 
menced. Those headquarters were established there, as being 
the most convenient point for all parts of his command. Some 
of the troops were at Crump's Landing, between Savannah and 
Pittsburg, and all the new arrivals were coming to Savannah. 
That was the proper place for the headquarters of the command- 
ing General at that time. The General visited Pittsburg Landing 
and all the important points every day. The attack was made 
Sunday morning by a vastly superior force. In five minutes after 
the first firing was heard, General Grant and staff Avere on board 
a steamboat on the way to the battle-field ; and instead of not 
reaching the field till ten o'clock, or, as has been still more falsely 
represented, till noon, I have a letter before me from one of his 
aids who was with him, and who says he arrived there at eight 
o'clock in the morning, and immediately assumed command. 
There he directed the movements, and was always on that part 
of the field where his presence was most required, exposing his 
life, and evincing in his dispositions the genius of the greatest 
commanders. With what desperate bravery that battle of Sun- 
day was fought ! What display of prowess and courage ! What 
prodigies of valor ! Our troops, less than forty thousand, attacked 
by more than eighty thousand of the picked men of the rebels, 
led by their most distinguished Generals ! 

But it is gravely charged by these military critics who sit by 
the fireside while our soldiers are risking their lives on the field 
of conflict, that Grant was to blame in having his troops on the 
same side of the river with the enemy. I suppose they would 
have the river interpose between our army and the enemy, and 
permit that enemy to intrench himself on the other side, and then 
undertake to cross in his face. It was, in the judgment of the best 
military men, a wise disposition of his forces, placing them where 
he did. To have done otherwise would have been like keeping 
the entire army of the Potomac on this side of the river, instead 
of crossing it when it could be done, and advancing on the other 
Bide. 



484 Appendix. 

After fighting all day with immensely superior numbers of the 
enemy, they only drove our forces back two and one half miles, 
and then it Avas to face the gunboats and the terrible batteries so 
skilfully arranged and worked by the gallant and accomplished 
officers, Webster and Callender, and which brought the countless 
host of the enemy to a stand. And when night came, this un- 
conquerable army stood substantially triumphant on that bloody 
field. I am not here to speak disparagingly of the troops of any 
other state, but I will speak in praise of the troops of my own 
state. No Illinois regiment, no Illinois company, no Illinois sol- 
dier, fled from the battle-field. If any did flee, they were not 
from Illinois ; and they would be the ones who, after their own 
flight, would seek to cover up their own disgrace, but only add 
to it by attacks upon an Illinois General. 

Now, sir, I have something to say about the Generals and the 
soldiers who fought in the battle. I have a word to say about 
the brave McClernand, so lately our colleague here, who, as I 
learn from a man who was on the battle-field on that Sunday, 
was seen riding at the head of his division, holding his flag in the 
face of the enemy, daring them to come on. I would say some- 
thing" in relation to the bravery and skill of Hurlbut, from my 
own district, who commanded another division there, and won 
great glory. I would say something in defence of another man, 
who has been charged with having his division surprised, and 
having been taken prisoner at the time. I mean General Pren- 
tiss. I have a letter upon my desk which says, that instead of 
being surprised on Sunday morning, the writer saw him at half 
past two o'clock of that day fighting most gallantly at the head 
of his division. I rejoice to have this opportunity to make that 
statement injustice to a brave man and true soldier. 

Sir, if I had time I would like to speak of others; I would 
speak of General Wallace, of my state, who fell nobly fighting 
at the head of his division, a soldier by nature, a pure and noble 
man, whose memory will be ever' honored in Illinois. I would 
speak of the gallant Colonel Ellis, falling at the head of the 
Fifteenth, and of Major Goddard, of the same regiment, also 
killed ; of Davis, of the Forty-sixth, terribly wounded while gal- 
lantly bearing in his own hands the colors of his regiment. I 
would speak of the deeds of valor of the lead-mine Forty-fifth, 



'Appendix. 485 

covering itself with undying honor; of Captains Connor and 
Johnson, falling at the head of their companies ; of the genial 
and impetuous young Irishman, Lieutenant George Moore, mor- 
tally wounded ; of Captains Wayne, and Nase, and Brownell, all 
killed. Nor would I fail to mention Brigadier-General McArthur 
and Acting Brigadier General Kirk, who boldly led their brigades 
everywhere where duty called and danger threatened, and were 
at last carried from the field badly wounded ; and of Colonel 
Chetlain, of the old Twelfth, rising from a sick bed and entering 
into the thickest of the fight ; and, too, I would like to speak 
of the dauntless valor of Rawlins, and Rowley, and Campbell, 
and of many others who distinguished themselves on that field. 

I see before me my friend from Pennsylvania [Mr. McPherson], 
which reminds me of a friend of us both — young Baugher, a 
Lieutenant in the lead-mine regiment, who, wounded six times, 
refused to leave the field ; and, when finally carried off, waved his 
sword in defiance to the enemy. But who shall attempt to do 
justice to the bravery of the soldiers and the daring and skill of 
the officers ? Who shall describe all the valor exhibited on those 
days ? Who shall presume to speak of all the glory won on that 
blood-stained field ? I have spoken of those more particularly 
from my own part of the state ; but it is because I know them 
best, and not because I claim more credit for them than I know 
to be due to the troops from all parts of the state. They all 
exhibited the same bravery, the same unbounded devotion, the 
same ardor in vindicating the honor and glory of the flag, and 
maintaining the prestige of our state. 

Mr. Wilson. I desire to ask the gentleman whether he de- 
nies that the army was surprised at Pittsburg on the morning of 
Sunday. 

Mr. Washbttexe. I state that I have the fullest authority for 
making a substantial denial of that charge. I said, however, that 
I did not intend to argue that question ; that it was not necessary 
• for the defence of General Grant. But I say, whether there was 
a surprise or not, the manner in which all those gallant troops 
fought on that day has conferred upon them and upon the coun- 
try imperishable renown. 

Mr. Wilson. I desire to ask, admitting that it was a surprise, 
whose fault it was. 



486 Appendix. 

Mr. Washburne. I suppose, if there had been a surprise, it 
would hare been the fault of the man who commanded the divis- 
ion surprised. I come not here, however, to speak of the faults 
of anybody, but to do justice. 

Mr. Wilson. I desire the gentleman to follow that a little 
further. 

Mr. Kellogg, of Illinois. I want to say a word before the 
gentleman from Iowa proceeds. My colleague [Mr. Washburne] 
has defended his friend well. I regret the disposition to find 
fault with our Generals in the field, who have done so nobly, so 
bravely, and so well. Let us remember only their prowess and 
their glory, and let there not be crimination and recrimination. 
Let us rather glory in the success of our arms in our brilliant 
achievements on the well-fought field, and say all have done well. 
I regret that this matter of crimination of officers in the field 
should be brought up. 

Mr. Wilson. I will state that I fully concur in the remark of 
the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Kellogg] last on the floor, that 
this matter ought not to have been brought up here ; and I for 
one do not intend to join in any crimination or recrimination. I 
have thought the whole thing out of taste. I have thought it 
improper and uncalled for. There was no occasion for it at all 
that I can discover. No charge has been made here against 
General Grant or any other officer engaged in that contest, 
although there are very grave differences of opinion in relation 
to certain matters connected with the fight. 

Mr. Washburne. I cannot yield further. "Whatever may be 
my friend's opinion on the subject, I say to him that whenever I 
find a General from my own state at the head of an army attacked 
as General Grant has been, I will feel myself called upon, in all 
places and upon all occasions, to defend him; and I think this is 
the best occasion I shall have, and I intend to avail myself of it. 
I believe, notwithstanding the desperate fighting on Sunday, and 
the partial repulse of our troops, that, aided by the fresh troops 
of the brave Lew. Wallace, that army could have whipped the 
enemy on Monday without further reinforcements. That army 
could never have been conquered. But I would not detract from 
the glorious fighting of Buell's troops on Monday, for they behaved 
with great gallantry, ami fought bravely, successfully, and well. 
Justice must be done to all. 



Appendix. 487 



IV. 

AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF MEN IN PEMBERTON'S 
COMMAND DURING AND BEFORE THE SIEGE OF VICKS- 
BURG. 

*Tiie records of the Commissary General of Prisoners show a 
total of forty-two thousand and fifty-nine prisoners captured dur- 
ing the Vicksburg campaign, after the 1st of May. As Grant lost 
in that time nearly nine thousand men in killed and wounded, it 
is fair to suppose that Pemberton and Johnston, so repeatedly and 
disastrously beaten, lost twelve thousand. Any one who has seen 
war is aware how small an estimate six thousand is for the strag- 
glers in an unsuccessful campaign. The calculation is simple. 

Prisoners, 42,000 

Killed and wounded, 12,000 

Stragglers, 6,000 

Total, 60,000 

This estimate is proof of Pemberton's force at the beginning 
of the campaign. He surrendered thirty-two thousand men at 
Vicksburg; three thousand were captured at Champion's Hill; 
nearly two thousand at the Big Black Bridge ; and at least two 
thousand others at Port Gibson and Raymond, and during the 
campaign and siege ; while those who escaped with Loring from 
Champion's Hill could not have been fewer than four thousand. 

Surrendered at Vicksburg, .... 82,000 

Captured at Champion's Hill, . . . 3,000 

" « Big Black Bridge, . . . 2,000 

« Port Gibson, &c, . . . 2,000 

Loring, . , 4,000 

Killed and wounded in Pemberton's command, 10,000 

Stragglers, 3,000 

Total, 56,000 

There can no longer be a doubt that many rebel officials per- 



488 Appendix. 

sistontly and designedly misstated the numbers and losses in thur 
armies. Doubtless in this they persuaded themselves that the 
end justified the menus. But the possession of the records of 
both parties to the contest makes the fact plain. In this very 
instance, Pcinherton stated in his official report, that his effective 
strength at the beginning of the siege was eighteen thousand five 
hundred men ; and (May 14) that his whole available force, at 
the time of the battle of Champion's Hill, was sixteen thousand 
in the field, while seven thousand eight hundred were left to hold 
Vicksburg. He lost at least fifteen thousand men after this, 
and had thirty-two thousand to surrender two months later. 
— Badeau, Military History. 



V. 

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL GRANT, 1804-65. 

Headquarters Armies of the United States, » 
Washington, D. C, July 22, 1865. ] 

Sir : I have the honor to submit the following report of the 
operations of the armies of the United States from the date of my 
appointment to command the same : — 

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with 
the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops 
that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and 
weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The 
resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior 
to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a 
population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines 
of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to 
supply the operating armies. 

The armies in the east and west acted independently and with- 
out concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, 
enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of 
communication for transporting troops from east to west, re- 
enforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large 
numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their 



Appendix. 489 

homos and do the work of producing for the support of their 
armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and 
resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and 
the enemy's superior position. 

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could 
be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the 
pepple, both north and south, until the military power of the 
rebellion was entirely broken. 

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of 
troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy ; prevent- 
ing him from using the same force at different seasons against first 
one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose 
for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on 
resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed 
force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in 
no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal 
submission with the loyal section of our common country to the 
constitution and laws of the land. 

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders 
given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they 
might have been better in conception and execution is for the 
people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay 
the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have 
done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and 
in what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole 
country. 

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the con- 
tending forces was about as follows : The Mississippi River was 
strongly garrisoned by Federal troops from St. Louis, Missouri, to 
its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving 
us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi, north of that 
stream. A few points in Southern Louisiana, not remote from the 
river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near 
the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the balance of the vast ter- 
ritory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was in the almost undis- 
puted possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less 
than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought 
into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought 
them out. The let-alone policy had demoralized this force so that 



490 Appendix. 

probably but little more than one half of it was ever present in 
garrison at any one time. But the one half, or forty thousand 
men, with the bands of guerrillas scattered through Missouri, 
Arkansas, and along the Mississippi River, and the disloyal char- 
acter of much of the population, compelled the use of a large 
number of troops to keep navigation open on the river and to 
protect the loyal people to the west of it. To the east of the 
Mississippi we held substantially with the line of the Tennessee 
and Ilolston Rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the 
State of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga, a small foothold had 
been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee 
from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West 
Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with the 
exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area 
about the mouth of James River covered by the troops at Norfolk 
and Fort Monroe, and the territory covered by the army of the 
Potomac lying along the Rapidan, was in the possession of the 
enemy. Along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at Plym- 
outh, Washington, and Newbern, in North Carolina; Beaufort, 
Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port 
Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in 
Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our possession, 
while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. The 
accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sher- 
man and other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines 
the territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion and 
at the opening of the campaign of 18G4, while those in blue are 
the lines which it was proposed to occupy. 

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerrillas, and 
a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary 
to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. 
In the South a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made 
every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier, and those 
who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for col- 
lecting deserters and returning them. This enabled the enemy to 
bring almost his entire strength into the field. 

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the 
Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee 
and J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best Generals. The army com- 



Aptendix. 491 

manded by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extend- 
ing from Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and 
defending Richmond, the rebel capital, against the army of the 
Potomac. The army under Johnston occupied a strongly in- 
trenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending 
Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre, 
against the armies under Major General W. T. Sherman. In addi- 
tion to these armies, he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in 
North-east Mississippi ; a considerable force, of all arms, in the 
Shenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia, and ex- 
treme eastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea- 
coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no 
foothold upon land. 

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, 
were the main objective points of the campaign. 

Major General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the com- 
mand of the military division of the Mississippi, embracing all the 
armies and territory east of the Mississippi River to the Allegha- 
nies, and the department of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, 
had the immediate command of the armies operating against 
Johnston. 

Major General George G. Meade had the immediate command 
of the army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general 
supervision of the movements of all our armies. 

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's 
army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's 
country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon 
their war resources ; if the enemy in his front showed signs of 
joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, 
while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him if it 
was in the power of the army of the Potomac to do so. More 
specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that I 
had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was sat- 
isfied that he understood them, and would execute them to the 
fullest extent possible. 

Major General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red 
River against Shreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized 
previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me, on 
the 15th of March, of the importance it was that Shreveport 



492 Appendix. 

should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found 
that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more 
time than General Sherman had given his troops to be absent 
from their command, he would send them back at the time speci- 
fied by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of 
the main object of the Red River expedition, for this force was 
uecessary to movements east of the Mississippi ; that should his 
expedition prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the 
Red River with such force as he might deem necessary, and 
return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New 
Orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of terri- 
tory, unless it was to make that then held by him more easily 
held ; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move 
against Mobile ; that it certainly would be if troops enough could 
be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements ; 
that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an 
expedition ; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a 
real move from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks), 
instead of a demonstration, as Steele thought advisable. 

On the 21st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification 
and directions, he was instructed as follows : — 

1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over 
the defence of the Red River to General Steele and the navy. 

2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon 
the Eio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn 
their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At least one half of 
the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops. 

3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi Eiver, the force to guard it 
from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if 
not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the 
territory necessary to hold until active operations can be resumed west of the 
river. According to your last return, this would give you a force of over 
thirty thousand eflective men, with which to move against Mobile. To this I 
expect to add five thousand men from Missouri. If, however, 3'ou think the 
force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold 
possession of, I would say, concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of 
your present command for operations against Mobile. With these and such 
additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demon- 
stration, to be followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads 
will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong 
naval fleet with which to cooperate. You can make your own arrangements 



Appendix. 493 

with the admiral for his cooperation, and select your own line of approach. 
My own idea of the matter is, that Pascagoula should be your base ; but, from 
your long service in the Gulf department, you will know best about the mat- 
ter. It is intended that your movements shall be cooperative with move- 
ments elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I would now add 
is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. Preserve a 
profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible 
moment. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 
Major General N. P. Banks. 

Major General Meade was instructed that Lee's array would be 
Lis objective point ; that wherever Lee went he would go also. 
For his movement two plans presented themselves : one, to cross 
the Rapid an below Lee, moving by his right flank ; the other, 
above, moving by his left. Each presented advantages over the 
other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee 
would be cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going 
north on a raid. But if we took this route, all we did would 
have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out ; 
besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be 
directed how to cooperate. If we took the other route, Brandy 
Station could be used as a base of supplies until another was 
secured on the York or James River. Of these, however, it was 
decided to take the lower route. 

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major 
General B. F. Butler: — 

Port Monroe, Va., April 2, 1864. 

General : In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at 
as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all 
the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished. 

It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones, to 
act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the ter- 
ritory already taken from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concentra- 
tion can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the 
enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. By such movement 
they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, 
thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least 
occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is 
gained. Lee's army and Bichmond being the greater objects towards which 
our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite 
all the force we can against them. The necessity of covering Washington 
with the army of the Potomac, and of covering your department with your 



494 Appendix. 

army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. 
I propose therefore, what conies nearest this of anything that seems practica- 
ble. The army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee's army 
beimr the objective point. You will collect all the forces from your command 
that can be spared from garrison duty — 1 should say not less than twenty 
thousand effective men — to operate on the south side of James River, Rich- 
mond being your objective point. To the force you already have will be 
added about ten thousand men from South Carolina, under Major General 
Gillmore, who will command them in person. Major General W. F. Smith 
is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from 
your own department. 

General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe, with 
all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as 
practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will 
make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best 
calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made. 

When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as 
possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops 
for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point directions cannot 
be given at this time for your further movements. 

The fact that has already been stated — that is, that Richmond is to be your 
objective point, and that there is to be cooperation between yourforce and the 
army of the Potomac — must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of 
your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you advance. 
Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in Richmond, the 
army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies 
would become a unit. 

All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. 
If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to 
cut the railroad about Hick's Ford about the time of the general advance, it 
would be of immense advantage. 

You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable 

day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of 

this order. 

XJ. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General B. F. Butler. 

On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. 
On the 19th, in order to secure full cooperation between his army 
and that of General Meade, he was informed that I expected him 
to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade 
moved from Culpeper. The exact time I was to telegraph him 
as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 
27th of April; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Cul- 
peper and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he, however, 



Appendix. 495 

fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction 
with his (General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could 
I be certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south 
Bide, so as to have his left resting on the James above the city, I 
would form the junction there; that circumstances might make 
this course advisable anyhow ; that he should use every exertion 
to secure footing as far np the south side of the river as he could, 
and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move ; that 
if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a 
force as possible. 

In cooperation with the main movements against Lee and 
Johnston, I was desirous of using all other troops necessarily 
kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate opera- 
tions, and also those kept in the background for the protection 
of our extended lines between the loyal states and the armies 
operating against them. 

A very considerable force under command of Major General 
Sigel was so held for the protection of "West Virginia, and the 
frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops 
could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the 
north to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, 
they could act directly to their front, and give better protection 
than if lying idle in garrison. By such movement they would 
either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of 
his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them. 

General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his avail- 
able force into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charles- 
ton, under command of Generals Orel and Crook, against the East 
Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. Subsequently, General Ord hav- 
ing been relieved at his own request, General Sigel was instructed, 
at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by Beverly and 
to form two columns, one under General Crook, on the Kanawha, 
numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, 
numbering about seven thousand men ; the one on the Shenan- 
doah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and 
the infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such 
cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the 
enemy in the Shenandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible ; 
while General Crook would take possession of Lewisburg with 
•6'2 



496 Appendix. 

part of his force, and move clown the Tennessee Railroad, doing 
as much damage as he could, destroying the New River Bridge 
and the salt-works at Saltville, Virginia. 

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, opera- 
tions were delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being 
in readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a gen- 
eral movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of May. 

My first object being to break the military power of the rebel- 
lion and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me 
desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement 
against Richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, 
unless it were the capture of Lee's army, to accomplish this de- 
sired result in the east. If he failed, it was my determination, by 
hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat or to so cripple him 
that he could not detach a large force to go north and still retain 
enough for the defence of Richmond. R was well understood, 
by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the cam- 
paign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of 
the James River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it. 

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at 
Fort Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent im- 
portance of getting possession of Petersburg and destroying rail- 
road communication as far south as possible. Believing, however, 
in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it was re- 
enforced, I made that the objective point of his operations. As 
the army of the Potomac was to move simultaneously with him, 
Lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy 
did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city 
in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River. 

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I 
tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent 
command of the army of the Potomac. My instructions for that 
army were all through him, and were general in their nature, 
leaving all the details and the execution to him. The campaigns 
that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. 
His commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to 
him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention 
that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he would other- 
wise have received. 



Appendix. 497 

The movement of the army of the Potomac commenced early 
on the morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direc- 
tion and orders of Major General Meade, pursuant to instructions. 
Before night the whole army was across the Rapidan (the Fifth 
and Sixth Corps crossing at Germania Ford, and the Second Corps 
at United States Ford, the cavalry, under Major General Sheridan, 
moving in advance), with the greater part of its trains, numbering 
about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. 
The average distance travelled by the troops that day was about 
twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed 
from my mind the most serious apprehension I had entertained 
— that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well- 
appointed and ably-commanded army, and how so large a train 
was to be carried through a hostile country and protected. Early 
on the 5th, the advance corps (the Fifth, Major General G. K. 
Warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy outside his 
iutrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged furiously all 
day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the 
corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density 
of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with com- 
mendable promptness. 

General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was, at the time the 
army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at 
the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria Rail- 
road, holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to 
move until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was 
secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was re- 
ceived. This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 
4th. By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was leading 
his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of his 
troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing 
both the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers. Considering that 
a large proportion, probably two thirds of his command, was 
composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches and carrying 
the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march. 

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock 
on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury 
until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same 
position that they had on the evening of the 5th. After dark 



498 Appendix. 

the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, cap- 
turing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable con- 
fusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was 
personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon 
reformed it and restored order. On the morning of the 7th, recon- 
noissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched 
lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. 
From this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting 
had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest 
in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and 
that he would wait an attack behind his works. I therefore de- 
termined to push on, and put my whole force between him and 
Richmond ; and orders were at once issued for a movement by 
his right flank. On the night of the 7th the march was com- 
menced towards Spottsylvania Court-house, the Fifth Corps mov- 
ing on the most direct road. But the enemy, having become 
apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was 
enabled to reach there first. On the 8th General Warren met a 
force of the enemy which had been sent out to oppose and delay 
his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at Spottsyl- 
vania. This force was steadily driven back on the main force, 
within the recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, 
resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the 9th 
General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of 
communication with Richmond. The Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. 
Among the killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished sol- 
dier Major General John Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Army 
Corps. Major General II. G. Wright succeeded him in command. 
Early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on 
the enemy in position. The Second Corps, Major General Hancock 
commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of John- 
ston's division of E well's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. But 
the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not 
prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th were 
consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforce- 
ments from Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make any 
further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court-house, 
orders were issued on the 18th with a view to a movement to 



Appendix. 499 

the North Anna, to commence at twelve o'clock on the night of 
the 19th. Late in the afternoon of the 19th Ewell's corps came 
out of its works on our extreme right flank ; but the attack was 
promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. This delayed the movement 
to the North Anna until the night of the 21st, when it was com- 
menced. But the enemy, again having the shorter line, and being 
in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the North 
Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. The Fifth 
Corps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, 
closely followed by the Sixth Corps. The Second and Ninth 
Corps got up about the same time, the Second holding the rail- 
road bridge and the Ninth lying between that and Jericho Ford. 
General Warren effected a crossing the same afternoon, and got 
a position without much opposition. Soon after getting into 
position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with 
great slaughter. On the 25th General Sheridan rejoined the 
army of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from 
Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and 
Ashland Stations, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, 
and many miles of railroad track ; recaptured about four hundred 
of our men, on their way to Richmond as prisoners of war; met 
and defeated the enemy's cavalry at Yellow Tavern ; carried the 
first line of works around Richmond, but finding the second line 
too strong to be carried by assault, recrossed to the north bank 
of the Chickahominy at Meadow's Bridge, under heavy fire, and 
moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, 
where he communicated with General Butler. This raid had the 
effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, and 
making it comparatively easy to guard our trains. 

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pur- 
suance of instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having 
joined him with the Tenth Corps. At the same time he sent a force 
of eighteen hundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junc- 
tion with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three 
thousand cavalry, under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate 
against the roads south of Petersburg and Richmond. On the 
5th he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Ber- 
muda Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. On 
the 6th he was in position with his main army, and commenced 



500 Appendix. 

intrenching. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the 
Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying a portion of it 
after some fighting. On the 9th he telegraphed as follows : — 

Headquarters near Bermuda Landing, May 9, 1864. 

Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With seventeen hun- 
dred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the Chickahominy, 
and have safely brought them to our present position. These were colored 
cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets towards Richmond. 

General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same day 
with our movement up James River, forced the Blackwater, burned the rail- 
road bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting in two Beauregard's 
force at that point. 

We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of rail- 
road, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against 
the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies. 

Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting 
of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reached Petersburg under 
Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many 
prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight. 

General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to Lee 

from Beauregard's force. 

Benjamin P. Butler, Major General. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried 
a portion of the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff, or 
Fort Darling, with small loss. The time thus consumed from the 
6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond 
and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose 
forces in North and South Carolina, and bring them to the defence 
of those places. On the 16th the enemy attacked General Butler 
in his position in front of Drury's Bluff. He was forced back, or 
drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the James 
and Appomattox Rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his 
front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valua- 
ble to him. His army, therefore, though in a position of great 
security, was as completely shut off from further operations direct- 
ly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. 
It required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold 
it there. 

On the 12th General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a 



Appendix. 501 

raid against the Danville Railroad, which he struck nt Coalfield, 
Powhatan, and Chola Stations, destroying them, the railroad track, 
two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quanti- 
ties of commissary and other stores ; thence crossing to the South- 
side road, struck it at Wilson's, Wcllsville, and Black and White 
Stations, destroying the road and station-houses ; thence he pro- 
ceeded to City Point, which he reached on the 18th. 

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General 
Butler, the enemy, with a land force under General Hoke, and an 
iron-clad ram, attacked Plymouth, N. C, commanded by General II. 
W. Wessels, and our gunboats there; and after severe fighting the 
place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and arma- 
ment captured. The gunboat Smithfield was sunk and the Miami 
disabled. 

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermeti- 
cally sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled 
to bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the 
South by Beauregard against the army of the Potomac. In addi- 
tion to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not 
less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the 
scattered troops under Breckinridge from the western part of 
Virginia. 

The position at Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it 
was difficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined, 
therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only 
to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, I 
directed that they be sent forward, under command of Major 
General W. F. Smith, to join the army of the Potomac. 

On the 24th of May the Ninth Army Corps, commanded by 
Major General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the army of the 
Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of 
Major General Meade's command. 

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than 
either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to 
the north bank of the North Anna, and moved via Hanovertown 
to turn the enemy's position by his right. 

Genei'als Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under 
Sheridan, and the Sixth Corps, led the advance ; crossed the Pa- 
munkey River at Hanovertown, after considerable fighting, and on 



502 Appendix. 

the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe but successful 
engagement with the enemy at Haw's Shop. On the 29th and 
30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the Hanover Court- 
house and Cold Harbor road, and developed the enemy's position 
north of the Chickahominy. Late on the evening of the last day 
the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with 
very considerable loss. An attack was immediately ordered by 
General Meade along his whole line, which resulted in driving the 
enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line. 

On the 81st General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the 
railroad bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the 
enemy's cavalry. General Sheridan on the same day reached 
Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the Sixth Corps and 
General Smith's command, which had just arrived, via White 
House, from General Butler's army. 

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P. M. by the 
Sixth Corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps 
being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This 
resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works 
in front of the right of the Sixth Corps and in front of General 
Smith. During the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on 
each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but were re- 
pulsed with heavy loss in every instance. That night he made 
several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed. 
The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on 
the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's works, 
in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt our 
loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, 
was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made 
from the Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the 
enemy losses to compensate for our own losses. I would not be 
understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories 
to our arms, or accomplished as much as I had hoped from them; 
but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in 
the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion. 

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Rich- 
mond, it was impossible by any flank movement to interpose 
between him and the city. I was still in a condition to either 
move by his left flank and invest Richmond from the north side, 



Appendix. 503 

or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the 
James. While the former might have been better as a covering 
for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that 
it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of Rich- 
mond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad — a long, 
vulnerable line, which would exbaust much of our strength to 
guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, 
and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication 
on the south side of the James. My idea, from the start, had been 
to beat Lee's army north of Richmond if i^ossible; then, after 
destroying his lines of communication north of the James River, 
to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee in Rich- 
mond, or follow him south if he should retreat. After the battle 
of the Wilderness it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the 
first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. He 
acted purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the 
offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of re- 
pulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater 
sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be 
accomplished that I had designed north of Richmond. I therefore 
determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then 
occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that 
might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to 
Charlottesville and Gordonsville, to effectually break up the rail- 
road connection between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley 
and Lynchburg ; and, when the cavalry got well off, to move the 
army to the south side of the James River, by the enemy's right 
flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of supply except 
by the canal. 

On the 7th two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, 
got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, 
with instructions to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near 
Charlottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the work 
laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the army of the 
Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions. 

On the 10th of June General Butler sent a force of infantry 
under General Gillmore, and cavalry under General Kautz, to cap- 
ture Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common 
bridges across the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the works on 



504 Appendix. 

the south side, and penetrated well in towards the town, but were 
forced to retire. General Gillraore, finding the works which he 
approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, 
returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting one. 

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I 
sent back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point General Smith's 
command by water, via the White House, to reach there in advance 
of the army of the Potomac. This was for the express purpose of 
securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our in- 
tention, could reenforce the place. 

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the 
evening of the 12th; one division of cavalry (under General "Wil- 
son) and the Fifth Corps crossed the Chickahominy at Long 
Bridge, and moved out to White Oak Swamp, to cover the cross- 
ings of the other corps. The advance corps reached James River, 
at Wilcock's Landing and Charles City Court-house on the night 
of the 13 th. 

During three long years the armies of the Potomac and North- 
ern Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they 
had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before 
fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing 
the vantage-ground of either. The southern press and people, 
with more shrewdness than was displayed in the North, finding 
that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to 
New York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they 
only defended their capital and southern territory. Hence Antie- 
tam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, 
were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for 
them. Their army believed this, It produced a morale which 
could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. 
The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna, and 
Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were 
-even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make 
him wary ever after of taking the offensive. His losses in men 
were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save 
in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party; and 
when he did attack, it was in the open field. The details of these 
battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the sol- 
diery have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of Major 
General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it. 



Appendix. 505 

During the campaign of forty-three clays, from the Rapid an to 
James River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting 
base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely-wooded 
country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to 
conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot, there- 
fore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary depart- 
ments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under the 
general supervision of the chief Quartermaster, Brigadier General 
R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads 
between the army and our water base, and but little difficulty was 
experienced in protecting them. 

The movement of the Kanawha and Shenandoah Valleys, under 
General Sigel, commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, 
who had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, 
divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cav- 
alry, to General Averill. They crossed the mountains by separate 
routes. Averill struck the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, near 
Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and Chris- 
tiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and 
depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with 
Crook at Union on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the Shen- 
andoah Valley, met the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, 
after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and re- 
tired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding the operations of Gen- 
eral Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from command, and 
Major General Hunter was appointed to supersede him. His 
instructions were embraced in the following despatches to Major 
General II. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army : — 

Near Spottsylvania Court-house, Va., May 20, 1864. 

The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought 

over the branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I 

think it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction ; reach 

Staunton, and Gordonsville, or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too much 

opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing 

good service. . . . 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General H. W. Halleck. 

Jericho Ford, Va., May 25, 1864. 
If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do 



506 Appendix. 

bo, living on the country. The railroads and canal should be destroyed be- 
yond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he could find his 
way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville join this army. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 
Majok General H. W. Halleck. 

General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and moving 
up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at 
Piedmont, and after a battle of ten hours routed and defeated him, 
capturing on the field of battle fifteen hundred men, three pieces of 
artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. On the 8th of 
the same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averill at 
Staunton, from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via 
Lexington, which place he reached and invested on the 16th day 
of June. Up to this time he was very successful ; and but for 
the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over 
so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, 
have captured that (to the enemy) important point. The destruc- 
tion of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very great. 
To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent 
a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached Lynch- 
burg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 
17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition 
to give battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this 
want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but 
by way of Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for 
several weeks from the defence of the North. 

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead 
of Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have 
been in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against 
the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. 
If it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the James 
River Canal, on the main line of communication between Lynch- 
burg and the force sent for its defence. I have never taken ex- 
ception to the operations of General Hunter, and I am not now 
disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted 
within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and 
the interests of the service. The promptitude of his movements 
and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his 
country. 



Appendix. 507 

To return to the army of the Potomac : The Second Corps 
commenced crossing the James River on the morning of the 14th, 
by ferry-boats, at Wilcox's Landing. The laying of the pontoon 
bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the cross- 
ing of the remainder of the army was rapidly pushed forward by 
both bridge and ferry. 

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by a steamer to 
Bermuda Hundred, to give the necessary orders for the immediate 
capture of Petersburg. 

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for 
him to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the 
troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then 
held. I told him that I would return at once to the array of the 
Potomac, hasten its crossing, and throw it forward to Petersburg 
by divisions as rapidly as it could be done ; that we could reen- 
force our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring 
troops against us. General Smith got off as directed, and con- 
fronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight 
next morning, but, for some reason that I have never been able 
to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main 
lines until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command 
only, he made the assault, and carried the lines north-east of 
Petersburg from the Appomattox River, for a distance of over 
two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three 
hundred prisoners. This was about seven P. M. Between the line 
thus captured and Petersburg there were no other works, and 
there was no evidence that the enemy had reenforced Petersburg 
with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear — 
the moon shining brightly — and favorable to further operations. 
General Hancock, with two divisions of the Second Corps, reached 
General Smith just after dark, and offered the service of these 
troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named 
commander, who, he naturally supposed, knew best the position 
of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But instead of taking 
these troops, and pushing at once into Petersburg, he requested 
General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured 
works, which was done before midnight. 

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. 
An attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by 



508 Appendix. 

the troops under Smith and the Second and Ninth Corps. It 
required until that time for the Ninth Corps to get up and into 
position. The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting con- 
tinued with but little intermission until six o'clock the next morn- 
ing, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the 
main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previa 
ously captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and 
over four hundred prisoners. 

The Fifth Corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and 
persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only re- 
sulted in forcing the enemy to an interior line, from which he 
could not be dislodged. The advantages in position gained by 
us were very great. The army then proceeded to envelop Peters- 
burg towards the Southside Railroad, as far as possible, without 
attacking fortifications. 

On the 6th, the enemy, to reenforce Petersburg, withdrew from 
a part of his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expect- 
ing, no doubt, to get troops from north of the James to take the 
place of those withdrawn before we could discover it. General 
Butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the 
railroad between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as I was 
apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two 
divisions of the Sixth Corjis, General Wright commanding, that 
were embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, 
to report to General Butler, at Bermuda Hundred, of which Gen- 
eral Butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position 
in advance of his present line urged upon him. 

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back 
to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. Gen- 
eral Wright, with his two divisions, joined General Butler on the 
forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong picket 
line the enemy's works. But instead of putting these divisions 
into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt 
and jest some distance in the rear of his own line. Between four 
and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in 
his pickets, and reoccupied his old line. 

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment 
was effected by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on 
the north bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected the 
pontoon bridge with Bermuda Hundred. 



Appendix. 509 

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedi- 
tion against the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White 
House just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and 
compelled it to retire. The result of this expedition was, that 
General Sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near Trevillian Station 
on the morning of the 11th of June, whom he attacked, and after 
an obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. He 
left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about 
four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. On the 12th 
he destroyed the railroad from Trevillian Station to Louisa Court- 
house. This occupied until three o'clock P. M., when he advanced in 
the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced by 
infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from 
the latter place, and too strong to successfully assault. On the 
extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's 
works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night 
closed the contest. Not having sufficient ammunition to continue 
the engagement, and his animals being without forage (the country 
furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing from General 
Hunter, he withdrew his command to the north side of the North 
Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching White House 
at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot at that 
place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely after 
heavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort 
Powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the army of 
the Potomac. 

On the 22d General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry 
of the army of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of 
cavalry of the army of the James, moved against the enemy's 
railroads south of Richmond. Striking the Weldon Railroad at 
Ream's Station, destroying the depot and several miles of the 
road, and the Southside Road, about fifteen miles from Peters- 
burg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a 
force of the enemy's cavalry, he reached Burkesville Station on the 
afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville Rail- 
road to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he 
found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could 
not dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on 
the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad 



510 Appendix. 

crossing of Stony Creek, where he had a severe hut not decisive 
engagement. Thence he made a detour from his left, with a view 
of reaching Ream's Station (supposing it to be in our jtossession). 
At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by 
infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and 
trains. In this last encounter, General Kautz, with a part of his 
command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. 
General Wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in 
crossing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our left and 
reai'. The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than 
compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connec- 
tion by railroad with Richmond for several weeks. 

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Rich- 
mond to the Anna Rivers, and making him wary of the situation 
of his army in the Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in 
this, to take advantage' of his necessary withdrawal of troops 
from Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in 
front of the Ninth Corps, and assault the enemy's lines at that 
place, on the night of the 26th of July the Second Corps and two 
divisions of the Cavalry Corps and Kautz's Cavalry were crossed 
to the north bank of the James River, and joined the force General 
Butler had there. On the 27th the enemy was driven from his 
intrenched position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On 
the 28th our lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Mar- 
ket road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy 
in heavy force. The righting lasted for several hours, resulting in 
considerable loss to both sides. The first object of this move 
having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by 
the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made, 
by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force back there. 
One division of the Second Corps was withdrawn on the night of 
the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the Eighteenth 
Corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose 
in the assault to be made. The other two divisions of the Second 
Corps and Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of 
the 29th, and moved in front of Petersburg. On the morning of 
the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, 
blowing ;i]) a battery and most of a regiment, and the advance of 
the assaulting column, formed of the Ninth Corps, immediately 



Appendix. 511 

took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line 
for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line 
in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to 
the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I have every reason to be- 
lieve that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops were imme- 
diately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up 
enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been com- 
plete), and get forces to this point for its defence. The captured 
line thus held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the 
troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus ter- 
minated in disaster what promised to be the most successful 
assault of the campaign. 

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter 
was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, 
thus laying the Shenandoah Valley open for raids into Maryland 
and Pennsylvania, he returned northward, and moved down that 
valley. As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, 
General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha River, was di- 
rected to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to 
Harper's Ferry ; but owing to the difficulty of navigation, by 
reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was 
experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore, to 
find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For this 
purpose the Sixth Corps was taken from the armies operating 
against Richmond, to which was added the Nineteenth Corps, 
then fortunately beginning to arrive in Hampton Roads from the 
Gulf Department, under orders issued immediately after the as- 
certainment of the result of the Red River expedition. The 
garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time made 
up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred-days men, and detach- 
ments from the invalid corps. One division, under command of 
General Ricketts, of the Sixth Corps, was sent to Baltimore, and 
the remaining two divisions of the Sixth Corps, under General 
Wright, were subsequently sent to Washington. On the 3d of 
July the enemy approached Martinsburg; General Sigel, who was 
in command of our forces there, retreated across the Potomac at 
Shepardstown ; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's 
Ferry, crossed the river and occupied Maryland Heights. On 
the 6th the enemy occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column 
33 



512 Appendix. 

towards Frederick City. General Wallace, with Ricketts's division 
and his own command, — the latter mostly new and undisciplined 
troops, — pushed out from Baltimore with great promptness, and : 
met the enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of: 
the railroad bridge. His force was not sufficient to insure suc- 
cess, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it 
resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and 
thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington 
with two divisions of the Sixth Corps, and the advance of the 
Nineteenth Corps, before him. From Monocacy the enemy moved 
on Washington, his cavalry advance reaching Rockville on the 
evening of the 10th. On the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown 
out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and. 
force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two 
hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss 
was probably greater. He commenced retreating during the 
night. Learning the exact condition of aflairs at Washington, I 
requested by telegraph, at quarter of twelve P. M., on the 12th, 
the assignment of Major General H. G. Wright to the command 
of all the troops that could be made available to operate in the 
field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outsido 
of the trenches with all the force he could, and push Early to the 
last moment. General Wright commenced the pursuit on the 
13th. On the 18th the enemy was overtaken at Snicker's Ferry, 
on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred ; and on the 
20th General Averill encountered and defeated a portion of the 
rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and 
several hundred prisoners. 

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg 
or Richmond, I directed that the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps be 
got back to the armies operating against Richmond, so that they 
might be used in a movement against Lee before the return of 
the troops sent by him into the valley ; and that Hunter' should 
remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between any force of 
the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much as 
possible. I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, 
the fact would be developed before the Sixth and Nineteenth 
Corps could leave Washington. Subsequently the Nineteenth 
Corps was excepted from the order to return to the James. 






Appendix. 513 

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again 
advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the Sixth Corps, 
then at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's 
Ferry. The rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raid- 
ing party into Pennsylvania, which, on the 30th, burned Chani- 
bersburg and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards 
Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelly, 
and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West 
Virginia. From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires 
were frequently down between Washington and City Point, mak- 
ing it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. 
It took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get despatches 
through and return answers back ; so that often orders would be 
given, and then information would be received showing a differ- 
ent state of facts from those on which they were based, causing 
a confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have 
considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and 
rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they 
otherwise would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident 
to my mind that some person should have the supreme command 
of all the forces in the Departments of West Virginia, Washing- 
ton, Susquehanna, and the Middle Department, and I so recom- 
mended. 

On the 2d of August I ordered General Sheridan to report in 
person to Major General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, 
with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces 
against Early. At this time the enemy was concentrated in the 
neighborhood of Winchester, whilst our forces, under General 
Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of 
the Baltimore and Ohio Pailroad, leaving open to the enemy 
Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. From where I 
was, I hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our 
forces at Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. 
Therefore, on the 4th I left City Point to visit Hunter's com- 
mand, and determine for myself what was best to be done. On 
arrival there, and after consultation with General Hunter, I issued 
to him the following instructions : — 



514 Appendix. 



Monocacy Bridge, Md., | 



August 5, 1864 — 8 P. M. 

General : Concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity I 
of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public : : 
property as may be necessary. Use, in this concentrating, the railroads, if E 
by so doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the : 
enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following : 
him and attacking him wherever found; follow him if driven south of the 
Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy , 
has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main 
force, detaching, under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after i 
the raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force, the 
brigade of cavalry now en route from Washington via Eockville, may be taken 
into account. 

There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best I 
cavalry, numbering, at least, five thousand men and horses. These will be 
instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side oft 
the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow. In pushing up the 
Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is 
desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all 
provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such a8 
cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be 
destroyed — they should rather be protected ; but the people should be in- 
formed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these 
raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards. 

Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south ; and tq do this you i 
want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course 
he takes. 

Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular 

vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through | 

which you march. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General D. Hunter. 

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance 
reached Halltown that night. 

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a will- 
ingness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have Gen- 
eral Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the 
morning train, with orders to take general command of all the 
troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at Monocacy, 
who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. I re- 
mained at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, on the 
morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation 



Appendix. 515 



to military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by 
way of Washington. 

On the 7th of August the Middle Department and the Depart- 
ments of West Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna were 
constituted into the "Middle Military Division," and Major Gen- 
eral Sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same. 

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and 
Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the army of the Potomac. 
The first reached him at Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August. 

His operations during the month of August and the fox*e part 
of September were both of an offensive and defensive character, 
©suiting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in 
which we were generally successful ; but no general engagement 
took place. The two armies lay in such a position — the enemy 
on the west bank of the Opequan Creek, covering Winchester, 
and our forces in front of Berrysville — that either could bring 
on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would lay open to the 
enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long dis- 
tances before another army could be interposed to check him. 
Under these circumstances, I hesitated about allowing the initia- 
tive to be taken. Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were both 
obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to 
us, and the importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland 
from continuously threatened invasion so great, that I determined 
the risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order for 
an attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan's 
feelings as to what would be the probable result, I left City Point, 
on the 15th of September, to visit him at his headquarters, to 
decide, after conference with him, what should be done. I met 
him at Charleston, and he pointed out so distinctly how each 
army lay, what he could do the moment he was authorized, and ex- 
pressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but two 
words of instruction necessary — Go in ! For the convenience of 
forage, the teams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's 
Ferry. I asked him if he could get out his teams and supplies 
in time to make an attack on the ensuing Tuesday morning. His 
reply was, that he could before daylight on Monday. He was off* 
promptly to time, and I may here add that the result was such 



• 



516 Appendix. 

that I have never since deemed it necessary to visit General Sheri- 
dan before giving him orders. 

Early on the morning of the 19th General Sheridan attacked 
General Early at the crossing on the Opequan Creek, and after a 
most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the 
evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position 
from Opequan Creek to Winchester, capturing several thousand 
prisoners and five pieces of artillery. The enemy rallied and made 
a stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked . 
and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th. Sheridan pur- 
sued him with great energy through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and 
the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After stripping the upper valley of 
most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, he returned 
to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of Cedar 
Creek. 

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early 
again returned to the Valley, and on the 9th of October his cav- 
alry encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were de- 
feated with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hun- 
dred and fifty prisoners. On the night of the 18th the enemy 
crossed the mountains which separated the branches of the Shen- 
andoah, forded the north fork, and early on the morning of the 
19th, under cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and 
turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed 
our whole line. Our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much 
confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and New- 
town. At this juncture General Sheridan, who was at Winches- 
ter when the battle commenced, arrived on the field, arranged his 
lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and im- 
mediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great 
vigor. The enemy was defeated with great slaughter and the loss 
of most of his artillery and trains and the trophies he had cap- 
tured in the morning. The wreck of his army escaped during 
the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg. 
Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this, the ene- 
my's last attempt to invade the north via the Shenandoah Valley. 
I was now enabled to return the Sixth Corps to the army of the 
Potomac, and to send one division from Sheridan's army to the 
army of the James, and another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold 



Appendix. 517 

Sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him 
to move without detaching from his force for that purpose. 

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy 
had detached three divisions from Petersburg to reenforce Early 
in the Shenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the Second Corps 
and Gregg's division of cavalry, of the army of the Potomac, and 
a force of General Butler's army, on the night of the 13th of 
August, to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James, 
to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw 
back those sent. In this move we captured six pieces of artillery 
and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under 
marching orders, and ascertained that but one division (Ker- 
shaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone. 

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to re- 
sist this movement, the Fifth Corps, General Warren command- 
ing, was moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the Wel- 
don Railroad. During the day he had considerable fighting. To 
regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and des- 
. perate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss. On 
the night of the 20th the troops on the north side of the James 
were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front 
of Petersburg. On the 25th the Second Corps and Gregg's divis- 
ion of cavalry, while at Ream's Station destroying the railroad, 
were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of our line 
gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the 
enemy. 

By the 12th of September a branch railroad was completed 
from the City Point and Petersburg Railroad to the WeldoH 
Railroad, enabling us to simply, without difficulty, in all weather, 
the army in front of Petersburg. 

The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad com- 
pelled the enemy to so extend his that it seemed he could have 
but few troops north of the James for the defence of Richmond. 
On the night of the 28th the Tenth Corps, Major General Birney, 
and the Eighteenth Corps, Major General Ord commanding, of 
General Butler's army, were crossed to the north side of the 
James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the 
very strong fortifications and intrenchments below Chapin's farm, 
known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and 



518 Appendix. 

the New Market road and intrenchments. This success was fol- 
lowed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gillmore, immediately in 
front of the Chapin farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed 
with heavy loss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road 
to the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's 
inner line, but was unable to get farther. The position captured 
from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond that I deter- 
mined to hold it. The enemy made several desperate attempts 
to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he 
paid dearly. On the morning of the 80th General Meade sent 
out a reconnoissance, with a view to attacking the enemy's line if 
it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the 
north side. In this reconnoissance we captured and held the enemy's 
works near Poplar Spring Church. In the afternoon troops moving 
to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy 
in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the 
forces holding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg 
was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss. 

On the 7th of October the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry 
north of the James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, 
wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery — eight 
or nine pieces. This he followed up by an attack on our in- 
trenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. 
On the 13th a reconnoissance was sent out by General Butler, 
with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was 
constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us. 

On the 27th the army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient 
men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. 
The Second Corps, followed by two divisions of the Fifth Corps, 
with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a 
passage of Hatcher's Run, and moved uj) the south side of it 
towards the Southside Railroad, until the Second Corps and 
part of the cavalry reached the Boydton plank road, where it 
crosses Hatcher's Run. At this point we were six miles distant 
from the Southside Railroad, which I had hoped by this move- 
ment to reach and hold. But finding that we had not reached 
the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting 
itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up 
and shortened, I determined to withdraw to within our fortified 



Appendix. 519 

line. Orders were given accordingly. Immediately upon receiv- 
ing a report that General Warren had connected with General 
Hancock, I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I left, the 
enemy moved out across Hatcher's Eim, in the gap between Gen- 
erals Hancock and Warren (which was not closed, as reported), 
and made a desperate attack on General Hancock's right and rear. 
General Hancock immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after 
a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew 
that night to his old position. 

In support of this movement General Butler made a demonstra- 
tion ©n the north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on 
•the Williamsburg road, and also on the York River Railroad. In 
the former he was unsuccessful ; in the latter he succeeded in 
carrying a work, which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces 
withdrawn to their former positions. 

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg 
and Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined 
to the defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive move- 
ments for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to 
prevent his detaching any considerable force to send south. By 
the 7th of February our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, 
and the Weldon Railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford. 

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, 
with the armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, com- 
manded, respectively, by Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Scho- 
field, upon Johnston's army at Dalton ; but finding the enemy's 
position at Buzzard Roost, covering Dalton, too strong to be 
assaulted, General McPherson was sent through Snake Gap to 
turn it, whilst Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it in 
front and on the north. This movement was successful. John- 
ston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his forti- 
fied position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon 
of May 15. A heavy battle ensued. During the night the 
enemy retreated south. Late on the 17th his rear-guard was 
overtaken near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. The 
next morning, however, he had again disappeared. He was vig- 
orously pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville on the 19th, but, 
during the ensuing night, retreated across the Etowah. Whilst 
these operations were going on. General Jefferson C. Davis's divis- 



520 Appendix. 

ion of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it, with its 
forts and artillery, and its valuable mills and founderies. General 
Sherman, having given his army a few days' rest at this point, 
again put it in motion on the 23d for Dallas, with a view of turn- 
ing the difficult pass at Allatoona. On the afternoon of the 25th, 
the advance, under General Hookei*, had a severe battle with the 
enemy, driving him back to New Hope Church, near Dallas. 
Several sharp encounters occurred at this point. The most im- 
portant was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General 
McPherson at Darlas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse. 

On the 4th of June Johnston abandoned his intrenched .posi- 
tion at New Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions . 
of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost Mountains. He was forced to yield 
the two last-named places and concentrate his army on Kenesaw, 
where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and McPherson made a de- 
termined but unsuccessful assault. On the night of the 2d of 
July Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, 
and on the morning of the 3d found that the enemy, in conse- 
quence of this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated 
across the Chattahoochie. 

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochie to give his 
men rest and get up stores until the 17th of July, when he re- 
sumed his operations, crossed the Chattahoochie, destroyed a 
large portion of the railroad to Augusta, and drove the enemy 
back to Atlanta. At this place General Hood succeeded General 
Johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming the offen- 
sive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman 
in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of 
which was on the 22d of July. About one P. M. of this day the 
brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed. 
General Logan succeeded him, and commanded the army of the 
Tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was super- 
seded by Major General Howard, on the 26th, with the same suc- 
cess and ability that had characterized him in the command of a 
corps or division. 

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. 
Finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sher- 
man, after securing his line of communications across the Chatta- 
hoochie, moved his main force round by the enemy's left flank 



Appendix. 521 

upon the Montgomery and Macon roads, to draw the enemy from 
his fortifications. In this he succeeded, and, after defeating the 
enemy near Rough and Beady, Jonesboro', and Lovejoy's, forcing 
him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of September occupied 
Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign. 

About the time of this move the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, 
attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed 
at Dal ton, and driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded 
west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro,' and Franklin, and was finally 
driven south of the Tennessee. The damage done by this raid 
was repaired in a few days. 

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau 
joined General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, 
having made a successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery 
Railroad, and its branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also 
made by Generals McCook, Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the 
remaining railroad communication with Atlanta. The first two 
were successful, the latter disastrous. 

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta 
was prompt, skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank move- 
ments and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be 
read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history. 

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders 
accompanying it, give the details of that most successful cam- 
paign. 

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single- 
track railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating. 
This passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and 
every foot of it had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force 
of the enemy under Forrest, in Northern Mississippi, was evident- 
ly waiting for Sherman to advance far enough into the mountains 
of Georgia to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon his line and 
destroy it beyond the possibility of further use. To guard against 
this danger, Sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force 
to operate against Forrest in West Tennessee. He directed Gen- 
eral Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier General 
S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him. On the 
morning of the 10th of June General Sturgis met the enemy near 
Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter 



522 Appendix. 

rout and confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred 
miles, hotly pursued by the enemy. By this, however, the enemy 
was defeated in his designs upon Sherman's line of communica- 
tions. The persistency with which he followed up this success 
exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. 
In the mean time Major General A. J. Smith, with the troops of 
the army of the Tennessee that had been sent by General Sher- 
man to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return from 
Red River, where they had done most excellent service. He was 
directed by General Sherman to immediately take the offensive 
against Forrest. This he did with the promptness and effect 
which have characterized his whole military career. On the 14th 
of July he met the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped 
him badly. The fighting continued through three days. Our 
loss was small compared with that of the enemy. Having accom- 
plished the object of his expedition, General Smith returned to 
Memphis. 

During the months of March and April this same force under 
Forrest annoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it cap- 
tured Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th 
attacked Paducah, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, Fortieth 
Illinois Volunteers. Colonel Hicks, having but a small force, 
withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the 
enemy and drove him from the place. 

On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel General 
Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to sur- 
render, but received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, Thirty- 
fourth New Jersey Volunteers, that, being placed there by his 
government with adequate force to hold his post and repel all 
enemies from it, surrender was out of the question. 

On the morning of the same day, Forrest attacked Fort Pil- 
low, Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry, 
and the First Regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by 
Major Booth. The garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock 
in the afternoon, when the enemy carried the Works by assault ; 
and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhu- 
man and merciless massacre of the garrison. 

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, ap- 
peared before Paducah, but was again driven off. 



Appendix. 523 

Guerrillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's op'eiv- 
ations, were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of 
these was Morgan. With a force of from two to three thousand 
cavalry he entered the state through Pound Gap in the latter part 
of May. On the 11th of J.une he attacked and captured Cynthi- 
ana, with its entire garrison. On the 12th he was overtaken by 
General Burbridge, and completely routed, with heavy loss, and 
was finally driven out of the state. This notorious guerrilla was 
afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and his 
command captured and dispersed by General Gillem. 

In the absence of official reports at the commencement of the 
Red River expedition, except so far as relates to the movements 
of the troops sent by General Sherman under A. J. Smith, I am 
unable to give the date of its starting. The troops under General 
Smith, comprising two divisions of the Sixteenth and a detach- 
ment of the Seventeenth army corps, left Vicksburg on the 10th 
of March, and reached the designated point on Red River one day 
earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebel forces 
at Fort De Russey, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the 
14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying 
the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed 
forward to Fort De Russey, which had been left with a weak gar- 
rison, and captured it with its garrison — about three hundred and 
fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many small arms. Our 
loss was but slight. On the 15th he pushed forward to Alexan- 
dria, which place he reached on the 18th. On the 21st he had 
an engagement with the enemy at Henderson Hill, in which he 
defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four 
pieces of artillery. 

On the 28th he again attacked and defeated the enemy under 
the rebel General Taylor at Cane River. By the 26th General 
Banks had assembled his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed 
forward to Grand Ecore. On the morning of April G, he moved 
from Grand Ecore. On the afternoon of the 7th his advance en- 
gaged the enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him from the field. 
On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond 
Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat. On the 8th, at 
Sabine Cross-roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and de- 
feated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an 



524 Appendix. 

immense amount of transportation and stores. During the night 
General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was 
fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. During 
the night General Banks continued his retrograde movement to 
Grand Ecore, and thence to Alexandria, which he reached on the 
27th of April. Here a serious difficulty arose in getting Admiral 
Porter's fleet, which accompanied the expedition, over the rapids, 
the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent 
their return. At the suggestion of Colonel (now Brigadier Gen- 
eral) Bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were con- 
structed, by which the channel was contracted, so that the fleet 
passed down the rapids in safety. 

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after con- 
siderable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached 
Morganzia and Point Coupee near the end of the month. The 
disastrous termination of this expedition and the lateness of the 
season rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans of a 
movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of Mobile. 

On the 23d of March Major General Steele left Little Rock with 
the Seventh Army Corps to cooperate with General Banks's expedi- 
tion on Red River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the 
16th of April, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined 
near Elkin's Ferry, in Washita County, by General Thayer, who 
had marched from Fort Smith. After several severe skirmishes, in 
which the enemy was defeated, General Steele reached Camden, 
which he occupied about the middle of April. 

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks 
on Red River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's 
Mill, in Dallas County, General Steele determined to fall back to 
the Arkansas River. He left Camden on the 26th of April, and 
reached Little Rock on the 2d of May. On the 30th of April the 
enemy attacked him while crossing Saline River at Jenkins's 
Ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. Our loss was 
about six hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners. 

Major General Canby, who had been assigned to the command 
of the "Military Division of West Mississippi," was therefore di- 
rected to send the Nineteenth Army Corps to join the armies 
operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his 
command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the 
positions and lines of communication he then occujned. 



Appendix. 525 

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, 
General Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy 
that was collecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith met 
and defeated this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June. Our 
loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded. 

In the latter part of July General Canby sent Major General 
Gordon Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to cooperate 
with Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile Bay. On 
the 8th of August Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval 
and land forces. Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned. 

On the 9th Fort Morgan was invested, and after a severe bom- 
bardment, surrendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted 
to fourteen hundred and sixty-four prisoners and one hundred and 
four pieces of artillery. 

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel Gen- 
eral Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached 
Jacksonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's 
command, then en route from Memphis to join Sherman, was or- 
dered to Missouri. A cavalry force was also, at the same time, 
sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow. This 
made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those of Price, and no 
doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price and drive 
him back, while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas, would 
cut off his retreat. On the 26th day of September Price attacked 
Pilot Knob, and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved 
north to the Missouri River, and continued up that river towards 
Kansas. General Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, im- 
mediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion 
of Kansas, while General Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his 
rear. 

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, 
with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large num- 
ber of prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Ar- 
kansas. The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over 
the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief 
done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force may be 
used. There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have 
concentrated his forces and beaten and driven Price before the 
latter reached Pilot Knob. 



526 Appendix. 

September 20 the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the 
Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the 
garrison at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated 
on the 24th. Soon after the surrender, two regiments of reinforce- 
ments arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. 
Forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at 
Sulphur Branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on 
the 27th, and on the same day cut the Nashville and Chattanooga 
Railroad near Tullahoma and Dec-hard. On the morning of the 
30th one column of Forrest's command, under Buford, appeared 
before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the garrison. 
Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity 
of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its sur- 
render, and received the same reply as on the night before. He 
withdrew in the direction of Athens, which place had been re- 
garrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, 
but without success. On the morning of the 2d he renewed his 
attack, but was handsomely repulsed. 

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on 
the morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the 
morning of the 3d he moved towards Mount Pleasant. While 
these operations were going on every exertion was made by Gen- 
eral Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he could 
recross the Tennessee, but he was unable to prevent his escape to 
Corinth, Mississippi. 

In September an expedition under General Burbridge was sent 
to destroy the salt-works at Saltville, Virginia. He met the 
enemy on the 2d of October, about three miles and a half from 
Saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position 
around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. 
During the night he withdrew his command and returned to Ken- 
tucky. 

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his 
armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations 
for refitting and supplying them for future service. The great 
length of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however, 
which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest. 

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, 
Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the South, and soon 



Appendix. 527 

became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of tho 
enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to fully meet them. lie 
exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that bad been 
beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive 
could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that 
had so often defeated it. 

In execution of this plan, Hood, with his army, was soon re- 
ported to the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's 
right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, 
and moved north on it. 

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the 
remainder of his army fell upon him, and drove him to Gadston, 
Alabama. Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with 
the roads to his rear, if we attempted to hold Atlanta, General 
Sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, 
with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as fol- 
lows : — 

Centreville, Ga., October 10 — Noon. 

Despatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa River, 

twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over the Mobile and 

Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel 

Porter, and leave General Thomas, with the troops now in Tennessee, to 

defend the state? He will have an ample force when the refinforcements 

ordered reach Nashville. 

W. T. Sherman, Major General. 

Lieutenant General Grant. 

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this despatch, 
I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter : " I will therefore 
give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should be reenforced 
to the maximum ; that, after you get Wilmington, you strike for 
Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the 
Mississippi River, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, 
either by the way of the Alabama or the Apalachicola, and that 
I keep Hood employed and put my army in final order for a march 
on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wil- 
mington is sealed as to commerce, and the city of Savannah is in 
our possession." This was in reply to a letter of mine of date 
September 12, in answer to a despatch of his containing substan- 
tially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a 
U 






528 Appendix. 

proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in 
Virginia, &c. 

City Point, Va., October 11, 1864 — 11 A. M. 
Your despatch of October 10 received. Does it not look as if Hood was 
going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and 
Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Ten- 
nessee River, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this he ought to be met 
and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River. If you were to 
cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bush- 
whacked by all the old men, little boys, and such railroad guards as are still 
left at home. Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by 
going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the 
rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at Hood's army I would 
prefer that ; but I must trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able 
to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, 
therefore, will be independent of mine ; at least until the fall of Richmond 
takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to pro- 
tect, could not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose, 
with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive 

than heretofore. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General W. T. Sherman. 

Kingston, Ga., October 11 — 11 A. M. 

Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and Cedar- 
town, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw one corps 
on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the 
Twentieth Corps, and have strong detachments along my line. This reduces 
my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain here on the 
defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, 
he can constanfly break my roads. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck 
of the road and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the 
latter city, send back all my wounded and worthless, and, with my effective 
army, move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood may turn 
into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me: 
Instead of my being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of 
guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The 
difference in war is full twenty-live per cent. I can make Savannah, Charles- 
ton, or the mouth of the Chattahoochie. 

Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long. 

W. T. Sherman, Major General. 

Lieutenant General Grant. 

City Point, Va., October 11, 186-i —11.30 P. M. 
Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea- 



Appendix. 529 

coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly, yon may 

make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you 

think best. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General W. T. Sherman. 

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting 
through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern rail- 
roads leading east and west through Georgia, to effectually sever 
the east from the west — in other words, cut the would-be Con- 
federacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining 
possession of the Mississippi River. General Sherman's plan vir- 
tually effected this object. 

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his 
proposed movement, keeping his army in position, in the mean 
time, to watch Hood. Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved 
westward from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, General Sherman 
sent the Fourth Corps, Major General Stanley commanding, and 
the Twenty-third Corps, Major General Schofield commanding, 
back to Chattanooga to report to Major General Thomas at Nash- 
ville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his 
military division, save the four army corps and cavalry division 
he designed to move with through Georgia. With the troops 
thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt that General 
Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee, or, in the event 
Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him 
in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman 
should start for the sea-coast. 

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of No- 
vember, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and 
Macon. His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. 
Having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the 
country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own 
might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, 
instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy, 
however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army — 
the only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of 
the Mississippi River — northward on an offensive campaign, left 
the whole country open, and Sherman's route to his own choice. 

How that campaign ivas conducted, how little opposition was 



530 Appendix. 

met with, the condition of the country through which the armies 
passed, the capture of Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River, 
and the occupation of Savannah on the 21st of December, are all 
clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report. 

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlan- 
ta, two expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one 
from Vicksburg, Mississippi, were started by General Canby, to 
cut the enemy's line of communication with Mobile, and detain 
troops in that field. General Foster, commanding Department 
of the South, also sent an expedition, via Broad River, to destroy 
the railroad between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition 
from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier General 
E. D. Osband (Colonel Third United States Colored Cavalry), 
captured, on the 27th of November, and destroyed the Mississippi 
Central Railroad Bridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, 
near Canton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, be- 
sides large amounts of stores. The expedition from Baton Rouge 
was without favorable results. The expedition from the Depart- 
ment of the South, under the immediate command of Brigadier 
General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of 
all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad 
River and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, 
from where it moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At 
Honey Hill, about three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was 
found and attacked in a strongly-fortified position, which resulted, 
after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred 
and forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. During the night 
General Hatch withdrew. On the 6th of December General Fos- 
ter obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah 
Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and Talifinny Rivers. 

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move north- 
ward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At 
all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should 
not have changed the. orders under which he seemed to be acting. 
On the 2Gth of October the advance of Hood's army attacked the 
garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but foiling to carry the place, with- 
drew towards Courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, 
in effecting a lodgment on the north side of the Tennessee River, 
near Florence. On the 28th Forrest reached the Tennessee, at 



Appendix. 531 

Fort Iliemau, and captured a gunboat and three transports. On 
the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below John- 
sonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats 
and eight transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries 
upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the gar- 
rison. The gunboats, becoming disabled, were set on fire, as also 
were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the 
enemy. About a million and a half dollars' worth of stores and 
property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. 
On the 5th the enemy disappeared, and crossed to the north side 
of the Tennessee River, above Johnsonville, moving towards Clif- 
ton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of the 5th 
General Schofield, with the advance of the Twenty-third Corps, 
reached Johnsonville, but, finding the enemy gone, was ordered to 
Pulaski, and put in command of all the troops there, with instruc- 
tions to watch the movements of Hood and retard his advance, 
but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of General 
A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until General Wilson 
could get his cavalry remounted. 

On the 19th General Hood continued his advance. General 
Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards 
Nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gain- 
ing time for the arrival of reinforcements. The enemy, coming 
up with our main force commanded by General Schofield, at 
Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the 
afternoon, until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed. 
His loss in this battle was seventeen hundred and fifty killed, 
seven hundred and two prisoners, and thirty-eight hundred 
wounded. Among his losses were six general officers killed, six 
wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was twenty-three 
hundred. This was the first serious opposition the enemy met 
with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. 
During the night General Schofield fell back towards Nashville. 
This left the field to the enemy, — not lost by battle, but volunta- 
rily abandoned, — so that General Thomas's whole force might be 
brought together. The enemy followed up and commenced the 
establishment of his line in front of Nashville on the 2d of De- 
cember. 

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Ten- 



532 Appendix. 

nessce River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General 
Rosecrans was ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of 
General A. J. Smith's command, and such other troops as he could 
spare. The advance of this reenforcement reached Nashville on 
the 30th of November. 

On the morning of the 15th of December General Thomas 
attacked Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, 
defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, 
leaving in our hands most of his artillery and many thousand 
prisoners, including four general officers. 

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it 
appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was in- 
creased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry 
across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would 
cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. After 
urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately 
assuming the offensive, I started west to superintend matters 
there in person. Reaching Washington city, I received General 
Thomas's despatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and 
the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. 
All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satis- 
fied but that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance 
of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, 
should have moved out with his whole force and given him bat- 
tle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him 
until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to at- 
tack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so 
complete that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distin- 
guished officer's judgment. 

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued 
by cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to 
abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. 
On the 28th of December our advance forces ascertained that he 
had made good his escape to the south side of the river. 

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee 
and North Alabama, making it difficult to move army transporta- 
tion ami artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his 
in:, in force at the Tennessee River. A small force of cavalry, 
under Colouel W. J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, 



Appendix. 533 

continued to follow Hood for some distance, capturing consid- 
erable transportation and the enemy's pontoon bridge. The de- 
tails of these operations Avill be found clearly set forth in General 
Thomas's report. 

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major General Grierson, 
started from Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he 
surprised and captured Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, 
Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, destroyed the rail- 
road, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for Hood's 
army, four thousand new English carbines, and large amounts of 
public stores. On the morning of the 28th he attacked and cap- 
tured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of 
fourteen cars; thence, turning to the south-west, he struck the 
Mississippi Central Railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories 
and' large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine shops 
and public property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5. 

During these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with 
a force under General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On 
the 13th of November he attacked General Gillem, near Morris- 
town, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. Gil- 
lem, with what was left of his command, retreated to Knoxville. 
Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to near Knoxville, 
but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen. Under 
the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concen- 
trated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem, near 
Bean's Station, to operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or 
drive him into Virginia — destroy the salt-works at Saltville, r.nd 
the railroad into Virginia as far as he could go without endanger- 
ing his command. On the 12th of December he commenced his 
movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces wherever 
he met them. On the 16th he struck the enemy, under Vaughn, 
at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville, 
capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety- 
eight prisoners ; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and 
supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to 
Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge, consisting, among 
other troops, of the garrison of Saltville, that had started in pur- 
suit. He at once made arrangements to attack it the next morn- 
ing ; but morning found Breckinridge gone. He then moved 



534 Appendix. 

directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works at 
that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of 
artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he 
returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to 
Knoxville. 

"Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast 
port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, 
and send cotton and other products out by blockade-runners, be- 
sides being a place of great strategic value. The navy had been 
making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of Wilmington, but 
with only partial effect. The nature of the outlet of Cape Fear 
River was such that it required watching for so great a distance, 
that without possession of the land north of New Inlet, or Fort 
Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor 
against the entrance of blockade-runners. 

To secure' the possession of this land required the cooperation 
of a land force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately com- 
menced the assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. 
Porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for concen- 
tration upon one given point. This necessarily attracted the at- 
tention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal north ; and 
through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely of 
officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the expe- 
dition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers 
both north and south. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet 
it. This caused a postponement of the expedition until the latter 
part of November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. 
Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men 
required at once, and went myself, in company with Major Gen- 
eral Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we had a conference with 
Admiral Porter as to the force required and the time of starting. 
A force of six thousand five hundred men was regarded as suffi- 
cient. The time of starting was not definitely arranged, but it 
was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December, if not 
before. Learning on the 30th of November that Bragg had gone 
to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilming- 
ton, I deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition 
should reach its destination before the return of Bragg, and di- 
rected General Butler to make all arrangements for the departure 



Appendix. 535 

of Major General Weitzel, who had heen designated to command 
the land forces, so that the navy might not he detained ono 
moment. 

On the 6th of December the following instructions were 
given : — 

City Point, Va., December C, 1864. ■ 

General : The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is to 
close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this, the second 
will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable grounds to hope 
for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of 
the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The directions 
you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, 
except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of 
intrenching tools to be taken. The object of the expedition will be gained by 
effecting a landing on the main land between Cape Fear River and the At- 
lantic, nortli of the north entrance to the river. Should such landing be 
effected whilst the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding 
the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, 
by cooperating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. 
•These in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wil- 
mington would be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on 
which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, 
then it will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march 
and surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedi- 
tion, the second will become a matter of after consideration. 

The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer imme- 
diately in command of the troops. 

Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near 

Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against Richmond 

without delay. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General B. F. Butler. 

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops 
were taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they 
were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and 
instructions should go through him. They were so sent; but 
General Weitzel has since officially informed me that lie never 
received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their 
existence until he read General Butler's published official report 
of the Fort Fisher failure, with my indorsement and papers ac- 
companying it. I had no idea of General Butler's accompanying 
the expedition until the evening before it got off from Bermuda 



536 Appendix. 

Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel Lad 
received all the instructions, and would be in command. I rather 
formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to 
witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. The 
expedition was detained several days at Hampton Roads, await- 
ing the loading of the powder-boat. 

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off 
without any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been 
urged upon General Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral 
Porter. 

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and 
arrived at the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort 
Fisher, on the evening of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on 
the evening of the 18th, having put in at Beaufort to get ammu- 
nition for the monitors. The sea becoming rough, making it 
difficult to land troops, and the supply of w T ater and coal being 
about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to 
replenish ; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return 
to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. The powder-boat was 
exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the return of General 
Butler from Beaufort ; but it would seem from the notice taken 
of it in the southern newspapers that the enemy were never 
enlightened as to the object of the explosion until they were 
informed by the northern press. 

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a 
reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier General Curtis, pushed up 
towards the fort. But before receiving a full report of the result 
of this reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the 
instructions given, ordered the reembarkation of the troops and 
the return of the expedition. 

The reembarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th. 

On the return of the expedition, officers and men — among 
them Brevet Major General (then Brevet Brigadier General) M., 

R. Curtis, First Lieutenant G. W. Boss, regiment Vermont 

volunteers, First Lieutenant George W. Walling and Second 
Lieutenant George Simpson, one hundred and forty-second New 
York volunteers — voluntarily reported to me that when recalled 
they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have 
been taken without much loss. 



Appendix. 537 

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a despatch 
from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, 
informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and express- 
ing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could 
be taken. The natural supposition with me was, that when the 
troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also. 
Finding it had not, however, I answered on the 30th of Decem- 
ber, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would send a 
force and make another attempt to take the place. This time I 
selected Brevet Major General (now Major General) A. H. Terry 
to command the expedition. The troops composing it consisted 
of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a 
small brigade, numbering about one thousand five hundred, and 
a small siege train. The latter it was never found necessary to 
land. I communicated direct to the commander of the expedi- 
tion the following instructions : — 

City Point, Va., January 3, 18C5. 

General : The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out 
to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C, and Wilmington ultimate- 
ly, if the fort falls. You will, then, proceed with as little delay as possible to 
the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, and report the arrival of yourself 
and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic block- 
ading squadron. 

It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should 
exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that 
you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part to be per- 
formed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of 
action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. 
I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his judg- 
ment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would, therefore, defer 
to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. The first 
object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which 
Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. You want 
to look to the practicability of receiving j-our supplies, and to defending your- 
self against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open 
to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher 
will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished or another plan of 
campaign is ordered from these headquarters. • 

My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a 
portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the balance of it operates on 
the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut it off from sup- 
plies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the euemy. 



538 Appendix. 

A siege train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in readi- 
ness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be drawn from 
Beaufort as you need them. 

Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. When 
you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can 
6pare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders. 

In case of failure to effect a landing, bring ^ r our command back to Beaufort, 
and report to these headquarters for further instructions. You will not 
debark at Beaufort until so directed. 

General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to Balti- 
more, and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will be brought to 
Fort Monroe, and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. Should 
you require them they will be 6ent to you. 

U. S. Gkant, Lieutenant General. 

Brevet Major General A. H. Terry. 

Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Corastock, aide-de-camp (now Brevet 
Brigadier General), who accompanied the former expedition, was 
assigned in orders as chief engineer to this. 

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially 
from those given for the first expedition ; and that in neither in- 
stance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a 
matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer. 

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 
6th, arriving on the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where, 
owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning 
of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its destination 
that evening. Under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the 
troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by three 
o'clock P. M. was completed without loss. On the 14th a recon- 
noissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, 
and a small advance work taken possession of and turned into a 
defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the 
fort. This reconnoissance disclosed, the fact that the front of the 
work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the after- 
noon of the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate 
fighting was captured with its entire garrison and armament. 
Thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and army, 
one of the most important successes of the war. Our loss was — 
killed, one hundred and ten ; wounded, five hundred and thirty- 
eix. On the lGth and 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up 



Appendix. 539 

Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's Island, which were imme- 
diately occupied by us. This gave us entire control of the mouth 
of the Cape Fear River. 

At my request Major General B. F. Butler was relieved, and 
Major General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the command of the De- 
partment of Virginia and North Carolina. 

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring 
the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army 
threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation for 
General Thomas's surplus troops — fields from which they would 
cooperate with other movements. General Thomas was therefore 
directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communica- 
. tions, at Eastport, in readiness for orders. On the 7th of Janu- 
ary General Thomas was directed, if he was assured of the depar- 
ture of Hood south from Corinth, to send General Schofield with 
his corps east with as little delay as possible. This direction was 
promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached 
Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent 
to Fort Fisher and Newbern. On the 26th he was directed to 
send General A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry 
to report to General Canby. By the 7th of February the whole 
force was en route for its destination. 

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military 
department, and General Schofield assigned to command, and 
placed under the orders of Major General Sherman. The follow- 
ing instructions were given him: — 

City Point, Va., January 31, 1S65. 
General: . . . Tour movements are intended as cooperative with 
Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina. The first point 
to be attained is to secure "Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be your ob- 
jective point, moving either from "Wilmington or Newbern, or both, as you 
deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advance on 
the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast — as near 
to it as you can, building the road behind you. The enterprise under you 
has two objects : the first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, 
in his march north ; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his 
line of march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two 
points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best use for throwing supplies from 
to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations 
and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will 



540 Appendix. 

get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior 
as you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has received some 
instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securing smpplies 
for his army. You can learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in 
your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores will also be 
necessary. 

Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the 
field with me at City Point. Communicate with me by every opportunity, 
and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to Fortress 
Monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph. 

The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those re- 
quired for your own command. 

The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative 
duty, to cut loose from your base and strike for the interior to aid Sherman. 
In such case you will act on your own judgment, without waiting for instruc- 
tions. You will report, however, what you purpose doing. The details for 
carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, 
however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance 
of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of 
Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of February : this limits your 
time very materially. 

If rolling stock is not secured in the capture of "Wilmington, it can be sup- 
plied from Washington. A large force of railroad men have already been 
sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two. 
On this point I have informed you by telegraph. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General J. M. Schofield. 

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher, 
accompanied by General Schotield, for the purpose of seeing for 
myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with 
General Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be 
done. 

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah, — 
his army entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, 
Tennessee, the southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take 
several months to reestablish a through line from west to east, 
and regarding the capture of Lee's army as the most important 
operation towards closing the rebellion, — I sent orders to General 
Sherman, on the 6th of December, that after establishing a base 
on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison to include all his artil- 
lery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point with the bal- 
ance of his command. 



Appendix. 541 

On the 18th of December, having received information of the 
defeat and utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and 
that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transporta- 
tion, it would take over two months to transport Sherman's army, 
and doubting whether he might not contribute as much towards 
the desired result by operating from where he was, I wrote to 
him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would 
be best to do. A few days after this I received a communication 
from General Sherman, of date lGth December, acknowledging 
tlje receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his 
preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get trans- 
portation. Also, that he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, 
instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Ra- 
leigh, and thence to report to me ; but that this would consume 
about six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah, whereas by sea 
he could probably reach me by the middle of January. The con- 
fidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and 
join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my letter 
of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to make 
preparations to start, as he proposed, without delay, to break up 
the railroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies 
operating against Richmond as soon as he could. 

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had 
ordered the Twenty-third Corps, Major General Schofield com- 
manding, east ; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand 
men ; that we had at Fort Fisher about eight thousand men ; at 
Newbern about four thousand; that if Wilmington was cap- 
tured, General Schofield would go there ; if not, he would be 
sent to Newbern ; that, in either event, all the surplus force at 
both points would move to the interior towards Goldsboro', in 
cooperation with his movement ; that from cither point railroad 
communication could be run out; and that all these troops would 
be subject to his orders as he came into communication with 
them. 

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded 
to reduce Wilmington, North Carolina, in cooperation with the 
navy under Admiral Porter, moving his forces up both sides of 
the Cape Fear River. Fort Anderson, the enemy's main defence 
on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of 



542 Appendix. 

the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance 
before it. 

After fighting on the 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wil» 
mington on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated 
towards Goldsboro' during the night. Preparations were at once 
made for a movement on Goldsboro' in two columns, — one from 
Wilmington, and the other from Newbern, — and to repair the 
railroads leading there from each place, as well as to supply Gen- 
eral Sherman by Cape Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it be- 
came necessary. The column from Newbern was attacked on the 
8th of March at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of 
several hundred prisoners. On the 11th the enemy renewed his 
attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe 
loss, and fell back during the night. On the 14th the Neuse 
River was crossed and Kinston occupied, and on the 21st Golds- 
boro' was entered. The column from Wilmington reached Cox's 
Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on 
the 22d. 

By the 1st of February General Sherman's whole army was in 
motion from Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, 
on the 17th ; thence moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via 
Fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of March, 
opening up communication with General Schofield by way of 
Cape Fear River. On the 15th he resumed his march on Golds- 
boro'. He met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a 
severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in the 
engagement was about six hundred. The enemy's loss was much 
greater. On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under 
Joe Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing 
three guns and driving it back upon the main body. General 
Slocum, who was in the- advance, ascertaining that the whole of 
Johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the de- 
fensive, intrenched himself, and awaited reinforcements, which 
were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the enemy re- 
treated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. 
From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place had 
been occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the 
Neusc River ten miles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where Gen- 
eral Terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon bridge, on 



Appendix. 543 

the 22d), thus forming a junction with the columns from New- 
bern and Wilmington. 

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of 
Charleston, South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on 
the night of the 17th of February, and occupied by our forces on 
the 18th. 

On the morning of the 31st of January General Thomas was 
directed to send a cavalry expedition under General Stoneman 
from East Tennessee, to penetrate South Carolina well clown 
towards Columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources 
of the country, and return, if he was able, to East Tennessee, by 
way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our prisoners there, 
if possible. Of the feasibility of this latter, however, General 
Stoneman was to judge. Sherman's movements, I had no. doubt, 
would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could col- 
lect, and facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was 
so late in making his start on this expedition (and Sherman hav- 
ing passed out of the State of South Carolina), on the 27th of 
February I directed General Thomas to change his course, and 
ordered him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the rail- 
road towards Lynchburg as far as he could. This would keep 
him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the enemy. I 
regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy being 
driven from Richmond he might fall back to Lynchburg and 
attempt a raid north through East Tennessee. On the 14th of 
February the following communication was sent to General 

Thomas : — 

City Point, Va., February 14, 1865. 

General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile 
and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twenty thousand 
men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sent to Canby 
will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry already in that 
section, will move from there eastward, in cooperation. Hood's army has 
been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, by 
desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many 
of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large portion of the infantry has 
been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in the Richmond papers, and a mem- 
ber of the rebel Congress said a few days since in a speech, that one half of it 
had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, 
or even if it is not true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the 
enemy, and leave the advance from your stand-point easy. I think it ad- 
35 



544 Appendix. 

visable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can 
spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be three-fold: 
first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible to insure success to 
Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and military 
resources ; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. 
Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition 
against. This, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of 
penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion should be left to the officer com- 
manding the expedition to go where, according to information he may receive, 
he will best secure the objects named above. 

Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what num- 
ber of men you can put into the field. If not more than five thousand men, 
however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It is not desirable that you 
should start this expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or 
four days out, or even a week. I do not know when it will start, but will 
inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn. If you should hear through other 
sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received. 

To insure success, your cavalry should go with as little wagon train as pos- 
sible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce the num- 
ber of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams 
to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight 
horses. 

Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you 
will be able to send under these directions. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General G. H. Thomas. 

On the 15th he was directed to start the expedition as soon 
after the 20th as he could get it off. 

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general move- 
ment of the armies operating against Richmond, that all commu- 
nications with the city, north of James River, should be cut 
off. The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the 
Shenandoah Valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from 
Richmond, and desiring to reenforce Sherman, if practicable, whose 
cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, I 
determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which, if suc- 
cessful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly the latter 
of these objects. I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan as 
follows : — 

City Point, Va., February 20, 18G5 — 1 P. M. 

General : As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no dif- 
ficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there 



Appendix. 545 

you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no 
further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look 
after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information you might get there 
would justify it, you could strike south, heading the streams in Virginia to 
the westward of Danville, and push on and join General Sherman. This ad- 
ditional raid, with one now about starting from East Tennessee under Stone- 
man, numbering four or five thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, number- 
ing seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten 
thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay with about thirty-eight thousand 
mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Mont- 
gomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Caro- 
lina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. 
I would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charles- 
ton was evacuated on Tuesday last. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General 
Major General P. H. Sheridan. 

On the 25th I received a despatch from General Sheridan, in- 
quiring where Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him 
definite information as to the points he might be expected to 
move on this side of Charlotte, North Carolina. In answer, the 
following telegram was sent him : — 

City Point, Va., February 25, 1865. 

General : Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition 
he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly have to 
fall back to Georgetown, S. C, and fit out for a new start. I think, how- 
ever, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. I believe 
he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on his way to Goldsboro'. 
If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after movements 
by the information you obtain. Before you could possibly reach Sherman, I 
think you would find him moving from Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or en- 
gaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with 
railroad communications opened from his army to Wilmington or Newbern. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General P. H. Sheridan. 

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of Feb- 
ruary, with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thou- 
sand each. On the 1st of March he secured the bridge, which 
the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the 
Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the 
2d, the enemy having retreated on Waynesboro'. Thence he 
pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in 



54:6 Appendix. 

an intrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping 
to make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the 
position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces 
of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two hundred 
wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen battle- 
flags, were captured. The prisoners, under an escort of fifteen 
hundred men, were sent back to Winchester. Thence he marched 
on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges 
as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Here he remained 
two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond and Lynch- 
burg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south 
forks of the Rivanna River, and awaiting the arrival of his trains. 
This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing 
Lynchburg. On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into 
two columns, he sent one to Scottsville, whence it marched up 
the James River Canal to New Market, destroying every lock, 
and in many places the bank of the canal. From here a force was 
pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to obtain possession 
of the bridge across the James River at that place, but failed. The 
enemy burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned the 
bridge across the river at Hardwicksville. The other column moved 
down the railroad towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Am- 
herst Court-house, sixteen miles from Lynchburg ; thence across the 
country, uniting with the column at New Market. The river being 
very high, his pontoons would not reach across it ; and the enemy 
having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the 
river and get on the Southside Railroad about Farmville, and de- 
stroy it to Appomattox Court-house, the only thing left for him 
was to return to Winchester or strike a base at the White House. 
Fortunately he chose the latter. From New Market he took up his 
line of march, following the canal towards Richmond, destroying 
every lock upon it, and cutting the banks wherever practicable, 
to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the whole 
force at Columbia on the 10th. Here he rested one day, and sent 
through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, 
and a request for supplies to meet him at White House, which 
reached me on the night of the 12th. An infantry force was im- 
mediately sent to get possession of White House, and supplies 
were forwarded. Moving from Columbia in a direction to threaten 



Appendix. 547 

Richmond, to near Ashland Station, he crossed the Annas, and 
after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of the rail- 
road, proceeded down the north bank of the Pamunkey to "White 
House, which place he reached on the 19th. 

Previous to this the following communication was sent to Gen- 
eral Thomas : — 

City Point, Va., March 7, 1865 — 9.30 A. M. 

General : I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in 
East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap and fortify there. 
Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as required. With Bull's 
Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee, and be 
prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make a campaign 
towards Lynchburg, or into North Carolina. I do not think Stoneman should 
break the road until he gets into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off 
rolling stock that may be caught west of that. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General G. H. Thomas. 

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was 
moving an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending 
it under General Dick Taylor ; Thomas was pushing out two large 
and well-appointed cavalry expeditions, — one from Middle Ten- 
nessee under Brevet Major General "Wilson against the enemy's 
vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee under 
Major General Stoneman towards Lynchburg, — and assembling 
the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to offensive op- 
erations from East Tennessee ; General Sheridan's cavalry was at 
"White House ; the armies of the Potomac and James were con- 
fronting the enemy under Lee in his defences of Richmond and 
Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, reenforced by that 
of General Schofield, was at Goldsboro' ; General Pope was mak- 
ing preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under 
Kirby Smith and Price, west of the Mississippi; and General 
Hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of "Winchester, 
Virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as 
might prove necessary. 

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter 
roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this 
time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the 
enemy would leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Rich- 
mond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston, before he was 



548 Appendix. 

driven from them by battle, or I was prepared to make an effec- 
tual pursuit. On the 24th of March General Sheridan moved 
from White House, crossed the James River at Jones's Landing, 
and formed a junction with the army of the Potomac in front of 
Petersburg on the 27th. During this move General Ord sent 
forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy. 

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general 
movement of the armies operating against Richmond were is- 
sued : — 

City Point, Va., March 24, 1865. 

General : On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond will 
be moved by our left for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his 
present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry 
under General Sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to 
reach and destroy the Southside and Danville Railroads. Two corps of the 
army of the Potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the two 
roads crossing Hatcher's Run nearest where the present line held by us strikes 
that stream, both moving towards Dinwiddie Court-house. 

The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under 
General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon road and the 
Jerusalem plank road, turning west from the latter before crossing the 
Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony Creek. 
General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions 
which will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the army of 
the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the middle military division 
not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will 
report to Brigadier General Benham, to be added to the defences of City 
Point. Major General Parke will be left in command of all the army left for 
holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point, subject, of course, to 
orders from the commander of the army of the Potomac. The Ninth Army 
Corps will be left intact to hold the present line of works so long as the whole 
line now occupied by us is held. If, however, the troops to the left of the 
Ninth Corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so 
as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon 
road. All troops to the left of the Ninth Corps will be held in readiness to 
move at. the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the 
order is given. 

General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, 
or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for 
the present left of the army of the Potomac. In the absence of further 
orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the 
left column of the army of the Potomac, and the colored .division the right 
column. During the movement Major General Weitzel will be left in com- 
mand of all the forces remaining behind from the army of the James. 



Appendix. 549 

The movement of troops from the army of the James will commence on the 
night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum num- 
ber of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main army. A 
cavalry expedition from General Ord'a command will also be started from 
Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, 
for the purpose of cutting the railroad about Ilieksford. This, if accom- 
plished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hun- 
dred men will be sufficient. They should, however, be supported by all the 
infantry that can be spared from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to 
where the cavalry crosses the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be 
at Uniten. Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon road, he 
will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads be- 
tween Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad bridge at Weldon being 
fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any 
accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the Itoanoke. 
All the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks, and eight days' 
in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as possible, and to give the army of 
the James the same number of days' supply with the army of the Potomac, 
General Ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient 
supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty 
rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as 
the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of 
other supplies. The densely wooded country in which the army has to 
operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken 
with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the 
option of the army commanders. 

All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may 
be commenced at once. The reserves of the Ninth Corps should be massed 
as much as possible. Whilst I would not now order an unconditional attack 
on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready, and should make the 
attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. 
In case they carry the line, then the whole of the Ninth Corps could follow 
up, so as to join or cooperate with the balance of the army. To prepare for 
this, the Ninth Corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of 
the army. General Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if 
found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. A suc- 
cess north of the James should be followed up with great promptness. An 
attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached 
largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are rely- 
ing upon their local reserves, principally, for the defence of Richmond. 
Preparations may be made for abandoning all the lines north of the James, 
except enclosed works — only to be abandoned, however, alter a break is 
made in the lines of the enemy. 

By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against Rich- 
mond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip 
their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken 



550 Appendix. 

of it, whilst they hurl everything against the moving column, and return. It 
cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the 
trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. The very 
fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as 
almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it 
particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from 
the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the command- 
ing officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move prompt- 
ly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also enjoin the same 
action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are 
engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance of following up a 
repulse of the enemy. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major Generals Meade, Ord, and Sheridan. 

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines 
in front of the Ninth Corps (which held from the Appomattox River 
towards our left) and carried Fort Steadman and a part of the 
line to the right and left of it, established themselves, and turned 
the guns of the fort against us; but our troops on either flank 
held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the 
enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded, 
and one thousand nine hundred prisoners. Our loss was sixty- 
eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five 
hundred and six missing. General Meade at once ordered the 
other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective 
fronts. Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's 
strongly intrenched picket line in front of the Second and Sixth 
Corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. The enemy 
made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without suc- 
cess. Our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight hun- 
dred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven miss- 
ing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater. 

General Sherman, having got his troops all quietly in enmp 
about Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to 
them perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, 
and stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously 
written me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for 
twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command 
to bear against Lee's army, in cooperation with our 1'orces in front 
of Richmond and Petersburg. General Sherman proposed in this 



Appendix. 551 

movement to threaten Raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to 
the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or thereabouts, whence he 
could move on to the Richmond and Danville Railroad, striking it 
in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armies operating against 
Richmond, as might be deemed best. This plan he was directed 
to carry into execution, if he received no further directions in the 
mean time. I explained to him the movement I had ordered to 
commence on the 29th of March. That if it should not prove as 
entirely successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to 
destroy the Danville and Southside Railroads, and thus deprive 
the enemy of furthur supplies, and also prevent the rapid concen- 
tration of Lee and Johnston's armies. 

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring 
the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. I was 
firmly convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be 
the signal for Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, a 
long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the 
summer, might become necessary. By moving out I would put 
the army in better condition for pursuit, and would, at least, by 
the destruction of the Danville road, retard the concentration of 
the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to 
abandon much material that he might otherwise save. I there- 
fore determined not to delay the movement ordered. 

On the night of the 27th, Major General Ord, with two divis- 
ions of the Twenty-fourth Corps, Major General Gibbon command- 
ing, and one division of the Twenty-fifth Corps, Brigadier General 
Birney commanding, and McKenzie's cavalry, took up his line of 
march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and readied the 
position assigned him near Hatcher's Run on the morning of the 
29th. On the 28th the following instructions were given to Gen- 
eral Sheridan : — 

City Point, Va., March 28, 1865. 

General : The Fifth Army Corps will move by the Vaughn Road at three 
A. M., to-morrow morning. The Second moves at about nine A. M., having but 
about three miles to march to reach the point designated i'or it to take on the 
right of the Fifth Corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court-house. 
Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being con- 
fined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the Dearest roads 
in rear of the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, and, passing near to or through 
Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is 



552 Appendix. 

not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force 
him out, if possible. Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where 
he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with 
the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will 
dictate. I shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate 
with you. Should I not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his 
main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville road. 
If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross the Southside road, be- 
tween Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would 
not advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville road, 
which I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make 
your destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can then pass on 
to the Southside road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in like manner. 

After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are 
now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this army, 
selecting your road further south, or you may go on into North Carolina and 
join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course, get the informa- 
tion to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at 

Goldsboro'. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 
Major General P. H. Sheridan. 

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At 
night the cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court-house, and the left of 
our infantry line extended to the Quaker road, near its intersec- 
tion with the Boydton plank road. The position of the troops, 
from left to right, was as follows : Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, 
Ord, Wright, Parke. 

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy, and 
the capture of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was 
made. I therefore addressed the following communication to 
General Sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not 
to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he 
received notice from me to do so : — 

Gravelly Creek, March 29, 1865. 
General : Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie. 
We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem plank road to 
Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After 
getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's 
position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker road inter- 
sects the Boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred 
men. Humphrey's reached Dabney's mill, and was pushing on when last 
heard from. 



Appendix. 553 

I now feci like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going 
back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's 
roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get 
on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, 
modify your action. We will act all together as one army here until it is 
seen what can be done with the enemy. Tho signal officer at Cobb's Hill 
reported, at 11.30 A. M., that a cavalry column had passed that point from 
Richmond towards Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General P. H. Sheridan. 

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st, the rain 
fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled 
vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. 
During the 30th, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court-house 
towards Five Forks, where he found the enemy in force. General 
Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton plank 
road to near the White Oak road, with a view of getting across 
the latter ; but finding the enemy strong in his front and extend- 
ing beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and 
fortify. General Plumphreys drove the enemy from his front into 
his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's mills. Generals Orel, 
Wright, and Parke made examinations in their fronts to deter- 
mine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. The two 
latter reported favorably. The enemy confronting us, as he did, 
at every point from Richmond to our extreme left, I conceived his 
lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated if my estimate 
of his forces was correct. I determined, therefore, to extend my 
line no further, but to reenforce General Sheridan with a corps of 
infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's 
right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. 
The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, 
when he assaulted Fort Steadman, particularly favored this. The 
enemy's intrenched picket line captured by us at that time threw 
the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some 
points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. 
Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys' 
corps, to report to General Sheridan ; but the condition of the 
roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of the 
31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of 
the White Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish 



554 Appendix. 

this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, 
which was attacked by the enemy in superior force, and driven 
back on the second division before it had time to form, and it, in 
turn, forced back upon the third division, when the enemy was 
checked. A division of the Second Corps was immediately sent to 
his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and posses- 
sion of the White Oak road gained. Sheridan advanced, and 
with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five Forks, 
but the enemy, after the affair with the Fifth Corps, reenforced the 
rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him 
back towards Dinwiddie Court-house. Here General Sheridan 
displayed great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole 
command on the main army, to tell the story of superior forces 
encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mount- 
ed men enough to take charge of the horses. This compelled the 
enemy to deploy over a vast extent of woods and broken country, 
and made his progress slow. At this juncture he despatched to 
me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly 
on Dinwiddie Court-house. General McKenzie's cavalry and one 
division of the Fifth Corps were immediately ordered to his assist- 
ance. Soon after, receiving a report from General Meade that 
Humphreys could hold our position on the Boydton road, and 
that the other two divisions of the Fifth Corps could go to Sheri- 
dan, they were so ordered at once. Thus the operations of the 
day necessitated the sending of Warren because of his accessi- 
bility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated 
intended movements. 

On the morning of the 1st of April, General Sheridan, reen- 
forced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on Five P^orks, 
where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly- 
fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between five and 
six thousand prisoners. About the close of this battle, Brevet 
Major General Charles Griffin relieved Major General Warren in 
command of the Fifth Corps. The report of this reached me 
after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind lest the 
enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling 
upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive 
him from his position and open the way for retreat. To guard 
against this, General Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was 



Appendix. 555 

sent to reenforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and 
kept up until four o'clock in tlio morning (April 2), when an 
assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. General Wright pen- 
etrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before 
him and to his left towards Hatcher's Run, capturing many guns 
and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by two 
divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other divis- 
ion of General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's 
lines near Hatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately 
swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of 
them in Petersburg, while General Humphreys pushed forward 
with two divisions and joined General Wright on the left. Gen- 
eral Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main line, capturing 
guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line. Gen- 
eral Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, returned 
General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy's 
lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General 
Gibbon's corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong 
enclosed works, — the most salient and commanding south of 
Petersburg, — thus materially shortening the line of investment 
necessary for taking in the city. The enemy south of Hatcher's 
Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station, where they were 
overtaken by Miles's division. A severe engagement ensued, and 
lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the 
approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Sta- 
tion towards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade 
from the front of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confu- 
sion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. This 
force retreated by the main road along the Appomattox River. 
During the night of the 2d, the enemy evacuated Petersburg 
and Richmond, and retreated towards Danville. On the morning 
of the 3d, pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed 
for the Danville road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed 
by General Meade with the Second and Sixth Corps, while Gen- 
eral Ord moved for Burkesville along the Southside road; the 
Ninth Corps stretched along that road behind him. On the 4th, 
General Sheridan struck the Danville road near Jettersville, 
where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court-house. He im- 
mediately intrenched himself, and awaited the arrival of General 



556 Appendix. 

Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached 
Burkesville on the evening of the 5th. 

On the morning of the 5th I addressed Major General Sher- 
man the following communication: — 

Wilson's Station, April 5, 1865. 

General : All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danville 
with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him last night, 
reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much 
demoralized. We hope to reduce this number one half. I shall push on to 
Burkesville, and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a verv few days go 
there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see 
if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will 
be better for you to strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be 
better able to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only 
strategic points to strike at. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Major General W. T. Sherman. 

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was 
moving west of Jettersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan 
moved with his cavalry (the Fifth Corps having been returned to 
General Meade on his reaching Jettersville) to strike his flank, 
followed by the Sixth Corps, while the Second and Fifth Corps 
pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wag- 
ons and several pieces of artillery. General Ord advanced from 
Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of infantry 
and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier General Theo- 
dore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met the 
head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked 
and detained until General Read was killed and his small force 
overpowered. This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and 
enabled General Ord to get well up with the remainder of his 
force, on meeting which the enemy immediately intrenched him- 
self. In the afternoon General Sheridan struck the enemy south 
of Sailor's Creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery, and about 
four hundred wagons, and detained him until the Sixth Corps got 
up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which 
resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among 
whom were many general officers. The movements of the Second 
Corps and General Ord's command contributed greatly to the 
day's success. 



Appendix. 557 

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cav- 
alry, except one division, and the Fifth Corps moving by Prince 
Edward's Court-house ; the Sixth Corps, General Orel's command, 
and one division of cavalry, on Farmville, and the Second Corps 
by the High Bridge road. It was soon found that the enemy had 
crossed to the north side of the Appomattox ; but so close was 
the pursuit that the Second Corps got possession of the common 
bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and im- 
mediately crossed over. The Sixth Corps and a division of cavalry 
crossed at Farmville to its support. 

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly 

hopeless, I addressed him the following communication from 

Farmville : — 

April 7, 18G5. 

General : The result of the last week must convince you of the hopeless- 
ness of further resistance on the part of the array of Northern Virginia in this 
struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself 
the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the sur- 
render of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the army of 

Northern Virginia. 

TJ. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 
General R. E. Lee. 

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received, at 
Farmville, the following : — 

April 7, 18G5. 

General : I have received your note of this date. Though not entertain- 
ing the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the 
part of the army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid use- 
less effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask 
the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. 

R. E. Lee, General. 

Lieutenant General U. S. Grant. 

To this I immediately replied, — 

April 8, 1865. 

General : Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking 
the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the army of Northern 
Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say that peace being my great 
desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely : that the men 
and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against 
the government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet 
you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same 



558 Appendix. 

purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely 
the terms upon which the surrender of tbe army of Northern Virginia will be 
received. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 
General R. E. Lee. 

Early on the morning of the 8th tne pursuit was resumed. 
General Meade followed north of the Appomattox, and General 
Sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight for Appomattox 
Station, followed by General Ord's command and the Fifth Corps. 
During the day General Meade's advance had considerable fight- 
ing with the enemy's rear guard, but was unable to bring on a 
general engagement. Late in the evening General Sheridan struck 
the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from there, 
and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and 
four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. During 
this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about mid- 
night received the following communication from General Lee: — 

April 8, 1865. 

General : I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of yester- 
day I did not intend to propose the surrender of the army of Northern Vir- 
ginia, but to ask tbe terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think 
the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army, but as the 
restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether 
your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a 
view to surrender the army of Northern Virginia, but as far as your proposal 
may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the 
restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A. M., to-morrow, 
on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies. 

R. E. Lee, General. 

Lieutenant General IT. S. Grant. 

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as 
follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the 
Appomattox : — 

April 9, 1865. 
General : Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat 
on the subject of peace ; the meeting proposed for ten A. M. to-day could lead 
to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for 
peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The 
terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South lay- 
ing down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thou- 



Appendix. 559 

eands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. 

Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of 

another life, I subscribe myself, &c, 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

General R. E. Lee. 

On the morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 
Fifth Corps reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was 
making a desperate effort to break through our cavalry. The in- 
fantry was at once thrown in. Soon after a white flag was received, 
requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a 
surrender. 

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the 
following from General Lee : — 

April 9, 1865. 

General : I received your note of this morning on the picket line, whither 

I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced 

in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I 

now ask an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of 

yesterday for that purpose. 

R. E. Lee, General. 

Lieutenant General U. S. Grant. 

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-house, the result 
of which is set forth in the following correspondence : — 

Appomattox Court-house, Va., April 9, 1865. 
General : In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 
8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the army of Northern Vir- 
ginia on the following terms, to wit : Rolls of all the officers and men to be 
made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, 
the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The 
officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the govern- 
ment of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or 
regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. 
The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned 
over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace 
the side-arms of the officers nor their private horses or baggage. This done, 
each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be dis- 
turbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and 
the laws in force where they may reside. 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

General R. E. Lee. 

36 



5G0 Appendix. 

Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, April 9, 18G5. 

General : I received your letter of this date, containing the terras of the 

surrender of the army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are 

substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, 

they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the 

stipulations into effect. 

E. E. Lee, General. 
Lieutenant General U. S. Grant. 

The command of Major General Gibbon, the Fifth Army Corps ' 
under Griffin, and McKenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain 
at Appomattox Court-house until the paroling of the surrendered 1 
army Avas completed, and to take charge of the public property. 
The remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity | 
of Burkesville. 

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused I 
his example to be followed ; and to-day the result is, that the armies j 
lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and 
quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers. 

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved 
directly against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through j 
Raleigh, which place General Sherman occupied on the morning j 
of the 13th. The day preceding, news of the surrender of General { 
Lee reached him at Smithfield. 

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General 
Sherman and General Johnston, which resulted, on the 18th, in | 
an agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum J 
or basis for peace, subject to the approval of the President. This | 
agreement was disapproved by the President on the 21st, which 1 
disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated I 
to General Sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, | 
at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to your orders. Notice j| 
was at once given by him to General Johnston for the termination ] 
of the truce that had been entered into. On the 25th another t 
meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the I 
2Gth, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of 
Johnston's army upon substantially the same terms as were given |) 
to General Lee. 

The expedition under General Stoneman, from East Tennessee, I 
got off on the 20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Caro- i 
l'ui.i, and struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and 
Big Lick. The force striking it at Big Lick pushed on to within a 



Appendix. 501 

few miles of Lynehburg, destroying the important bridges, while 
with the main force he effectually destroyed it between New River 
and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro', on the North Caro- 
lina Railroad; struck that road, and destroyed the bridges between 
Danville and Greensboro', and between Greensboro' and the Yad- 
kin, together with the depots of supplies along it, and captured 
four hundred prisoners. At Salisbury he attacked and defeated a 
force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing fourteen 
pieces of artillery and thirteen hundred and sixty-four prisoners, 
and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this place he 
destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Char- 
lotte. Thence he moved to Slatersville. 

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make 
preparations for a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile 
and the interior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 
20th of March. The Sixteenth Corps, Major General A. J. Smith 
commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish River ; 
the Thirteenth Corps, under Major General Gordon Granger, 
moved from Fort Morgan and joined the Sixteenth Corps on Fish 
River, both moving thence on Spanish Fort, and investing it on 
the 27th ; while Major General Steele's command moved from 
Pensacola, cut the railroad leading from Tensas to Montgomery, 
effected a junction with them, and partially invested Fort Blake- 
ly. After a severe bombardment of Spanish Fort, a part of its 
line was carried on the 8th of April. During the night the enemy 
evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the 
9th, and many prisoners captured ; our loss was considerable. 
These successes practically opened to us the Alabama River, and 
enabled us to approach Mobile from the north. On the night of 
the 11th the city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by 
our forces on the morning of the 12th. 

The expedition under command of Brevet Major General Wil- 
son, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, 
was delayed by rains until March 22, when it moved from Chicka- 
saw, Alabama. On the 1st of April General Wilson encountered 
the enemy in force, under Forrest, near Ebenezer Church, drove 
him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three 
guns, and destroyed the Central Bridge over the Cahawba River. 
On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of Selma, 



5G2 Appendix. 

defended by Forrest with seven thousand men and thirty-two 
guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundery, machine 
shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand 
prisoners. On the 4th he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. 
On the 10th he crossed the Alabama River, and after sending 
information of his operations to General Canby, marched on 
Montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy 
having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five steam- 
boats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct on Co- 
lumbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were 
assaulted and captured on the 16th. At the former place we got 
fifteen hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two 
gunboats, the navy yard, founderies, arsenal, many factories, and 
much other public property. At the latter place we got three 
hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives 
and three hundred cars. On the 20th he took possession of 
Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, twelve hundred militia, and 
five generals, surrendered by General Howell Cobb. General 
Wilson hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying to make his escape, 
sent forces in pursuit, and succeeded in capturing him on the 
morning of May 11. 

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to 
General Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi. 

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy 
under Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put 
in motion for Texas, and Major General Sheridan designated for 
its immediate command ; but on the 26th day of May, and before 
they reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrendered 
his entire command to Major General Canby. This surrender did 
not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel presi- 
dent and vice-president ; and the bad faith was exhibited of first 
disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate 
plunder of public property. 

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against 
the government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carry- 
ing with them arms rightfully belonging to the United States, 
which had been surrendered to us by agreement, — among them 
some of the leaders who had surrendered in person, — and the 
disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for 
troops to proceed to Texas were not changed. 



Appendix. 563 

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions and move- 
ments to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of 
them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed 
greatly to our final triumph, that I have not mentioned. Many 
of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith 
submitted ; some in the telegrams and brief despatches announ- 
cing them, and others, I regret to say, have not as yet been offi- 
cially reported. 

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would re- 
spectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of departments 
in which they have occurred. 

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the west and 
the east fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is 
no difference in their fighting qualities. All that it was possible 
for men to do in battle they have done. The western armies 
commenced their battles in the Mississippi valley, and received 
the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed 
to them in North Carolina. The armies of the east commenced 
their battles on the river from which the army of the Potomac 
derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old 
antagonist at Appomattox Court-house, Virginia. The splendid 
achievements of each have nationalized our victories, removed all 
sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced 
too much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that 
might have followed had either section failed in its duty. All 
have a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate them- 
selves and each other for having done their full share in restoring 
the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to 
the United States. Let them hope for perpetual peace and har- 
mony with that enemy, whose manhood, however mistaken the 
cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
Your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 



ICE, > 

5. > 



Adjutant General's Office 
November 18, 1865 
Official copy. 

E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General. 



,} 



564 Appendix. 



VI. 

GRANT'S REPORT AS SECRETARY OF WAR AD INTERIM AND 
GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY FOR 1867. 

War Department, ") 
Washington City, November, 1867. j" 

Me. Peesident : I have the honor to submit my report as Sec- 
retary of War ad interim, and the accompanying reports of the 
army and bureaus under the War Department, since the last 
annual report of the Secretary of War. 

I assumed the duties of Secretary of War ad interim August 
12, 1867, in pursuance to the following instructions from the 
President, to wit: — 

" Executive Mansion, 
" Washington, D. C, August 12, 1867. 

" Sir : The Honorable Edwin M. Stanton having been this day suspended 
as Secretary of War, you are hereby authorized and empowered to act as 
Secretary of War ad interim, and will at once enter upon the discharge of 
the duties of that office. 

" The Secretary of War has been instructed to transfer to you all records, 
books, papers, and other public property now in his custody and charge. 
" Very respectfully yours, 

" Andrew Johnson. 

" General Ulysses S. Grant, Washington, D. C." 

On receipt of the above I notified the Secretary of War of it, 
first verbally, and then, at his suggestion, by letter, of which the 
following is a copy : — 

" Headquarters Armies of the United States, i 
" Washington, D. C, August 12, 1867. ] 
" Sir : Enclosed herewith I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of 
a letter just received from the President of the United States, notifying me 
of my assignment as Acting Secretary of War, and directing me to assume 
those duties at once. 

" In notifying you of my acceptance, I cannot let the opportunity pass 
without expressing to you my appreciation of the zeal, patriotism, firmness, 
and ability with which you have ever discharged the duties of Secretary of 

War. 

" With great respect, your obedient servant, 

"U. S. Grant, General. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War" 



[ENT, ) 

12, 1807. ) 



Appendix. 5G5 

To this the Secretary of War made this reply : — 

" War Department, 
" Washington City, August 

" General : Your note of this date, accompanied by a copy of a letter 
addressed to you, August 12, by the President, appointing you Secretary of 
War ad interim, and informing me of your acceptance of the appointment, 
has been received. 

" Under a sense of public duty I am compelled to deny the President's 
right, under the constitution and laws of the United States, to suspend me 
from office as Secretary of War, or to authorize any other person to enter 
upon the discharge of the duties of that office, or to require me to transfer 
to you or any other person the records, books, papers, and other property in 
my official custody and charge as Secretary of War. 

" But inasmuch as the President has assumed to suspend me from office as 
Secretary of War, and you have notified me of your acceptance of the ap- 
pointment of Secretary of War ad interim, I have no alternative but to sub- 
mit, under protest, to the superior force of the President. 

" You will please accept my acknowledgment of the kind terms in which 
you have notified me of your acceptance of the President's appointment, and 
my cordial reciprocation of the sentiments expressed. 
"I am, with sincere regard, truly yours, 

" Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

" General Ulysses S. Grant." 

Immediately after this exchange of notes I assumed the duties 
of the office assigned to me, in addition to the duties of General 
of the Army. 

A long war had entailed upon the army practices of extrava- 
gance totally unjustifiable in times of peace ; and as the increase 
of the regular army since 1860 (now almost the entire army) is 
officered by men whose army experience does not go back to that 
period (and therefore they may not know but their indulgences 
at the expense of the general government are all legitimate), re- 
trenchment was the first subject to attract my attention. During 
the rebellion, ambulances and mounted orderlies at every head- 
quarters had come into use; and since the rebellion they have 
been continued, if not at every post of a single company, at least 
generally throughout the army. A discontinuance of this evil 
was necessary both to the discipline and efficiency of the army 
and to the relief of the treasury. Orders were therefore given 
both for breaking it up and seeing to its execution. 

The Bureau of Rebel Archives was transferred to the Adju- 



566 Appendix. 

tint General's Department, as was also the Bureau for the Ex- 
change of Prisoners, &c., thus relieving from government employ- 
ment a large number of clerks and sevei*al officers who had, to 
that date, been continued in service. 

Supplying large armies for a period of four years of hostilities 
necessarily led to an accumulation of stores of all sorts far beyond 
the wants of our present establishment for many years to come. 
Many of these articles were of a perishable nature ; besides being 
borne on the returns of officers accountable for them, they had to 
be stored and guarded, although the cost of care per annum might 
be greater than their value. Under my direction all these sur- 
plus and useless stores in the Quartermaster's Department are 
being sold, and the balance distributed for issue to troops as they 
may be wanted. This releases a large number of storehouses for 
which rent is being paid, and also discharges a large number of 
civil employees of government. 

During the last summer and summer before I caused inspec- 
tions to be made of the various routes of travel and supply 
through the territory between the Missouri River and the Pacific 
coast. The cost of maintaining troops in that section was so 
enormous that I desired, if possible, to reduce it. This I have 
been enabled to do, to some extent, fi*onj the information obtained 
by these inspections ; but for the present the military establish- 
ment between the lines designated must be maintained at a great 
cost per man. The completion of the railroads to the Pacific 
will materially reduce this cost, as well as the number of men to 
be kept there. The completion of these roads will also go far 
towards a permanent settlement of our Indian difficulties. There 
is good reason to hope that negotiations now going on with the 
hostile tribes of Indians will result, if not in a permanent peace, 
at least in a suspension of hostilities until the railroads are pushed 
through that portion of the Indian territory where they are giv- 
ing the most trouble. 

Freedmerfs Bureau. 

From the report of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Refu- 
gees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, I make the following 
synopsis : — 



Appendix. 5G7 

No changes have been made in the organization and practical 
working of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned 
Lands, except such as have been caused by the appointment of 
district commanders under the Reconstruction Act. 

The detail of officers serving with troops has enabled the Com- 
missioner to reduce the number of bureau agents. Twenty-eight 
(28) civil agents have been discharged, and forty-eight (48) mus- 
tered out. 

The freedmen, as a people, are making rapid progress in educa- 
tion, in mechanic arts, and in all branches of industry. 

The amount of "abandoned land" now in possession of the 
bureau is 215,024 acres, much of which is swamp land, and 
scarcely any affording revenue. The number of pieces of town 
property is 950. 

The business of adjusting the claims of colored soldiers has 
greatly increased in good results. The total number of claims 
presented during the year is 5,535, of which 755 have been finally 
adjusted, and 4,266 are now awaiting action in the Treasury 
Department. The amount collected and paid to claimants has 
been $64,494.29 ; certificates received by the commissioner and 
ordered paid, under act of Congress approved March 29, 1867, 
amounting to $890,712.99. 

Transportation has been furnished to 778 refugees, and to 
16,931 freedmen, to enable them to reach places where they can 
provide for themselves. Teachers and agents have also received 
transportation. Railroad accounts for transportation have been 
audited, amounting to $102,093.99, and the amount paid by the 
disbursing officer has been $227,754.63. 

Hospitals are being rapidly closed and dispensaries substituted, 
as a more economical mode of giving relief to the sick. The 
number of refugees treated during the year ending August 31, 
1867, is 8,853, of whom 196 died, or 2 2-10 per cent. The num- 
ber of freedmen treated is 135,296; died, 4,640, or 3 4-10 per 
cent. The number of commissioned medical officers and private 
physicians employed by the bureau has been 178, of whom 105 
were on duty at the end of the year. No adequate provision has 
been made for the insane, either by state or municipal authorities ; 
but they are cared for in separate wards of bureau hospitals. 
The average cost of furnishing medical attendance and medicines 



568 Appendix. 

during the year has been two dollars and seventy-three cents 
($2.73) for each patient. 

The total expenditures for the medical department have been 
$301,800. 

Commissary szipplies have been issued to a limited extent. It 
has been found impracticable to discontinue such issues alto- 
gether. The average number of rations for the year ending Sep- 
tember 1, 18G7, was 11,658 per day. In the latter part of winter 
the destitution became so great that urgent appeals were made 
for a more general distribution of supplies. The total amount of 
supplies furnished by means of the "relief fund" has been 850,388 
pounds of pork and bacon, and 6,809,296 pounds of corn. The 
number of persons receiving relief is reported to have been 233,372. 
The average number has been 58,000, the largest number being in 
July, 82,000. The whole expense has been $445,993.36, i. e., 
nearly $8 to each person for the period of four months, or $2 per 
month. This special relief was discontinued in August, the funds 
and supplies remaining on hand being reserved for those who 
may require help during the coming winter. 

The schools have increased in number and usefulness. Normal 
and training schools are well attended. The total of day and 
night schools reported, including industrial, but not the Sunday 
schools, is 2,207, with 2,442 teachers and 130,735 scholars; an 
increase of 40,000 since the last annual report. Of these, 1,056 
schools are sustained wholly or in part by freedmen, and 391 
buildings are owned by them. Of the teachers, 699 are colored 
and 1,388 white. 

The average amount of tuition paid per month by the freed- 
men has been $14,555. 

Finances. — Appropriation for the year ending July 1, 1868, 
$3,836,300. 

Total expenditures from October 1, 1866, to August 31, 1867, 
eleven months, $3,597,397.65. 

The principal items of expenditures are : for schools and school 
buildings, $553,915.79; subsistence stores, $1,460,326.28; trans- 
portation, $227,754.63 ; salaries of agents, clerks, &c, $521,421.44; 
medical department, $331,001.21 ; quarters and fuel, $135,098.64 ; 
clothing, $116,688.80. 



Appendix. 5G9 

The balance of the expenditure, 8251,190.86, has been for print- 
ing, postage, and other contingencies. 

The surplus from the unexpended appropriations of I860, with 
the balance of the appropriations of this year, will be sufficient 
for the purposes of the bureau during the present fiscal year 
ending June 30, 18G8. In addition to the above proper expen- 
ditures, the disbursing officer has paid back to colored soldiers, 
or their heirs, retained state bounties to the amount of $51,720.83, 
and has paid claims of colored soldiers, under joint resolution of 
Congress approved March 29, 1867, to the amount of $350,870.96. 

Apprenticeship in Maryland still holds large numbers of colored 
children in virtual slavery. The evils and cruelties resulting 
from this system, sanctioned by the state laws, are matters of 
constant complaint. As many as two thousand cases have been 
presented in a single county. 

Education. — In all the schools in the District of Columbia 
and West Virginia there have been 7,998 scholars and 229 
teachers. In West Virginia the schools have been sustained in 
part from the public school fund, where an impartial system of 
free schools exists. In the District of Columbia the colored 
schools are also entitled to a proportionate share of the public 
school fund, but the city authorities have not yet paid the en- 
tire sum claimed. It is probable, however, that the trustees of 
the colored schools will recover all that is due, and in future 
receive an equitable share of the public funds, in which case the 
colored schools will be independent of the bureau. Several in- 
stitutions of higher grade than common schools have been 
established, and have made a good beginning. Among these 
are the National Theological Institute, in Washington, under the 
auspices of the Baptist denomination ; the normal school and 
college at Harper's Ferry, conducted by the Free-will Baptists, 
and the Howard University, in the District of Columbia, which 
is designed to be national and free to all. The normal and 
preparatory department has been opened with about sixty schol- 
ars, and buildings are now being erected for other departments. 

To provide cheap homes for industrious colored men, a farm has 
been purchased, surveyed into acre lots, and sold at cost. The 
lots have been taken up rapidly, and payments upon them prompt- 
ly made. 



570 Appendix. 

Expenditures have fallen below the original estimates. No 
further appropriation of funds is asked for. As the bureau will 
expire next July, unless extended by Congress, no funds are esti- 
mated for the next fiscal year. In case the bureau is not ex- 
tended, it is recommended by the Commissioner that proper 
arrangements be made with the state authorities for the care of 
indigent classes; that the educational work be continued under 
the direction of the Bureau of Education or other United States 
agency, with full power and means to maintain and extend the 
present system ; and that the Claim Division be continued in con- 
nection with the War Department as long as it may be deemed 
necessary by the Secretary of War. 

This is but a brief abstract of the report of the Commissioner 
of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands. Special attention 
to the report itself is respectfully invited. No recommendation 
is made at the present time respecting the continuance or discon- 
tinuance of this bureau. During the session of Congress, facts 
may develop themselves requiring special legislation in the prem- 
ises, when the necessary recommendations can be made. 

Adjutant General. 

The report of the Adjutant General of the army shows the 
organization and present strength of the army, the force stationed 
in each military department and district, the number of recruits 
enlisted, and desertions from October 1, 1866, to September 20, 
1867, and the organization of the colored troops. 

On the 30th of September, 1867, the aggregate strength of the 
army (officers and men) was 56,815; the number of recruits, 
34,191 ; and desertions, 13,608. 

The recruiting service has been very successful, and men have 
been supplied as fast as needed. 

The greatly enlarged numbers of the army, and of the military 
posts occupied by it, render it necessary that some change should 
be made in the present system of courts-martial and of punish- 
ments. The organization of " companies of discipline " is recom- 
mended. It is also recommended that, for the good of the service, 
the term of enlistment be changed from three to five years. In 
the cavalry it is five years, but the other arms of the service only 
enlist for three. 



Appendix. 571 

At the date of the last report, 11,043 volunteers still remained 
in service. That number has been reduced, and now oidy 203 
commissioned officers remain, and no enlisted men. These officers 
are kept by special acts authorizing retention of volunteers in 
Freed men's Bureau. 

The mustering and disbursing officers have all been discontin- 
ued, except at Albany, New York ; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 
Columbus, Ohio; Louisville, Kentucky; St. Louis, Missouri; Santa 
Fe, New Mexico; and San Francisco, California. No appropria- 
tion is required for the volunteer disbursing branch for the next 
year. 

Attention is called to the great number of desertions, and the 
necessity for a change in the present system of courts-martial and 
of punishment to abate the evil. 

I would recommend an increase of three assistant adjutants 
general. This would enable the assignment of one to each of the 
major generals and brigadier generals of the army, and avoid the 
necessity of detaching officers from their legitimate duties to act 
as assistant adjutants general. 

Inspector General. 

During the year there has been no change in the Inspector 
General's Department, except that two of the assistant inspectors 
general have been promoted from majors to lieutenant colonels, 
under the provisions of the act of Congress approved July 28, 
1866. The number of officers in this branch of the service is too 
small to properly make the required special and stated inspections, 
whereby many abuses and irregularities have crept into the ser- 
vice. The immediate organization of an inspection department, 
composed of competent, active officers, is respectfully recommended 
to the attention of the authorities. 

The Chief of the Bureau of Military Justice 

Reports, that in the Bureau of Military Justice, during the past 
year, 11,432 records of military courts were received, reviewed, 
and registered ; 2,135 special reports made as to the regularity of 
judicial proceedings, the pardon of military offenders, the remis- 
sion or commutation of sentences, and upon the miscellaneous sub- 
jects and questions of law referred for the opinion of the bureau. 



572 Appendix. 

The only change made in the conduct of the bureau and the 
status of its officers during the year has been in the detailing, by 
the order of the Secretary of War, of the assistant judge advocate 
general and four judge advocates, for service at the headquarters, 
respectively, of the five military districts established by the act of 
Congress of March 2, 1867. From official reports of the district 
commanders, and other communications, it is believed that the 
serviqes of these officers have been of an important and valuable 
character. The satisfactory manner in which they are represented 
as having performed their duties, which have been both of an ad- 
visory and judicial character, is deemed especially to vindicate the 
policy of Congress in retaining in the army a small body of officers 
instructed in military and common law, by constituting the corps 
of judge advocates a part of the permanent regular establishment. 

Quartermaster General. 

The Quartermaster General submits full financial statement and 
analysis of accounts for fiscal year ending June 30, 1867, showing 
that during the past year 11,130 accounts have been examined, 
amounting to $309,738,171.89, and of accounts remaining to be 
examined 1,544, amounting to $47,451,262.74. 

Sixteen thousand and eighty-six horses and mules were pur- 
chased during the year for the public service. 

The sales of surplus or unserviceable animals during the year 
amount to $268,572.24. The total sales of this character since the 
close of active hostilities in 1865 amount to $16,245,716.46. 

The supply of clothing and equipage is so large that no pur- 
chases of these articles will be necessary for the next year. 

The amount of clothing and equipage issued under the act of 
Congress approved July 14, 1866, to families rendered houseless 
and destitute by the recent conflagration in Portland, Maine, is 
fully set forth in report. 

The fund of $1,000,000, known as the sheltering fund for the 
troops on the plains, has been applied to the purposes for which 
it was intended. 

One thousand temporary buildings have been sold during the 
year for the sum of $112,000. 

The erection of the fire-proof warehouse in Philadelphia is in 
process of construction. The contract price for building is 



Appendix. 573 

$138,800. It will probably be ready for occupancy in December 
next. 

The United States not owning any land at or near the city of 
Jeffersonville, Indiana, and no appropriation having been made to 
purchase land as a site for the buildings, no steps have been taken 
to execute the provisions of the fourth section of the act of Con- 
gress approved February 2, 1867, authorizing the erection of fire- 
proof buildings at that place. 

There are 308 cemeteries in the United States, in which are 
interred the bodies of United States soldiers. Eighty-one of these 
are known as "national cemeteries." The total number of United 
States soldiers interred in cemeteries is 251,827, of which 238,666 
are interred in the national cemeteries. Seventy-six thousand two 
hundred and sixty-three bodies are yet to be interred in these 
cemeteries, which, when completed, will make the total number 
328,090. Twenty thousand eight hundred and sixty-one rebel 
prisoners of war have been interred. The estimated cost for 
fencing the cemeteries is $709,000. The amount already expended 
on cemeteries is estimated at $1,737,000. The total cost of the 
cemeteries, when completed, is estimated at $3,500,000. 

On July 1, 1866, the southern railroads were indebted to the 
government to the amount of $6,570,074.05. June 30. 1867, this 
amount was reduced to $5,921,372.10. 

The number of troops and the quantity of supplies transported 
up to the 20th September were as follows: Passengers- 73,196; 
animals, 7,194 ; public freight, 306,576 tons, at a cost of $4,048,000. 

During the fiscal year there were presented 24,417 claims, 
amounting to $13,924,764.10, of which — 

5,408 claims were approved, amounting to $5,440,041 48 

6,513 claims were not allowed, amounting to 3,613,806 99 

12,496 claims are awaiting action, amounting to . . 4,870,855 63 

13,924,704 10 

On the 1st of July, 1866, the organization of the department 
consisted of 67 officers and 12 military storekeepers, — total 79. 
By the act approved July 28, 1866, the department was reorgan- 
ized, and now consists of 76 officers and 16 military storekeepers 
with the rank of captain, making a total of 92. Five assistant 



574 Appendix. 

quartermasters general have been retired. The number of volun- 
teer officers in the department has been reduced from 107 to 31. 
Those remaining at the close of the year were fully employed upon 
important duties. 

It is found that the number of officers of the quartermasters' 
department, as authorized by the act of July 28, 1866, is insufficient 
to the prompt performance of the duties devolving upon them. 
It is therefore respectfully recommended that a portion of section 
13 of the act approved July 28, 1866, be repealed, and that there 
be added to the quartermasters' department so many assistant 
quartermasters, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of captains 
of cavalry, as will raise the number of officers of that grade to 
fifty; and that the vacancies thereby created in the grade of 
assistant quartermaster shall be filled by selection from those 
persons who have rendered meritorious services in the military 
service of the United States as assistant quartermasters of vol- 
unteers in the late war. 

All of the officers of the department are highly commended for 
the able, conscientious, and faithful manner in which they have 
discharged the highly important duties devolving upon them in 
the various details of business pertaining to the department. 

Commissary General. 

The Commissary General of Subsistence reports that during 
the past year subsistence stores for the army have been procured 
in the usual manner, by advertising for proposals in the larger 
markets of the country. Efforts have been made with consider- 
able success to obtain supplies from the producers and dealers 
established near the point of consumption. The completion and 
extension of the Union Pacific Railroad already afford great 
facilities for reaching and supplying distant occupied posts, here- 
tofore supplied by trains of wagons at special seasons of the year. 
Recent reports from the military division of the Pacific give 
assurances of success in the efforts to supply the troops of that 
division with pork made on the coast. This article has heretofore 
been shipped from New York. Tobacco has been supplied to the 
enlisted men of the army under the sixth section of the act of 
March 3, 1865, to the amount of $104,895.84. Subsistence to the 
amount of $882,684.66 has been furnished by this department, for 



Appendix. 575 

the fiscal year ending June 30, 18G7, to freedmen and others, 
under the proper and authorized demands of the officers and 
agents of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned 
Lands. The total cost of subsistence stores issued or transferred 
for the subsistence of Indians for the fiscal year ending June 80, 
1867, is $044,439.22. The number of claims presented and paid 
under public resolution No. 50, approved July 25, 1800, up to 
September 12, 1807, was 2,009, and amounted to $110,187.75. 
The number presented and passed for payment under section three 
of the act of March 2, 1807, was five, and amounted to $259.50. 

The total number of claims received under the third section of 
the act approved July 4, 1804, is 4,920, amounting to $2,493,257.45; 
of which number there have been examined and ^approved 482, 
amounting to $140,149.51 ; examined and rejected, 1,881, amount- 
ing to $1,071,194.42 ; leaving for final action and decision 2,503, 
amounting to $1,275,913.32. 

The number of claims examined and decided since the last 
annual report is 1,190, amounting to $480,430.00 ; of which num- 
ber there have been approved 248, amounting to $00,800.41 ; re- 
jected, 942, amounting to $419,030.19. 

The officers of the department have all performed their duties 
with zeal and ability. 

All of the commissaries of subsistence of volunteers have now 
been mustered out except two, who are by authority of law on 
duty in the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands. 

No appropriation having been made to meet the large expendi- 
tures necessary to carry out the provisions of section 25 of the 
act approved July 28, 1800, an order was issued permitting sutlers 
to continue to trade with troops until further orders. 

The law authorizing the appointment of commissaries of sub- 
sistence having expired, it is suggested that it be recommended 
to Congress to authorize the General commanding the army to 
appoint from the lieutenants of the line, on the recommendation 
of the Commissary General of Subsistence, as many assistant com- 
missaries of subsistence as the service may require, not to exceed 
thirty-two, such officers to be paid $20 a month in addition to 
their proper pay and emoluments, but without loss of the fourth 
ration, and to hold their appointment until cancelled by their pro- 
motion to the grade of captain or by order of the General. 
37 



576 Appendix. 

It is also suggested that it would be highly beneficial to the 
service could there be authorized a grade of non-commissioned 
officers, to be called post commissary sergeants, to be selected and 
appointed as are ordnance sergeants, and to have the same rank, 
pay, and emoluments — the number not to exceed one to each 
military post. 

The recommendation of the Commissary General for the ap- 
pointment of thirty-two assistant commissaries is approved. It 
is absolutely necessary that there should be, and there is, an 
officer acting as commissary at every post garrisoned by troops. 
The only bonded officers to act in such capacity are the officers 
of the subsistence department and the regimental quartermasters. 
The same bond should be required from assistant commissaries as 
is required to be given by the latter. The additional pay would 
only be allowed when the duty of assistant commissary was per- 
formed, and they would never perform that duty at a post of less 
than a full regiment when there was present either a commissary 
or a regimental quartermaster. 

I would recommend that no appropriation be made to execute 
the requirements of section 25 of the act of Congress entitled 
" An act to increase and fix the military peace establishment of 
the United States," and that public resolution of Congress No. 
33, approved March 30, 1867, as promulgated in the following 
orders, be continued in force : — 

[General Orders, No. 54.] 

War Department, Adjutant General's Office, 7 
Washington, April 15, 1867. ) 
The following resolution of Congress is published for the information and 
government of all concerned : — 

[Public Resolution — No. 33.] 
A EESOLUTION to authorize the commanding general of the army to per- 
mit traders to remain at certain military posts. 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, That the commanding general of the 
army shall be authorized to permit a trading establishment to be maintained, 
after the first day of July, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, at any military 
post on the frontier not in the vicinity of any city or town, and situated at 
any point between the one hundredth meridian of longitude west from Green- 
wich and the eastern boundary of the State of California, when, in his judg- 
ment, such establishment is needed for the accommodation of emigrants, 



Appendix. 577 

freighters, and other citizens : Provided, That after the commissary depart- 
ment shall be prepared to supply stores to soldiers as required by law, no 
trader permitted to remain at such post shall sell any goods kept by the com- 
missary department to any enlisted men : And provided further, That such 
traders shall be under protection and military control as camp followers. 

Approved March 30, 1867. 

By order of the Secretary of War. 

E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General. 



,i 



[General Orders, No. 58.] 

Headquarters of the Army, 

Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, May 24, 18G7. 

So much of paragraph II, General Orders No. 6, dated War Department, 
January 26, 1867, as is inconsistent with the following, is by direction of the 
Secretary of War revoked : 

The Commissary General of Subsistence having reported that no special 
appropriation has been made by Congress to enable the subsistence depart- 
ment to carry into effect section twenty-five of the act of Congress approved 
July 28, 1866, which abolishes the office of sutler, and requires said depart- 
ment to furnish for sale to officers and soldiers such articles (heretofore sup- 
plied by sutlers) as may be designated by the inspectors general of the army ; 
and in view of the large expenditure of funds necessary to furnish such sup- 
plies, and the delay which must ensue before an appropriation can be made 
for this purpose, it is ordered, that the sutlers at military posts on the fron- 
tier, not in the vicinity of any city or town, and situated between the one 
hundredth meridian of longitude west from Greenwich and the eastern bound- 
ary of the State of California, shall, after the 1st of July, 1867, be retained, 
until further orders, as traders at such military posts, under the resolution 
of Congress approved March 30, 1867, authorizing the commanding general 
of the army to permit traders to remain at certain military posts. 

Should the commanding officer of any post included in this order consider 
the present sutler of his post an unfit person to hold the office of trader, he 
will forward a report to that effect through intermediate commanders to these 
headquarters. 

By command of General Grant. 

E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General. 

[General Orders, No. 68.] 

Headquarters of the Army, \ 

Adjutant General's Office, > 

Washington, July 19, 1867. ) 
Traders at military posts. 
General Order No. 58, of May 24, 1867, is modified so as to permit any 
persons, without limit as to number, to trade at the military posts situated 



578 Appendix. 

between the one nundredth meridian of longitude west from Greenwich and 
the eastern boundary of the State of California, subject only to such regula- 
tions and restrictions as may be imposed by department commanders. 
By command of General Grant. 

E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General. 

Surgeon General. 

From the report of the Surgeon General it will be found that, 
since October 20, 1866, three surgeons, six assistant surgeons, and 
seven acting assistant surgeons have died. Of these five died of 
yellow fever and three of Asiatic cholera. 

In the month of June of the present year Asiatic cholera ap- 
peared among the troops at various points in the west and north- 
west ; and for a time fears of a wide-spread epidemic were enter- 
tained. Recent reports from the infected command show that 
the disease has subsided, or has been eradicated by vigorous 
hygienic measures. 

The valuable medical and mortuary records of this department 
were transferred to the fire-proof building on Tenth Street, in 
December, 1866. During the year official evidence has been fur- 
nished from these records of the death or discharge for disability 
in 55,500 cases. 

Four thousand and eight monthly reports of sick and wounded, 
315 special reports, 508 folio records of hospital records, 2,365 
burial records, and 1,262 hospital muster and pay-rolls have been 
received during the year. The alphabetical registers of the dead, 
as far as completed, contain the names of 244,747 white soldiers, 
29,796 colored soldiers, and 30,204 rebel soldiers. 

In the division of surgical records the histories of 45,551 
wounded men have been traced out and entered upon the per- 
manent registers. The number thus entered now amounts to 
207,941. The histories of the graver injuries, and of those cases 
in which important operations were performed, are very fully re- 
corded. 

Fifty-nine thousand five hundred and nineteen cases of wounds 
and operations occurring previous to the present system of regis- 
tration and return of injuries have been compiled, and will be 
entered upon the permanent registers. 

The average annual strength of white troops is represented by 
the reports at 41,104. The number taken on sick report for 



Appendix. 579 

diseases, wounds, and injuries, 122,181, an average of nearly three 
entries on sick report for each man. The mortality during the 
year was 1,527. The average annual strength of the colored 
troops, as shown by the reports, is 6,561. The number taken on 
sick report for disease, wounds, and injuries was 19,694, an av- 
erage of three entries on sick report for each man. The total 
number of white and colored soldiers discharged during the year 
on surgeons' certificate of disability is 618. 

The Army Medical Museum was removed to the building on 
Tenth Street in April last. Eight thousand five hundred and forty- 
two specimens have been catalogued, and a small appropriation 
will be required to continue and preserve this invaluable collection. 

In September, 1867, a medical board was convened in New 
York city for the examination of candidates for the position of 
assistant surgeons in the army and the promotion of assistant sur- 
geons, which resulted in the appointment of forty-seven as assist- 
ant surgeons in the army, and the promotion of fourteen assistant 
surgeons. 

Of artificial legs, arms, &c, there were issued during the past 
year, to wounded soldiers, 573 pieces. 

The funds of the medical and hospital department for the 
fiscal year ending June 30, 18G7, consisted of a balance 
remaining in the treasury June 30, 1866 .... $2,546,457 14 

Amount issued by the treasury in June, 1866, to disbursing 

officers, but which had not come to hand July 1, 1866 . 37,000 00 

Balance of appropriation for artificial limbs under act of July 

16, 1862 540 00 

Appropriation for the year ending June 30, 1867, by act of 

July 13, 1866 600,000 00 

Amount derived from the sale of old and surplus hospital 

property 293,002 82 

From boards of officers in hospitals 327 85 

For care of citizen patients in United States hospital at Louis- 
ville, Kentucky 1 > 270 88 

Eefunded from appropriation for prisoners of war . . 1,420 87 

Amounts in the hands of disbursing officers, including sus- 
pended vouchers .....••• 446, 13 J 47 

3,826,159 03 
Deduct balances in favor of various disbursing officers . . 751,555 81 

3,074,603 22 



580 Appendix. 

There was disbursed for purchase of medical and hospital sup- 
plies $176,556 40 

For pay of private physicians 225,531 40 

For pay of hospital employees 40,894 44 

For expense of purveying depots 102,253 06 

For artificial limbs for soldiers and seamen . . . 35,206 50 

For care of sick soldiers in private hospitals . . . 3,229 04 

For miscellaneous expenses of the medical department . 48,835 19 

For internal revenue tax 2,133 12 

Refundment of amounts erroneously deposited in the previous 

year 125 60 

Transferred to the pay department for the payment of con- 
tract surgeons 200,000 00 

Balance of appropriation for artificial limbs turned into the 

surplus fund 190 00 

Balance in the treasury June 30, 1867 2,909,614 08 

Amount of previous disallowances now admitted, proper 

vouchers being furnished ...... 33,789 33 

In the hands of disbursing officers 72,526 25 

Amounts chargeable to disbursing officers on suspended vouch- 
ers awaiting explanation and correction .... 65,769 52 



3,916,653 94 
Deduct balances due disbursing officers 842,050 72 



3,074,603 22 



Paymaster General. 

The Paymaster General reports that at the date of the last 
annual report there were 25 paymasters of the old establishment, 
and 58 additional paymasters, making a total of 83. There have 
Bince been 35 appointed in the permanent establishment, the com- 
plement authorized by the "Act to increase and fix the military 
peace establishment," approved July 28, 1866, making of regular 
paymasters created and now in service 60 ; reduction of addi- 
tional paymasters during the fiscal year, 37, leaving still in service 
21. Total of both classes now in service, 81. 

The explanation given in the last annual report of the necessity 
of continuing in service some of the additional paymasters still 
exists in all its force, though it is expected that. a further reduc- 
tion may be practicable before the end of the current year. 



Appendix. 581 

The financial summary exhibits a balance on hand at the fee- 
ginning of the fiscal year of $23,941,899 82 

Received from treasury and other sources during the year 34,933,958 27 

Total 58,875,558 09 



Accounted for as follows : 
Disbursements to the regular army and the Military Academy §14,309,243 62 

Disbursements to volunteers 28,389,213 43 

Requisitions cancelled 8,100,000 00 

Amount refunded to treasury 38,000 00 

Amount of paymasters' balances on deposit in Merchants' 
National Bank at date of closing, not heretofore account- 
ed for 107,014 65 

Unissued requisitions in treasury 3,550,000 00 

In hands of paymasters 4,321,786 39 

Total 58,875,558 09 



The total disbursements of each class during the fiscal year are 
as follows : — 

To troops in service $20,078,855 09 

To troops on muster-out 3,300,000 00 

To treasury certificates 10,614,000 00 

To referred claims 8,765,602 00 

Total 42.758,457 09 



There have been received and recorded to October 20, 1867, 
407,857 bounty claims under the act of Congress approved July 
28, 1866. Of this number, 105,378 have been fully settled and 
disposed of at an expenditure of $9,352,797 ; 302,479 claims re- 
main on hand to be settled. 

Thirty-one thousand claims for ordering bounty and arrears of 
pay have also been settled and disposed of within the year, at an 
expenditure of $3,353,203. 

Under the joint resolutions of Congress, the one approved 
March 30, 1867, and the other July 19, 1867, $1,500,000 was 
appropriated for expenditure in the five military districts ol" the 
South. Of this amount there has been drawn from the treasury 
$1,454,728.93, leaving a balance in the treasury of $45,271.07, 
which balance is to the credit of the second military district. 



582 Appendix. 

Chief Engineer. 

The corps of engineers consists of one hundred and seven 
officers and the battalion of engineer troops. Seventeen officers 
are on detached duty, serving on the staff of the General of the 
army, on the staffs of the general officers commanding military 
divisions and departments, at the Military Academy, on the 
Light-house Board, and in the Interior Department. The re- 
mainder are engaged, under the orders of the Chief of Engineers, 
upon the permanent defences of the country, the survey of the 
lakes, the improvement of rivers and harbors and the surveys 
relating thereto, upon explorations, in the command and instruc- 
tion of the engineer troops, and in the charge of public buildings, 
grounds, and works in Washington. 

The work of strengthening the permanent defences of the 
country, and of adapting them to receive more powerful arma- 
ments, has been continued during the past fiscal year. 

Experimental targets and other structures have been in the 
course of construction for the purpose of determining the further 
modifications which sea-coast defence must undergo in view of 
the great power of modern ordnance, and the best and ■ most 
economical manner of using iron as shields or scarps, or in other 
modes for defence. 

The estimates for the sea-coast defences during the next fiscal 
year are for the construction of such interior and other portions 
of the works now in progress as are not affected by the improved 
means of naval warfare and of siege operations, or where the 
increased strength required can be secured by simjile means, such 
as greater thickness of earth-covering, &c. 

The headquarters of the engineer battalion, with three com- 
panies, have been established at Willett's Point, the chief depot 
of engineer supplies; a second depot has been fixed at Jefferson 
Barracks, with one company; and a third, near San Francisco, 
with one company. A detachment from the engineer battalion is 
at the Military Academy, to aid in giving instruction in practical 
engineering. 

Some legislation for improving the discipline and instruction of 
the engineer troops is recommended by the Chief of Engineers, 
and appears to be required. 



Appendix. 583 

The operations of the corps relating to veconnoissanees and 
surveys for military and commercial purposes, and to the improve- 
ment of rivers and harbors, have progressed during the fiscal year 
in a satisfactory manner. 

The maps of the country from the Mississippi to the Pacific, 
prepared chiefly from the first-named surveys, are indispensable to 
the troops now occupying that region. The explorations and 
surveys in progress, and those in contemplation, will continue to 
supply such wants, and to furnish, besides, information of great 
value to the country. 

The surveys for river and harbor improvements supply the 
information essential for legislation, as well as for the proper 
location and construction of the works. They should be con- 
tinued, especially upon the western rivers, where changes in the 
channels and bars, and other obstacles to navigation, are constantly 
going on. 

The survey of the lakes has made satisfactory progress in the 
waters of Lakes Superior and Michigan, to which attention has 
been confined for the most part, to meet the demands of com- 
merce now being developed upon the borders of those waters. 

The report of the Chief of Engineers and accompanying papers 
contain all the information required to be presented by the acts 
of 1866 and 1867, making appropriations for certain river and 
harbor improvements and surveys. These works have been car- 
ried on in a highly satisfactory manner. 

Embarrassments have been experienced in the execution of the 
acts, modifications of which are suggested by the Chief of •Engi- 
neers. 

A large number of detailed maps, intended to illustrate some 
of the principal campaigns and battle-fields, have been prepared, 
and others are in course of preparation. They contain informa- 
tion not only useful for the purposes intended, but highly valuable 
in connection with other objects, military and civil. The Chief 
of Engineers recommends an appropriation of fifty thousand 
dollars for the engraving and printing of the most important, a 
recommendation which is concurred in. 






584 Appendix. 

Ordnance Bureau. 

The expenditures of the Ordnance Bureau during the past 
fiscal year were less than one third of those of the preceding year. 
They were applied chiefly to work previously begun and partially 
executed, and to the settlement of war claims. The estimates for 
the next year are for defraying expenses of ordinary peace opera- 
tions, and executing such work as have been authorized and 
directed by law. 

The operations at the arsenals have been confined to the manu- 
facture of iron gun-carriages and implements for sea-coast cannon, 
and of articles required for issue to troops, the reception, care, 
and preservation of ordnance and ordnance stores, the breaking 
up of unserviceable ammunition, and the construction of author- 
ized buildings, and other permanent improvements. The hired 
men employed at the arsenals have been reduced from last year 
by about seventeen per cent., and the reduction is in further prog- 
ress. There were, at the end of the year, 987 enlisted ordnance 
men employed at the arsenals in guard, police, and other military 
duties, and as mechanics and laborers in the workshops, magazines, 
and laboratories. 

A title to the property on Rock Island, Illinois, having been 
acquired, the construction of the arsenal and armory at that place, 
in accordance with the act of April 19, 1864, has been carried 
forward rapidly. The estimate for continuing that work during 
the next fiscal year is in accordance with its character and design 
as authorized and directed by law. The conditions connected 
with the appropriation in March last for the erection of a bridge 
at Rock Island having not yet been fulfilled by the railroad com- 
pany, no part of that appropriation has been expended. From 
correspondence and negotiations with the railroad company in 
reference to the guarantee required from them by the appropria- 
tion act, it is understood that the company will agree to pay, and 
will satisfactorily guarantee the payment of, half the cost of build- 
ing the bridges across the main channel of the Mississippi River 
and across the slough on the Illinois side, and is anxious to have 
the bridges built as soon as practicable upon those conditions. 
As there is some doubt whether the guarantee which the com- 
pany is willing to give would fulfil the exact requirements of the 



Appendix. 585 

law, this subject is recommended to be brought toHhc notiCJ of 
Congress for such further legislation as may be deemed necessary 
and proper. It is very desirable that the bridges should be built 
as soon as practicable, and that a sufficient appropriation for the 
purpose be made. When the work is done, one half of its 
expense will be returned to the government by the railroad com- 
pany. 

The arms and other ordnance stores which had accumulated at 
the Southern arsenals, excepting one in Florida turned over for 
use by the Freedmen's Bureau, and one at Little Rock, Arkansas, 
occupied as a military station, have been repossessed, and are now 
in charge of the ordnance department. The buildings and other 
public property at these arsenals should be kept from decay and 
in proper preservation, and the ordnance estimates include the 
amount necessary for that purpose. The arsenal at Augusta, 
Georgia, from its position and healthfulness, is peculiarly suitable 
for a large arsenal of deposit, and its advantages in this respect 
should be made available as soon as it may be considered neces- 
sary and proper to store arms in the South. The establishment 
of an arsenal at a suitable point between the Missouri and the 
Rocky Mountains, for supplying troops serving in that region, 
is considered necessary, and an appropriation for that purpose is 
recommended. The sale of the small arsenals at Rome, New 
York, Vergennes, Vermont, and Liberty, Missouri, which may be 
soon abandoned without disadvantage to the public service, is 
also recommended, as well as the sale of the North Carolina 
arsenal, the Macon armory, and the powder works at Augusta, 
Georgia, which were captured from the rebel government. The 
land and other property at Harper's Ferry, formerly used for an 
armory, are not now required by the department, and their sale is 
recommended, if it be decided that it can be done under the gov- 
ernment title. If not sold, it is suggested that it be leased for a 
term of years. 

There were 23,083 Springfield rifle muskets converted into 
breech-loaders during the past fiscal year at the national armory, 
and about 100,000 muskets, carbines, and sabres were cleaned and 
repaired there. All of the converted arms have been issued to 
troops, and nearly all the infantry serving in the departments of 
the Missouri and the Platte have been armed with them. Month- 



586 Appendix. 

ly reports received from the commanders of the companies so 
armed have been highly favorable to the arm, and furnish abun- 
dant evidence of its excellence and fitness for the military service. 
The almost unanimous opinion expressed by the officers is, that 
the musket is simple, strong, not liable to get out of order, and 
extremely accurate in firing. Not a single officer has expressed 
the opinion that the calibre (reduced from that of the muzzle- 
loader) is too small, while a few have recommended a further 
reduction. These arms have done excellent service in an Indian 
campaign during the past summer; very few of them have been 
reported as rendered unserviceable, and of these, more were made 
unserviceable through carelessness than from all other causes. In 
July, 1866, the Secretary of War directed the conversion of 25,000 
Springfield rifle muskets into breech-loaders, and the prepara- 
tion of an adequate supply of proper ammunition. He afterwards 
ordered the conversion of these arms to be continued, without 
fixing a limit as to number; and the work was carried on rapidly 
until August, 1867, when it was directed to be suspended, after 
50,000 arms had been altered. That number is nearly completed, 
and there have been prepared the requisite tools for converting 
about 400 muskets per day, at which rate their conversion can be 
resumed at short notice. It is confidently believed that no con- 
verted breech-loader, in this country or in Europe, has been pro- 
duced which is superior to the converted Springfield musket, as 
altered at the armory, and that none equal to it in serviceable 
qualities can be produced at less cost. In view of the fact that 
the 50,000 converted muskets will very soon be issued to troops, 
leaving no breech-loading muskets on hand in store, it is recom- 
mended that the conversion of the Springfield musket be resumed. 
The chief difficulties which have been interposed against the pro- 
duction of a good breech-loading musket, by the ordnance depart- 
ment, have been the immediate claim of almost every improve- 
ment under some of the many patents which have been granted 
for improvements in fire-arms, and the extreme eagerness and 
strong efforts of some inventors, and others interested in patents, 
to have their particular inventions used in the government mili- 
tary service. There are many claims of patent rights in the 
methods used to convert the Springfield muskets. Several par- 
ties, in some instances, claim to hold patents for the same thing; 






Appendix. 587 

and every improvement, it is believed, is claimed by more than 
one inventor. The validity of such patent claims for the improve- 
ments used at the national armory in converting (he muskets have 
not been acknowledged by the ordnance bureau, which believes 
that the proper course for the various claimants to take is to estab- 
lish their respective rights, and then apply to Congress for remu- 
neration for their use by the government. 

The cartridges used for breech-loading arms are known as 
"central lire," about 7,000,000 of which have been fabricated. 
Extensive trials of them, made by troops and in proofs, resulted in 
an average failure of only one third of one per cent. 

Smooth-bore cannon of less than eight inches calibre being in- 
effective against iron-clad war vessels, it has been determined to 
supersede all such now in the sea-coast forts by those of heavier 
calibre, and by rifled cannon. A board of engineer, ordnance, and 
artillery officers, especially appointed to consider the subject of 
arming the permanent forts, reported that 1,915 pieces of the cali- 
bre of 13, 15 and 20 inches for smooth-bores, and of 10 and 12 
inches for rifles, were required for the permanent fortifications, 
and should be provided; and their report was approved by the 
Secretary of War. None of these guns have yet been provided, 
and there are no existing orders or contracts for heavy cannon. 
This stoppage of the procurement of heavy cannon has been 
mainly occasioned by "persistent efforts for some time past by 
ignorant or designing persons to destroy public confidence in the 
heavy guns which have been provided by the ordnance depart- 
ment of the army and navy." This subject, as also the experi- 
ments which have been made to test the durability and efficiency 
of these cannon, are stated more fully and in detail in the report of 
the Chief of Ordnance. The experiments have resulted in estab- 
lishing the fact that our heavy cast-iron cannon are the cheapest 
and most effective guns that are possessed by any nation. While 
this is fully proved so far as regards the smooth-bore heavy guns, 
and the same results have followed in respect to the rifles, so far 
as the tests have yet been applied to them, it is not deemed pru- 
dent to enter upon the manufacture of these latter to a large 
extent without the previous trial of a greater number of these 
guns. 

Since the delivery of the report of the Chief of Ordnance, that 



588 Appendix. 

officer has received such information as to materially change his 
views in regard to additional legislation, which he thinks neces- 
sary to secure the interests of the United States, before expend- 
ing any money on the railroad bridge at Rock Island. 
His views will be submitted in special report hereafter. 

Signal Corps. 

The chief signal officer of the army reports that the course of 
tuition in military signalling and telegraphing has been definitely 
established and commenced at West Point ; that *the preliminary 
steps have been taken to secure the arrangement, upon similar 
plans, in so far as is practicable, of the studies of these duties, at 
the Military and Naval Academies; that a project for the general 
communication of the army and navy, by signals common to both 
services, has been brought under consideration; that a general 
order, publishing regulations for the equipment and instruction of 
the army, has been authorized. When these plans shall have 
been carried into effect, the active forces of the United States 
will be prepared to use, in the contingencies of the service, either 
aerial or electric telegraphy. 

Military Academy. 

The corps of cadets at the examination in June last numbered 
two hundred and fifty-five. Of these sixty-three graduated, and 
were commissioned in the army. 

The report of the Board of Visitors exhibits fully the excellent 
condition of the institution, and bears ample testimony of its use- 
fulness. They renew the recommendation made by the board of 
the previous year to increase the number of cadets, giving sub- 
stantially, but perhaps more elaborately, the same arguments for 
the increase. They also recommend that the pay and emolu- 
ments of the superintendent should be not less than those of a 
brigadier general, and give various strong reasons therefor. They 
rightly say that "the continuous and increasing visits of official 
persons from abroad and from our own country exact expendi- 
tures which ought not to be permitted by a generous people any 
longer to dimmish his income." The erection of a fire-proof 
building, for the preservation and safety of the records and 
archives of the academy, is also recommended. Congress appro- 



Appendix. 589 

priated fifteen thousand dollars to accomplish this object, but it is 
found inadequate, and an additional appropriation of fifteen thou- 
sand dollars is asked for this year. Other recommendations aro 
made by the board, but for which no estimates are submitted by 
the inspector. The inspector bears liberal testimony to the un- 
usual degree of interest and patience manifested by the board to 
examine and investigate all the affairs, faults, and errors of admin- 
istration of the institution ; and he says that it will be the pleas- 
ure and endeavor of the academic authorities to profit by and 
carry out the views and suggestions of the board where no legal 
obstacle intervenes. 

The total estimate of military appropriations for the fiscal 

year ending June 30, 1S69, is $77,124,707 08 

For office of the General of the army 5,000 00 

For Adjutant General's office, recruiting service . . 300,000 00 

For Inspector General's office — no appropriation. 

For Military Academy $146,305 00 

For pay of cadets, &c 188,707 00 

335,012 00 

For Bureau of Military Justice — no appropriation. 

For Quartermaster General's department . . . $28,1S0,066 20 

For ditto — deficiency estimate 13,500,000 00 

For ditto — for contingencies 100,000 00 

41,780,066 20 

For subsistence department — no appropriation. 

For medical department $15,000 00 

For pay department 22,412,068 00 

For engineer bureau 10,528,769 88 

For ordnance bureau 1,533,084 00 

For Bureau Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands — no 

appropriation. 
For signal service 27,000 00 

The foregoing estimates for the approaching fiscal year are taken 
from the estimate of the different bureau chiefs, without change 
of the items. They are based upon the expenditures of the cur- 
rent year, and will probably exceed the amount which will be 
required. A season of peace with the Indians on the plains will 
of itself materially diminish the expenditures of the army, and 
justify a reduction in the number of enlisted men in a company. 



590 Appendix. 

Attention may be attracted to the great increase of appropria- 
tion for the bureaus of the War Department asked for this year 
over the estimates of last year, and requires explanation. The 
expenses for the next fiscal year will necessarily be much below 
those for the present year. It will be observed that $13,000,000 
of the present estimate is to cover deficiency in appropriation of 
last year. The last Congress made large appropriations for river 
and harbor improvements, for which no estimates were then made. 
The work having been commenced under such authority, it is 
now necessary to make large estimates for its continuance. The 
appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1867, having 
been made during the existence of war, were very large; far in 
excess of requirements after cessation of hostilities. This left a 
large balance, already appropriated, to commence the present fiscal 
year with, and reduced the estimate. No such balance will exist 
to commence the year 1868-69 with. 

The small regular army sustained by the United States prior to 
1861 was kept well supplied with officers educated at the National 
Military Academy. After the rebellion, however, it was found 
necessary to increase this standing force about four-fold. The 
war educated soldiers to fill well, by judicious selections, this 
increase to the army, but not to keep up the supply. The origi- 
nal vacancies created by this increase of the army are now filled, 
and appointments hereafter to fill vacancies must go in at the 
foot of the army register. For this reason, the time has passed, 
or soon will, when efficient volunteer soldiers, educated in the 
rebellion, will be willing to accept such positions; or, if willing, 
will be of an age making it unadvisable to accept them. While 
the army has been so much increased, no addition has been made 
to the number of cadets admitted at West Point. I would now 
respectfully recommend an increase to the full number that can 
be accommodated without additional buildings. The present 
number of cadets is limited by the number of representatives and 
delegates in the lower house of Congress, and ten at large each 
year appointed by the President, Four hundred cadets can be 
accommodated without increase of expense to the government 
further than the pay to the additional number. The manner of 
making these appointments, I would suggest, should be by adding 
three at large additional, to be appointed by the President, and 



Appendix. 591 

by regarding a vacancy as existing in each congressional district 
when the cadet representing it enters the second class. 

I would recommend the continuance for another year o/ the 
additional pay allowed to officers of the army by the last Con- 
gress. 

The 37th section of the act of July 28, 1866, appropriates 
$20,000 for the procurement of an equestrian statue of Lieutenant 
General Winfield Scott. It has been found that the work cannot 
be contracted for for less than from three to four times the appro- 
priation ; hence no contract has been entered into. 

Special report will be submitted hereafter of plans and esti- 
mates that have been prepared for the erection of new War 
Department buildings. 

By act of Congress the ten Southern States which have no 
representation in the national councils are divided into five mili- 
tary districts, each commanded by an officer of the army of not 
less rank than brigadier general. The powers of these command- 
ers are both civil and military. So far as their military duties are 
concerned they are under the same subordination to the General 
of the army and Secretary of War that department commanders 
are. In their civil capacity they are entirely independent of both 
the General and Secretary, except in the matters of removals, 
appointment, and detail, where the General of the army has the 
same powers as have district commanders. It is but fair to the 
district commanders, however, to state that, while they have been 
thus independent in their civil duties, there has not been one of 
them who would not yield to a positively expressed wish, in 
regard to any matter of civil administration, from either of the 
officers placed over them by the Constitution or acts of Congress, 
so long as that wish was in the direction of a proper execution of 
the law for the execution of which they alone are responsible. I 
am pleased to say that the commanders of the five military dis- 
tricts have executed their difficult trust faithfully and without 
bias from any judgment of their own as to the merit or demerit 
of the law they were executing. 

First Military District • 

Comprises the State of Virginia, Brevet Major General J. M. 
Schofield commanding. In assuming command, the principle was 
38 



592 Appendix. 

announced by General Schofield that the military power conferred 
by act of Congress on the district commander would be used only 
so far as was necessary to accomplish the purposes for which 
the power was conferred. The civil government was interfered 
with only when necessary, and the wisdom of the policy has been 
demonstrated by the result. The instances of complaint of the 
action of the civil courts became exceedingly rare. Still the evil 
which existed prior to the act of Congress of March 2, 1867, though 
mitigated by the increased efficiency of civil officers, was not re- 
moved. It was an evil in the jury system, apparent at all times, 
and fully developed by the natural antagonism between loyalist 
and rebel, or the prejudice between white and black, existing 
throughout the South since the rebellion. The first idea was to 
admit blacks on juries, and prescribe a test of loyalty. But as 
the requirement of a unanimous verdict must give very inade- 
quate protection where strong prejudice of class or caste exists, 
and as a military change of jury system would be but temporary, 
it was determined to leave its change to the convention soon to 
meet, and be content with a system of military commissions. 
Such commissioners were appointed from officers of the army and 
Freedmen's Bureau for the different cities and counties of the 
State, with powers of justices of the peace, while the State was 
divided into sub-districts under commanders whose powers were 
ultimately increased to those of circuit judges, taking jurisdiction 
only in cases where civil authorities failed to do justice. The 
system has given a large measure of protection to all classes of 
citizens, with slight interference with the civil courts. 

Since the publication of the act of March 23, 1867, all elections 
have been suspended. Existing State, county, and municipal 
officers were continued in office. Vacancies have been filled by 
the district commander. The number of removals has been five, 
and of appointments to fill vacancies one hundred and five. 

In executing the registration, a board of officers was first ap- 
pointed to select registering officers. The selections were made 
with great care, and the officers so selected have, with few excep- 
tions, done their duty in a most satisfactory manner. Carefully 
prepared regulations for the boards of registration were issued, 
being made as specific as possible, so as to secure a uniform rule 
of disfranchisement throughout the State. In prescribing them, 



Appendix. 593 

the district commander was controlled by the belief that the law 
made him responsible for its correct interpretation, as well as its 
faithful execution. 

The results of the first session of the registering boards were 
all received on September 15. One hundred and fifteen thousand 
and sixty-eight whites, and one hundred and one thousand three 
hundred and eighty-two colored, registered ; one thousand six 
hundred and twenty whites, and two hundred and thirty-two 
colored, being rejected. The tax list of 1866-67 (not quite com- 
plete) returns about one hundred and thirty-six thousand white 
male adults, and eighty-seven thousand colored male adults. 
This indicates that the number of whites disfranchised, or who 
have failed to register, is about nineteen thousand, and that about 
fifteen thousand more colored men have registered than were on 
the tax lists. Hence it may be inferred that nearly all male 
adults, white or colored, not disfranchised, have registered. 

The principle upon which the apportionment was made was to 
give separate representations to the smallest practicable subdi- 
visions of the State, and where fractions remained over, to so 
combine counties in election districts as to justly represent those 
portions. This is believed to be the fairest mode of apportion- 
ment practicable under the law. 

Second Military District 

Comprises the States of North Carolina and South Carolina, 
Brevet Major General E. R. S. Canby commanding. Major 
General Daniel E. Sickles, who was originally assigned to the 
command of this district, was relieved, and General Canby as- 
signed by the following order of the President : — 

[General Orders, No. 80.] 

Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, ) 
Washington, August 27, 1867. ) 
I. The following orders have been received from the President : — 

" Executive Mansion, ) 

• " "Washington, D. C, August 26, 1867. ) 

" Brevet Major General Edward It. S. Canby is hereby assigned to the 
command of the second military district, created by the act of Congress of 
March 2, 1867, and of the military department of the South, embracing the 
States of North Carolina and South Carolina. He will, as soon as practica- 



594 Appendix. 

ble, relieve Major General Daniel E. Sickles, and, on assuming the command 
to winch he is hereby assigned, will, when necessary to a faithful execution 
of the laws, exercise any and all powers conferred by acts of Congress upon 
district commanders, and any and all authority pertaining to officers in com- 
mand of military departments. 

" Major General Daniel E. Sickles is hereby relieved from the command 
of the second military district. 

" The Secretary of War ad interim will give the necessary instructions to 

carry this order into effect. 

"Andrew Johnson." 

II. In pursuance of the foregoing order of the President of the United 
States, Brevet Major General Can by will, on receipt of the order, turn over 
his present command to the officer next in rank to himself, and proceed to 
Charleston, South Carolina, to relieve Major General Sickles of the com- 
mand of the second military district. 

III. Major General Sickles, on being relieved, will repair to New York 
city, and report by letter to the Adjutant General. 

By command of General Grant. 

E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General. 

" In order to secure a more efficient administration of justice it 
■was deemed necessary to place all sheriffs and other municipal 
officers under the immediate control of a military office]-. Accord- 
ingly all such officers were directed to report to the provost marshal 
general, and to make monthly reports of ' crimes committed ' and 
' prisoners confined.' The reports of prisoners confined has aided 
materially in detecting illegal imprisonments or punishments, and 
has enabled the district commander to secure the release of many 
Union men and freedmen, against whom much gross injustice had 
been committed. 

"A bureau of civil affairs was established to take charge of all 
matters pertaining to registration ; and its duties were afterwards 
extended to include all questions of protection to person or prop- 
erty arising under the laws of Congress. One hundred and 
seventy registration precincts were established in North Carolina, 
and one hundred and nine in South Carolina. 

"In North Carolina there were registered 103,000 whites, and 
71,657 blacks ; and in South Carolina, 45,751 whites, and 79,585 
blacks. Registration proceeded very slowly on account of slow- 
ness of communication with distant parts of the district. 

" Of the appropriation made by Congress, $54,802.87 have been 



Appendix. 595 

expended, and outstanding liabilities will exceed the balance on 
hand $194,802.87. 

" The present condition of the district is so satisfactory as to 
warrant the belief that after elections the number of military 
posts in both States can be diminished." 

Third Military District 

Comprises the States of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, Brevet 
Major General John Pope commanding. 

"On assuming command, an order was issued" by General Pope 
" continuing in office State officials, but forbidding their opposing 
the reconstruction acts ; prohibiting elections except under those 
acts, and giving notice that all vacancies in civil offices would 
be filled by the district commander. Becoming satisfied subse- 
quently that State officials, while obeying the order personally, 
yet officially, by their patronage, encouraged papers opposing the 
reconstruction act, an order was issued forbidding official patron- 
age to such papers. 

"In consequence of the riot at Mobile, an order was issued 
holding city and county officers responsible for the preservation 
of peace at all public meetings, and requiring the United States 
troops to assist them when called on. No disturbances have since 
occurred. 

"Under the laws of the State, no colored person could be 
admitted to the jury box, and there was no surety of justice to 
Union men, to people from the North (and especially ex-Union 
soldiers), or to colored persons, from jui-ies inflamed with hostility 
towards such classes. 

" There is a very large number of cases of wrong perpetrated 
by such juries in the district on file. 

"Accordingly an order was issued directing all juries to be 
drawn indiscriminately from the list of voters registered by the 
boards of registration. 

"Very few civil officers have been removed, and those, in 
almost every case, were removed for refusing to comply with 
orders. Appointments to fill vacancies have only been made 
where the daily business of the people demanded it. 

" The State treasurers of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida have 
been ordered to make no payments after the appropriations of the 



596 Appendix. 

present fiscal year have expired, save on warrants approved by 
the district commander, as it is believed that a new legislature 
will not continue or approve- many of the appropriations made. 

" In executing the registration, it was deemed advisable that no 
officer nor soldier of the United States should be employed, and 
accordingly each board of registration was appointed from among 
the citizens living in the district, and to consist of two white men 
and one colored. A fixed sum was paid for registering each 
name, the average for the district being twenty-six cents per 
name. 

"There were registered in Georgia, 95,214 whites, and 93,457 
colored ; in Alabama, 74,450 whites, and 90,350 colored ; and in 
Florida, 11,180 whites, and 15,357 colored. The amount expended 
in registration, &c, has been $162,325. 

" The appointment of delegates was made in Georgia for State 
senatorial districts, and in Alabama for representative districts, 
fixed by an order. Polls were ordered to be opened at each 
county seat." 

Fourth Military District 

Comprises the States of Mississippi and Arkansas, Brevet Major 
General E. O. C. Ord commanding. 

" The reconstruction measures of Congress are unpopular with 
a majority of the white people, but their execution has met with 
slight opposition, the ignorant and lawless, from whom alone 
trouble was to be apprehended, having been kept in order by the 
troops distributed through the States. 

"The civil laws have not been interfered with when equally 
administered, except to remove from the civil courts cases of 
crime charged against persons who, being opposed to the rebel- 
lion, had reason to fear prejudice. Also freedmen's cases, where 
the courts were practically closed against them; and cases of 
horse stealing, and violations of acts of Congress, for all of which 
military commissions have been organized. 

" The officers of the provisional State government have continued 
in office, except where they have failed to perform their duties. 
It is difficult to find competent men who can qualify to fill vacan- 
cies in civil offices, some of which are consequently vacant. 

"In consequence of the indisposition (as manifested of late) 



Appendix. 597 

of the civil authorities in Arkansas to take action in offences of 
an aggravated nature against freedmen, orders have been issued 
for the trial of all such cases by military, commission, and for 
prompt action to be taken for the punishment of civil officers 
who fail to issue writs against offenders committing assaults, &c, 
against freedmen, and prohibiting bail for the appearance of such 
criminals." 

The extension of suffrage to freedmen has evidently aroused a 
sentiment of hostility to the colored race, and to northern men in 
many parts of the district, which did not exist before ; and Gen- 
eral Ord is convinced that a larger force than is now stationed in 
those. States to preserve order and organize conventions will be 
required hereafter to protect them and secure the freedmen the 
use of the suffrage. 

"In a majority of the counties of this district there are very 
few men who can take the test oath, and these are not disposed 
to defy public opinion by accepting office, unless supported by a 
military force afterwards. 

"The will of the colored people may be in favor of supporting 
loyal office-holders, but their intelligence is not now sufficient to 
enable them to combine for the execution of their will. All their 
combinations are now conducted by white men, under the protec- 
tion of the military; if the protection is withdrawn, the white 
men now controlling would withdraw with it ; and some of the 
southern people, now exasperated at what they deem the freed- 
men's presumption, would not be very gentle towards them, so 
that the ^presence of a larger military force will be required for 
some time to maintain the freedmen in the right of suffrage." 

Fifth Military District 

Comprises the States of Louisiana and Texas, Brevet Major Gen- 
eral J. A. Mower commanding. 

No report has yet been received from General Mower, but it is 
expected in time for the meeting of Congress. 

Major General P. H. Sheridan, who was originally assigned to 
the command of this district, was relieved, and General Hancock 
assigned, by the following orders of the President. On the de- 
cease of Brevet Major General Charles Griffin, designated as the 



598 Appendix. 

officer next in rank to whom General Sheridan should turn over 
the command until General Hancock assumed it, General Mower 
succeeded to the command : — 

[General Orders, No. 77.] 

Headquarters of the Army, ) 

Adjutant General's Office, > 

Washington, August 19, 1867. ) 
I. The following orders have been received from the President : — 



" Executive Mansion, 



,} 



" Major General George H. Thomas is hereby assigned to the command of 
the fifth military district, created by the act of Congress passed on the 2d day 
of March, 1SG7. 

" Major General P. H. Sheridan is hereby assigned to the command of the 
department of the Missouri. 

" Major General Winfield S. Hancock is hereby assigned to the command 
of the department of the Cumberland. 

" The Secretary of War ad interim will give the necessary instructions to 
carry this order into effect. 

"Andrew Johnson." 

II. In pursuance of the foregoing order of the President of the United 
States, Major General G. H. Thomas will, on receipt of the order, turn over 
his present command to the officer next in rank to himself, and proceed to 
New Orleans, Louisiana, to relieve Major General P. H. Sheridan of the 
command of the fifth military district. 

III. Major General P. II. Sheridan, on being relieved from the command 
of the fifth military district by Major General G. H. Thomas, will proceed to 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and will relieve Major General W. S. Hancock 
in the command of the department of the Missouri. 

IV. Major General W. S. Hancock, on being relieved from the command 
of the department of the Missouri by Major General Sheridan, will proceed 
to Louisville, Kentucky, and will assume command of the department of the 
Cumberland. 

V. Major General G. H. Thomas will continue to execute all orders he 
may find in force in the fifth military district at the time of his assuming 
command of it, unless authorized by the General of the army to annul, alter, 
or modify them. 

VI. Major General Sheridan, before relieving Major General Hancock, 
will report in person at these headquarters. 

By command of General Grant. 

E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General. 



Appendix. 599 



[General Orders, No. 81.] 

Headquarters of the Army, 

Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, August 27, 1867. 

I. The following orders have been received from the President : — 



! 



" Executive Mansion, ) 

" Washington, D. C, August 26, 1867. S 

" Sir : In consequence of the unfavorable condition of the health of Major 
General George II. Thomas, as reported to you in Surgeon Hasson's despatch 
of the 21st instant, my order dated August 17, 1867, is hereby modified so as 
to assign Major General Winfield S. Hancock to the command of the fifth 
military district, created by the act of Congress, passed March 2, 1867, and 
of the military department comprising the States of Louisiana and Texas. 
On being relieved from the command of the department of the Missouri by 
Major General P. H. Sheridan, Major General Hancock will proceed directly 
to New Orleans, Louisiana, and, assuming the command to which he is hereby 
assigned, will, when necessary to a faithful execution of the laws, exercise 
arty and all powers conferred by acts of Congress upon district commanders, 
and any and all authority pertaining to officers in command of military de- 
partments. 

" Major General P. H. Sheridan will at once turn over his present com- 
mand to the officer next in rank to himself, and proceeding, without delay, 
to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, will relieve Major General Hancock of the 
command of the department of the Missouri. 

" Major General George H. Thomas will, until further orders, remain in 
command of the department of the Cumberland. 

"Very respectfully, yours, 

"Andrew Johnson. 

" General U. S. Grant, 

" Secretary of War ad interim." 

II. In compliance with the foregoing instructions of the President of the 
United States, Major General P. EL Sheridan will, on receipt of this order, 
turn over his present command to Brevet Major General Charles Griffin, the 
officer next in rank to himself, and proceed, without delay, to Fort Leaven- 
worth, Kansas, and will relieve Major General Hancock in command of the 
department of the Missouri. 

III. On being relieved by Major General Sheridan, Major General Han- 
cock will proceed, without delay, to New Orleans, Louisiana, and assume 
con.mand of the fifth military district, and of the department composed of 
the States of Louisiana and Texas. 

IV. Major General George II. Thomas will continue in command of the 
department of the Cumberland. 

By command of General Grant. 

E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General. 



GOO Appendix. 

Generals Sheridan and Sickles having been relieved before the 
period for submitting their annual reports, none have been re- 
ceived from them. They have, however, been called on recently 
to submit reports, which may be expected before the meeting of 
Congress. 

The territory of the United States not embraced in the five 
military districts is divided into military divisions (they subdivided 
into departments) and departments. 

Abstract of Reports from Military Division and Depart- 
ment Commanders. 

Military Division of the Missouri, 

Commanded by Lieutenant General W. T. Sherman, embraces the 
departments of Dakota, the Platte, and the Missouri ; commanded 
respectively by Brevet Major General A. H. Terry, Brevet Major 
General C. C. Augur, and Major General P. H. Sheridan. 

During the latter part of the year 1866, the operations of this 
command were embarrassed by the necessity of mustering out the 
volunteer troops that had been organized for the war of the rebel- 
lion, before a sufficient number of regular troops could be raised 
and forwarded to remote parts of the frontier; to replace them. 
The winter of 1866-67 proved to be unprecedentedly severe, so 
that it was a physical impossibility to keep open communication 
with some of the most remote posts. The garrison of Fort Phil 
Kearney, on Powder River, 223 miles distant from old Fort Lara- 
mie, suffered severely from an attack made by Indians, December 
21, 1866, upon a wagon-train and its escorts, that had been sent a 
short distance from the fort to procure lumber, in which Brevet 
Lieutenant Colonel W. J. Fetterman and a detachment of forty- 
nine men were killed. In December other bands of hostile In- 
dians made their appearance at Fort Buford, and rumors were 
received of the massacre of the entire garrison. All communica- 
tion being cut off by the severity of the weather, great anxiety 
Avas felt for the safety of the garrison for two months, when 
reports were received contradicting the capture of the post. 

In tlie spring of 1867 rumors were received from all quarters 
of a renewal of Indian hostilities. Though many proved to be 
greatly exaggerated, yet depredations and attacks on the principal 



Appendix. 601 

emigrant routes increased to such an extent that it required the 
utmost activity on the part of the troops to keep open communi- 
cation with our Territories, and protect working parties on the 
important railroads now in process of construction. 

A village of the Cheyennes and Sioux, on Pawnee Fork, was 
burned April 19, as a punishment for depredations previously 
committed. 

Department commanders visited the scenes of hostilities in 
person, and made every effort with the means at hand to afford 
protection. They have at times been greatly embarrassed by a 
disposition on the part of irresponsible persons to precipitate hos- 
tilities by false rumors and sensation reports. 

Since the Indian commission, provided by act of July 20, 1867, 
commenced it's labors, the operations of the troops have been 
confined to the defensive, and they are now principally engaged 
in garrisoning the most important posts. 

Indians have been employed as soldiers under the provisions 
of the act of July 28, 1866, with some success. The attention of 
Congress is respectfully invited to the remarks of Lieutenant Gen- 
eral Sherman on this subject, and also in regard to providing for a 
more efficient civil government in the Indian country. 

The following number of trains have passed Fort Sedgwick, 
Colorado Territory, from February 1 to September 28 : — 

Trains, 124 ; wagons, 3,074 ; men, 4,587 ; women, 556 ; children, 
587; mules, 5,738; oxen, 11,096; horses, 1,062; led animals, 948. 

Department of the Cumberland, 

Major General G. II. Thomas commanding, embraces the States of 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and West Virginia. 

General Thomas reports that with his present force he is able 
partially to hold in check the disloyal tendencies of the people, 
and to punish, if not prevent, unlawful proceedings; that, although 
there still remains much to be desired in the way of protection to 
life and property throughout his command, outrages are not so 
prevalent as formerly ; but the feeling of the people is still hostile 
to the government. 

A small force is retained in West Virginia, as it is believed that 
without it the laws would not be impartially executed. 

In anticipation of trouble in Tennessee at the period of the 



602 Appendix. 

August elections, the troops were so disposed as to be able to ren- 
der proper assistance to the civil authorities in suppressing riots or 
violence of any kind. The department commander was directed 
to proceed in person to Memphis, and to make the best disposition 
to guard against an outbreak. The election, however, passed off 
quietly, and the services of the troops were not required. Trouble 
was again apprehended at Nashville at the charter election in Sep- 
tember, and General Thomas was directed to go in person to that 
city, and take every precaution against a disturbance, with the 
usual instructions to employ the troops only to preserve peace, not 
permit them to take sides in political differences, and to prevent 
mobs from aiding any party. General Thomas, by his presence 
and advice, again rendered the interposition of troops un- 
necessary. 

The Department of the Lakes, 

Brevet Major General J. C. Robinson commanding, embraces the 
States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. 

The few troops stationed in this department have been em- 
ployed in garrisoning the forts on our northern frontier. 

The Department of Washington, 

Brevet Major General W. II. Emory commanding. A disturbance 
being apprehended in Baltimore upon the occasion of the threat- 
ened removal of the police commissioners by the governor of 
Maryland, the headquarters of this department were temporarily 
transferred to that city November 6, 1866, and the troops were 
held in readiness to preserve the peace in case it should become 
necessary to employ them. Their services, however, were not 
required. 

The Military Division of the Pacific, 

Major General II. W. Ilalleck commanding, embraces the depart- 
ment of the Columbia and the department of California, com- 
manded respectively by Brevet Major General F. Steele and Brevet 
Major General Irwin McDowell. The territory, including the dis- 
trict of Alaska, or Russian America, contains 1,235,000 square 
miles, or more than one third of our entire territory, estimating 
it at 3,570,002 square miles. Coast line is estimated at 12,750 



Appendix. 603 

statute miles — more than three times the length of our Atlan- 
tic coast. 

Number of tribal Indians is about 130,000, or more than one 
third the whole number in the United States, estimating this num- 
ber at 330,000. 

White population is about one sixtieth part of the entire civilized 
population of the United States. 

Though some depredations have been committed upon white 
settlers in nearly every part of the military division, active mili- 
tary operations have been limited to Arizona, southern Idaho, 
south-eastern Oregon, and the northern portions of Nevada and 
California. Most of the troops engaged in hostile operations in 
the latter district have been under command of Brevet Major 
General Crook, who has exhibited skill, bravery, and untiring 
energy. 

Indians have no principal chiefs, but roam in small bands, and 
fight independently; hence the impossibility to make treaties with 
them. As their hunting-grounds are gradually taken from them 
by the settlers, they are obliged either to £ob or starve. The Apa- 
ches are the most hostile Indians. They will observe no treaties, 
agreements, or truces. With them there is no alternative but ac- 
tive and vigorous war till they are completely destroyed, or forced 
to surrender as prisoners of war. 

Though, from various causes, operations against hostile tribes 
during the past year have not been as active and successful as was 
expected, considerable progress has been made in breaking up 
their haunts and punishing their depredations. 

Services of Indian scouts employed under act of Congress have 
been of the greatest value in this military division. Officers are 
unanimously in favor of increasing the number. As guides and 
scouts they have been almost indispensable. At least a thousand 
could be employed on the Pacific coast. 

Commanders have been embarrassed by the number of Indians 
in their hands taken as prisoners of war. They require troops to 
guard them, and have to be fed by the commissary. They cannot 
be set to work unless reservations of land and tanning implements 
are provided. General Halleck recommends the transfer of the 
Indian Bureau to the War Department, and the removal of the 
Indians to large reservations placed entirely under military author- 



G04 Appendix. 

ity, and from which all white settlers should be excluded. He 
condemns the present Indian system, but does not cast reflections 
on the officers of the Indian Bureau in his military division. 
They have endeavored to do as much good as possible with 
their limited means. 

The Department of the East, 

Major General G. G. Meade commanding. This department em- 
braces the New England States, New York, New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, and Delaware. The troops have been employed in 
garrisoning the forts on our northern frontier and North Atlantio 
coast, and the operations have been confined to improving the 
posts and collecting and forwarding recruits to the army. 

Acting in the double capacity of Secretary of War and General 
of the anny, this report is made to embrace both. 

U. S. Grant, 
Secretary of War ad interim and General U. S. A. 



VII. 

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL GRANT AND THE 
PRESIDENT CONCERNING MR. STANTON'S REINSTATEMENT 
AS SECRETARY OF WAR. 

Tiie following is the correspondence between General Grant 
and the President relative to the reinstatement of Hon. Edwin M. 
Stanton as Secretary of War, which was presented to Congress 
by Mr. Stanton : — 

Mr. Stanton's Communication to the House. 

War Department, Feb. 4, 1868. 
Sir : In answer to the resolution of the House of Representa- 
tives of the 8th, I transmit herewith copies furnished me by Gen- 
eral Grant of the correspondence between him and the President 
relating to the Secretary of War, and which he reports to be 
all the correspondence he had with the President on the sub- 
ject. I have had no correspondence with the President since 
the 17th of August last. 



Appendix. 605 

After the action of the Senate on his alleged reason for my 
suspension from the office of Secretary of War, I resumed the 
duties of that office as required by the act of Congress, and have 
continued to discharge them without any personal or written 
communication with the President. No orders have been issued 
from the Department in the name of the President with my 
knowledge, and I have received no orders from him. 

The correspondence sent herewith embraces all the correspond- 
ence known to rne on the subject referred to in the resolution 
of the House of Representatives. 

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, 
Your obedient servant, 

Edwin M. Stanton, 
Secretary of War. 
Hon. ScnuYLER Colfax, 

Speaker of the Souse of Representatives. 

General Grant to the President. 

Headquarters Army of the United States, \ 
Washington, D. C, January 25, 18G8. J 

His Excellency Andrew Johnson, 

President of the United States. 
Sir : On the 24th instant, I requested you to give me in writing 
the instructions which you had previously given me verbally, not 
to obey any order from the Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of 
War, unless I knew that it came from yourself. To this written 
request I received a message that has left doubt in my mind 
of your intentions. To prevent any possible misunderstanding, 
therefore, I renew the request that you will give me written 
instructions, and I, until they are received, will suspend action on 
your verbal ones. I am compelled to ask these instructions in 
writing in consequence of the many gross misrepresentations 
affecting my personal honor, circulated through the press for the 
last fortnight, purporting to come from the President, of conversa- 
tions which occurred either with the President privately in his 
office, or in Cabinet meeting. What is written admits of no mis- 
understanding. In view of the misrepresentations referred to, it 
will be well to state the facts in the case. 



(506 Appendix. 

Some time after I assumed the duties of Secretary of War ad 
interim, the President asked my views as to the course Mr. 
Stanton would have to pursue, in case the Senate should not 
concur in his suspension, to obtain possession of his office. My 
reply was, in substance, that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal 
to tho courts to reinstate him, illustrating my position by citing 
the grounds I had taken in the case of the Baltimore Police Com- 
missioners. In that case I did not doubt the technical right of 
Governor Swann to remove the old Commissioners and to appoint 
their successors, as the old Commissioners refused to give up. 
However, I contended that no recourse was left but to appeal to 
the courts. Finding that the President was desirous of keeping 
Mr. Stanton out of office, whether sustained in the suspension or 
not, I stated that I had not looked particularly into the Tenure of 
Office bill, but that what I had stated was a general principle, and 
if I should change my mind in this particular case, I would inform 
him of the fact. Subsequently, on reading the Tenure of Office 
bill closely, I found that I could not, without violation of the 
law, refuse to vacate the office of Secretary of War the moment 
Mr. Stanton was reinstated by the Senate, even though the 
President ordered me to retain it, which he never did. Taking 
this view of the subject, and learning on Saturday, the 11th instant, 
that the Senate had taken up the subject of Mr. Stanton's suspen- 
sion, after some conversation with Lieutenant General Sherman and 
some members of my staff, in which I stated that the law left me 
no discretion as to my action should Mr. Stanton be reinstated, 
and that I intended to inform the President, I went to the 
President for the sole purpose of making this decision known, 
and did so make it known. In doing this I fulfilled the promise 
made in our last preceding conversation on the subject. The 
President, however, instead of accepting my view of the require- 
ments of the Tenure of Office bill, contended that he had 
suspended Mr. Stanton under the authority given by the Consti- 
tution, and that the same authority did not preclude him from 
reporting, as an act of courtesy, his reasons for the suspension to 
the Senate ; that having been appointed under the authority 
given by the Constitution, and not under any act of Congress, 
I could not be governed by the act. I stated that the law was 
binding on me, constitutional or not, until set aside by the proper 



Appendix. 607 

tribunal. An hour or more was consumed, each reiterating his 
views on this subject, until, getting late, the President said lie 
would see me again. I did not agree to call again <>n Monday, 
nor at any other definite time, nor was I sent for by the President 
until the following Tuesday. From the 11th till the Cabinet 
meeting on the 14th instant, a doubt never entered my mind about 
the President's fully understanding my position, namely : That 
if the Senate refused to concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton, 
my powers as Secretary of War ad interim would cease, and 
Mr. Stanton's right to assume at once the functions of his office 
would, under the law, be indisputable ; and I acted accordingly. 
With Mr. Stanton I had no communication, direct or indirect, on 
the subject of his reinstatement during his suspension. I knew 
it had been recommended to the President to send in the name 
of Governor Cox, of Ohio, for Secretary of War, and thus save all 
embarrassment, — a proposition that I sincerely hoped he would 
entertain favorably, — General Sherman seeing the President, at my 
particular request, to urge this on the 13th instant. On Tuesday, 
the day Mr. Stanton reentered the office of the Secretary of War, 
General Comstock, who had carried my official letter, announcing 
that, with Mr. Stanton's reinstatement by the Senate, I had ceased 
to be Secretary of War ad interim, and who saw the President 
open and read the communication, brought back to me, from the 
President, a message that he wanted to see me that day at the 
Cabinet meeting, after I had made known the fact that I was no 
longer Secretary of War ad interim. At this meeting, after 
opening it as though I were a member of his Cabinet, when 
reminded of the notification already given him that I was no 
longer Secretary of War ad interim, the President gave a version 
of the conversation alluded to already. In this statement it was 
asserted that in both conversations I had agreed to hold on to the 
office of Secretary of War until displaced by the courts, or resign, 
so as to place the President where he would have been had I 
never accepted the office. After hearing the President through, 
I stated our conversations substantially as given in this letter. I 
will add that my conversation before the Cabinet embraced other 
matter not pertinent here, and is therefore left out. I in no wi<e 
admitted the correctness of the President's statement of our con- 
versation, though, to soften the evident contradiction my statement 
39 " 



608 Appendix. 

gave, I said, alluding to our first conversation on the subject, the 
President might have understood me the way he said, namely, 
" That I had promised to resign if I did not resist the reinstate- 
ment." I made no such promise. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

(Signed) U. S. Grant, General. 

Another Letter, and the President's Indorsement. 

Headquarters Army of the United States, ) 
Washington, January 24, 18G8. ) 

His Excellency Andrew Johnson, 

President of the United States. 
Sir : I have the honor very respectfully to request to have in 
writing the order which the President gave me verbally on Sun- 
day, the 19th instant, to disregard the orders of the Hon. E. M. 
Stanton, as Secretary of "War, until I knew from the President 
himself that they were his orders. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 
(Signed) U. S. Grant, General. 

The following is the indorsement on the above note : — 

As requested in this communication, General Grant is instructed, 
in writing, not to obey any order from the War Department, as- 
sumed to be'issued by the direction of the President, unless such 
order is known by the General commanding the armies of the 
United States to have been authorized by the Executive. 

(Signed) Andrew Johnson. 

January 29, 1868. 






General Grant to the President. 

Headquarters Army of the United States, | 



Washington, January 30, 18GS. j 
His Excellency Andrew Johnson. 

President of the United States. 
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the return of my note of 
the 24th instant, with your indorsement thei-eon, "That I am not to 
obey any order from the War Department, assumed to be issued 



Appendix. 609 

by direction of the President, unless such order is known by mo 
to have been authorized by the Executive;" and in reply thereto 
to say, that I am informed by the Secretary of War that he lias 
not received from the Executive any order or instructions limit- 
ing or impairing his authority to issue orders to the army, as has 
heretofore been his practice under the law and customs of the 
Department. While his authority to the War Department is not 
countermanded, it will be satisfactory evidence to me that any 
orders issued from the War Department by direction of the 
President are authorized by the Executive. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 
(Signed) U. S. Grant, General. 

President Johnson to General Grant. 

Executive Mansion, January 31, 18G8. 
General : I have received your communication of the 28th 
instant, renewing your request of the 24th, that I should repeat 
in a written form my verbal instructions of the 19th instant, viz. : 
" That you obey no order from the Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, as 
Secretary of War, unless you have information that it was issued 
by the President's direction." In submitting this request, with 
which I complied on the 29th instant, you take occasion to allude 
to recent publications in reference to the circumstances connected 
with the vacation by yourself of the office of Secretary of War 
ad interim, and with the view of correcting the statements which 
you term " gross misrepresentations," and give at length your own 
recollection of the facts under which, without the sanction of the 
President, from whom you had received and accepted the appoint- 
ment, you yielded the Department of War to the present incum- 
bent. As stated in your communication some time after you had 
assumed the duties of Secretary of War ad interim, we inter- 
changed views respecting the course that should be pursued in 
the event -of the non-concurrence by the Senate in the suspension 
of Mr. Stanton. I sought that interview, calling myself at the 
War Department. My sole object in then bringing the subject 
to your attention was to ascertain definitely what would be your 
own action should such an attempt be made for his restoration to 
the Wa: Department. That object was accomplished, for the 



610 Appendix. 

interview terminated with the distinct understanding, that if upon 
reflection you should prefer not to become a party to the contro- 
versy, or should conclude that it would be your duty to surrender 
the Department to Mr. Stanton, upon action in his favor by the 
Senate, you were to return the office to me prior to a decision by 
the Senate, in order that, if I desired to do so, I might designate 
some one to succeed you. It must have been apparent to you 
that had not this understanding been reached, it was my purpose 
to relieve you from the further discharge of the duties as Secre- 
tary of War ad interim, and to appoint some other person in that 
capacity. Other conversations upon the subject ensued, all of 
them having on my part the same object, and leading to the same 
conclusion as the first. It is not necessary, however, to refer to 
any of them, excepting that of Saturday, the 11th instant, men- 
tioned in your communication. As it was then known that the 
Senate had proceeded in the case of Mr. Stanton, I was anxious 
to learn your determination. After a protracted interview, dur- 
ing which the provisions of the Tenure of Office bill were fully 
discussed, you said, that as it had been agreed upon in our first 
conference, you would either return the office to my possession in 
time to enable me to appoint a successor before final action by the 
Senate upon Mr. Stanton's susf>ension, or would remain as its 
head, awaiting a decision of the question by judicial proceedings. 
It was then understood that there would be a further conference 
on Mcfnday, by which time I supposed you would be prepared to 
inform me of your final decision. You failed, however, to fulfil 
the engagement, and on Saturday notified me in writing of the 
receipt of your official notification of the action of the Senate in 
the case of Mr. Stanton, and at the same time informed me that, 
according to the act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices, 
your functions as Secretary of War ad interim ceased from the 
moment of receipt of notice. You thus, in disregard of the 
understanding between us, vacated the office without having 
given me notice of your •intention to do so. It is but just, how- 
ever, to say, that in your communication, you claim that you did 
inform me of your purpose, and thus fulfilled the promise made 
in our last preceding conversation on the subject. The fact that 
such a promise existed is evidence of an arrangement of the kind 
I have mentioned. You had found in our first conference that 



Appendix. Gil 

the President was desirous of keeping Mr. Stanton out of office, 
whether sustained in the suspension or not. You knew what 
reasons had induced the President to ask from you a promise. 
You also knew that in case your views of duty did not accord 
with his own convictions, it was his purpose to fill your place by 
another appointment, even ignoring the existence of a positive 
understanding between us. These conclusions were plainly de- 
ducible from our various conversations. It is certain, however, 
that even under these circumstances you did not offer to return 
the place to my possession, but, according to your own statement, 
placed yourself in a position where, could I have anticipated 
your action, I would have been compelled to ask of you, as I was 
compelled to ask of your predecessor in the War Department, a 
letter of resignation, or else to resort to the more disagreeable 
expedient of suspending you by the appointment of a successor. 
As stated in your letter, the nomination of Governor Cox, of 
Ohio, for the office of Secretary of War was suggested to me. 
This appointment as Mr. Stanton's successor was urged in your 
name, and it was said that his selection would save further 
embarrassment. I did not think that in the selection of a 
Cabinet officer I should be trammelled by such considerations. 
I was prepared to take the responsibility of deciding the question 
in accordance with my ideas of constitutional duty, and, having 
determined upon a course which I deemed right and proper, was 
anxious to learn the steps you would take should the possession 
of the War Department be demanded by Mr. Stanton. Had 
your action been in conformity with the understanding between 
us, I do not believe that the embarrassment would have attained 
its present proportions, or that the probability of its repetition 
would have been so great. I know that, with a view to an early 
termination of a state of affairs so detrimental to the public 
interests, you voluntarily offered, both on Monday the 15th 
instant, and on the succeeding Sunday, to call upon Mr. Stan- 
ton and urge upon him that the good of the service required his 
resignation. I confess that I considered your proposal as a sort 
of reparation for the failure on your part to act in accordance 
with an understanding more than once* repeated, which I thought 
had received your full assent, and under which you could have 
returned to me the office which I had conferred upon you, thiib 



612 Appendix. 

saving yourself from embarrassment, and leaving the responsi- 
bility where it properly belonged, with the President, who is 
accountable for the faithful execution of the law. I have not 
yet been informed by you whether, as twice proposed by yourself, 
you had called upon Mr. Stanton and made an effort to induce 
him voluntarily to resign from the War Department. You con- 
clude your communication with a reference to our conversation at 
the meeting of the Cabinet held on Tuesday, the 14th instant. 
In your account of what then occurred, you say that, " after the 
President had given his version of our previous conversations, 
you stated them substantially as given in your letter, and that 
you in no wise admitted the correctness of his statement of 
them ; though, to soften the evident contradiction my statement 
gave, I said, alluding to our first communication on the subject, 
the President might have understood in the way he said, viz., 
that I had promised to resign if I did not resist the reinstate- 
ment. I made no such promise." My recollection of what then 
transpired is diametrically the reverse of your narration. In the 
presence of the Cabinet I asked you, first, if, in a conversation 
which took place shortly after your appointment as Secretary of 
War ad interim, you did not agree either to remain at the head 
of the War Department, and abide any judicial proceedings that 
might follow the non-concurrence by the Senate in Mr. Stanton's 
suspension, or, should you wish not to become involved in such 
a controversy, to put me in the same position with respect to the 
office as I occupied previous to your appointment, by returning 
it to me in time to anticipate such action by the Senate ? This 
you admitted. Second : I then asked you if, at the conference 
on the preceding Saturday, I had not, to avoid misunderstand- 
ing, requested you to state what you intended to do ; and fur- 
ther, if in reply to that inquiry you had not referred to my 
former conversations, saying that from them I understood your 
position, and that your action would be consistent with the 
understanding which had been readied ? To these questions 
you also replied in the affirmative. Third : I next asked if, at 
the conclusion of our interview on Saturday it was not under- 
stood that we were to have another conference on Monday, before 
final action by the Senate on the case of Mr. Stanton? You 
replied that such was the understanding, but that you did not 



Appendix. 613 

suppose the Senate would act so soon ; that on Monday you had 
been engaged in a conference with General Sherman, and were 
occupied with "many little matters," and asked if General Sher- 
man had not called on that day. What relevancy General Slier- 
man's visit to me on Monday had with the purpose for which 
you were to have called, I am at a loss to perceive, as he cer- 
tainly did not inform me whether you had determined to retain 
possession of the office, or to afford me an opportunity to appoint 
a successor in advance of any attempted reinstatement of Mr. 
Stanton. 

This account of what passed between us at the Cabinet meet- 
ing on the 14th instant widely differs from that contained in your 
communication, for it shows that instead of having "stated our 
conversations as given in the letter," which has made this reply 
necessary, you admitted that my recital of them was entirely 
accurate. Sincerely anxious, however, to be correct in my state- 
ments, I have to-day read this narration of what occurred on the 
14th instant to the members of the Cabinet who were then pres- 
ent. They, without exception, agree in its accuracy. It is only 
necessary to add that on Wednesday morning, the 15th, you 
called on me in company with Lieutenant General Sherman. 
After some preliminary conversation, you remarked that an arti- 
cle in the National Intelligencer of that date did you much injus- 
tice. I replied that I had not seen the Intelligencer of that 
morning. You first told me that it was your intention to urge 
Mr. Stanton to resign his office. After you had withdrawn, I 
carefully read the article of which you had spoken, and found 
that its statement of the understanding between us was substan- 
tially correct. On the 17th, I caused it to be read to four of the 
five members of the Cabinet, wdio Avere present at our conference 
on the 14th, and they concurred in the general accuracy of its 
statements respecting our conversation upon that occasion. In 
reply to your communication, I have deemed it proper, in order 
to prevent further misunderstanding, to make this simple recital 
of facts. 

Very respectfully yours, 

AXDKEW JOHXSON". 

General U. S. Graxt, 

Commanding United States Arm' s. 



614 Appendix. 

General Grant to the President. 

Headquarters Army op the United States, I 
Washington, D. C, February 3, 1S68. ] 

To His Excellency Andrew Johnson, 

President of the United States. 

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your com- 
munication of the 31st ultimo, in answer to mine of the 28th 
ultimo. After a careful reading and comparison of it with the 
article in the National Intelligencer of the 15th ultimo, the arti- 
cle over the initials "J. B. S." in the New York World of the 
27th ultimo, purporting to be based upon your statement and that 
of the members of the Cabinet therein named, I find it to be but 
a reiteration, only somewhat more in detail, of the many and gross 
misrepresentations contained in these articles, and which my state- 
ment of facts, set forth in my letter of the 28th ultimo, was in- 
tended to correct; and here I reassert the correctness of my 
statements in that letter, anything in yours in reply to it to the 
contrary notwithstanding. 

I confess my surprise that the Cabinet officers referred to should 
so greatly misapprehend the facts in the matter of admissions 
alleged to have been made by me at the Cabinet meeting on the 
14th ultimo, as to suiter their names to be made the basis of 
the charges in the newspaper article referred to, or agree to the 
accuracy, as you affirm they do, of your account of what occurred 
at that meeting. You know that we parted on Saturday, the 11th 
ultimo, without any promise on my part, either expressed or im- 
plied, to the effect that I would hold on to the office of Secretary 
of War ad interim, against the action of the Senate, or, declining 
to do so myself, would surrender it to you before such action was 
had, or that I would see you again at any fixed time on the sub- 
ject. The performance of the promises, alleged to have been 
made by me, would have involved a resistance of the law, and an 
inconsistency with the whole history of my connection with the 
suspension of Mr. Stanton. From our conversation, and my writ- 
ten protest of August 1, 1867, against the removal of Mr. Stanton, 
you must have known that my greatest objection to his removal 
was the fear that some one would be appointed in his stead who 
would, by opposition to the laws relating to the restoration of the 



Appendix. G15 

Southern States to their proper relation to the government, em- 
barrass the army in the performance of the duties especially im- 
posed upon it by the laws, and that it was to prevent such an 
appointment that I accepted the appointment of Secretary of 
War ad interim, and not for the purpose of enabling you to get 
rid of Mr. Stanton by my withholding it from him in opposition 
to the law, or, not doing so myself, surrender to one who, as the 
statement and assumption in your communication plainly indi- 
cate, was sought; and it was to avoid this danger, as well us to 
relieve you from the personal embarrassment in which Mr. Stan- 
ton's reinstatement would place you, that I urged the appoint- 
ment of Governor Cox, believing that it would be agreeable to 
you, and also to Mr. Stanton, satisfied as I was that it was the 
good of the country and not the office the latter desired. On the 
18th ultimo, in the presence of General Sherman, I stated to you 
that I thought Mr. Stanton would resign, but did not say I would 
advise him to do so. On the 18th I did agree with General* 
Sherman to go and advise him to that course; and on the 19th I 
had an interview alone with Mr. Stanton, which led me to the 
conclusion that any advice to him of this kind would be useless, 
and so informed General Sherman. Before I consented to advise 
Mr. Stanton to resign, I understood from him, in a conversation 
on the subject immediately after his reinstatement, that it was his 
opinion that the act of Congress, entitled "An act temporarily to 
supply vacancies in the Executive Department in certain cases," 
approved February 20, 18G3, was repealed by subsequent legisla- 
tion, which materially influenced my action. Previous to this 
time I had no doubt that the law of 1863 was still in force ; and 
notwithstanding my action, a fuller examination of the law leaves 
a question in my mind whether it is or is not repealed. This be- 
ing the case, I could not now advise his resignation, lest the same 
danger I aj^prehended from his first removal might follow. The 
course you have understood I agreed to pursue was in violation 
of law, and that without orders from you ; while the course I did 
pursue, and which I never doubted you fully understood, was in 
accordance with law, and not in disobedience to any orders of 
my superior. And now, Mr. President, when my honor as a 
soldier and integrity as a man have been so violently assailed, 
pardon me for saying that I can but regard this whole matter, 



616 Appendix. 

from beginning to end, as an attempt to involve me in the resist- 
ance of law, for which you hesitated to assume the responsibility 
in orders, and thus to destroy my character before the country. 
I am in a measure confirmed in this conclusion, by your recent 
orders directing me to disobey orders from the Secretary of War, 
my superior and your subordinate. Without having counter- 
manded his authority, I am to disobey. With assurance, Mr. 
President, that nothing less than a vindication of my personal 
honor and character could have induced this correspondence on 
my part, 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, General. 

The President to General Grant. 

Executive Mansion, February 10, 1868. 

General : The extraordinary character of your letter of the 3d 
instant would seem to preclude any reply on my part ; but the 
manner in which publicity has been given to the correspondence 
of which that letter forms a part, and the grave questions which 
are involved, induce me to take this mode of giving, as a proper 
sequel to the communications which have passed between us, the 
statements of the five members of the Cabinet who were present 
on the occasion of our conversation on the 14th ultimo. Copies of 
the letters which they have addressed to me upon the subject are 
accordingly herewith enclosed. 

You speak of my letter of the 31st ultimo as a reiteration of the 
many and gross misrepresentations contained in certain newspaper 
articles, and reassert the correctness of the statement contained in 
your communication of the 28th ultimo, adding, — and here I give 
your own words, — "Anything in yours in reply to it to the con- 
trary notwithstanding." When a controversy upon matters of 
fact reaches the point to which this has been brought, further as- 
sertion or denial between the immediate parties should cease, 
especially when upon either side it loses the character of the 
respectful discussion which is required by the relations in which 
the parties stand to each other, and degenerates in tone and 
temper. In such a case, if there is nothing to rely upon but the 
opposing statements, conclusions must be drawn from those state- 



Appendix. G17 

merits alone, and from whatever intrinsic probabilities they afford 
in favor of or against either of the parties, I should not shrink 
from the controversy. 

But, fortunately, it is not left to this test alone. There were 
five Cabinet officers present at the conversation, the details of 
which, in my letter of the 28th ultimo, you allow yourself to say 
contain " many and gross misrepresentations." These gentlemen 
heard that conversation, and have read my statement. They speak 
for themselves, and I leave the proof without a word of comment. 

I deem it proper before concluding this communication to notice 
some of the statements contained in your letter. You say that a 
performance of the promise alleged to have been made by you to 
the President "would have involved a resistance to law, and an 
inconsistency with the whole history of my connection with the 
suspension of Mr. Stanton." You then state that you had fears 
the President would, on the removal of Mr. Stanton, appoint some 
one in his place who would embarrass the army in carrying out the 
reconstruction acts, and add : " It was to prevent such an appoint- 
ment that I accepted the office of Secretary of War ad interim, 
and not for the purpose of enabling you to get rid of Mr. Stanton 
by my withholding it from him, in opposition to the law, or, not 
doing so myself, surrendering it to one who would, as the state- 
ments and assumptions in your communication plainly indicate 
was sought, first of all." 

You here admit that from the very beginning of what you term 
the whole history of your connection with Mr. Stanton's suspen- 
sion, you intended to circumvent the President. It was to carry 
out that intent that you accepted the appointment: this was in 
your mind at the time of your acceptance. It was not, then, in 
obedience to the order of your superior, as has heretofore been 
supposed, that you assumed the duties of the office. You knew 
it was the President's purpose to prevent Mr. Stanton from resum- 
ing the office of Secretary of War, and you intended to defeat 
that purpose. You accepted the office, not in the interest of the 
President but of Mr. Stanton. 

If this purpose, so entertained by you, had been confined to 
yourself, — if, when accepting the office, you had done so with a 
mental reservation to frustrate the President, — it would have 
been a tacit deception. In the ethics of some persons such a course 



618 Appendix. 

is allowable, but you cannot stand even upon that questionable 
ground. The history of your connection with this transaction, as 
written by yourself, places you in a different predicament, and 
shows that you not only concealed your design from the President, 
but induced him to suppose that you would carry out his purpose 
to keep Mr. Stanton out of office by retaining it yourself, after an 
attempted restoration by the Senate, so as to require Mr. Stanton 
to establish his right by judicial decision. 

I now give that part of this history as written by yourself in 
your letter of the 28th ultimo : " Some time after I assumed the 
duties of Secretary of War ad interim, the President asked me my 
views as to the course Mr. Stanton would have to pursue in case 
the Senate should not concur in his suspension, to obtain posses- 
sion of his office. My reply was, in substance, that Mr. Stanton 
would have to appeal to the courts to reinstate him, illustrating 
my position by citing the ground I had taken in the case of the 
Baltimore Police Commissioners." 

Now, at that time, you admit in your letter of the 3d instant, 
you held the office for the very object of defeating an appeal to 
the courts ; in that letter you say that in accepting the office, one 
motive was to prevent the President from appointing some other 
person who would retain possession, and thus make judicial pro- 
ceedings necessary. You knew the President was unwilling to 
trust the office with any one who would not, by holding it, compel 
Mr. Stanton to resort to the courts. You perfectly understood 
that in this interview. Some time after you accepted the office, 
the President, not content with your silence, desired an expression 
of your views, and you answered him that Mr. Stanton " would 
have to appeal to the court." If the President had reposed confi- 
dence "before" he knew your views, and that confidence had been 
violated, it might have been said he made a mistake ; but a viola- 
tion of confidence reposed "after" that conversation was no mis- 
take of his, nor of yours; it is the fact only that needs be stated, 
that at the date of this conversation you did not intend to hold 
the office with the purpose of forcing Mr. Stanton into court, but 
did hold it then, and had accepted it, to prevent that course from 
being carried out. In other words, you said to the President, 
« Thai is the proper course," and you said to yourself, "I have ac- 
cepted this office, and now hold it, to defeat that course." 



Appendix. C19 

The excuse you make in a subsequent paragraph of that letter 
of the 28th ultimo, that afterwards you changed your virus aa to 
what would be a proper course, has nothing to do with the point 
now under consideration. The point is, that before you changed 
your views you had secretly determined to do the very thing which 
at last you did — surrender the office to Mr. Stanton. You may 
have changed your views as to the law, but you certainly did not 
change your views as to the course you had marked out for your- 
self from the beginning. 

I will only notice one more statement in your letter of the 3d 
instant, that the performance of the promises which it is alleged 
wei'e made by you would have involved you in the resistance of 
law. I know of no statute that would have been violated had you, 
carrying out your promises in good faith, tendered your resigna- 
tion when you concluded not to be made a party in any legal pro- 
ceeding. 

You add : "lamina measure confirmed in this conclusion by 
your recent order directing me to disobey orders from the Secre- 
tary of "War, my superior and your subordinate, without having 
countermanded his authority to issue the orders I am to disobey." 

On the 24th ult., you addressed a note to the President request- 
ing in writing an order given to you verbally five days before, to 
disregard orders from Mr. Stanton, as Secretary of War, until you 
knew from the President himself that they were his orders. On 
the 29th, in compliance with your request, I did give you instruc- 
tions in writing not to obey any order from the War Department 
assumed to be issued by the direction of the President, unless such 
order is known by the General commanding the armies of the 
United States to have been authorized by the Executive. There 
are some orders which a Secretary of War may issue without the 
authority of the President. There are others which he issues 
simply as the agent of the President, and which purport to be by 
direction of the President. For such orders the President is re- 
sponsible, and he should therefore know and understand what they 
are before giving such direction. Mr. Stanton states, in his letter 
of the 4th instant, which accompanies the published correspond- 
ence, that he has had no correspondence with the President since 
the 12th of August last. And he further says, that since he re- 
sumed the duties of the office, he has continued to discharge them 



620 Appendix. 

■without any personal or written communication with the President, 
and he adds : " No orders have been issued from this Department 
in the name of the President, with my knowledge, and I have re- 
ceived no orders from him." 

It thus seems that Mr. Stanton now discharges the duties of 
the War Department without any reference to the President, and 
without using his name. My orders to you had only reference to 
orders assumed to be issued by the President. 

It would appear from Mr. Stanton's letter that you have 
received no such orders from him. In your note to the President 
of the 13th ultimo, in which you acknowledge the receipt of the 
written order of the 29th, you say that you have been informed by 
Mr. Stanton that he has not received any order limiting his au- 
thority to issue orders to the army, according to the practice of 
the Department, and state that, " while this authority to the "War 
Department is not countermanded, it will be satisfactory evidence 
to me that any orders issued from the War Department, by direc- 
tion of the President, are authorized by the Executive." 

The President issues an order to you to obey no order from the 
"War Department purporting to be made " by the direction of the 
President" until you have referred it to him for his approval. 
You reply that you have received the President's order and will 
not obey it, but will obey an order purporting to be given by his 
direction if it comes from the War Department. You will obey 
no direct order of the President, but will obey his indirect order. 
If, as you say, there has been a practice in the War Department to 
issue orders in the name of the President, without his direction, 
does not the precise order you have requested and have received 
change the practice as to the General of the Army ? Could not 
the President countermand any such order issued to you from the 
War Department? If you should receive an order from that 
Department, issued in the name of the President to do a special 
act, and an order directly from the President himself not to do 
the act, is there a doubt which you are to obey ? You answer the 
question when you say to the President in your letter of the 3d 
instant, the "Secretary of War is your superior and my sub- 
ordinate." And yet you refuse obedience to the superior out of 
deference to the subordinate! Without further comment upon 
the insubordinate attitude which you have assumed, I am at a loss 



Appendix. 621 

to know how you can relieve yourself from the orders of the 
President, who is made by the Constitution, the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Army and Navy, and is, therefore, the official superior 
as well of the General of the Army as of the Secretary of War. 
Respectfully yours, 

Andrew Johnson. 
General U. S. Grant, 

Commanding Armies of the United States, 

Washington, D. C. 



VIII. 

LETTERS FROM CABINET OFFICERS. 

The following is a copy of a letter addressed to each of the 
members of the Cabinet present at the conversation between the 
President and General Grant on the 14th of January, 1868 : — 

Executive Mansion, 
Washington, D. C, February 5, 1868. ) 

Sir : The Chronicle of this morning contains a correspondence 
between the President and General Grant, reported from the 
"War Department in answer to a resolution of the House of 
Representatives. 

I beg to call your attention to that correspondence, and 
especially to that part of it which refers to the conversation 
between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting 
on Tuesday, the 14th of January, and to request you to state 
what was said in that conversation. 

Very respectfully, yours, 

Andrew Johnson. 

Reply of Secretary "Welles. 

Washington, February 5, 1SG8. 
Sir : Your note of this date was handed to me this evening. 
My recollection of the conversation of the Cabinet meeting on 
Tuesday, the 14th of January, corresponds with your statement 



622 Appendix. 

of it in the-Ietter of the 31st ultimo, in the published correspond- 
ence. The three points specified in that letter giving your 
recollection of the conversation are correctly stated. 
Very respectfully, 

Gideon "Welles. 

Reply op Secretary McCulloch. 

Treasury Department, February 6, 1868. 
Sir: I have received your note of the 5th instant, calling my 
attention to the correspondence between yourself and General 
Grant, as published in the Chronicle of yesterday, especially to 
that part of it which relates to what occurred in the Cabinet 
meeting on Tuesday, the 14th ultimo, and requesting me to state 
what was said in the conversation referred to. I cannot under- 
take to state the precise language used, but I have no hesitation 
in saying that your account of that conversation, as given in your 
letter to General Grant, under date of the 31st ultimo, substan- 
tially, in all important particulars, accords with my recollection 
of it. 

With great respect, your obedient servant, 

Hugh McCulloch. 
To the President. 

Reply of Postmaster-General Randall. 

Post-Office Department, ") 
Washington, February 6, 1868. l" 

Sir : I am in receipt of your letter of the 5th February, calling 
my attention to the correspondence published in the Chronicle 
between the President and General Grant, and especially to that 
part of it which refers to the conversation between the President 
and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on the 14th of January, 
w T ith a request that I state what was said in that conversation. 

In reply, I have the honor to state that I have read carefully 
the correspondence in question, and particularly the letter of the 
President to General Grant, dated January 31, 1868. 

The following extract from your letter of the 31st of January 
to General Grant is according to my recollection of the conver- 
sation that took place between the President and General Grant 
at the Cabinet meeting on the 14th of January last: — 



Appendix. 623 

In the presence of the Cabinet the President asked General 
Grant whether, in the conversation which took place alter his 
appointment as Secretary of War ad interim, he did not agree 
either to remain at the head of the War Department and abide 
any judicial proceedings that might follow the non-concurrencr by 
the Senate in Mr. Stanton's suspension, or, should he not wish to 
become involved in such a controversy, to put the President in 
the same position with respect to the office as he occupied previous 
to General Giant's appointment, by returning it to the President 
in time to anticipate such action by the Senate. 

This General Grant admitted. 

The President then asked General Grant if, at the conference 
on the preceding Saturday, he had not, to avoid misunderstanding, 
requested General Grant to state what he intended to do. And 
further, if in reply to that inquiry, he (General Grant) had not 
referred to their former conversations, saying that from them the 
President understood his position, and that his (General Grant's) 
action Avould be consistent with the understanding which had 
been reached. 

To these questions General Grant replied in the affirmative. 
The President asked General Grant if, at the conclusion of their 
interview on Saturday, it was not understood that they were to 
have another conference on Monday before final action by the 
Senate in the case of Mr. Stanton? General Grant replied that 
such was the understanding, but that he did not suppose the Senate 
would act so soon ; that on Monday he had been engaged in a con- 
ference with General Sherman, and was occupied with many little 
matters, and asked if General Sherman had not called on that 
day. 

1 take this mode of complying with the request contained in 
the President's letter to me, because my attention had been called 
to the subject before, when the conversation between the Presi- 
dent and General Grant was under consideration. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Alexander W. Randall, 

Postmaster- General. 

To THE PkESLDENT. 

40 



624 Appendix. 



Reply of Secretary Browning. 

Department of the Interior, \ 
Washington, D. C, February 6, 1868. ) 

I am in receipt of yours of yesterday, calling my attention to a 
correspondence between yourself and General Grant, published 
in the Chronicle newspaper, and especially to that part of said 
correspondence which refers to the conversation between the 
President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, 
the 14th of January, and requesting me to state what was said in 
that conversation. In reply, I submit the following statement : — 

At the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, 1868, 
General Grant appeared and took his accustomed seat at the 
board. When he had been reached in the order of business, the 
President asked him as usual if he had anything to present. In 
reply, the General, after referring to a note which he had that 
morning addressed to the President, enclosing a copy of the 
resolution of the Senate refusing to concur in the reasons for the 
suspension of Mr. Stanton, proceeded to say that he regarded his 
duties as Secretary of War ad interim terminated by that reso- 
lution, and that he could not lawfully exercise such duties for a 
moment after the adoption of the resolution by the Senate. That 
the resolution reached him last night, and that this morning he 
had gone to the War Department, entered the Secretary's room, 
bolted one door on the inside, locked the other on the outside, 
delivered the key to the Adjutant-General, and proceeded to the 
headquarters of the army, and addressed the note above men- 
tioned to the President, informing him that he (General Grant) 
was no longer Secretary of War ad interim. 

The President expressed great surprise at the course which 
General Grant had thought proper to pursue, and addressing 
himself to the General, proceeded to say in substance, that he 
had anticipated such action by the Senate, and being very 
desirous to have the constitutionality of the Tenure of Office bill 
tested, and his right to suspend or remove a member of the 
Cabinet decided by the judicial tribunal of the country, he had 
some time ago, and shortly after General Grant's appointment as 
Secretary of War ad interim, asked the General what his action 
would be in the event that the Senate should refuse to concur in 



Appendix. 025 

the suspension of Mr. Stanton, and that the General had then 
agreed cither to remain at the head of the War Department till 
a decision could be obtained from the court, or resign the office 
into the hands of the President before the case was acted upon 
by the Senate, so as to place the President in the same situation 
he occupied at the time of his (Grant's) appointment. 

The President further said that the conversation was renewed 
on the preceding Saturday, at which time he asked the General 
what he intended to do if the Senate should undertake to rein- 
state Mr. Stanton; in reply to which the General referred to their 
former conversation upon the same subject, and said, "You under- 
stand my position, and my conduct will be conformable to that 
understanding;" that he (the General) then expressed a repug- 
nance to being made a party to a judicial proceeding, saying that 
he would expose himself to fine and imprisonment by doing so, 
as his continuing to discharge the duties of Secretary of War ad 
interim after the Senate should have refused to concur in the 
suspension of Mr. Stanton, would be a violation of the Tenure 
of Office bill; that in reply to this, he (the President) informed 
General Grant he had not suspended Mr. Stanton under the 
Tenure of Office bill, but by virtue of the powers conferred on 
him by the Constitution, and that as to the fine and imprisonment, 
he (the President) would pay whatever fine was imposed, and 
submit to whatever imprisonment might be adjudged against him 
(the General) ; that they continued the conversation for some time, 
discussing the law at length, and that they finally separated 
without having reached a definite conclusion, and with the under- 
standing that the General would see the President again on 
Monday. 

In reply, General Grant admitted that the conversations had 
occurred, and said that at the first conversation he had given it as 
his opinion to the President that in the event of non-concurrence 
by the Senate in the action of the President in respect to the 
Secretary of War, the question would have to be decided by the 
court ; that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the court to 
reinstate him in office; that the ins would remain in till they 
could be displaced, and the outs put in by legal proceedings, 
and that he then thought so, and had agreed that if he should 
change his mind he would notify the President in time to enable 



626 Appendix. 

him to make another appointment. But at the time of the first 
conversation he had not looked very closely into the law ; that it 
had recently been discussed by the newspapers, and that this had 
induced him to examine it more carefully, and that he had come 
to the conclusion that if the Senate should refuse to concur in the 
suspension, Mr. Stanton would thereby be reinstated, and that he 
(Grant) could not continue thereafter to act as Secretary of War 
ad interim without subjecting himself to fine and imprisonment, 
and that he came over on Saturday to inform the President of 
the change in his views, and did so inform him ; that the Presi- 
dent replied that he had not suspended Mr. Stanton under the 
Tenure of Office bill, but under the Constitution, and had ap- 
pointed him (Grant) by virtue of the authority derived from the 
Constitution, &c. ; that they continued to discuss the matter some 
time, and finally he left without any conclusion having been 
reached, expecting to see the President again on Monday. He 
then proceeded to explain why he had not called on the President 
on Monday, saying that he had a long interview with General 
Sherman ; that various little matters had occupied his time till it 
was late, and that he did not think the Senate would act so soon; 
and asked, "Did not General Sherman call on you on Monday?" 

I do not know what passed between the President and General 
Grant on Saturday, except as I learned it from the conversation 
between them at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday ; and the fore- 
going is substantially what then occurred. The precise words 
used on the occasion are not, of course, given exactly in the order 
in which they were spoken, but the ideas expressed and the facts 
stated are faithfully preserved and presented. 

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, 
Your obedient servant, 
(Signed) O. H. Browning. 

The President. 

Reply of Secretary. Seward. 

Department of State, \ 

Washington, February 6. ) 

Sir: The meeting to which you refer in your letter was a 
regular Cabinet meeting. While the members were assembling, 
and before the President had entered the council chamber, 



Appendix. G27 

General Grant, on coming fa, said to me that lie was there, not as 
a member of the Cabinet, but upon invitation, and I replied by 
the inquiry whether there was a change in the War Department! 

After the President had taken his Beat, business went on in the 
usual way of hearing matters submitted by the several Secretaries. 
When the time came for the Secretary of War, General Grant 
said that he was now there, not as Secretary of War, but upon 
the President's invitation ; that he had retired from the War De- 
partment. 

A slight difference then appeared about the supposed invitation, 
General Grant saying that the officers who had borne his letter to 
the President that morning, announcing his retirement from the 
War Department, had told him that the President desired to see 
him at the Cabinet, to which the President answered : That 
when General Grant's communication was delivered to him, the 
President simply replied that he supposed General Grant would be 
very soon at the Cabinet meeting. 

I regarded the conversation thus begun as an incidental one. It 
went on quite informally, and consisted of a statement on your 
part of your views in regard to the misunderstanding of the 
tenure upon which General Grant had assented to hold the War 
Department ad interim, and of his replies by way of answer and 
explanation. 

It was respectful and courteous on both sides, being in this con- 
versational form, as details could only have been presented by a 
verbatim report. So far as I know no such report was made at 
the time. I can give only the general effect of the conversation. 

Certainly you stated that although you had reported the reasons 
for Mr. Stanton's suspension to the Senate, you nevertheless held 
that he would not be entitled to resume the office of Secretary of 
War even if the Senate should disapprove of his suspension, and 
that you had proposed to have the question tested by judicial 
process to be applied to the person who should be the incumbent 
of the Department. Under your designation of Secretary of 
War ad interim in the place of Mr. Stanton you contended that 
this was well understood between yourself and General Grant. 
That when he entered the War Department as Secretary ad 
interim he expressed his concurrence in a belief that the question 
of Mr. Stanton's restoration would be a question for the courts. 



628 Appendix. 

That in a subsequent conversation you had with General Grant 
you had adverted to the understanding thus had, and that Gen- 
eral Grant expressed his concurrence in it. 

That at some conversation which had been previously held, 
General Grant said he still adhered to the same construction of 
the law, but said that if he should change his opinion he would 
give you reasonable notice of it, so that you should, in any case, 
be placed in the same position in regard to the War Department 
that you were while General Grant held it ad interim. 

I did not understand General Grant as denying, nor as expli- 
citly admitting these statements in the firm and full extent to 
which you made them. His admission of them was rather indi- 
rect and circumstantial, though he did not understand it to be an 
evasive one. He said that reasoning from what occurred in the 
case of the police in Maryland, which he regarded as a parallel 
one, he was of opinion, and so assured you, that it would be his 
right and duty, under your instructions, to hold the War Office 
after the Senate should disapprove of Mr. Stanton's suspension 
until the question should be decided upon by the courts ; that he 
remained until very recently of that opinion, and that on the Sat- 
urday before the Cabinet meeting a conversation was held be- 
tween yourself and him, in which the subject was generally dis- 
cussed. General Grant's statement was that in that conversation 
he had stated to you the legal difficulties which might arise, 
involving fine and imprisonment under the Civil Tenure bill, and 
that he did not care to subject himself to those penalties ; that 
you replied to this remark that you regarded the Civil Tenure bill 
as unconstitutional, and did not think its penalties were to be 
feared, or that you would voluntarily assume them ; and you 
insisted that General Grant should either retain the office until 
relieved by yourself, according to what you claimed was the 
original understanding between yourself and him, or, by season- 
able notice of change of purpose on his part, put you in the same 
situation which you would be in if he adhered. You claim that 
General Grant finally said in that Saturday's conversation that 
you understood his views, and his proceedings thereafter would 
be consistent with what had been so understood. General Grant 
did not controvert, nor can I say that he admitted, his last state- 
ment. 



Appendix. G29 

Certainly General Grant did not at any time in the Cabinet 
meeting insist that be had in the Saturday's conversation either 

distinctly or finally advised you of his determination to retire 
from the charge of the War Department, otherwise than under 
your own subsequent direction. lie acquiesced in your state- 
ment that the Saturday's conversation ended with an expectation 
that there would be a subsequent conference on the subject, which 
he as well as yourself supposed could seasonably take place on 
Monday. 

You then alluded to the fact that General Grant did not call 
upon you on Monday, as you had expected from the conversa- 
tion. General Grant admitted that it was his expectation or 
purpose to call upon you on Monday. General Grant assigned 
reasons for the omission. He said he was in conference with 
General Sherman, that there were many little matters to be 
attended to. He had conversed upon the matter of the incum- 
bency of the War Department with General Sherman, and he 
expected that General Sherman -would call on you on Monday. 
My own mind suggested a further explanation, but I do not 
remember whether it was mentioned or not, viz. ; That it was not 
supposed by General Grant on Monday that the Senate would 
decide the question so promptly as to anticipate further explana- 
tion between yourself and him, if delayed beyond that day. 

General Grant made another explanation, that he was engaged 
on Sunday with General Sherman, and, I think, also on Monday, 
in regard to the War Department matter, with a hope, though he 
did not say in an effort, to procure an amicable settlement of the 
affair of Mr. Stanton, and he still hoped that it would be brought 
about. 

I have the honor to be, with great respect, 
Your obedient servant, 

William n. Seward. 

To the President. 

Washington, February 11. 

The accompanying letter from General Grant, recti veil since 
the transmission to the House of Representatives of my commu- 
nication of this date, is submitted to the House, as a part of the 
correspondence referred to in the resolution of the 10th instant. 

Andrew Johnson. 



630 Appendix. 



Headquarters Army of the United States, } 
"Washington, D. C, February 11, 1SG8. j" 

His Excellency Andrew Johnson, 

President of the United States. 

Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your com- 
munication of the 10th instant, accompanied by the statements 
of five Cabinet ministers of their recollection of what occurred 
on the 14th of January. 

Without admitting anything contained in these statements, 
where they differ from anything heretofore stated by me, I pro- 
pose to notice only that portion of your communication wherein 
I am charged with insubordination. I think it will be plain to 
the reader of my letter of the 30th of January, that I did not 
propose to disobey any legal order of the President distinctly 
given, but only gave an interpretation of what would be regarded 
as satisfactory evidence of the President's sanction to orders com- 
municated by the Secretary of War. I will say here, that your 
letter of the 10th instant contains the first intimation I have had 
that you did not accept that interpretation. Now for reasons for 
giving that interpretation : — 

It was clear to me, before my letter of January 80 was written, 
that I, the person having more public business to transact with 
the Secretary of War than other of the President's subordinates, 
was the only one who had been instructed to disregard the 
authority of Mr. Stanton, where his authority was derived as 
agent from the President. 

On the 27th of January I received a letter from the Secretary 
of War (copy herewith), directing me to furnish an escort to the 
public treasure from the Rio Grande to New Orleans, etc., at the 
request of the Secretary of the Treasury to him. 

I also send two other enclosures showing the recognition of 
Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War by the Secretary of the Treas- 
ury and the Postmaster-General, in all of which cases the Secre- 
tary of War had to call upon me to make the orders requested, 
or give the information desired, and where his authority is derived, 
in my view, as agent of the President. 

With an order so clearly ambiguous as that of the President's 
here referred to, it was my duty to inform the President of my 



Appendix. 631 

interpretation of it, and to abide by that interpretation until I 
received other orders. 

Disclaiming any intention, now or heretofore, of disobeying 
any legal order of the President, distinctly communicated, I 
remain, 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

U. S. Grant, General. 



A N E W 



DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE, 



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